

ROOSEVELT

AND THE

REPUBLIC



J. W. Bennett



THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES



ROOSEVELT AND THE REPUBLIC

BY

JOHN W. BENNETT



With Photo Cover

BROADWAY PUBLISHING CO.
835 BROADWAY, ✂ ✂ NEW YORK

THE
HISTORY OF
THE
UNITED STATES

OF THE
UNITED STATES

Copyright, 1908.

BY

JOHN W. BENNETT.

All rights reserved.



NEW YORK
PUBLISHED BY
THE
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT
PRINTING OFFICE

E
757
B47

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
PREFACE	i
INTRODUCTION: Roosevelt's estimate of famous Americans—Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, George Clinton, Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, Martin Van Buren, Oliver Ellsworth, Thomas Paine, Judge Taney, Jefferson Davis, and others	I
CHAPTER I.	
"Joe" Murray falls out with "Barney" Hess—"Joe" discovers a budding statesman—A name—Ancestry—Harvard—Prowess, Associates, Characteristics—New Assemblyman	1
CHAPTER II.	
Roosevelt, the Solon—Political stress—Spoils—Corruption—Large programme—Position of novice—Committees—"Finds" himself—Murphy, Bogan et al.—Civil service reform—Traction—Investigator—Reformer—Claims—Facts—Accomplishment—An incident	8
CHAPTER III.	
Roosevelt, investigator—Practical situation—Grover Cleveland—Union League Club takes initiative—Scope of inquiry—Roosevelt's light not to be hidden—"Rippering"—Up-State machine and Tammany—Municipal home rule—Prohibition—Elevated Railway legislation—Accomplishment	21

	PAGE
CHAPTER IV.	
Roosevelt makes crucial decision—Blaine—Edmunds— —Stalwarts, halfbreeds, Independents—Roosevelt avows his partisanship.....	33
CHAPTER V.	
Answers call to the wilds—Longings of hunter— Adding cubits to stature horizontally—Ranchman—Answers partisan call—Candidate for Mayor of New York.....	38
CHAPTER VI.	
Civil Service Commissioner—Changes flavor of body —Dramatic as against quiet effort—Pugnacity—In controversy with prominent men— Real work—Harrison—Cleveland—"Midnight" order of 1893.....	41
CHAPTER VII.	
Enters storm center in New York—Police commissioner—Genesis—Strong—Union League Club —Committee of Seventy—Tammany—Police reform—Civil service—Roosevelt in his element —Efficiency—Troubles—Quits.	48
CHAPTER VIII.	
"Head" of Navy Department—Conditions—Trials —Naval personnel—Difficulties—Quits	59
CHAPTER IX.	
Leader of Rough Riders—Organization—Equipment—Regular officers—To Cuba—Las Guasimas—Race for "first blood"—Wheeler—Young —Wood—Roosevelt—Lawton's wrath—Losses.	69
CHAPTER X.	
San Juan and days that followed—Wheeler makes proposition—Plan of advance—Spanish valor —Queer order to bivouac—Desperate position —A trap—The assault—Up to the trenches—Roosevelt's place—The part he played—After the battle—War horrors.....	81

CHAPTER XI.

PAGE

Santiago falls—Game of bluff—American luck— Roosevelt's round robin—Going home.....	98
--	----

CHAPTER XII.

Roosevelt gets the nomination—Skillful political manipulation—Platt and the Independents— Roosevelt again chooses partisanship—Good or bad faith?—Rough Rider campaign—Governor —Starts out bravely—War message—Platt and Odell as advisers—Canals—Payn—Trust Com- pany investigation—Messages—Work unfin- ished—Dangers and difficulties—Platt's magic ring—Estimates of Roosevelt's work—Accom- plishment—Quits.	102
---	-----

CHAPTER XIII.

Menaced by vice-presidency—Platt, Quay and Roosevelt—Woe for Senator Hanna—Roosevelt yields—The campaign—Roosevelt as spokesman —Denounces opponents, Filipinos and others— Wins.	132
---	-----

CHAPTER XIV.

Tragedy makes Roosevelt president—Flight to Adirondacks—Dramatic entrance—Pledges— Civil Service—Tariff—Philippines—Conditions —Exploitation—Legislation against assassins— Roosevelt's message	139
---	-----

CHAPTER XV.

Race problems confront administration—Booker Washington—Crum—Indianola—Brownsville— Lynch law	151
---	-----

CHAPTER XVI.

President takes up reform—Northern Securities— Beef—Postal scandal	156
---	-----

CHAPTER XVII.

President captures canal site—Mr. Hay's politeness	
--	--

	PAGE
—Treaty with Great Britain—Colombia—Treaty with latter rejected—Panama “revolts”—Strange prevision—Panama Company gets millions—Constructing the canal—Problems—Changes—Blunders.	159

CHAPTER XVIII.

Roosevelt revises the Monroe doctrine—Venezuela and Santo Domingo—Bischoffsheim and Goldschmidt—State Department shields asphalt trust—Loomis, thrifty diplomat—Bowen humiliated—United States as receiver—Roosevelt’s “agreement” with Morales—Senate overridden—President has his way—Uncle Sam as protector general	179
--	-----

CHAPTER XIX.

Pious mastication and “benevolent assimilation”—Roosevelt as historian finds colonies utterly hopeless—Bryan’s sinister influence—Filipinos as Apaches and Boxers—Government by presidential ukase	195
--	-----

CHAPTER XX.

Cuba becomes free, almost—America’s pledge—Government by military satrap—Cuba libre—Palma’s “yellow streak”—America “preserves Cuban independence”	214
--	-----

CHAPTER XXI.

Battling with railway octopus—President adopts a Democratic party issue rejected at polls—Makes it his cardinal doctrine—Public mandate by newspaper clamor and iteration—Roosevelt-Chandler-Tillman-Bailey-Moody episode—New recruits for the Ananias Club—Aldrich acts—Roosevelt again demonstrates partisanship—Very hard labor, very small mouse.	219
---	-----

CHAPTER XXII.

Civil service reform by the president—Regaining	
---	--

CONTENTS

PAGE

lost ground—Taking care of friends—Patronage as bribery—"Joe" Murray—Rough Riders—Harvard men—College men—Cabinet officers and clerks in politics.....	236
--	-----

CHAPTER XXIII.

Alexander Hamilton, Roosevelt's political ideal—Hamilton in the Constitutional Convention—Praises monarchy—Outlines constitution establishing monarchical government—Hamilton's errors—His influence on the Republic—Burr and Hamilton—Hamilton's strangely false prophecies. . .	250
---	-----

CHAPTER XXIV.

Thomas Jefferson and his sinister democracy—How the "weaklings" won from the mighty Napoleon—Roosevelt's contempt for democracy's leader—Things Jefferson did—Apostle of democracy—Lincoln's tribute	271
--	-----

CHAPTER XXV.

Our "ignorant" president, Andrew Jackson—Change to him change for the worse—Despicable followers of Jackson—Jackson as "tool and figurehead"—Jackson's political methods compared with those of Roosevelt—Jackson and Van Buren's "expensive" government as compared with that of Roosevelt.....	289
--	-----

CHAPTER XXVI.

Roosevelt distrusts democracy—Rights of kings as logical as rights of majorities—Sanctions of government—Right of suffrage—Voice of people voice of God?.....	298
---	-----

CHAPTER XXVII.

Rich and poor in politics as Roosevelt sees them—No abuses to correct—Poor stirred by jealousy	
--	--

	PAGE
and envy—Lightning change of front following "muckrake" speech—Now steering "reform" movements.	313

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Roosevelt in literature—Atavistic in theme—War and chase his favorite topics—First book best—Autobiography in books—Sublime subjectiveness—Mania for executive messages—Annual cyclopedia of universal knowledge.....	324
---	-----

CHAPTER XXIX.

Roosevelt, war and peace—Glorification of war spirit—Conquest and commercialism—Non-resistant creed—Sermon on Mount—Rome and Christianity—The "true man's part"—Carl Schurz and Gen. Sherman comment on war—As a poet sees it.....	329
--	-----

CHAPTER XXX.

What Roosevelt has done for Washington society—Greater "individuality"—More exclusiveness—Public receptions curtailed—The "Social Secretary"—Roosevelts refuse to meet the "mob"—Traveling contingent fund—White House expenditures.	344
--	-----

CHAPTER XXXI.

A bit of autobiography—Biographers differ.....	353
--	-----

CHAPTER XXXII.

Sidelights on Roosevelt's character—Tariff—Friends—Ananias Club—Reformer, etc., etc....	357
---	-----

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Some recent history—"My policies"—Progress by states—Politicians clamor—Railway lobbyists as "reformers"—Roosevelt fortunate in his enemies—He "helps" in Chicago—Railroads fail—Loeb discovers "conspiracy"—Roosevelt's tol-	
---	--

	PAGE
erance—"Undesirable citizens"—Suspends pilot —"Sport"—A successor—Fleet to Pacific— Roosevelt "helps" Cleveland—Oklahoma consti- tution—Financial panic—"Honest money"— Roosevelt's responsibility—What his platforms asserted—Different ox gored.....	377

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Critical view of Roosevelt—His character, his ideals, his aims, his achievements—Place in his- tory.	400
--	-----

PREFACE.

This is not a biography of President Roosevelt. We are interested in Roosevelt the man only in so far as his peculiarities throw light upon Roosevelt the office-holder.

It is our aim to journey freely along the public pathway followed by Roosevelt in his march from obscurity to eminence. We shall pick up on the way, and examine evidences of his influence upon this Republic.

In taking this excursion, we shall try to hamper ourselves as little as possible with the baggage of preconceived opinion. Our own opinion, we shall give for what it is worth, indicating where possible its foundation. Those who prefer to take their opinions of men, their political philosophy, or even their politics, blindfolded, would do well not to travel with us.

Americans, as a rule, have improved upon the old maxim, "noblesse oblige." To persons in high place we prefer to apply the more comfortable fiction, "The king can do no wrong." Having no king, many of us try to make kings of every popular person. Being without heroes, we are not discriminating as to whom we shall give this distinction. We might have made it treason to criticize those in high place, as it is infamous presumption to suggest that they ever speak unwisely. But our sense of self-restraint has held us back.

Extraordinary authority is not hampered with extraordinary responsibility in high places. We assume a divine sanction for every act of a person whom we have honored. Each word from the lips of a high official contains prophet wisdom. Each peccadillo we find a virtue in disguise, each offense a scintillation of genius.

Peans of hero worship are not especially easy for us, but we shall try to fulfill expectations. If at any time we should seem to treat the subject of our inquiry as just an American citizen, with rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness merely equal to those of other American citizens, it will not be because we forget the more popular viewpoint. As for standards of truth and righteousness to which we shall subject the acts of our characters indiscriminately, we shall make due allowance for high place and the trials and temptations surrounding it. The sequel will show whether our standards will be more strict or more liberal for one in authority.

An administration which has attracted much attention is about to close. It has been different in some respects from other administrations. This is an excellent time to take stock and to inquire what influence that administration has had upon this Republic. Pleas are being made for a continuation of certain governmental policies. We could not take better time to inquire whether we wish them continued.

Your indulgence we bespeak. Walk with us with open mind. Let us try to get perspective in which near as well as distant objects appear in their just proportions.

Give tolerant ear, we beseech you, to our introduction. Ponder it carefully. Prejudices must be cleared away or sterilized. In no better way than by studying the opinions there expressed can we get the viewpoint of the man we are about to study. Giving us a more instructive insight into the motives, abilities and characters of the nation's past great, it will aid us in judging more correctly the great of the present and of the future.

the first of these is the fact that the
the second is the fact that the
the third is the fact that the
the fourth is the fact that the
the fifth is the fact that the
the sixth is the fact that the
the seventh is the fact that the
the eighth is the fact that the
the ninth is the fact that the
the tenth is the fact that the

the eleventh is the fact that the
the twelfth is the fact that the
the thirteenth is the fact that the
the fourteenth is the fact that the
the fifteenth is the fact that the
the sixteenth is the fact that the
the seventeenth is the fact that the
the eighteenth is the fact that the
the nineteenth is the fact that the
the twentieth is the fact that the

the twenty-first is the fact that the
the twenty-second is the fact that the
the twenty-third is the fact that the
the twenty-fourth is the fact that the
the twenty-fifth is the fact that the
the twenty-sixth is the fact that the
the twenty-seventh is the fact that the
the twenty-eighth is the fact that the
the twenty-ninth is the fact that the
the thirtieth is the fact that the

the thirty-first is the fact that the
the thirty-second is the fact that the
the thirty-third is the fact that the
the thirty-fourth is the fact that the
the thirty-fifth is the fact that the
the thirty-sixth is the fact that the
the thirty-seventh is the fact that the
the thirty-eighth is the fact that the
the thirty-ninth is the fact that the
the fortieth is the fact that the

INTRODUCTION.

President Roosevelt has made many and lengthy literary excursions into various fields. There has he met many of the great, the good, the highly honored of this nation. Freely has he expressed his opinion of their characters, their services and their worth. It is interesting to hear him speak of them:—

Thomas Jefferson.—“The father of nullification and therefore of secession. . . . Constitutionally unable to put a proper value upon truthfulness.” (Roosevelt’s *Life of Benton*, page 95.)

“Characteristically enough, he only showed his annoyance by indirect methods.” (Roosevelt’s *Life of Morris*, page 293.)

“Jefferson was using them (the alien and sedition laws) as handles to guide seditious agitation.” (Roosevelt’s *Life of Morris*, page 323.)

“He (Morris) despised Jefferson for a tricky and incapable theorist.” (Roosevelt’s *Life of Morris*, page 331.)

“Jefferson . . . was perhaps the most incapable executive that ever filled the presidential chair. . . . He was utterly unable to grapple with the slightest actual danger, and even excepting his successor, Madison, it would be difficult to find a man less fit to guide the state with honor and safety.”

Roosevelt says that the burning of the Capitol

INTRODUCTION.

President Roosevelt has made many and lengthy literary excursions into various fields. There has he met many of the great, the good, the highly honored of this nation. Freely has he expressed his opinion of their characters, their services and their worth. It is interesting to hear him speak of them:—

Thomas Jefferson.—“The father of nullification and therefore of secession. . . . Constitutionally unable to put a proper value upon truthfulness.” (Roosevelt’s Life of Benton, page 95.)

“Characteristically enough, he only showed his annoyance by indirect methods.” (Roosevelt’s Life of Morris, page 293.)

“Jefferson was using them (the alien and sedition laws) as handles to guide seditious agitation.” (Roosevelt’s Life of Morris, page 323.)

“He (Morris) despised Jefferson for a tricky and incapable theorist.” (Roosevelt’s Life of Morris, page 331.)

“Jefferson . . . was perhaps the most incapable executive that ever filled the presidential chair. . . . He was utterly unable to grapple with the slightest actual danger, and even excepting his successor, Madison, it would be difficult to find a man less fit to guide the state with honor and safety.”

Roosevelt says that the burning of the Capitol

at Washington was as nothing compared with the "cowardly infamy" of Jefferson and Madison, who failed to take means adequate to protect it.

James Madison.—"Excepting Jefferson we have never produced an executive more helpless than Madison when it comes to grappling with real dangers and difficulties." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 348.)

"The indignation naturally excited by the utter weakness and folly of Jefferson's second term and the pitiable incompetence shown both by him and his successor," etc. (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 344.)

Madison's followers in the South and West.—

"They themselves, for all their bluster, were but a shade less incompetent than their nominal chief when it came to actual work, and were shamefully unable to make their words good by deeds." (Witness Jackson at New Orleans.)

"The administration thus drifted into a war which it had neither the wisdom to avoid nor the foresight to prepare for." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 348-9.)

Congress at Madison's time.—"With almost incredible folly the Congress that declared war, voted down the bill to increase the navy by twenty battleships." (American Ideals, page 260.)

James Monroe.—"I think he was as much of a failure as his predecessors (Washington, Adams, Jefferson and Madison), and a harsher criticism could not be passed upon him. Like other statesmen of his school, he was mighty of word, but weak in action; bold to plan, but weak to per-

form." (Roosevelt's *Naval War of 1812*, page 456.)

"A very amiable gentleman, but one who comes distinctly in the class of one whose greatness was thrust upon them." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 293.)

President Martin Van Buren.—"Van Buren faithfully served the mammon of unrighteousness, both in his own state and later on at Washington; and he had his reward, for he was advanced to the highest office in the gift of the nation. He had no reason to blame his own conduct for his final downfall; he got just as far along as he could possibly get, he succeeded because of, not in spite of his moral shortcomings; if he had always governed his actions by a high moral standard, he would probably never have been heard of." (Roosevelt's *Life of Benton*, page 187.)

President Tyler.—"He was a mediocre man; but that is unwarranted flattery—he was a politician of monumental littleness. . . . His chief mental and moral attributes were peevishness, fretful obstinacy, inconsistency, incapacity to make up his own mind . . . together with inordinate vanity"

"His mind which was not robust at best, was completely dazzled by his sudden elevation, and his wild hopes that he could continue to keep the place that he had reached." (Roosevelt's *Life of Benton*, pages 239 and 257.)

Andrew Jackson.—"Few men were ever more unlike than the scholarly, timid, shifty, doctrinaire (Jefferson) who supplanted the elder Adams, and

the ignorant, headstrong and straightforward soldier who was victor over the younger. The change was the deliberate choice of the great mass of the people, and that it was for the worse, was then and has been even since, the opinion of most thinking men." (A sly way of paying the author a handsome compliment). (Roosevelt's Life of Benton, page 73.)

"The public service then took its first step in the downward career of progressive debasement, and deterioration which has only been checked in our own days." (Roosevelt's Life of Benton, page 74.)

Washington.—"Washington's administration was in error in not acting with greater decision about the Spanish posts." (Winning of the West, vol. 4, page 203.)

"His (Monroe's) appointment (by Washington) was an excellent example of the folly of trying to carry on a government on a non-partisan basis." (Roosevelt's Life of Morris, pages 301, 302.)

President Pierce.—"Seeing him (President Pierce) exactly as he was—a small politician of low capacity and mean surroundings, proud to act as the servile tool of men worse than himself, but also stronger and abler" . . . arguing in favor of slavery with "undaunted mendacity, moral callousity and mental obliquity; exemplifying in his last message all the modes of conveying untruths, direct assertion, fallacious inference and false innuendo." (Roosevelt's Life of Benton, page 345.)

A portion of the above is quoted from Benton with evident approval.

George Clinton, Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry.—“They (opponents of centralized government) “were followed by a lot of designing politicians who feared that their importance would be lost if their sphere of action should be enlarged. Among these leaders the three most conspicuous were, in New York, George Clinton, and in Massachusetts and Virginia, Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry.” (Roosevelt’s Life of Morris, page 128.)

Gouverneur Morris.—“In fact throughout the war of 1812 he appeared as the open champion of treason to the nation, dishonesty to the nation’s creditors and subserviency to a foreign power.” (Roosevelt’s Life of Morris, pages 352 to 355.)

Harrison Gray Otis.—“Harrison Gray Otis was almost as bad as Morris himself.” (Roosevelt’s Life of Morris, page 353.)

Captain Perry.—“He certainly stands on a lower grade than either Hull or MacDonough, and not a bit higher than a dozen others.” (Naval War of 1812, page 271.)

Gen. Winfield Scott.—“A good general but otherwise a wholly absurd and flatulent person.” (Roosevelt’s Life of Benton, page 344.)

“Timothy Pickering showed eager desire to stand by another country to the hurt of his own country’s honor.” (Forum, January, 1897.)

“Oliver Ellsworth (Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States) of Connecticut, whose name should be branded with infamy

because of the words he uttered." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 160.)

Thomas Paine.—"So the filthy little atheist had to remain in prison." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 289.) The occasion for rejoicing on the part of Mr. Roosevelt, was Gouverneur Morris' strange indifference to the imprisonment of the great pamphleteer of the Revolution, in a French prison. There are historians who hold that the pen of Thomas Paine did more for the Revolution than was done by any other one man except Jefferson and Washington. Gouverneur Morris showed as much feeling and patriotism in this matter as he did in the burial of Mr. Roosevelt's "corsair" (John Paul Jones).

"Judge Taney of unhappy fame." (*Life of Benton*, page 358.)

Wendell Phillips.—"After the war and until the day of his death his position upon almost every public question was either mischievous or ridiculous, and usually both." (Roosevelt's *Life of Benton*, page 160.)

Jefferson Davis and Aaron Burr.—"The moral difference between Benedict Arnold on the one hand and Aaron Burr and Jefferson Davis on the other, is precisely the difference which obtains between a politician who sells his vote for money and one who supports a bad measure in consideration of being given high place."

President Polk and the Abolitionists.—"Abolitionists joined hands with Northern roughs and Southern slavocrats to elect the man who was, excepting Tyler, the very smallest of the small presidents who came between Jackson and Lin-

coln." (Observe the compliment to Harrison, Taylor, Filmore and the others.)

"Owing to a variety of circumstances the Abolitionists have received an immense amount of hysterical praise which they do not deserve and have been credited with deeds done by other men whom they in reality hampered and opposed rather than aided." (Roosevelt's *Life of Benton*, page 292.)

Whole classes of Americans, too, came in for Mr. Roosevelt's emphatic disapproval.

Jefferson's followers.—"Four fifths of the talent, ability and good sense of the country was to be found in the Federalist ranks." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 321.)

Cowboys, small farmers and mechanics.—"When drunk on villainous whiskey of the frontier towns, they (the cowboys) cut mad antics, firing their pistols right and left . . . and indulging too often in deadly shooting affrays, brought on by the incidental conduct of the moment or some long standing grudge, or perhaps because of bad blood between certain ranches or localities. . . . They are much better fellows and pleasanter companions than small farmers or agricultural laborers; nor are mechanics or workmen of the big cities to be mentioned in the same breath." (Roosevelt's *Ranch Life and Hunting Trail*, page 10.)

Catholics (who believe in miracles).—"Those persons of arrested mental development who now make pilgrimages to our Lady of Lourdes, had plenty of prototypes in the atheistic France of

the French Revolution." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 291.)

Merchants and traders.—"He (Morris) had no patience with those despicable beings, the merchants and traders." (*Life of Morris*, page 297.)

Napoleon.—"He (Morris) fully appreciated Napoleon's utter unscrupulousness and marvelous mendacity." (*Life of Morris*, page 303.)

Quakers (As seen by Roosevelt, historian).—"It is a bitter and unanswerable commentary on the non-resistant creed that such outrages and massacres as those committed on the helpless Indians, were more numerous in the colony that the Quakers governed than in any other; their vaunted policy of peace . . . caused the utmost possible evil . . . their system was a direct incentive to crime and wrong-doing. No other colony made such futile contemptible efforts to deal with the Indians; no other colony showed such supine selfish helplessness. (*Winning West* I.-98.) "A class of professing non-combatants is as hurtful to the real healthy growth of the nation as a class of fire-eaters, for a weakness or a folly is as bad for a nation as a vice, or worse, and in the long run a Quaker may be quite as undesirable a citizen as a duelist. No man not willing to bear arms and fight for his rights can give a good reason why he should be entitled to the privilege of living in a free community." (*Life of Benton*, page 37.)

Taken to task later for the statement, President Roosevelt in a campaign said: "Were I now to rewrite the sentence I should so phrase it that

it could not be construed as offensive to the Society of Friends." In a speech at Plainfield, N. J., in 1900, he praised the Quakers. That was in a campaign. He also made some modification of his views on farmers and mechanics.

Germans and Irish.—"The habit of importing indentured Irish servants as well as German laborers under contract, prevailed throughout the colonies, and the number of men thus imported was quite sufficient to form a considerable element in the population, and to add a new, although, perhaps, not a very valuable strain to the already mixed blood." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 34.)

Bryan, Sewall, Watson, Populists, Democrats and other Americans who disagreed with Roosevelt in politics in 1896.—"McKinley believes in sound finance. That is a currency based on gold and as good as gold. McKinley believes in a protective tariff. McKinley believes in the only way of enforcing orderly liberty, that is, in seeing that the laws are enforced at any cost."

"Mr. Watson would be a more startling, more attractive and more dangerous figure (than Sewall) for if he got the chance, he could lash the nation with a whip of scorpions, while Bryan would be contented with the torture of ordinary thongs."

"Mr. Bryan, the nominee for the presidency, and Messrs. Sewall and Watson, the nominees for the vice-presidency, are almost equally devoted adherents to the light-weight dollar and of a currency (not clearing house certificates) which shall not force a man to repay what he

borrowed, and shall punish the wrong-headed laborer who expects to be paid his wages in money worth something, as heavily as the business man or the farmer who is so unmoral as to wish to pay his debts."

"Loud-mouthed predecessors of Mr. Bryan and his kind then thought good enough for them . . . Neither Mr. Bryan nor Mr. Sewall nor Mr. Watson has advocated a two-cent copper dollar. Still they are striving toward that ideal."

"Mr. Sewall distinctly lags behind the leader of the spike team, Mr. Bryan, and still more distinctly behind his rival or running mate, or whatever you may choose to call him, the Hon. Thomas Watson."

"He (Mr. Sewall) is a well-to-do man. Indeed in many communities he would be called a rich man. He is a banker, a railroad man, a ship-builder, and has been successful in business. Now if Mr. Bryan and Mr. Watson really stand for any principle, it is hostility to this kind of success. Thrift, industry and business energy, are qualities which are quite incompatible with true populistic feeling. Paying of debts, like the suppression of riots, is abhorrent to the populistic mind. Such conduct strikes the populist as immoral."

"Populism never prospers save where men are unprosperous, and your true populist is especially intolerant of business success. If a man is a successful business man, he at once calls him a plutocrat. He makes only one exception. A miner or speculator in mines may be

many times a millionaire, and yet remain in good standing in the populist party."

"Silver is connected in his mind (the populist's) with scaling down debts, the partial repudiation of obligations, and other measures aimed at those odious moneyed tryants who lend money to those who insist upon borrowing, or who have put their ill-gotten gains in savings banks and kindred wicked institutions for the encouragement of the vice of thrift. . . . Not even the fact that the rich silver mine owners may have earned their money honestly, can outweigh the other fact that they champion a species of currency which will make most thrifty and honest men poorer, in the mind of the truly logical populist."

There are rich scoundrels, Mr. Roosevelt says, who make their money dishonestly, and other men who make their money honestly. "But the populist draws no line of division between the classes."

"In the minds of most thrifty, hard-working men who are given to thinking at all about public questions, the free-silver plank is very far from being the most rotten of the many rotten planks put together with such perverted skill by the Chicago architects. A platform which declared for free and unlimited rioting, and which has the same strenuous objection to the exercise of the police power by the Federal government that is felt in the circles presided over by Herr Most, Eugene V. Debs, and all the persons whose pictures appear in the detective bureaus of our great cities, cannot appeal to per-

sons who have gone beyond the unpolished stone period of civilization. The *men* who *object* to *government* by *injunction*, are as regards essential principles of our government, in hearty sympathy with their remote skin-clad ancestors, who lived in caves, fought one-another with stone-headed axes and ate the mammoth and the woolly rhinoceros. They are interesting as representing a geological survival. . . . They are not in sympathy with men of good minds and of sound civic morality."

"Mushy sentimentalists and wrong-doers," Roosevelt says, made the Chicago platform. Their attack upon the Supreme Court represents "recurrence to the ways of thought of their remote barbarian ancestors." . . . "Populists realize that the judiciary stands between them and plunder."

"He (Sewall) has a vein of the erratic in his character, otherwise he would not be in such company at all. But on the whole, his sympathies must be with the man who saves money, rather than with the man who proposes to take away the money that has been saved; with the police who arrest a violent criminal, rather than with the criminal. Such sympathy puts him at a disadvantage in the populist camp."

In other words, Mr. Sewall, Mr. Roosevelt said, must have been uncomfortable.

"Mr. Watson, whose enemies now call him a Georgia cracker, is in reality a far more suitable companion for Mr. Bryan. With Mr. Bryan, denunciation of the gold bug and banker is largely a mere form of intellectual entertainment,

but with Mr. Watson it represents a ferocious conviction. . . . In Watson and Tillman is embodied retribution on the South for having failed to educate the cracker, the poor white, which gives them strength. Mr. Watson is certainly an awkward man for a community to develop."

"They (the Southern populists) distrust anything they cannot understand; and as they understand but little, this opens a wide field for distrust. Refinement and comfort they are apt to consider quite as objectionable as immorality. That a man should change his clothes in the evening, that he should dine at any other hour than noon, impresses these people as symptoms of depravity, instead of merely trivial. A taste for learning and cultivated friends and a tendency to bathe frequently cause them the deepest suspicion."

Mr. Roosevelt tells how out of place Mr. Watson is in Georgia, where modern ideas have obtained some hold, and regrets that Mr. Watson could not have the more suitable South Carolina constituency which had been developed by Tillman.

"Moreover, Mr. Tillman's brother has been frequently elected to Congress on the issue that he never wore an overcoat nor an undershirt, an issue which any populist statesman finds readily comprehensible, and which he would recognize at a glance as being strong before the people."

"Altogether, Mr. Watson with his sincerity, his frankness, his extreme suspicion and distrust

of anything he cannot understand, and the feeling he encourages against all the elegancies and decencies of civilized life, is an exceedingly interesting personage. . . . Bryan, after all, is more or less of a sham and a compromise."

"Now in the event of Mr. Bryan having more votes than Mr. McKinley, that is, in the event of the country showing strong bedlamite tendencies next November" . . . "Farrago of sinister nonsense making up the Democratic platform."

The above complimentary notice of Mr. Bryan, Mr. Watson, Mr. Sewall and a considerable mass of American voters, is quoted from the *Review of Reviews* for September, 1896.

We have quoted liberally from the above as a model of the temperate and gentlemanly way in which a political controversy should be conducted. This calm and enlightening discussion of the issues of a campaign in one of America's leading reviews by a Harvard man, a historian, a member of the New York Four Hundred, a former high Federal officer who had reached the age of 38, is set forth as a model for the youth of the land to be followed on similar occasions. The manner of treating the subject is so frank and fairminded, the chivalry and fairness shown to rivals is something which could not be found in the discourse of just an ordinary American citizen, certainly not in a man of less education and refinement. High ideals shine through the whole discourse. After listening to the misrepresentations, the innuendo, the demagogic appeals, the highly colored and narrowly prejudiced

stuff of the ordinary cross-roads orator, this classic piece of literature is like a breath of cool salt air on a sultry day. Such scholarly poise, such historic love of justice. No hasty words these, but carefully thought out polished periods such as befitted the man and the periodical.

Still there are those who if the above matter had proceeded from another source, might have thought it pure demagoguery. To one not fully considering the high motives, it might be thought demagoguery of the most outrageous sort. The undiscerning reader might think he saw wholesale appeal to class prejudice, wholesale impugning of motives, cynical sneering at the lowly, poor and less fortunate classes, wholesale charges of iniquitous dishonesty on the part of the majority of the American people; for the American people, strangely enough did show the Bedlamite propensities and McKinley was actually a minority candidate, various groups of radicals having cast the majority of the country's vote.

Had the notice come from a source capable of being doubted, there are those who would have applied to it the quotation taken approvingly by Mr. Roosevelt from Thomas H. Benton and applied to President Franklin Pierce:—

“Arguing with undaunted mendacity, moral callousity, and mental obliquity; exemplifying . . . all the modes of conveying untruths, direct assertion, fallacious inference and false innuendo.” (Roosevelt's Life of Benton, page 345.)

But then President Pierce was subject to criticism.

Another passage from Mr. Roosevelt might by the indiscriminating be applied to his *Review of Reviews* discussion:—

“All forms of coarse and noisy slander being apparently considered legitimate weapons to employ against men of the opposite party or faction. Public men, good and bad, are assailed as scoundrels. The effect is two-fold:—The citizen learning to disbelieve any statement he may see in a newspaper, so that the attacks on evil lose their edge; and on the other hand acquiring a deeprooted belief that all public men are more or less bad. The worst offense that can be committed against the Republic is the offense of the public man who betrays his trust; but second only to it comes the offense of the man who tries to persuade others that an honest and efficient public man is dishonest and unworthy. Downright foul abuse may be after all less dangerous than incessant aspersions, sneers and those half truths that are the meanest lies.” (American Ideals, page 53, quoted in part from memory.)

Our good president places on the same plane the “man in public life who is a demagogue, or who is corrupt, and the newspaper writer who fails to attack him because of his corruption, or who slanderously assails him if he be honest.”

“If there was a wholly irrational state of mind,” says Mr. Roosevelt, “it was that in which the Jacksonians kept themselves. Every canvass on the part of Jackson was full of sound fury and excitement of appeals to passion, prejudice

and feelings, but never the reason of the hearers. A speech for him was usually a frantic denunciation of whoever or whatever opposed him, coupled with fulsome adulation of the old hero. . . . The cool judgment of the country was apt to be against them." (Life of Benton, page 135.)

History is said sometimes to repeat itself.

Mr. Roosevelt's article in the *Review of Reviews* undoubtedly had its effect, as such a temperate, calm and patriotic article from such a high source must have. Strangely enough, it grieved Mr. Watson, and Mr. Watson wrote thus rudely to the distinguished author:—

Hon. Theodore Roosevelt: It pains me to be misunderstood by those whose good opinion I respect, and upon reading your trenchant article in the September *Review of Reviews* the impulse was strong to write you.

When you take your stand for honest government and for better laws in New York, as you have so courageously done, your motives must be the same as mine—for you do not need the money your office gives you. You can understand instinctively what you feel—what your motives are. You merely obey a law of your nature which puts you into mortal combat with that you think wrong. You fight because your own sense of self-respect and self-loyalty compels you to fight. Is not this so?

If in Georgia and throughout the South we have conditions as intolerable as those that surround you in New York, can you not realize why I make war on them?

Tammany itself has grown great because the mistaken leaders of Southern democracy catered to the Kellys and Crokers and feared to defy them.

The first "roast" I ever got from a Democratic press of this State followed a speech I had made denouncing Tammany, and denouncing the craven leaders who obeyed Tammany.

It is astonishing how one honest man may honestly misjudge another.

My creed does not lead me to dislike the men who run a bank, a factory, a railroad, or a foundry. I do not hate a man for owning a bond or having a bank account, or having cash loaned at interest.

Upon the other hand, I think each should make all the profit in business he fairly can; but I do believe that the banks should not exercise the sovereign power of issuing money, and I do believe that all special privileges granted and all exemptions from taxation work infinite harm. I do believe that the wealth of the Republic is practically free from Federal taxation, and that the burdens of government fall upon the shoulders of those least able to bear them.

If you could spend an evening with me among my books and amid my family, I feel quite sure you would not again class me with those who make war upon "all the decencies and elegancies of civilized life." And if you could attend one of my great political meetings in Georgia and see the good men and the good women who believe in Populism, you would not continue to

class them with those who vote for candidates upon the "no undershirt" platform.

In other words, if you understood me and mine, your judgment of us would be different.

The "Cracker" of the South is simply the man who did not buy slaves to do his work. He did it all himself—like a man. Some of the best generals in war and magistrates in peace have been of the "cracker" class. As a matter of fact, however, my own people from my father back to revolutionary times, were slave-holders and land-owners. In the first meeting held in Georgia to express sympathy with the Boston patriots my great-grandfather bore a prominent part, and in the first State Legislature ever convened in Georgia, one of my ancestors was the representative of his county.

My grandfather was wealthy and so was my father. My boyhood was spent in the idleness of a rich man's son. It was not till I was in my teens that misfortune overtook us, sent us homeless into the world, and deprived me of the thorough collegiate training my father intended for me.

At sixteen years of age I thus had to commence life moneyless, and the weary years I spent among the poor, the kindness I received in their homes, the acquaintance which I made with the hardship of their lives, gave me that profound sympathy for them which I still retain—though I am no longer poor myself.

Pardon the liberty I take in intruding this letter upon you. I have followed your work in New York with admiring sympathy, and have

frequently written of it in my paper. While hundreds of miles separate us, and our tasks and methods have been widely different, I must still believe that we have much in common, and that the ruling force which actuates both is to challenge wrong and to fight the battles of good government.

That is the end of Thomas Watson's letter. We give it in full.

There was one salvation about it. It took Watson out of the despised class of "Crackers," or poor whites, and Mr. Roosevelt felt that he could be treated as a "near" gentleman, even if he had some queer notions. This is what Roosevelt says:—

"I intended to draw a very sharp line between Mr. Watson and many of those associated with him in the same movement. . . . To Mr. Watson's own sincerity and courage, I thought I paid full tribute. . . ."

"The staunchest friends of order and decent government fully and cordially recognized Mr. Watson's honesty and good faith—men for instance like Senator Lodge of Massachusetts and Congressman Bellamy Storer of Ohio." (This was before "dear Bellamy" had joined the "Ananias Club.")

This is the way in which Mr. Roosevelt drew the "very sharp line."

"Mr. Watson was, in a sense born out of place when he was born in Georgia." He should have been born in South Carolina, where Tillman had such a following. "Moreover, Mr. Tillman's brother has been frequently elected to Congress

on the issue that he never wore an overcoat nor an undershirt—an issue which any populist statesman finds readily comprehensible, and which he would recognize at a glance as being strong before the people.”

“Altogether, Mr. Watson with his sincerity, has frankness, his extreme suspicion and distrust of anything he cannot understand and the feelings he encourages against all the elegancies and decencies of life, is an exceedingly interesting personage.

“Mr. Watson is certainly an awkward man for a community to develop.”

Certainly Mr. Roosevelt drew a very sharp line not only between Mr. Watson and those with whom he was associated, but also between Mr. Watson and the decent civilized portion of the community. Mr. Roosevelt's generous and ingenuous explanation must put him right with all fair-minded persons. It was made in the January following the elections.

Anyway, how was a high-minded gentleman and cultured literary man to know that a wild-eyed populist actually came from decent ancestors. He ought to have remained in his class, and if he had, such mistakes could not have occurred. Moreover, facts in cases like this are really not essential. They tend to hamper the expression of an imaginative literary man bent upon producing an effect, and altogether serve no useful purpose.

With this explanation we pass on. Thus have we cleared the ground. We have fixed the lines of our structure. Our distinguished statesman-

historian has shown us how to deal with public men. He has shown us that the men honored by the American people with presidential office have been mostly small, mean and incompetent, if not corrupt. Presidential place is no criterion of worth, for the majority of those whom the people chose with devoted enthusiasm, were weaklings or scoundrels when their true measure was disclosed by our distinguished statesman-historian. We should not forget, as our mentor has clearly indicated, that it is the petty incident which to a really discerning biographer or historian must fix the real character of our distinguished men. If they err in small things, little good can be found in them.

Neither should we weakly permit ourselves to attribute high motives to actions which to us seem reprehensible. Motives in such cases are much more likely to be selfish, sordid, mean, unworthy;—as our distinguished statesman-historian has found in examining the records of many honored by their own and subsequent generations, and still considered great by the uninformed masses.

Even whole sections of the people may be wrong-headed and essentially wicked. On occasion a majority of the American people may be foolish, uncivilized, dishonest, immoral, meanly envious and vindictive and bent upon despoiling their more intelligent, more virtuous and more fortunate fellows. This is what calm investigation convinced our distinguished literary-statesman in 1896 to be the fact. It is what we too, no doubt, could have found if we faced facts with

the fearless comprehension with which this good and great leader is endowed.

Indeed, he has taught us most unequivocally that as high-motived narrators of fact, we should not hesitate one moment in visiting even the tombs of this nation's honored dead and tearing from them with ruthless hands the entwined wreaths of laurel and ivy placed there by generations of loving and admiring souls.

In following the example of so distinguished a historian in this little excursion among the great, we shall try not to forget that undistinguished men like ourselves must walk more circumspectly than our high ideal. We could not assume, like him, to speak with such infallible assurance of men and things. Yet his example must be our pillar of cloud by day and our pillar of fire by night to guide us on our pathway.

ROOSEVELT AND THE REPUBLIC.

CHAPTER I.

"JOE" MURRAY DISCOVERS A STATESMAN.

District worker "Joe" Murray wanted revenge upon his quondam district leader, Barney Hess. Murray had been misused. The reward which should have been the meed of faithful service in caucus, primary and party conference, had passed to another. Murray's wrath burned red. He would revolt and show them who was the real power in the 21st District.

Murray needed an instrument, a vehicle, a triumphal car, as it were, to which he might chain his vanquished foes. Assemblyman of the Twenty-first district was the immediate stake. The capture of that position was to show Murray's prowess.

Right here Murray had an inspiration. There was a name in that district to conjure with. It was eminently respectable in a district where bourgeois respectability counted for much. The name was old. Five generations or more had borne it. They were generations of smug, sleek, thrifty, successful business men, following an ancestor of homely, sturdy frugality. Though they had not been of great importance in civil life, aldermen and other minor municipal officers had risen from their ranks. They were men of

substance and power. Possibly a remote strain of Jewish blood had intensified the native Dutch shrewdness. But pursuit of money for money's sake had worn its keen edge to dullness. Fads of charity and public service had grasped this good name. It was known by its works as well as by its thousands.

A new Scion of this precious stock had broken into bloom in the ancestral garden. He had followed circumspectly the beaten road to the threshold of a career. Boyhood had been passed most respectably between the proper town mansion and ample country home. There were tennis courts, stables and kennels, the equipment of the American gentleman of leisure, of the name graduated from trade to membership in the lesser gentry. Rides, hunts, games, dogs, all the badges of ease and respectability surrounded the young Scion.

There was the preparatory school, not an Eton, to be sure, but a New England school quite as sufficient. And afterward Harvard, the Oxford of America, so to speak.

Our Scion marched through Harvard in the congenial society of other rich men's sons. His was a class noted for the worldly wealth of its members in a school in which the standard of living was high for America. Our Scion's class was without special enthusiasm or distinction while in college, but its purse-strings hung loosely, and it was not unpopular. Among them all Scion was noted for his liberality. His purse counted for more than his prowess in athletics.

He took a prominent part in financing Harvardian muscle developments.

Scion's biographer says that his hero might have lived in elegance at Harvard, but instead chose only two modest rooms in the unpretentious two-story-and-attic wooden residence of Mr. Richardson at No. 16 Winthrop street. There he lived alone without chums, cut off from his fellows in the college dormitories. On parade he drove a genteel horse and trap. Sometimes he essayed tandem driving, for Scion was something of a swell.

Letters were furnished him from the Name to other Names in Boston, and they unlocked for him "Back Bay" society. Purse and Name and inclination carried him into the Natural History Club, Athletic Association, Art Club, Rifle Corps, OK Society, Finance Club, Hasty Pudding Club, Alpha Delta Phi Club, and to an editorial chair on the college paper. Once in, goodfellowship and good nature kept him there.

It was a time of transformation at Harvard. Looking across the water to dear old London, the numerous Scions, long of purse, envied their brethren who went from Oxford and Cambridge to careers in politics. By sheer neglect since the time of the younger Adams, the wealth and "respectability" of America had left politics to the "hoi polloi." Harvard had awakened to the opportunities of wealth and college breeding in politics. It mourned the days of the Adamses and resolved that its sons should again become a power in the "ruling class."

Harvard had its Walker. Awakened by the

political revival, Harvard men saw other things British to admire. There was a rebirth of the idea of free trade, after the years of class taxation and commercialism following the Civil war. Civil service reform, too, as England had it looked good to Harvard. It became also a fad. Our Scion shared all of these fads, for most of his real work outside of natural history was done in civil history and economics. Nothing important did our Scion do. He was not the worst student in college, but was far from the best. "Honors" in scholarship flew all about him. They hit him but once and that a glancing blow.

Possibly the atmosphere of great wealth which surrounded Scion in his college career was not conducive to scholarship. At all events his class is noted for its politicians and men of affairs. Robert Bacon, first lieutenant of J. P. Morgan; H. G. Chapin, traffic manager of the Boston and Albany Railway; Henry N. Collison, the prominent Boston Democrat; William A. Gaston, of the Metropolitan Railway of Brooklyn; R. A. Saltonstall of business prominence; Arthur Hale, of the Pennsylvania Railway; Josiah Quincy, Boston's former mayor; Richard Trimble, of the Federal Steel Company; Robert Winsor, successful promoter, and Charles G. Washburn, of the wire corporation, all were schoolmates of the Scion.

With college oratory, Scion had not speaking acquaintance. His writings consisted of a characteristic exhortation upon athletics. This is the only thing he is said to have written for the college paper. A certain "prize fight" or "glove

contest," in which he came out second best, and a turtle episode of possible mythological character intended to illustrate natural history leanings, marked his special distinction at college, if we except liberality of purse. Scion was wise in his generation. He garnered for the future.

Bereavement which came to him in the third year of his college course, the loss of a distinguished father, left Scion at the end of his college career, virtually head of his house. As if to emphasize his bourgeois respectability and give dignity to his new position, Scion married, a few months after his graduation, the blue-blooded and accomplished daughter of an "aristocratic" Boston family, Alice Lee.

Shunning the ancestral trade which had given Scion his thousands, his respectability, his standing, his shrewd business sense and power of organization, Scion went into the law office of his uncle in New York City. He joined a political club. With some impulse, possibly from his Bullock ancestry of the South, he deliberately chose politics as a career because, as he frankly declared afterward, he "wanted to belong to the governing, not the governed class." To him they could by no means be the same. In order, however, that there might remain undone nothing which ought to be done by a man of his station and his fortune, he took the precaution of a trip to Europe, climbed the Jungfrau and the Matterhorn and joined the London Alpine Club, where the Name gave him entry.

This was Scion when discovered by the revengeful "Joe" Murray, disgruntled district

worker of the Twenty-first district, on the eve of an Assembly election. A young man of Harvard training; a Name with centuries of respectability upon it; avaricious dollar-lust dulled to satiety by generations of plenty; confronted by no vulgar problem of bread and butter—the problem that has harried the ambition and even the soul out of many a promising career; ample time and money at his disposal; ancestral business shrewdness and organizing efficiency with an ambition to use it in politics rather than the counting room; Republican traditions; residence in the “silk-stocking” or “diamondback” district of New York City where Republicanism and the Name were all-powerful, these were the assets of Scion on the threshold of his career. In addition, there was district worker “Joe” Murray to point out the political opportunity.

Is it any wonder that Scion in his twenty-fourth year should shoot up as Theodore Roosevelt, assemblyman from the Twenty-first district of New York, by grace of circumstances and district worker “Joe” Murray, Mentor. There was some campaigning, primary and final election, to be sure, but in the light of conditions the result was inevitable. “Joe” Murray had his revenge. He has also come to his reward, for Theodore Roosevelt does not forget his friends, if they persevere in meeting the demands which his friendship makes upon them. “Joe” Murray came into a comfortable berth in the immigration service.

While in college, Theodore Roosevelt had been a thin, pale stripling of a youth. He stepped

into the political arena, polished, lithe, alert, but with the nascent lines of bulldog countenance and character. These have deepened and broadened as the years have gone by.

CHAPTER II.

ROOSEVELT THE SOLON.

Stress and tension ruled in politics when the Assembly met at Albany in 1882. New York was, as usual, the storm center. Tilden's election to the presidency, the plot, hatched in the New York newspaper office, and Tilden's counting out by a commission; the threatened contest of blood and iron barely averted, were events still fresh in political memories. Stalwarts with Blaine's plume and Conkling's banner in the van had tried to ride down Garfield's halfbreeds and had been unhorsed. Then came the assassination of the victorious President by a disappointed office-seeker, with its fearsome fanning of factional flames and its awakening of the country to the danger of spoils politics.

Scandals which had blossomed rank in the rotten soil of Grant's administration still gave out their decaying stench. It was becoming less fashionable to sneer with Conkling and Blaine at political virtue. Political regeneration after a carnival of political unrighteousness seemed at length at hand. Never in the history of the nation was it more sorely needed. Each campaign reeked with scandalous accusation, and the pity of it was that much that was said was true.

But young men and new ideas were coming to the front and old leaders going to temporary or permanent retirement. New York Republicans were split into yawning factions, ready to do battle to the hilt. It all had resulted in a Democratic assembly. Alonzo B. Cornell was still governor.

Under these conditions Roosevelt went to his task as a partisan Republican, attached in sympathy and by blood-feud to the halfbreeds, but keeping aloof as far as he might from party faction. Even then, this man of seeming impulsiveness and bulldog tenacity was passing wary.

Democrats ruled in the assembly, but their slender majority of eight made their factional differences so serious, that it was almost a month after the opening of the session before Charles E. Patterson secured the needed majority in the speakership contest. Roosevelt voted with consistent partisanship for Thomas G. Alvord, the minority candidate who by the rules of the game became minority floor leader.

Important matters came before the Assembly. In his message Governor Cornell ran the gamut, from the assassination of Garfield to the biennial session of the legislature. Taxation, canals, insurance, militia, oleomargarine, agriculture, pleuro pneumonia, railway discrimination, prisons, increased murders, imprisonment for debt in New York City, Indians, health, immigration, licensing saloons, lotteries, reform in New York, exposition, army laws, Adirondacks, forestry, penal code, contested elections, bribery at the polls and reapportionment, were some of the in-

gredients of this legislative menu. Young Roosevelt had full scope for his solon wisdom then and there. Even the railway question which was to loom so big in his career, confronted him at the very doorstep.

Besides, he was to become acquainted with an entirely new set of men with slender claim to respectability according to the Roosevelt standards. It was then that the young Knickerbocker gentleman met with the Bogans, the Costellos, the O'Neills, the O'Briens, the McCarrens, the McClellans, the Murphys, the McDonoughs, the McManuses, the Mahers, the Haggerties, the Welches, and the whole brood of undesirable citizens, undesirable in name, at least, to Theodore Roosevelt, aristocrat. The assembly roll call sounded in sections like a Fenian roster.

Your novice is not an important personage in American legislative halls. Young Roosevelt was no exception. With the Name to conjure with, with the prestige and acquaintance which it gave him, with his unique position as the representative from New York of wealth and social standing in the assembly, he received unusual attention from some periodicals and newspapers. Roosevelt's innate modesty did not cause him to shrink from the publicity. Measures were placed in his hands by friends and political backers, to be presented to the Assembly. Every novice, if he have backers, has like opportunity. It serves to bring him into the limelight where he can be measured up and catalogued by the political sharps who make a business of legislation. These sharps sized up young Roosevelt.

His committee assignments were not bad. His favorite committee, and that through which he afterwards gained most of his notoriety as an assemblyman, was that on "Affairs of Cities." He had no chairmanship. In this session, however, he seems not to have been identified with all of the legislation relating to New York City, that passed through the committee and the Assembly. He was, however, sponsor for a minor measure relating to the metropolis.

In this first year of his service, Theodore Roosevelt "found" himself. Like Kipling's ship, the stays and yards of him, the sails, the rudder and even the compass, were put in working order. Roosevelt learned the rules of the game. He was schooled to debate at ease, to give and take upon the floor. In fact he figured in a more or less violent controversy over the impeachment of a judge, an impeachment which resulted in little of importance. That bulldog chin, and the teeth of him, Theodore Roosevelt learned to display to advantage.

Two things this wise young man learned above all others. He learned the value of dramatic display and liberal publicity. With him melodramatic action was instinctive. Almost at once, he learned the way in which it impresses and sways the crowd the part it plays in the career of the ambitious public man. Very well! Thereafter he would be dramatic, melo-dramatic when occasion required. Neither did Roosevelt forget the rainbow-tinted posters announcing the show. There must be publicity—the stage announcements. Therefore the

bulldog visaged one cultivated newspapers and newspaper men.

His fellows, too, learned something from him as well as of him. They learned that a well-fitting coat and a clean collar do not necessarily conceal a white liver or a weak heart. One does not need to be named Murphy or Bogan in order to have a convincing right hand. The fine lines of the royal young bulldog are even more indicative of dogged physical courage than the sullenest and ugliest mongrel visage that ever glared into a fighting ring.

Not all of these sapient lessons were taught or learned in legislative halls. It is related picturesquely, even fawningly by biographers that a night brawl in the neighborhood of a hotel café or barroom in Albany finally established Roosevelt's reputation in legislative circles for physical courage and a mighty right arm, just as that reputation has been established for many humbler bruisers. It was a dramatic incident, losing nothing in the garnished telling by these imaginative biographers.

Our solon, alone, unattended proceeded at night from the lobby of the hotel to the café or barroom. This Albany hostelry was a favorite resort for legislative politicians. Meanwhile a foul plot had been hatched by revengeful enemies. "Shorty" was to be the instrument of execution. Of course "Shorty's" record was red with prize-ring gore, and plethoric with prize-ring victories. Otherwise vital dramatic elements in the story would have been lacking. Forming the apex of a flying wedge "Shorty" was thrust

rudely in the path of our Solon, barring his barward progress, and jostling his manly feelings as well as his slender person. With vicious uppercut" the "Shorty" right shot out, that right which had done such prize-ring execution. But only to fan unsubstantial air. Solon smiled engagingly and with the quickness of light, or at least, electricity, Solon's well-directed smash sent "Shorty" to the hard, unsympathetic stones.

Since biographers are blessed with different degrees of imaginative enthusiasm, the narrative at this point varies, the most entertaining if not the most plausible version being that Solon smote the human flying wedge and the human components thereof hip and thigh until the lobby floor was strewn thickly with the fallen. Then with long, melodramatic stride he confronted the conclave of scowling, conspiring, discomfited enemies and flippantly, even mirthfully hurled contemptuous defiance full in their faces, baring his teeth the while in a chilling smile, without so much injury as a spectacle awry. Thereafter his wicked "enemies" respected the compelling logic of his argument. This was to be expected. John L. Sullivan's prowess was never illustrated by a more convincing tale. Scott could not tell a prettier story of Richard Lionheart.

To young Roosevelt, one term in the Assembly meant another. This time Bogan et al. were in overwhelming numbers, for they marched in with the triumphant Cleveland over the wreck of the rotten Republican machine. This machine with characteristic unrighteousness, but with a brazen boldness, rather than its usual smug but

shifty hypocrisy, had placed itself in opposition to every reform that the people demanded. Roosevelt's district, however, was so safe a Republican stronghold that he survived the deluge. With so many of the veteran Republican clansmen swept into the abyss, Roosevelt and his year of legislative experience loomed conspicuously in the Assembly. He was made Republican candidate for the speakership with the incidental distinction of minority floor leader. Considering the Democratic majority, this was a barren honor. At least it might have been barren for any other person. It gave young Roosevelt opportunity to develop his dramatic and fighting qualities and to court further publicity.

In accomplishment for Roosevelt, this session was scarcely less barren than the last; still he made progress. Your machine politician makes red relentless warfare upon the real independent, as soon as the independent one has unequivocally placed himself. His sympathies go out to the partisan, even in the opposition. It makes little difference, too, how rabid the partisan. Murphy, Bogan et al finally catalogued Roosevelt as a thick-and-thin Republican partisan, and figuratively speaking they took him to their political bosoms. His bark was annoying, but not dangerous. They learned to enjoy it on occasion. In an Assembly Democratic five to three, they permitted Roosevelt to introduce and pass a primary law, the primary law recommended by Governor Cleveland in his message and agreed to by the partisan politicians. It indicated that Roosevelt was not unpopular with the "braves."

Biographers tell a pretty story of the young assemblyman standing at first aloof striving after high ideals, a chaste and pure isolated peak. Soon he felt his loneliness and impotence. The political Mahomet would not come to the mountain, and strange to say this "isolated peak" developed motion and came to the political Mahomet, somewhat reversing the old order of things. This primary law came when "isolated peak" had become perambulatory.

In the great reform programme of Governor Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, naturally, was assigned no other number and took but a critic's part. Civil service reform was the piece-de-resistance of this programme. Since Roosevelt had been in knickerbockers, civil service reform had been agitated. Such men as Curtis, Godkin and Schurz had been urging it with greater and greater emphasis. The useful Allen Jenckes, despite his plebeian name and his coming out of that most unholy little commonwealth, Rhode Island, must be given the credit for getting a hearing for this reform. His work began in the sixties. Several presidents had referred to it officially and otherwise. At length by dint of the enthusiastic support of such men as Curtis, and his friends outside, and the persistent efforts of Pendleton, Democrat, in Congress, civil service had become an issue in politics. Garfield's assassination by an office-seeker with a grievance made it a burning issue. Cleveland and the Democrats took it up in New York.

For two years a law had been prominently

before Congress, urged by the persistent Pendleton. In January, 1883, about the time that the New York Legislature convened, a national measure was passed. Dorman B. Eaton of New York, backed by Curtis and the Civil Service Reform Association, had whipped the Pendleton measure into a satisfactory piece of legislation and it passed a Republican congress by a non-partisan vote, counting its friends and its enemies on both sides of the chamber.

Then it was "up to" New York Democrats to make good platform pledges and to pass a similar measure applying to New York State. Several bills were introduced, but the bills fathered by Assemblymen Miller and Brooks seem to have been those favored by the committee. They had the sanction of the New York Civil service organization. These bills were pushed forward in the legislature until on May 2, 1883, a bill made up of some of the elements of both was offered by Michael C. Murphy of New York City, chairman of the committee on Affairs of Cities. It passed the Assembly by a vote of 96 to 2. (There were about 48 Republicans and about 85 Democrats in the Assembly.) Only Assemblymen Avery and Small voted against the measure.

Theodore Roosevelt, civil service reformer, did not vote, although he was present in the Assembly immediately before, if not, indeed, at the time the vote was taken. (Assembly Journal for 1883, page 1338-9.) The measure two days later passed the Senate unanimously. It became the first effective state civil service law.

Some strange aberrations are shown by Roosevelt's sapient biographers in dealing with his early record on civil service reform. One biographer is sure that Roosevelt originated the idea or at least introduced it into the country. He is made by this biographer, not only the author of the New York measure, which he did not see fit to support with his vote, but the national measure is modeled upon the New York measure! It seems to make no difference at all to this historian that the National measure was in Congress before Roosevelt left college and was on the statute books about the time of the convening of the New York legislature which passed its own measure five months later.

Stratemeyer in his "American Boy's Life of Theodore Roosevelt" says that one of the greatest services done by "Theodore Roosevelt at that time" (when he was assemblyman) "was the support given by him to a civil service law for the state."

Our good Indian, Francis E. Leupp, in his campaign life of Roosevelt shows an even more capricious imagination as to this portion of his hero's record:—

"Mr. Roosevelt, who had been his" (Dorman B. Eaton's) "enthusiastic colleague in the National Civil Service Reform League, was author of the bill which passed the legislature of New York during President Cleveland's administration about simultaneously with the Federal act." (Leupp's Life of Roosevelt, page 34.)

Shades of George William Curtis, and Roosevelt did not even vote for the measure; civil ser-

vice had passed Congress months before; impossible Tammany men had prepared and passed the Cleveland law in New York! Even so blase and sophisticated a biographer as Mr. Leupp can on occasion perpetuate a "wonder story" when Theodore Roosevelt is the subject. Not nearly so exact was this as the George Washington hatchet story which was exploded by Theodore Roosevelt's good friend Lodge.

In the civil service matter Theodore Roosevelt's action was characteristic. This wise and discreet young man had already learned not to pin his faith to new and strange measures of doubtful and untried popularity. The knowledge was kept before him throughout his subsequent career. Let others do the pioneer work. The band-wagon must be well filled and tooling along swimmingly, before he claims a seat. Then he sees to it that the most conspicuous place is accorded him.

Our discreet young solon, as in after life, was impulsive only on the surface. Impulsiveness with him was a stage business, used for dramatic attractiveness and advertising purposes. Under the skin Theodore Roosevelt was wary as a wood lynx. Platonic affection for free trade or civil service reform was all right. It tended to bring good fellowship at Harvard and in the Reform Club, but a young solon with a political future in the "ruling class" must be careful. Time would tell how the crowd would take this Cleveland measure supported by Bogan et al. There would then be plenty of time to use it in

one's business. If it proved a fiasco, the Tammany shoulders were broad and strong. Roosevelt's skirts were clean.

It was not the last of civil service during Roosevelt's legislative career. The next New York assembly counted its Republicans in numbers like unto the Democrats in 1883. These high-minded reformers immediately began assaults upon the Cleveland civil service law. Roosevelt was a prominent member. It is to be presumed that by this time he had sufficient confidence in civil service reform to consider it a safe thing to tie to for even the most discreet of young men. History does not record that the coy young Roosevelt aided or abetted the assault upon the Cleveland civil service law. There are some indications that his activity was in support of the measure's integrity. However that may be, the Republican Assembly of 1884, of which Roosevelt was an influential member, did emasculate the Cleveland civil service law, and it is not recorded that Roosevelt made strenuous effort to prevent that emasculation. The law was made a milk-and-water thing by repealing the section (Section 10) prohibiting political assessments upon state office-holders by outsiders; by exempting soldiers and sailors from its operation, and by other touches deft and cunning. It was extended to cities as a compulsory measure, but in such extenuated form that firemen, police officers and most of the important classes escaped through its wide-open meshes. If one has not the milky way

notion of Theodore Roosevelt's importance, his legislative record on civil service reform, in view of his subsequent clamorous insistence of the reform's importance, would surprise one, to say the least.

CHAPTER III.

ROOSEVELT BECOMES AN INVESTIGATOR.

According to folk lore, in the third trial lay the charm, and this proved true of Roosevelt. With a third term he rounded out his legislative career. Republicans were in the saddle. He found unusual opportunity. New York political tactics were simple as a child's primer. Tammany Democrats looted the city; machine Republicans as regularly looted the state. Machine Republicans covered up their own iniquities by exposing the city wickedness of Tammany. Tammany Democrats defended their plunderous strongholds by bombarding the hypocrisy and crookedness of the up-state hordes.

Grover Cleveland had entered as a disturbing element, for the moment putting to rout the Tammany enemies up-state, but finally betraying his unsavory metropolitan allies to Republican ambush and defeat. It was a beautiful situation. Here the up-state machine could use to mighty advantage the clamorous honesty of young Assemblyman Roosevelt.

A patriotic, non-partisan organization, the Union League Club of New York, whose political actions are always highly disinterested,—strictly for the public good, initiated this particular as-

sault upon Tammany. (I neglected to say that all the members of this Union League Club are Republican partisans in good standing who habitually find practically all virtue in the Republican party, as it will be remembered Historian Roosevelt found in its Federalist ancestor.) It was important that this Union League movement should have the appearance of disinterested reform. Possibly it was Thomas Ryan's friend, the distinguished Elihu Root who fathered these resolutions and spoke to them convincingly. We do not now remember distinctly. At all events a proper member must be found in the New York Assembly to serve as official head for the assaulting column.

Two Republican party wheel-horses, Littlejohn and House, took the Union League Club resolutions into the assembly and Gibbs did like service in the Senate. As soon as the legislative branches had formally declared war, House and Littlejohn modestly retired, remarking that they wished to use their time for legislative purposes at Albany. At first it was suggested that the direct physical assault (the investigation) be left to the committee on Affairs of Cities of which Roosevelt was chairman. Then it was decided to appoint a special committee with Roosevelt still chairman. His clamorous honesty would be a buckler and shield in the up-state campaign against Tammany. Roosevelt entered into the spirit of the movement.

Right here there was a little rift in the partisan lute, seemingly so well attuned to anti-Tammany battle strains. Union League, as everyone knows,

is too respectable to give anyone a general commission to smash political crockery right and left, even though it be Tammany crockery. Some of its friends, like Thomas F. Ryan and William C. Whitney might suffer. Union League wanted Hugh O. Thompson and his department of public works investigated. It did not care to go further. Take down the bars and one could not tell where such an investigation may lead.

Gibbs was well in hand and consented. Assemblyman Roosevelt wanted a general commission, a sort of letter of marque against Tammany. Some of the Gibbs men suggested that the House and Senate committees should be consolidated into a general committee. This would make it a Gibbs committee. Roosevelt's name would be left out. His clamorous honesty would have no dramatic avenue of expression. Newspaper headlines would contain the name of Gibbs instead of Roosevelt. That would not do. There were two committees.

Probably at no time for a century could a reasonably efficient inquisition have investigated Tammany officials of New York City (or anti-Tammany officials for that matter), or the upstate machine, without finding rottenness amply sufficient to warrant the investigation. Gibbs and Roosevelt both found Tammany rottenness. Roosevelt with his superior talent for stage business, exploited his find the more dramatically. He got the thing dear to ambitious young men of precious dramatic sense—generous newspaper advertising. A few bills were the result of Roosevelt activity, giving to certain Tammany

officers generous salaries rather than plethoric fees. A thing righteous and just.

Good campaign material were these lurid disclosures. They argued eloquently for a Republican mayor in New York City next time. Mayor Edson had some broad powers of appointment which would hamper his successor. To meet this situation, Roosevelt and his associates essayed the gentle art of "ripping" the New York City administration. It was a mild "ripping," hardly worthy of the name, but it sufficed. Quay legislators in Pennsylvania bent upon smothering opposition in Pittsburg, and Cox's Ohio legislature with similar intentions as to Cincinnati and Cleveland, followed the Roosevelt precedent. Besides Roosevelt got through a measure taking away from Aldermen the power of confirming mayoralty appointments. Although there was a possibility of getting a Republican mayor, there was none of getting a Republican board of Aldermen, so the virtuous partisans of the legislature did the best they could. It was the only way to secure control of New York for the Union League patriots. Of course this making of a little municipal czar of the mayor was entirely in the interest of "good government." It was always easier to elect a "good" czar and put him in control, than to have decent minor officers.

Senator Gibbs with much less fireworks and public clamor, pushed through two measures, excellent in general purport, making elective the places of comptroller and president of the board of aldermen. His good intentions were greatly

disfigured by a provision placing the power of removal in the hands of the governor, rather than in those of the mayor of New York. This was part of the everlasting machine programme of governing New York City from Albany in the interest of the up-state machine.

While the astute Gibbs and the clamorous Roosevelt were industriously smashing Tammany and making capital for themselves and the up-state machine, a matter vital to good government in cities came before the legislature. It was a constitutional amendment embodying the enlightened principle of municipal home rule. Albany's interference with New York City affairs had probably caused ten times the corruption in the metropolis that otherwise would have been possible of accomplishment by a league of all the powers of the world the flesh and the Tammany devil. It just destroyed the resisting power of New York City's citizenship.

In 1882 the legislature had recognized this fact and had voted to submit a municipal home rule amendment to the State constitution. That amendment must pass another legislature before it could be submitted to the people for approval. It was up in this legislature where Roosevelt clamorously contended for pure municipal government. The amendment failed. Roosevelt did not fight it directly or openly, for he had voted for it in the former legislature when it did not need his vote, and stultifying oneself is dangerous business even for a wary young legislator of clamorous honesty. Friends of the bill were pressing it to a vote in the Assembly. Roose-

velt all at once became anxious about the measure's legal form. He lay in ambush and sprung upon the hard-beset thing the bushwhacking motion of reference to the judiciary committee. There it died, killed in exactly the same way as other legislative measures of merit, beset by legislative crooks. Roosevelt was not a legislative crook. Perish the thought. He merely adopted their methods upon this occasion in order to retain Albany control of New York City municipal government, as a handy asset of the up-state machine.

Here was a world of enlightenment as to the quality of our reformer. There was opportunity to do the one thing worth while to meet the conditions with which he battled. Roosevelt chose the more dramatic route of evanescent exposure. As a result New York City continued to have government by Tammany—and hysterics.

Temperance too was a problem with the Assembly. In mellow autumn days, when preparing the lines of battle for capturing the spoils of office, the up-state machine in solemn state convention had pledged the Republican party to submit to the voters of New York a prohibition constitutional amendment. A venerable member who was also a clergyman was possessed by the strange delusion that platform pledges were made to keep. He offered and pressed a resolution for such an amendment. With the fervor and eloquence of a Peter the Hermit he contended for this thing to which his party had so recently pledged itself. Assemblyman Roosevelt of clamorous anti-Tammany honesty was de-

tailed to disabuse the venerable member's mind. Boldly he counseled the lawmakers to repudiate their ante-election platform pledge. To keep it would be disastrous to the Republican party, he said. Party success at that moment loomed bigger to him than party honor. Partisan bias silenced the conscience of this young man of high ideals. Roosevelt somewhere has said that an honest man will keep a platform pledge just as he will keep a personal pledge. But possibly a party platform is not so sacred as a rostrum statement.

Prohibition was not the only issue involved; hardly the main issue. If it were Assemblyman Roosevelt might have had firmer ground to stand upon. His venerable clerical friend was not asking the Assembly to pass a prohibition law. High-minded reformers of insistent honesty cannot be expected to feel bound by party pledges to which mere office-seekers might adhere. The thing asked here was merely giving the people of New York the opportunity to say whether or no they wanted prohibition.

With Roosevelt it was a matter of principle. In his first book thereafter, in which there was an opportunity he justified himself by denouncing as witless fools legislators who would obey the will of their constituents against their better judgment. Poor ignorant voters must be kept in tutelage by their wise solons and given the best government which they are capable of receiving.

Friends and enemies both made capital of an episode in Roosevelt's legislative career. Each

has a different tale to tell. There is dearth of record in checking the laudatory as well as the condemnatory versions of this interesting tale. Either version is characteristic in its way. Each has doubtless in it something of truth.

Tammany and up-state patriots joined hands in 1883 in pushing through the New York legislature a bill reducing the fares on the elevated railways of New York from ten to five cents. One at that time in high place in New York politics and later of national fame as a Washington lawmaker tells the story in this cynic fashion:—

“It was a ‘strike’ pure and simple. The boys felt that they were being neglected by the public service interests of New York City and took this way of showing themselves alive. At that time a five-cent fare was probably unjust to the roads, and I believe the courts would have held such legislation a violation of the transit company’s franchise. The roads, therefore, felt that Cleveland might be relied upon to kill the bill when it came to him, and they paid no manner of attention to the menacing ‘strike.’ In pique at this defiance the Assembly and the Senate both passed the measure. Roosevelt voted for it.

“Sure enough, when the measure reached Cleveland he vetoed it and returned it with a smoking message to the Assembly. Newspapers took it up and made things uncomfortable for the ‘striking’ solons. It ceased to be a badge of honor to have voted for low fare. In fact ex-

planations were required to show that it was not a badge of graft.

"When the measure came up for passage over the veto of Governor Cleveland, there was scurrying of the timid to cover,—with many contrite explanations. Roosevelt also explained.

"'I was busy at my desk,' declared Roosevelt, his thin voice rising in shrill crescendo, 'when this measure came up for passage. I asked the gentlemen about me what it was, and they assured me it was a meritorious measure. I took their word for it and voted for the bill. Now I find I have been deceived. I shall place no further confidence whatever in these gentlemen.'

"Roosevelt did a "flipflop," said the narrator, contemptuously, flipping one hand over the other in illustration of a somersault. "Characteristically he pleaded the baby act, placing the blame upon the other fellow who so wickedly seduced him from the straight and narrow path." As may be guessed, this narrator loved not Roosevelt.

The other version has Roosevelt arising upon the floor and frankly announcing that Cleveland had converted him. He felt that it would be injustice to the roads to put a lower fare in force and Roosevelt could no more do an injustice than Washington could tell a lie. He would support the veto of Governor Cleveland.

As the record shows, Roosevelt voted for the measure when it originally passed the Assembly, but switched about and voted against it when it came up on the question of overturning

Cleveland's veto. He did explain his vote. Whether cynic narrative or hero tale be true, we must judge as we read. If the righteous young solon shifted the blame for his mistake upon other shoulders, it was not the last time he was to take such praiseworthy action. If he permitted his solicitude for the welfare of the corporation to crowd out his sympathy for its patrons, it was not to stand as an isolated peak in his career. Probably Roosevelt made both explanations, for both are characteristic. One thing is certain, whether or not his stand was courageous and manly, his motives certainly were not corrupt. For Roosevelt has no taint of dollar-lust dishonesty.

In the next session the New York street railways had the Assembly better in hand for up-state influences governed. Lines of communication were less obstructed. This up-state machine was as successful a band of political freebooters as ever—outside of Pennsylvania—looted a confiding municipality of its priceless public service franchises. Through this legislature in which Roosevelt was a prominent member of the dominant party, was passed a railway consolidation act which was the progenitor of practically all of the subsequent legislation which has served to loot New York City out of its street railway wealth. Nowhere do we find recorded determined opposition of the strenuous one to this nascent steal. Yet it meant millions to New York where Tammany speculation meant thousands.

Assemblyman Roosevelt bade good-bye to the

legislative chamber a wiser man than when he entered, and with fewer and different ideals. The faithful Riis tells of the young man in his first year of service playing the role of "isolated peak" standing apart in cold ideal purity. He learned to be practical, to do things to the everlasting benefit of other legislators who dote upon the fleshpots of legislation's pleasant valley.

Possibly this was all true. Roosevelt undoubtedly thought himself an isolated peak, for this distinguished man has always taken himself with great seriousness. In his estimation, events must necessarily revolve about him. But if there was really an isolated peak in the New York legislature in 1882, it was well concealed in the partisan jungle. At all events Roosevelt quickly descended into the delectable valley of politics and power.

That Roosevelt made a very marked impression upon his fellows of the New York Assembly, goes without saying. His work, however, was in no way extraordinary. It would be difficult to point out anything of permanent value which he accomplished for the State. Undoubtedly his experience was of permanent value to himself. If Roosevelt differed from the average legislator, he was greater rather than less.

No problem with which he dealt was touched by him at a vital spot. He blazed no pioneer trail. Our young hero was cautiously rash, as well as clamorously aggressive, yet he traveled legislative highways well worn by meeker men. Never did he delve beneath the surface. Symptoms were the only things he essayed to treat. No

probe of his struck the deep-gnawing disease. Roosevelt wanted to be understood and appreciated by men. To win appreciative applause, one must learn to play upon prejudices as upon a well-thumbed lute. Roosevelt schooled himself in all the popular stops and keys. From legislative halls Roosevelt came with serpent wisdom. If there was drama in the situation Roosevelt could stage it as nobody else could. At the end of his legislative career, he was a connoisseur in the political show business, from multichrome posters to the dying declaration of the villain. Stage business came naturally to him.

Substantial accomplishment is another story. Roosevelt dodged civil service. Probably he distrusted the new plan. Later it became the most important business of his career. Upon temperance, municipal government, franchise legislation, his record was indifferent. Whether through failure of comprehension or mistaken sympathies, one is left to judge. Against the development of the democratic idea, his influence was set like a flint. This was on principle. This highly practical and wise young man, had in three short years narrowed from a man of ideals to a partisan politician—and the partisan politician, whether he will or no, must place party above city, state or nation where their interests clash. But few learn to place it also above the interests of No. 1. Roosevelt did not.

CHAPTER IV.

ROOSEVELT MAKES CRUCIAL DECISION.

Theodore Roosevelt soon had occasion to use all the political wisdom he had acquired as assemblyman. He stepped from legislative work into national politics. Strenuous times were these. Stalwarts, half-breeds and independents were contending in deadly struggle for supremacy in the Empire state.

Newspaper prestige had he. He had appended his name to a sensational report of sensational investigation. New York with the ardor as well as the fickleness of a courtesan was pushing her new favorite to the front.

Blaine like Clay of earlier days had been pursuing the presidential phantom for many weary years. Now it seemed almost within his grasp. Machine Republicanism and the forces of corruption, which in the years of iniquity following the Civil war had grown strong, were everywhere working in his support. But New York had one of her spasms of virtue. In the presidential caucuses Blaine and his stalwart forces had gone down in defeat before the allied forces of half-breed and independent. Senator Edmunds was New York's candidate. Roosevelt who had fought as an independent, led the dele-

gation. This delegation contained such men as George William Curtis (a curious commentary on the way politics often pushes to the front the untried and the immature, ignoring those of long and honorable service).

In the convention Roosevelt seems to have fought manfully for his candidate, but Blaine was nominated. It was a sore blow to "independent" forces. Almost immediately a nasty scandal suppressed for years, broke upon Blaine with full force. Everybody open to conviction had the convincing, damning Blaine record before him. This record was black enough. The Mulligan and Fisher letters convicted Blaine of corruption in office—using his position as speaker of the House of Representatives for private gain. In addition he practiced mendacity to escape the charge.

Blaine was inimical to every enlightened domestic policy. At this time when there was promise of civic awakening Blaine had his face turned to the setting sun. He was hostile to civil service reform, to tariff reform, to clean politics. Blaine was not a Quay, but he was of the Quay school. Brilliancy and personal magnetism glossed over his rascally traits.

Against this proved corruption was pitted Grover Cleveland, who up to that time had an official record of sterling, stalwart integrity. Cleveland was right on civil service reform, right on the tariff, and he stood for clean politics. Public office was to him, at that time, at least, a public trust, and there was not a breath of suspicion that this trust had ever been betrayed.

Independent Republicans deserted in shoals the Republican battle-standard with Blaine's besmirched plumes waving at its side. George William Curtis and Carl Schurz were types of those who declared their independence.

Theodore Roosevelt had moved with these men. He was a member of the Civil Service Reform Association. Tariff reform was a favorite tenet from college days. Clamorous was he for honesty in the public service. When Tammany men held the offices, these high ideals were held up before gods and men. He would not be denied. One of his hobbies was clean politics. He knew Grover Cleveland as a man of official efficiency, purpose, intelligence and integrity. Cleveland's programme at that time was practically Roosevelt's programme in public affairs, if we are to judge by the declarations and association of Theodore Roosevelt.

This rash, this impulsive, this earnest young man, this young man of high ideals and fixed convictions seemed to have no choice. Independents were sure he must come with them.

They were mistaken. The rash young man of twenty-six showed a serpent wisdom and caution unknown to timorous gray-beards. Scarcely halting or hesitating, he bade good-bye to his independent friends and stepped blithely under the besmirched banner of James G. Blaine. This young man who had demonstratively stood up in the New York Assembly and asked his party to repudiate its platform for its own benefit, now found party action especially binding upon all party men. He supported Blaine the

corruptionist, the prevaricator, the opponent of civil service reform, the hide-bound protectionist, the man of unclean political associations. Roosevelt could do all this but he could not lay himself open to the charge of partisan irregularity. Convictions on official integrity, civil service reform, tariff reform and the rest were sluffed off and discarded like a last year's garment and in their stead he donned the robe of mere partisanship. Roosevelt supported Blaine. As every partisan on occasion must do, he placed partisan regularity above country, above public good, above convictions, above clean ideals, above civic integrity.

Never a Bogan, a McCarren, or a Murphy, or a follower of Bogan, a McCarren or a Murphy, has shown more narrow or hide-bound partisanship. If Croker's Indians had been as conscientious in partisan regularity as Theodore Roosevelt has shown himself upon this occasion, the boss would still be gathering plums upon Manhattan. For the only way to get political crooks out of power, or to rebuke villainous nominations on the part of political machines is for intelligent men to refuse to be bound by iniquitous party action. Otherwise corruption once in the saddle of a majority party would remain in power forever and a day.

Opportunity had knocked again at the gate of the rising young politician. His decision to remain in the partisan fold was the most momentous thus far in his political life, possibly the most momentous in his whole life. It means much for a young man of high ideals to place his civic

integrity, his civic conscience in the hands of his party leaders to do with it as they will. This is the very thing which has made of voters dumb driven cattle moving under the lash of self-seeking political bosses. Public privilege exploiters make it their stock in trade. It has laid a paralyzing hand upon the Republic from its inception. Blind partisanship has been responsible for at least nine-tenths of the political corruption in American history. Should every voter adhere to it, it would mean the speedy death of the Republic. In Pennsylvania only has this ideal held sway with practical uniformity for a considerable period, and we all know Pennsylvania. When all men reputed to be honest, honorable, patriotic and intelligent in politics, refuse to rebuke their recalcitrant party by temporarily withdrawing support, we may ring the deathknell of self-government. Open revolt in such circumstances is the only bond of party decency. It is not a question of abandoning the party, merely one of castigating it into cleanliness.

Roosevelt, then showed rare courage, rare as Foraker ever displayed, in taking the merely partisan course. In his later writings he says there are occasions upon which men must break with their party. He has been fortunate in never finding an occasion on which he found it necessary to do so. Roosevelt at least kept his partisan record clear, his influence as a partisan unimpaired for future use. Probably it was better to do so in view of an overmastering ambition to belong to the "governing class."

CHAPTER V.

ROOSEVELT ANSWERS A CALL TO THE WILDS.

Coincident with Blaine's defeat was the retirement of Theodore Roosevelt for a time from politics. Atavistic longings for the excitement of the primordial hunter thrilled him. He had met personal bereavement in the deaths of his wife and mother. A sullen wish to get away from men possessed him. It must be quenched in the red blood of living things. His biographer says that Roosevelt must have been born with the instincts of the hunter. When he was given his first gun at ten, all else was forgotten for a time while child Roosevelt indulged the primordial lust to kill. Now again, Roosevelt sought the wilds. Violent, uncouth men and strange beasts were selected for companions. Like a Saxon forest baron Roosevelt drew rough retainers about him and spent his days in tending herds and in slaughter of the wild.

Up to this time Roosevelt had preserved the slenderness of youth. Now he showed remarkable increase in girth. The filling out which comes to most healthy men, especially those who pass a spare and angular youth, now came upon Roosevelt. He became possessed of rough physical strength.

With his biographers this was due to Roosevelt virtue. It was an indication of what will-power could do. He had evaded the Biblical rule and added cubits (in circumference) to his stature. To the faithful Riis, whose pathetic canine loyalty unhorses his judgment whenever Roosevelt is the theme, the thickening of Roosevelt's form was a miracle due to Roosevelt's wonderful will. All others who think it over, will find that what happened here happens with the great majority of the healthy sons of women between their twenty-second and twenty-eighth years.

To Roosevelt on his crude ranch in the barren Dakotas came the well-recognized partisan call. A municipal election was in progress in the Knickerbocker city. It was not Tammany this time. A great popular leader, beloved of the toiling masses, was beginning a campaign which menaced Wall street privileges and Wall street millions. Tammany leaders, those mercenaries of corrupt privilege, took the alarm. They nominated a gentleman of eminent respectability to uphold the traditions of Democracy—and Tweed. There was still danger. The Tammany rank and file would not listen to discipline. Hosts of young men were restive. It was difficult to say how they would vote. At this crisis, the up-state machine commanded its useful son. He came. Not that he had any message to give or programme of city government to carry out. But Roosevelt was a young "reformer." Just the man to keep in the fold young enthusiasts whose ideas might lead them into the George

ranks, even to a war on privilege. Roosevelt heeded the call. He went through a campaign with his usual aggressive assurance. Young enthusiastic voters were divided. Tammany's highly respectable representative was elected with the aid of the young "reformer." George went down to defeat. Privilege was safe. Roosevelt came out a rather poor third in the voting, a thing not especially flattering to the regular nominee of one of the two great parties. Roosevelt was a good soldier and did not complain. He was proud in the consciousness that he had served his party and saved New York City to the respectable element in government. Privilege, too, had won a victory. Mr. Ivins and his commission have recently been furnishing facts as to how valuable such a victory was.

Roosevelt went back to his cow-punchers and his hunting. Here he killed the forest population and wrote epics of the killing. He became part of the primitive lawless life of the frontier. Thus was he to know intimately the two extremes of life—that of the New York Four Hundred and that of the primordial life of the frontier wilderness.

CHAPTER VI.

ROOSEVELT BECOMES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER.

While Roosevelt punched cows and killed bears in the far west he kept an anxious eye upon politics in the East. Political club membership was kept up. He had still the ambition to belong to the governing class.

Activity in the Harrison-Cleveland struggle in 1888 brought its reward in Roosevelt's appointment to membership in the Civil Service Commission. He was to serve with Charles Lyman and Hugh Thompson, the former a veteran in the work.

At this time the "merit" system in civil service had been tried out and its popularity proved beyond question. It was no raw experiment. Great respectability had come to it. It was entirely safe for the most cautiously rash young politician. There were then none of the dangers and problems that beset its pioneer path. No other reform had been so quickly accepted by the respectable elements. Few were less vital in principle to democracy. Not that the "merit" system was not a great improvement over the spoils system. As applied thus far, both have evil elements. The "merit" system, as at present administered, far the fewer.

Therefore the commission had busied itself with organizing the new bureau and pushing forward its claims as rapidly as discretion would suggest. Much had been accomplished. At the end of the Arthur administration there were about 14,500 places in the classified service out of a total of 125,000 places. At that time the classification applied to little more than the departments in Washington. The great postal service and the customs service were touched but lightly. Internal revenue, justice and the rest, not at all.

By executive orders during his first term, President Cleveland had added 7,000 positions to the classified service. Natural growth had added about 5,000 more. When President Cleveland left office in 1889 there were in the classified service approximately 28,000 employees, an increase in the four years of nearly one hundred per cent. This aggregate of 28,000 represented practically five years of patient and unostentatious work on the part of the commission in the application of the law. In this period the commission was headed for the most part by Dorman B. Eaton. Eaton had done much to get the civil service law through Congress. The organization and progress of the commission during this formative period was due largely to him.

With the support of a president, the most consistent civil service reformer who has thus far occupied the White House, the commission had succeeded in getting about eighteen per cent. in numbers of the executive civil service classified. Considering the importance of the positions, the proportion was much greater.

Roosevelt's entrance into the commission was the beginning of a new regime. Then for the first time the reports of the commission became pugnaciously controversial. Enemies were "lambasted" and the work of the commission exploited. What before had been done quietly and meekly was now done clamorously and ostentatiously. Roosevelt's dramatic instinct shines through the dry pages of the reports. Everything becomes superlative. Dramatic situations set in stage business are exploited before an admiring public. As would the editor of a sensational journal bent on street sales, the commissioners pick out some one stirring incident and write their reports around it.

This sort of tactics called the attention of the public to the civil service commissioners. When they looked the thunderous young Roosevelt was always at the center of the stage. He courted newspaper controversies with cabinet officers, Congressmen and Senators. It was not his fault that they were prominent and that controversies with them brought Roosevelt prominently into public notice. Neither was it his misfortune, thus to mount into public view on the shoulders of conspicuous public characters. Roosevelt soon had a reputation as a wonderful "civil service reformer."

As for the real work of the commission, it went on much as usual. Progress during the five years of Roosevelt's service as a commission member was approximately the same as for the previous five years. But the road was naturally

much smoother. Eaton and his pioneers had cleared the way.

Up to this time politicians had pressed each administration to play football with the civil service law. President Arthur had not learned how and President Cleveland, for the most part, resisted the solicitations. But the gang was too strong for Harrison, backed as he was by the insistent and pugnacious Roosevelt. Progress including new places had been painfully slow until President Harrison had been defeated for re-election. His followers, up to that time, seemed to need all the patronage that they could scrape together. But January 5, 1893, less than two months before President Harrison yielded the place to President Cleveland, by executive order he placed all the free-delivery post offices under the classified service. Theretofore only post offices with more than fifty employees had been classified. By this skillful coup of the eleventh hour 7,660 places had been added to the classified list. At the same time 7,660 Republicans who had been happy partakers of the spoils of office, were placed under the protection of civil service rules in anticipation of the assaults of Cleveland's hungry followers. Almost to a man these spoilsmen thus protected were Harrison party, partisans.

History repeated itself. The order of January 5, 1893, was an echo of the Adams midnight judges. A more shabby trick would be difficult to think of, or a more hypocritical one, seeing that it was done in the name of civil service reform. There were murmurings and ques-

tioning of motives. Harrison and his friends of the Civil Service Commission were held up to scorn. Circumstances looked bad. Still the thing was done for all time, and however shabby the trick it would be difficult to say at this time that it was not of benefit to the country.

By dribblets, before this eleventh-hour coup, Harrison had added about 350 other places, so that the end of his administration found about 8,000 places added by executive order and 7,000 new places by natural growth. Without the "midnight" order, Harrison's administration would have meant very little indeed to civil service, even though Roosevelt had been a commissioner a large portion of the time. There were now approximately 43,000 places in the classified service out of a total of 170,000. The number had increased from eighteen per cent. of the whole to twenty-five per cent. of the whole.

As soon as Cleveland took up the work of his second term, he resumed the extension of the classified service. In 1894 he extended the classification to assistant teachers in the Indian schools, to meat inspectors and to messengers in the departments. Also watchmen. Both these positions were open doors through which spoils appointees got into the classified service. Smaller customs houses and steamship mail clerks were also included. Railway mail service was classified. Many excepted places in the postal service came under the classification. Cleveland closed the back door entrance to classified protection by providing that persons appointed to non-classified places could not be transferred to

those which were classified. Roosevelt in one of his reports slyly belittles this work of Cleveland. No political opponent, somehow, has been able to do much capable of meeting the approval of Mr. Roosevelt.

Roosevelt resigned May 5, 1895, to become police commissioner in New York City. No halt was made in the extension of the classified service. Treasury department, pension agencies, Indian affairs were successively brought under the commission. Government printery followed. By the Cleveland order of May 6, 1896, practically all the places in the executive civil service coming within the scope of the law of 1883 were brought under the commission. It was one of the most important orders in the history of the civil service. Only fourth class postmasters and a few thousand other employees were excluded from the classified list. In an executive civil list of 178,717 there were 87,101 classified places. Outside of the classified list, but capable of classification, there were 72,371 places of which 66,725 were fourth class postmasters. Approximately fifty per cent. of the places were classified, a gain of twenty-five per cent. since Harrison's exit. Cleveland was also accused of getting his partisans under cover of the classified service before giving up his official ghost. The charge has little force. His sweeping order was nearly a year before the end of his term, and his work in the same direction had been so consistent theretofore, that his motive could hardly be questioned. For practical, consistent work, Cleveland stands head and shoulders above every

other presidential civil service reformer. While his work was done quietly and as a matter of course it was thorough, greatly strengthening the weak places and striking down evasion and fraud.

Without adding to or subtracting therefrom, we have given Theodore Roosevelt's record as civil service commissioner. He was an efficient officer, despite his bluster and his grandstand posing. Aside from the clamor of it, his record is in no sense extraordinary. Eaton, Lyman or Proctor, although figuring far less in the newspapers could have shown as great accomplishment. If we consider the greater difficulty of pioneer work either of these men undoubtedly did more for civil service than Theodore Roosevelt. Had Roosevelt never been connected with the Civil Service Commission it is more than probable that the cause would still be just as far advanced. Effective fighting was done by his predecessors and his overshadowing chief. His work in the commission was that of a faithful, but noisy and spectacular though very ordinary officer, nothing more. But his personality was never ordinary. He gave a melodramatic glamour to everything he touched. Civil service was no exception. We shall meet him again in the presidency and see what he has accomplished there for this reform.

CHAPTER VII.

ENTERS STORM CENTER IN NEW YORK.

Theodore Roosevelt finally grew weary of tennis and civil service reform. Literary activity palled upon him. His commissionership in Washington and the opportunities it gave "the bumptious young man" cynically "forgiven" by the *New York Sun* for "knowing it all," had made Roosevelt a national figure. His enemies thought him a national joke.

When in office but three months he was telling the country through periodicals and newspapers all about the civil service. Nobody else knew quite so well or could tell the story so impressively. Modesty prevented him from claiming responsibility for the whole civil service movement. But it remained for him to give it real vitality. Such was the spirit, if not the tenor of his fecund elucidations.

Things were happening in New York. Roosevelt looked thither, yearning for a part in the excitement. He wanted to be at the storm center, he said. Parkhurst, the zealot, had blazed the way for Lexow, a small county tool of the up-state machine. Of course the machine took advantage of the situation, and got the credit for the awakening, as Lexow got the credit for the work really done by Recorder Goff.

Good people of New York were aroused. Tammany, the unspeakable, had been wading deeper than usual in its welter of corruption. It had been preying, vampire-like, upon the powers that prey, a parasite upon parasites. Tammany demands grew exorbitant. It wanted too much of the plunder. Respectable big "interests" protested. Small grafters suffered in silence and stored up wrath for the days to come. This made an opportunity. Platt was there to grasp it, for at that time Platt was in the heyday of his power. His Sunday levees at the Fifth Avenue Hotel had become the talk of the nation. Platt was paving the way for the golden age of Governor Black and President McKinley.

At almost any time the citizens of New York City have just cause to flagellate Tammany, just as at any time New York state would be justified in crucifying, figuratively speaking, the up-state machine. Let a crusader arise, a Peter the Hermit, like unto Parkhurst, honest but narrow, and with a real message, and he can find material for a popular uprising. While Parkhurst confined himself to police graft and kindred evils, the interests were at his elbow encouraging on his mission, which was to humble the grasping avarice of Tammany pride. Politicians must have their lesson. Otherwise nothing may be left for the big "interests." An assault upon disreputable powers that prey may, however, in the dust of its conflict cover the taking over of king's ransoms by highly respectable "interests."

Mayor Strong rode into office upon such a swell of circumstances. Parkhurst's flaming

sword had put to flight the obvious powers of darkness. He and his friend Lawyer Moss were a pair to conjure with. Lexow got his commission for legislation from the same power as Strong. Public utility exploiters in partnership with the up-state machine were not to go unrewarded. Platt followers, lean from the stony hills up-state fed fat upon the fleshpots of the metropolis.

Harper's Weekly and the *Nation* saw no good in the Lexow Police measure. To them the cloven foot of Platt was clearly visible. He was trying to make New York police precincts part of his browsing ground. But the mayor was the right man. Business man of reputation, respectable, practical and complaisant, if he should approve these Platt measures even iniquity would be given tone.

Police rottenness had been the issue. Now we must have a correct police board. This was the one thing additional to make the setting perfect. On all sides it was conceded that Tammany's man Martin must go. Mayor Strong selected A. D. Andrews, an Elihu Root Democrat. Or was it William C. Whitney who stood sponsor? Murray and Kirwin who did yeoman service in defeating Tammany were to remain on the commission. Platt forces, at least, so understood. Strong, backed by the Union League Club and the Committee of Seventy, was not so anxious to carry out ante-election pledges, especially since they seem to have been ambiguous pledges. Through Andrews, the Democrat, he started a fight upon Murray and Kirwin

as obstructionists, and incontinently bade them go. It looked squally for Platt.

Mayor Strong floundered around a bit, offering a place on the regenerated commission to Henry Campbell and then to former Sheriff O'Brien. Both declined. By a happy thought, or a timely suggestion Strong hit upon Civil Service Commissioner Roosevelt. Everybody rejoiced, Roosevelt among the rest. He was to be in the "storm center." Now they would have real police reform.

On the other hand Roosevelt was entirely satisfactory to the "interests." Platt, Lauterbach, and their followers were standing in their own light, as mere politicians are likely to do. Possibly they were putting up a show of fight in order to get in on the "melon-cuttings" of the "interests," and by the capture of two places, through Frederick Dent Grant and A. D. Parker, they put themselves in the succession. At least they were collateral heirs.

Roosevelt has the knack of doing things, and doing them noisily, clamorously. While he is in the neighborhood the public can no more look the other way than the small boy can turn his head away from a circus parade followed by a steam calliope. Roosevelt with pen in hand and his doors wide open to the interviewers took up his work as president of the police board.

For months New York talked Roosevelt and police. High financiers rejoiced. A public engaged in such harmless pastime is not over watchful of more important things. Roosevelt and Parkhurst, both resonantly honest, cast out

real Tammany devils whose numbers were legion, while the "interests," silently, deftly, swiftly captured New York public privileges richer than Golconda.

Had Roosevelt's ancestors not reached business satiety, Theodore Roosevelt would have been one of the successful business men of to-day, instead of the most successful politician. Eminently he has the executive talent. This with an utter lack of idealism, the hard-headed practicality of the counting room, the pushing energy of the promoter and an opportunist attitude toward moral questions, made Roosevelt an excellent police head. His were the talents which have made many an American wealthy.

Police administration consists in "doing things." Police should know no principles but those of the law. They should have no policies but law enforcement, sympathetic, human and intelligent, to be sure, but rigid and uncompromising. Roosevelt met the conditions. Lack of idealism might leave his policies narrow and soulless. He might display little strength in the legislative field. Great questions concerning great peoples might be too much for him. But he could take a body of men and police a city. Roosevelt knew his men reasonably well. Energy and the power of concentration brought his personality to bear with maximum weight upon those in his control. Roosevelt is an excellent censor of commonplace morality. He appreciates order and respectability. Order and respectability are the things police are designed to enforce. Roosevelt was in his element. He

made a good police department head, one of the best that New York has produced.

It is said that he had congressional ambitions at that time and wanted to get himself prominently before the people. If so he succeeded. At all events in the light of the good which he accomplished as a police chief we can forgive his clamorous methods. Big "interests" also forgave them.

Corruption was rife in the police force, but it seems not to have penetrated the rank and file. Change of policy and the removal of a few men in high places, put the force upon a footing of reasonable efficiency. The disposition of the commission as a whole was to make an efficient police force. *Harper's Weekly* at the time, in a thoroughly friendly and laudatory article upon Roosevelt's administration of the New York police gave the whole commission credit for the work that was being done.

To write an epic upon police administration is not an easy task, yet that is the task some of Roosevelt's biographers have set themselves.

With access to the columns of leading periodicals, Commissioner Roosevelt did not permit his light to be hidden, nor the sounds of his exploits to die away. Critics then and thereafter attacked the police administration of Commissioner Roosevelt. They ridiculed the Oriental midnight visitations, setting it down as mere stage business. Melo-dramatic exploitation, they said, left unguarded the by-ways of serious crime. It is a controversy into which we do not care to enter.

Certain it was that the cleansing of the police had been made easy by Parkhurst and Lawyer Moss. Roosevelt and his associates had police resources far beyond their predecessors. They appointed about 1,700 new men to the force, unhampered by civil service rules.

One might find good grounds for legitimate criticism. An anonymous "roast" upon Chief Byrnes was given out by the board while the chief was still in office, without taking the trouble to identify the writer or sift the charges. This extraordinary method of dealing with subordinates in office has never been satisfactorily explained. Certainly it did not make for discipline. The victim, at least, could not see wherein it was just or manly.

When law runs counter to the wishes of Theodore Roosevelt, something is likely to happen to the law. Some of the New York police statutes were stretched almost to the breaking point, if, indeed they were not actually fractured. One required that men be given a trial before being removed from their positions. Action of the police commissioners in this matter were reviewable by the courts. Roosevelt and his associates boasted that they had found a way to beat the law. At least 100 men walked the plank without trial. Considering their own highmindedness, there was really no need of law to protect underlings. Some men could not act unfairly if they tried, for whatever they might do would not be unfair. Theodore Roosevelt is one of the few men who can claim this high privilege.

Other civil service principles were taken liber-

ties with too by the police commissioners. When as a member of the New York legislature, Roosevelt "investigated" the police of New York City, he found a very wicked state of affairs in the commissioners arbitrarily designating the men who should be candidates for examination and appointment. Police Commissioner Roosevelt found it convenient, as well as highly proper that men privileged to take examinations for promotion should be designated thus arbitrarily by the commissioners. Commissioners should have the privilege of saying who should get an opportunity to rise, and who should be condemned to plod onward in the ranks. Commissioner McAdoo of later years criticizes this sort of system sharply. Participated in by a commissioner capable of doing wrong, carping critics might see in it the cloven foot of spoils politics, even log-rolling. But of course Theodore Roosevelt could not be suspected of anything like that. He could toy with temptation but never fall. This gave him a new opportunity "to come out strong."

After Roosevelt had his sort of men in office he made an honest effort to give them protection on civil service principles. Like the trick of President Harrison's administration with the postal employees, it finally conferred a benefit on the force. Unlike the Harrison coup, Roosevelt had not filled the places with time-servers. His appointees averaged high.

Good intentions did not save Roosevelt. Trouble thickened about him. In trying to hit Tammany, Roosevelt went too far in his excise

crusade. He offended some good New York people with his all too puritanical Sunday. His stage business, always ridiculously vulnerable was exploited in opposition newspapers until in a large section of the popular mind, Roosevelt became something of a joke. American sense of humor refused to take seriously his gasconade.

Platt had things about where he wanted them. Roosevelt's distracting activity became annoying rather than helpful. He took himself and his work so seriously as to become obstreperous. Then Platt and Tammany put their heads together to tame the obstreperous one. Commissioners Parker and Grant began sticking official pins in the president. Everything Roosevelt stood for they opposed. Popular support in an important sense had not yet come to Roosevelt. Antagonism soon became acute friction. Fighting Theodore Roosevelt had all the fight he wanted right in his own household. The bipartisan board divided athwart party lines, Roosevelt and Andrews standing upon one side and Parker and Grant on the other.

Bickerings became public and discipline in the police force suffered. Chief Conlin said so. He blamed the commissioners for the condition. This was rank insubordination. When brought to task, Conlin refused to explain or apologize. Parker and Grant prevented punishment. Roosevelt was driven into a corner and baited until the strenuous fighting man threw up his hands. Instead of holding on like a thoroughbred and fighting it out to the end, Roosevelt quit—like a fake prize-fighter, his enemies said. His friend

Lodge had found an opening for him in the Navy Department. Roosevelt proceeded thither.

We are not prepared to say that Roosevelt was unwise in his action. Probably he realized that he had lost his grip, and further struggle would have meant defeat and humiliation. He might have known what outsiders could not know, that in the police commissionership of New York under conditions as they then were, there was failure ahead. In that case it was wise to move on and avoid the unpleasant denouement.

Lawyer Moss who with Parkhurst paved the way for Roosevelt, succeeded in his place, making a much quieter, but hardly less efficient commissioner. Really "the jig was almost up." New York tired of Platt and the up-state machine. The spell of hysterics had run its course. Union League Club disinterestedness was no longer accepted without question. Even there were axes to grind in the Committee of Seventy. New York had made a spasmodic effort for independence and failed. It flew for deliverance to the arms of Tammany and Van Wyck, as lesser evils. In making this move New York did not escape the "up-state" machine, nor Platt, nor the Union League Club, nor the "interests." But it found the receptive arms of Tammany—the same old Tammany that it had spurned.

Thus did the police commissionership of Theodore Roosevelt end rather unsatisfactorily. But it supplied New York a new sensation, humored its fit of hysterics, and improved somewhat the New York police force. No indelible impress was left by Roosevelt upon the service, for after

Roosevelt came Tim Sullivan, William Devery and Jerome. More remarkable than all this however, was Roosevelt's retreat under fire. This would have been galling to such a born fighter less thoroughly protected by an embracing armor of self-satisfaction.

CHAPTER VIII.

BECOMES HEAD OF NAVY DEPARTMENT.

From the gridiron heat of the Police Commissioner seat, Roosevelt went to the calm serenity of Washington tennis, literature and naval affairs. Things were happening in Washington. That, too, promised to become a storm center in the near future. Good people who had saved the country from "dishonest dollars," "free riot," "no undershirts" and a score of other dangerous or untidy things, now felt that they should have their reward. Senator Hanna of Ohio was the chief saint among these disinterested patriots. President McKinley's piety was so all-embracing as to give a glamour to all his surroundings, transforming questionable acts into those of the very greatest merit. Hanna and the President had saintliness sufficient for everybody. Their followers were hungry. Well doing alone could not sustain them. Richly did they reap their reward.

"Honesty" seems to have been entirely exhausted in the campaign. As soon as President McKinley was inaugurated, the black flag of piracy was raised on every industrial sea. A carnival of graft, public and private, swept over the country from Maine to California and from

Canada to Mexico. Greedily were the eyes of its votaries set upon rich pickings in other lands. The spasm of paper morality and lip virtue so evident during the most ingeniously insincere and shamelessly mendacious national campaign in our history was to counterbalance all the seething iniquity of the years to come.

When Roosevelt went into the Navy Department, darkening on the horizon was that sullen cloud which later burst into the flash and thunder of the war with Spain. There was unrest in the Orient. China, the mighty sleeping giant of Asia was stretching his limbs in a strife-beset awakening. Audible rumblings of the storm to come were rolling over the African veldt. Roosevelt heard and saw. He felt that he must get into the turmoil.

Roosevelt was an "authority" upon naval matters even before he entered the department. Like "Book-taught Bilkins" he was an authority upon most subjects under the sun. This was a great advantage to Roosevelt. One of his biographers tells how fortunate it was for the country that such a man was at the HEAD of the Navy Department at such a time. Peace-loving Mr. Long of Massachusetts who had the title of Naval secretary, did not seem to count at all. Roosevelt seems to have taken the same view. His seat was scarcely warm in his new place when he was enunciating naval policies and telling the public about them in sapient periodical communications. His facile pen was still with him. Also his power of granting interviews or inspiring

news items in which Assistant Secretary Roosevelt's name appeared.

For a close corporation among the American "governing class" we have nothing else approaching the navy. It is almost as exclusive as the British peerage and like that peerage, manages to digest some especially verdant morsels. The British peerage shows sour stomach for a generation or two after swallowing a brewer with his brewery, or a Hebrew banker with his bank, but the greenest Yankee in America can be polished naval gentleman in six years handling. Or if he cannot, he can be cast out. We do not wish to reflect upon the material in the navy. It has some of the best men in the nation. They are really wonderful men if they have any Americanism left after a lifetime in the service. The naval ideal does not harmonize with democratic institutions.

But the training does not lead to effeminacy. The well-groomed pedigreed bull-dog will fight as well as the gutter cur of the same breed. Society, however, counts for much in the navy. Such being the case one cannot wonder at the persistent recommendation for big-fighting ships which can be made into floating palaces for these fighting gentlemen, of elegance and leisure. Hence also the navy personnel bill. But we anticipate.

Roosevelt had social standing before he went to Washington. He could do something for the navy social circle and it could do something for him. They got along swimmingly together. He was a man after the navy's own heart.

Then the campaign began. Naval officers had a plan all built, varnished and polished to a piano finish. No naval officer wanted to father it. Congress can be pretty nasty to navy and army meddlers. They merely wanted the results which this plan would bring when once installed. The problem to be solved was difficult. Its object once stated, would insure its defeat. As everybody who is anybody knows, the unpardonable badge of dishonor in polite society is labor with the hands. It means acknowledged inferiority if one cannot compel others to do his manual service. Work-begrimed fingers are proof positive that one earns his bread instead of exploiting it from others, and since we have had a "governing class" no gentleman has ever earned his bread in the sweat of his own face. Nowhere better than in the navy has this lesson been bred into the bone. It is one of the navy's most holy traditions.

Circumstances and the ante-Roosevelt plan of organization made the rule difficult of application. Those beautiful floating palaces, the ocean war dogs of Uncle Sam, are put together by skilled human hands. Only the brain that plans for and guides these human hands can fully understand the complicated mechanism instinct with throbbing life. Only hands deft with practice can restore deranged mechanism.

Young midshipmen guide the fortunes of these complicated fighting engines. Responsibility for their condition is put upon these young men. Training must fit them for this responsibility. This is impossible without actual work day after

day with hand and brain. Even after the work of the school the naval man must live with his engines if he is to know and understand them.

This means grimy hands. Grimy hands do not harmonize well with the immaculate whiteness of above-deck dress parade. Naval officers above deck could not live up to their traditions and fraternize with the grimy ones. Engineer officers might emerge reeking with grease and offend the punctillious propriety of my Lord Admiral of His Majesty's ship Invincible. My lady may take deadly offense at the greasy fellow, you know. It was quite impossible that there should be a class of manual-working commissioned engineers ranking with the officers of the line above deck. To make this impossible officially as well as socially was the problem set for Roosevelt to solve.

Roosevelt faced the issue. His prodigious experience of several long months in the department peculiarly fitted him for the task. He knew how to handle congressmen. He headed a board of naval officers who made recommendations and submitted a personnel bill. It was really the piano-polished measure which we have met before. This time Roosevelt was proud to acknowledge it as his progeny. Secretary Long added the weight of his authority to that of his assistant. As a result the bill got an impetus which finally placed it upon the statute books. No begrimed mechanic can now fraternize with the fighting gentlemen of the navy. We have a personnel bill as irreproachable from the standpoint of caste as that of any European

aristocracy. But its efficiency. Oh! that is another story.

In its way, the personnel bill is a wonderful measure. When it came first before Congress, the *New York Nation* pointed out that it would require each Annapolis graduate to be an infantry drillmaster, hydrographer, electrician, navigator, naval tactician, strategist, ordnance expert, acquainted with the making of guns, gunpowder, projectiles, armor, torpedoes; expert machinist, mechanical engineer—and all in the limited course, taking a grammar school education as a starting point. Nobody looks for such midshipmen prodigies. The thing was absurd. Naval men turned their backs squarely upon the modern lesson of specialization, the only method in matters of this sort, leading to efficiency. They tried to turn back the dial to the time of sail fighting craft. The dial would not turn. Gentlemen fighting men were preserved in their spotlessness. We paid the price.

When the test comes we are likely to find that ability to manage warships and fight them, has been sacrificed to the exigencies of the ballroom. There are those who trace the dire disaster of the *Bennington* with its sacrifice of scores of human lives, to the inefficiency of midshipmen in looking after modern ships. Midshipmen are not to blame. It is the system of which the personnel bill is an application. There have been a superfluity of naval accidents these late years. A fleet commander cannot steer his fleet into New York Harbor without running it aground. When our next war comes, there is a serious

question as to whether we shall have skilled engineers to man our vessels. We have neither thorough drill-masters, nor hydrographers, nor electricians, nor strategists, nor navigators among the young men receiving our naval commissions. What the final result may be is not nice to contemplate. We are trying to remedy it by marooning civilian warrant officers upon our ships.

Fathering this sort of plan was Roosevelt's great work in the navy department. To be sure his biographers made him responsible for the efficiency of the fleet in the Spanish war. Every ship engaged in that war, with insignificant exceptions, was afloat and equipped before Roosevelt came into the service. Target practice had already become a policy among naval officers. There is no record of Roosevelt having trained either Dewey or Schley. Watson never went to his school. Probably he could not teach Evans how to fight.

Roosevelt's connection with the navy was characteristic. While the navy was seeking legislation and talking reorganization and expansion, Roosevelt was in the thick of the fray with pen and voice. When it faced Spain on the one hand, and on the other as conscienceless a band of civilian free-booters as ever traitorously tried to make riches out of their country's necessities, Roosevelt sought laurels in more spectacular fields. He remained long enough, however, to see what service he might have been to the nation if he had been content to work in inglorious silence. A man of stern personal integrity in

financial matters, as Roosevelt undoubtedly is, was needed sorely right there to fight American ghouls rather than Spanish soldiers. Roosevelt preferred to give over the inglorious task to a new and untried successor.

His rough-riding brought him more spectacular glory. He got more newspaper notice and better paved the way for higher place in the governing class. His service to his country, however, in the Spanish war was infinitesimal as compared with what it might have been if he had stuck to his post in the Navy Department. There were plenty of volunteers to fight the Spaniards in the field, few to fight the grafters at home.

Roosevelt claimed a hand in bringing about the Spanish war. Such a distinction was not a thing to envy, for it would be difficult to imagine a more needless and therefore a more iniquitous war, or one fraught with direr consequences to the aggressor nation. Possibly Roosevelt as assistant naval secretary sent the Maine upon its fool's errand of bluff to death and destruction in Havana harbor. The man who was responsible for that fine piece of strategy might well claim credit for the war, much as the picador with his red rag may claim credit for bringing on the bull fight. Sacrificing uselessly the lives of 260 American sailors and officers may be mentioned as another item in the credit account of the man responsible for the visit of the Maine. At all events Roosevelt felt that since he had had a hand in bringing about the war, he must take

an active part in that "bigger hunting expedition" of the tropical summer.

To be sure, America had then no dearth of fighting men. Literally an army of a million could have been raised. The struggle was not serious in magnitude, however serious the results. Physical cowards are a rare human product. But men away from the blare of trumpets and the roll of drums, from the inspiring "glory" of waving flags and booming guns, away from the eye of the news reporter, with no hope of crowning fame who will sit down and battle to the death silently with the sordid powers that prey, are scarce indeed. Roosevelt had the opportunity. He fled the field of silent heroism for the spectacular field of glory. This glory came.

Excitement, Theodore Roosevelt finds the very breath of life. The Spanish war offered real new thrills. Aside from book knowledge, Roosevelt knew little of military matters and nothing of war. But Roosevelt had the divine gift of self-confidence. If he were called upon to fresco St. Peters and promised a brass band accompaniment, a newspaper writeup with scare headlines and a commission from magazine and book publishers to tell how he did it, he would undertake the task. This courage to undertake has been an important element in the success of his career.

Possibly Roosevelt has no gift of painting, but he has a gift for military leadership. It meets an intense aspiration. He is fitted for it as for nothing else. Had fate placed him in proper surroundings, he might have attained great prom-

inence as a military man. Keener still is his dramatic sense. He would have made a "yellow journal" editor such as this country has not known, had his lines been laid in such pleasant places. As a circus manager he would have rivalled Barnum. Nobody else saw as Roosevelt saw the picturesque possibilities of a rough rider regiment. Few others understood the vista of newspaper advertising opened up by that idea. Volunteer regiments were just volunteers from this or that state, important only to the state that sent them. Roosevelt would head a regiment that would have the eyes of the world upon it as a novel military experiment. Possibly no other person had the insistence and means of advertising to get together such a body of men. It was certainly a laudable ambition upon Roosevelt's part to have the whole country watch him fight and see how well he could do it. He took the most effective way of producing this result. Roosevelt went into the Spanish war under conditions which to him were most auspicious.

CHAPTER IX.

LEADER OF ROUGH RIDERS.

When men and nations stand up to be judged before some higher, more clear-sighted civilization of the future years, the part played by many American newspapers and public officers in forcing a war with Spain will not be a subject of highest praise.

Wild stories with slight foundation were sown broadcast among the American people. Spain certainly was not wholly responsible for the devastation which meant gaunt famine and grim pestilence in Cuba. Patriot Cubans killed and burned as well as the Spaniards. To be sure, Spain had no business in Cuba exploiting its island people for Spain's selfish advantage. But Spain was not unique in that regard. Nearly all nations were doing it then, and are doing it now. But let us grant that Spain deserves little sympathy for the humiliation that is hers. Then we must add that the course which the United States has pursued in Cuba, Porto Rica and more especially the Philippines, fully justifies Spain so far as America assumes to be a critic.

America might have been sincere in April, 1898. The American people, as distinguished from official America, undoubtedly were sincere

in taking Spain to task "in the name of humanity," for her Cuban misdeeds. In this year of grace, 1908, America is in no such position. With traditions of liberty and self-government making silent but indignant protest, America has followed Spain in her programme of oppression; followed her without the necessities of Spain. Spain was merely holding what she considered her own and what the rest of the world conceded to be hers. She was ruling Cuba as her traditions taught her to rule. America robbed Spain "in the name of humanity," and adopted Spain's murderous policy to retain the plunder. Spain might have been a monster of tyranny. America became a monster of tyranny and hypocrisy. Spain despoiled and oppressed because it was the only governmental lesson she knew. America threw to the winds her most sacred tenets in order to plunge into a carnival of oppression and despoliation. We would pardon in the slum-dweller what we would consider heinous in the college professor. America has descended from the seats of the mighty, who are mighty because they are just and free into the pack of plunderers and slave-drivers of whom Spain was a most unhappy and warning example.

Apart from all this, America was unjust to Spain. It took the violent and bloody course in securing what might have been won by patient but persistent firmness. Spain was as tired of the Cuban contest as was the rest of the world. But Spain was proud. America knew it. Wise America would have considered Spanish pride and would have left open a possible highway of

retreat without vital humiliation. Spain was ready to meet such a movement more than half way. She had already conceded more than would have been asked of any strong nation no matter how monstrous the provocation. That did not suit the war-makers. They wanted blood—"a bigger hunting."

America furnished the first victims. Baited and at bay Spain was put under the menace of American guns, bristling from an American warship. If Spain was friendly, such a threat was an insult. Inclined merely to be hostile, these guns were an irritant. In any view it was a piece of imbecility, for it promoted trouble without providing means to meet it. It was the wild west way of showing good will—by trenchant display of many big guns. Some insane Spaniard probably set a match to the fuse which America had laid. Two hundred and sixty brave men of the *Maine* were sacrificed to as rank a piece of fool-hardy official bluster as often mars the history of a sober nation. War-makers had won. Frenzy seized America. Revenge!

Official Spain was undoubtedly as much shocked as was the rest of the world. It was willing to have an impartial tribunal ascertain the facts. America would none of it. Spain acceded to America's request for an armistice with the Cuban patriots. Reconcentrado camps would be broken up. "Butcher" Weyler had gone home. This country cried: "Remember the *Maine*!" Official Washington pretended not to understand what Spain said. Before President McKinley sent his war message—two weeks be-

fore,—he knew and the State Department knew that Spain was anxious for a peaceful settlement—even would give up Cuba.

Whether Senators or Congressmen knew it also, we cannot say. Certain it is, the information was not given officially to Congress nor at all to the country. War-makers were in the saddle. They captured the President.

Fortunately for Roosevelt, he missed the staff position that he sought with Lee and turned his attention to the Rough Riders. His lack of military experience was amply compensated by his talent for using others for his own purposes. Surgeon Leonard Wood was this time a willing victim. Captain Allyn Capron was induced to leave the Second Cavalry. He furnished the military talents for the Rough Rider enterprise. Roosevelt became its all-sufficient press agent and promoter. His knowledge of the political wires in Washington, supplemented by that of Dr. Wood, proved invaluable. With this and the long purses of their friends, they had no trouble in securing equipment. Additional regular army officers were placed in subordinate places to leaven the loaf.

No vulgar "ordinary farmer" or "city mechanic" marred this new military aggregation. It was made up of proper gentlemen of the East with zest for a man-hunt, and wild, reckless frontiersmen who loved strife for strife's sake.

Six weeks on the Southwestern plains gave the regiment the rudiments of discipline. Official pull rounded out the equipment so that this one regiment was on about the same footing as the

regular troops. Where other volunteers had black powder, short-range Springfield rifles and a paucity of artillery, the Rough Riders had smokeless powder, the regulation flat-trajectory, long-range rifle, machine and dynamite guns.

Pull energy and insistence, vulgarly known as "gall" or "cheek" put the Rough Riders on the Yucatan with the regulars of the first army of invasion, bound for Cuba. Roosevelt "stood in with the navy," and in the struggle through the surf at Daiquiri, naval assistants gave the Rough Riders preference over the regulars. It was a most important service. Because of it Roosevelt and his Rough Riders were some of the first to emerge from the tangle on Cuban soil.

Blithely did everybody look forward to the advance. It was to be a holiday jaunt. Spaniards could not or would not fight. This was the cheerful view taken by nearly all Americans, but more especially by the men of the army. They had forgotten the lesson that Napoleon once learned in Spain. If this man or that was to share in the "glory" he must get early into the "mess." It was to be merely a race for "glory." That was all.

Strange as it may seem to those who read the history of this struggle, however, the officers of our army seem actually to have had a plan for attacking Santiago. Lawton was to feel out the Spanish line in a flanking movement to the right, working his way about the city until he had it invested from the land side. This would coop up the Spanish troops, cut off their supplies and

finally result in their capture. Frontal attack, especially assault, was not to be attempted.

"The best laid schemes o' mice an' men, gang aft a-gley." Soon this "agley" became a foregone conclusion. Cavalry and infantry started a contest for "first blood." Volunteer cavalry contested with the regular cavalry for the same honor. Plans did not count. Scores of officers must not miss bagging a Spaniard before the season closed. Leaders must secure a trophy of this "bigger hunt" in the tropics.

Gen. Wheeler was ordered to proceed to Juragua and to throw forward pickets to Juraguacita or Siboney so as to get in touch with Gen. Linares' Spaniards and to observe their position. The old Confederate cavalry fighter was warned not to bring on an engagement until Gen. Lawton had pushed into position and until the remaining troops had been landed and organized for advance. Officers who took time to think thanked their stars that the Spaniards had not cut them to pieces in the surf and on the beach as they might have done. These officers wished to tempt fate no further by trusting to blind chance.

No such consideration entered Gen. Wheeler's head. Here was an opportunity to serve the flag he had once abandoned, and this opportunity would not be missed. Hogsheads of ink and acres of display type would exploit the officer who "started things" in Cuba. Gen. Wheeler wanted it known that he was serving the Union. Brigade and regimental officers were his way of thinking. The men wanted to get at the Spaniards. What mattered it that no thought had

been taken for the morrow, that there were no provisions, no adequate transportation for provisions, no tents, no medicines, no hospital service available, no ambulances, no proper ammunition trains, no reserves available for support should the attack develop serious resistance.

Gen. Young says in his official report of Las Guasimas that "I asked and obtained from Gen. Wheeler (commanding the cavalry division) authority to make a reconnoissance in force for this purpose." (The purpose of obtaining positive information as to the position and movements of the enemy in front.)

Gen. Wheeler did not put it in quite that way. He found the Cubans overjoyed with the prospect of going to battle shoulder to shoulder with their American deliverers. Cubans knew the country. Therefore it was not necessary that the American army officers should know it. Gen. Wheeler, probably to gratify the joy of the Cubans, at all events directly in the face of orders to the contrary from his superior officers, "resolved to attack as early (in the day) as possible."

Whether Wheeler was weakly inveigled by the ardent Young, Roosevelt et al., into making an attack under the guise of a reconnoissance in force, or whether deliberately ignoring orders he "resolved to attack" an indefinite number of Spaniards in an unknown position, is difficult to determine. He had an opportunity to outrun Lawton and his infantry in the race for first blood, and he could not resist, neither could his officers. Lawton, on the other hand, was ham-

pered by his soldiery heeding of orders from his superiors, and the necessity of preparing to meet serious resistance before plunging into the fray.

Accordingly, two squadrons of the Rough Riders, dismounted, under Col. Wood and Lieutenant Col. Roosevelt, and a squadron each of the First and Tenth regulars, also dismounted, were lined up in the early morning on the Santiago road near Siboney 964 strong. There was to be a foot race for first blood, the regulars and the Rough Riders taking separate, but parallel trails. In column of twos or single file, as the exigencies of the trail permitted, the troops rushed forward in their race for glory into an unknown and by them, unexplored jungle, in some part of which an enemy lurked.

Regulars went to the right, Rough Riders to the left. With the main body treading upon the heels of the scouts, the race went on. It must have delighted the heart of the most crass and fool-hardy among the reckless Rough Riders. The troops were like two bands of schoolboys racing for a berry patch, ignoring the guarding bulldogs.

Col. Wood's Rough Riders started fifteen minutes later than the regulars, and if they were to be in at the killing they must make the dust fly. Company and subaltern officers seem to have been ordered to sacrifice everything to making speed forward. Young was with the regulars in person. Possibly he was more cautious than his rival runners, Wood and Roosevelt. Whether through caution or luck, he did discover the Spaniards in time to deploy his men and plant his

Hotchkiss guns for the trouble to come. Young says that he sent a Cuban to Wood to warn him of the danger and that the regulars delayed the attack so that the action of both flanks should begin simultaneously. Gen. Wheeler came up and pronounced the arrangement good. Then came the attack, "simultaneously on both wings." Americans drove the Spaniards forward from the ridge beyond; or the Spaniards repulsed the American attack and then retreated, or withdrew their skirmish line. One can take his own view of the matter according to his bias or his judgment.

As we see it, the Rough Riders ran into an ambushade through the impetuous folly of their officers and were needlessly slaughtered. They were saved from utter rout only by the individual courage of the men, and the timely support of the Tenth regulars who had been more fortunate. Sixty-eight of the brave fellows fell in the useless race for glory, sixteen of whom found graves in Cuba. Captain Allyn Capron, who did more than any other man in the Rough Riders' organization to produce the efficiency which was to give glory to others, was among the slain.

This was Roosevelt's first baptism of blood and fire. He stood it bravely as the rest, content to share with them the result of the blunder for which he was, no doubt, in part responsible.

Precariously did the racers cling to their position while Wheeler appealed earnestly for support. Fortunately the Spaniards had no intention of holding this ground. It marked for them a mere skirmish line. They lost from seven to

eleven killed. Everything indicates that the Americans got the worst of it. The cavalry got first blood—the blood of its own troopers.

Wrath welled up in the heart of rough old General Lawton when he heard of the misadventure. He sent support, the coming of whom in full sight of the Spaniards probably helped on their retreat. But Lawton said unpleasant things. His infantry had been deprived of its position in the van. Plans of attack had to be reformed. Soldiers had to be rushed forward without supplies, rations or the means of getting them. Retreat was the alternative to frontal attack on the line of greatest resistance to Santiago. A blunder had been committed which would make the whole campaign doubly destructive and difficult. All to give Wood and Roosevelt's Rough Riders, Young's cavalry and Gen. Joe Wheeler the credit of having fought the first engagement before Santiago.

Lawton told Wheeler plainly that the blood of Captain Capron and the slaughtered troopers was upon his head. There is no doubt as to the force of Americans who took part in the engagement—964. Wild estimates of the Spanish strength are made by American historians of the event. Roosevelt's 1,200 is certainly liberal enough. Yet Young says 2,000 to 2,500 and hints that there might have been 4,000 Spaniards in this fight of June 24. It is doubtful if the Spaniards at that time had 4,000 men supporting that whole line of defenses to Santiago. Lieutenant Miller Tejeira is probably close to the mark in placing the Spanish strength at seven

companies and two guns under Gen. Rubin—about 800 men.

Las Guasimas blundering is excused on the ground that it showed the Spaniards what fighters the Americans were. Spaniards fought just as hard at San Juan and El Caney. Las Guasimas developed the enemy's position. Very well. On July 1 the Americans knew so little of the Spanish position that they actually blundered into a place where they had to advance by desperate assault or retreat in disastrous rout. So far as appears, two scouting companies could without bloodshed have done all that was accomplished at Las Guasimas. If time had been taken for such orderly procedure, and if the advance had been organized properly before it was attempted, the army would have been spared untold suffering due to lack of food, shelter, medical supplies and transportation facilities. The advance upon Santiago would not have been one-tenth as bloody. Many a brave fellow sleeping to-day under the Cuban palms would still have been breathing the free air of America; many invalidated for life by unbearable hardships would still have been useful citizens. Las Guasimas was the initial blunder of a tragedy of official errors before Santiago. In the face of a more resolute and enterprising foe, it would have been the initial disaster, resulting in courts martial instead of glory for the responsible officers. Possibly these officers had the keenness to judge their foe aright and deserve credit for their wisdom.

* * * * *

(Note)—1. Rough Riders had 500 men. Eight were killed and 34 injured. Regulars lost seven killed and eighteen wounded.

(Note)—2. Lodge says: "Then suddenly there were hostile volleys pouring through the brush and a sound like the singing of wires overhead. No enemy was to be seen. The smokeless powder gave no sign. The chapparal screened everything. Under the intense heat the men had already given way. Now they began to drop, some wounded and some dead."

If running into brush infested by an unseen foe and encountering fire from an unseen enemy, fire to which the troops could not reply, was surprise, then the Rough Riders were surprised.

CHAPTER X.

SAN JUAN AND DAYS THAT FOLLOWED.

Las Guasimas sobered Americans somewhat, and eke the Rough Riders. After all this war was not to be a holiday jaunt. Admiral Sampson had shown more enthusiasm than judgment in his cable message that ten thousand men could take Santiago in forty-eight hours.

Still American commanding officers were not ready to begin work before Santiago in a business-like manner. They must adopt Wheeler's blunder and follow the line of maximum resistance into Santiago. Still there was no concerted plan, no holding of division officers to their place, no organization of an adequate transportation or medical or hospital service. Wagons and ambulances and medical supplies, with few exceptions, had been left at Tampa or on the transports. By some hocus pocus of political scheming or some queer freak of fortune, a general who needed a steam winch and a soft mattress for transfer was placed in command, and things moved with consistent rapidity. Thus far it had been a comic-opera war. The dread tragedy of the thing had scarcely begun.

Gen. Wheeler got two batteries June 28th and 29th and wanted Shafter to let him reduce El

Caney. Shafter preferred to let Lawton do it, as originally planned. With abominable judgment, Wheeler thought it would be a skirmish of an hour. This opinion seemed to have been shared to some extent by Shafter and made disastrous his whole plan for the San Juan fight. In fact El Caney was the most stubborn battle of the war. Lawton's whole division of about 5,000 men, outnumbering the Spaniards at least five to one—probably seven or eight to one, fought before El Caney from early morning until late in the afternoon. When the battle was over four American officers and eighty-four men lay dead before the little gray church and the antiquated fort, and twenty-four officers and 232 men had been taken to the rear wounded. But a handful of the 500 or 700 Spaniards were found in the little grimy Spanish town when it surrendered. Their general lay dead with most of his men.

It was a strategic point, which meant water and food for the Spaniards, and the few men who could be spared to defend it fought with most desperate valor. There were tangled masses of human debris in the Spanish rifle pits. Broken and wounded men moaned in the little dim-lighted church. Tangled heaps of slain showed ghastly upon the roads. Spaniards fought from house to house in the village, in the little church, in the blockhouses to the right, and finally in a boulder strewn field. Retreat was cut off by the Second brigade. Only a body of Spanish cavalry escaped early in the engagement and those under artillery fire. Lawton and Chaffee had

reconnoitered their position and had fought as skillfully as gallantly. If the battle had been left to Gen. Wheeler and Las Guasimas methods, it is difficult to say what El Caney might have cost.

According to plans made by the ponderous military genius in command of the army, Lawton, supported by Bates with his independent infantry was to take El Caney, sweep about the Spanish left and strike the Spaniards on the left flank, doubling them back upon Santiago, while Kent and Sumner, who had succeeded Wheeler, ill on June 30 when the attack of the next day was planned, were to move forward toward San Juan and get in position for a general attack as soon as Lawton had successfully executed his turning movement, and come into touch with Sumner's right. Duffield was to make a demonstration before Aguidores and keep the Spaniards in the dark as to the real point of attack.

It was not a bad plan, but the commander of ponderous physical weight had not taken the trouble to learn anything of the character of the field of battle. He had reckoned, too, without taking into account the desperate character of Spanish valor when pressed into a corner.

Spanish troops occupied a steep, rugged ridge of hills in front of Santiago, covered by intrenchments and guarded by a fort or blockhouse, called San Juan. This position was flanked upon the extreme American right by El Caney and on the extreme American left by Aguidores, both out of full touch with the main position. The American front, or rather the American line of

march into position formed an acute angle with this ridge, the left of the American position coming into close touch with it. Gen. Wheeler says he knew the ground between the armies and told Shafter of its character. Whether or no Wheeler's information was insufficient or Shafter misunderstood it, there can be no question about the blundering. Shafter ordered Kent and Sumner's divisions forward two miles from their position near El Poso to bivouac and await the result of Lawton's attack. They were to move into position very early on the morning of July 1 and Lawton was to begin his attack upon El Caney still earlier.

Sumner, according to Col. Roosevelt, knew nothing of the ground he was to occupy until the day of the battle. Stephen Bonsal says Sumner knew no more about the creek bed he was to hold or the ground beyond than he did about the topography of central Borneo. Hawkins seems to have been no better informed. Executing Shafter's order brought them both under Spanish artillery and Mauser fire at from 800 to 1,500 yards range. Our ponderous commanding genius actually sent these two divisions into a death-trap—a fine place to bivouac and to await results!

Repeatedly the American artillery was tried to cover the advance of the troops, but with its black powder it could make no stand against the masked Spanish batteries. Each attempt ended not only disastrously to the artillery, but also to the troops it attempted to support. The clouds of smoke made a target for the dons.

Troops found the jungle impracticable and were obliged to advance along the roads, in concentrated order. Finally when the roads became untenable the Americans were deployed in the jungle and under cover of the creek banks which lay between them and the Spaniards. But the Spaniards had the range of the American lines, and their deadly fire never ceased.

All that long hot morning bullets sang the song of death in the jungle, along the narrow trails and in the glades before San Juan. The scythe of the grim reaper spung unseen. Men turned over and groaned or threw up their arms wildly and fell forward. Only a little blue mark told the story. Or was it a shrapnel shell that came screaming like an angry demon and turned a whole platoon of our devoted men into a mass of quivering, groaning mangled flesh? Our men could not reply for they could not see the foe. It was like fighting air. They had only to pursue, doggedly, grimly under the scorching tropical sun along the quagmire trail or through the tangled jungle, their march of death.

A captive balloon tugged at its cable. Bullets buzzed and whistled about it like a hive of bees. Down the cable came the deadly humming, until the brave fellows at its base caught the death hail. Congested on the trails, massed at the fords, tangled in the jungles, they crept on, the same song of death sounding dirgelike in men's ears. At every turn the same spiteful, hissing stealthy messengers took their companions from them as the troops moved on. It was a trying ordeal for seasoned veterans. For volunteers,

it was more than flesh and blood could stand, to remain just targets for a deadly fire from an unseen foe. For the troops with the long-range rifles and the smokeless powder, there was still some hope. They could volley back at random the deadly leaden storm. But for the men with Springfields, firing meant merely a smoke target and sure destruction.

A less ponderous military genius would not have sent the infantry and dismounted cavalry into such a death trap. He would have had his longer range artillery and a line of skirmishers keep the Spaniards in their trenches until Lawton had done his work at El Caney. If the real attack upon San Juan had come a day later and had been accompanied by a flanking movement on the part of Lawton, it is probable that the ridge would have been taken without great resistance.

Like a horse in a quagmire, the more the troops struggled, the deeper they sank into the mire of their impossible position. They were paying in full measure for the folly of their officers in plunging into such a place without knowing their ground. After this heart-breaking struggle forward through the sweltering jungle or along the steaming trails under the deadly Spanish fire and the scarcely less deadly tropical sun, the Americans finally found themselves deployed before the Spanish position.

Gen. Hawkins with the Sixteenth and Sixth United States infantry of Kent's division held an advanced position at a wire fence, beyond a wood at the foot of the hill just beyond the San

Juan river. He made up the American center, almost facing fort San Juan. On the left were the Thirteenth and Twenty-fourth (colored) United States infantry, and still further to the left a little to the rear, the Ninth United States infantry. To the left still further in reserve were the Tenth, Second and Twenty-first United States infantry. To the right was the cavalry division—well to the right of San Juan fort and its defenses. The cavalry was placed with the Sixth regiment in touch with Hawkins' right, and the Third, Ninth, Rough Riders, Tenth and First regiments extending in this order to the right. Rough Riders were at the center of the cavalry line to the right of and quite beyond San Juan fort. A low hill lay in front of the cavalry division, called the Hill of the Kettles, or Blue-house hill. Beyond this there was a depression and then the San Juan ridge. When the Americans advanced they found a strong skirmish line on the Kettles Hill.

Americans found that the Spaniards had the range of the American lines while Americans were only guessing at the location of Spain's entrenchments. Iron men could not remain indefinitely mere targets for a concealed fire. The troops were beginning to show nervousness. Then was it realized that the army of invasion in Cuba was in a desperate position. Orders to "bivouac and await results of Lawton's attack" were seen to be absurd, for the battle was still raging at El Caney.

Lieutenant Ord of Gen. Hawkins' staff found and climbed a very tall cocoanut tree. He it

was who first saw the exact Spanish position and located the San Juan fort. Hawkins saw at once that the only way to save the army was to assault and take San Juan hill. He returned to the ford and so told Kent and Sumner. They agreed. Col. Miley of Gen. Shafter's staff took the responsibility of directing Gen. Hawkins to advance with his brigade and capture San Juan blockhouse. Gen. Hawkins ordered his brigade brought forward and exploring further to the front, he discovered a trail leading to the open meadows at the foot of San Juan Hill. The Sixth and Sixteenth were deployed on either side of the trail as they came up. Hawkins sent for the Seventy-first New York, but the horrors of Aguidores ford and bloody angle were too much for the already overstrained nerves of the men, and they fell into confusion. Only scattered companies and groups of soldiers joining with the regulars made the charge. The Seventy-first is called a coward regiment. It is a vile aspersion. With their black-powder Springfields, worse than useless and their inefficient officers, they were put to a test to which no other soldiers even there submitted. They were not cowards who scaled San Juan heights with Rafferty—who kept step with their comrades without firing a shot, for that was the only condition upon which the separated companies and groups were permitted to participate. Regulars knew that black powder volleys would mean swift and certain death for the advancing troops.

Hains' battery was put in position near the stream and Parker's gatlings were placed well

to the front. Emerging from the jungle the thin lines reformed. What was left of the Sixth and Sixteenth under Hawkins lined up at the wire fence where the jungle joined the meadows. Soldiers were ready to do deeds praised by war-lovers for all time, or to stampede in broken disorder back into the jungle whence they had come. Nerves were tense to the breaking point, ready for prodigies of valor, or utter failure. A yellow streak anywhere then might have meant utter rout.

As Hawkins waited at the river ford to get his men across and his strength in hand, there was a rush in the jungle ahead like a stampede of wild elephants. One hundred and fifty men in wild disorder broke through the bushes and bore down upon the general and his staff. When they met him there, standing like a granite boulder, they slowed down, halted, stood abashed. The panic died before his cold sternness. Peremptorily he ordered the men back to the front.

"I think I had better put them back in their position in the line," remarked Lieutenant Ord of the General's staff. "If I do not see you again, good-bye!"

Ord swung ahead and the 150 men followed resolutely to the death of heroes or to heroic victory. Such is the narrow dividing line between valor and cowardice upon such a field. One should be careful in applying epithets.

Up to this time each soldier had fought alone in the dark jungle facing steadily death as best he may, and the final forming for the charge was the most trying of all. Now they were to

have the support of fighting comrades at their elbows. There had been paltering. Now there was to be action. The supreme test.

Parker's gatlings, well before the line began to drum in a fiercer, higher note. Hains' battery stood the Mauser hail and the hell of Spanish shrapnel, returning death for death. Big guns thundered from the invisible heights. Mauser bullets wailed and hissed in shriller tones. Machine guns barked and snarled like a pack of fighting wolves. Forward march, guide center! had been passed along the line. "To the charge!" rang out the bugle of the Sixteenth.

On through the guinea grass swept the thin blue line against a gale of screaming lead that rolled over the meadow as a summer squall might a wheat field. With mechanical regularity, as from a machine, came the Mauser volleys from the ridge. The Spaniards realize that the supreme test has come and the hail of bullet and shrapnel is redoubled. On goes the thin line, rising and falling, like the short waves in a choppy sea. Each platoon stands, fires, drops while another advances, then rushes on again. Across the meadow zig-zags the blue wave leaving in its wake writhing spots and masses of blue, but still it advances. At length the dead line is passed. The first blue wave has reached the very foot of the hill, which itself becomes a protection, for it masks the fire of the distant Spanish artillery and can scarcely be reached from the Mausers upon the hill's crest. Fortunately the Spaniards have fortified the ab-

solute crest of the hill instead of its military crest. It means much for the assailants. Bullets still sing dirges overhead, and shrapnel shrieks, but the message just now is for the blue lines in reserve.

To the right on the Kettles Hill the Spanish outpost has given way, hurrying from its trenches and retreating upon San Juan ridge. Hawkins' advance threatens to cut it off. But we are climbing the hill with Hawkins. Getting thinner and thinner as it goes, the blue line surges up the steep slope toward the blockhouse. Parker stands by his red-hot guns, now silent. Hains has been signalled to cease artillery fire. Now the Spanish trenches are in sight and the blue line again full in range. Spaniards leap from their trenches as the blue line sweeps relentlessly forward. A Cuban soldier stands in the open space before the trenches, hat in hand waving onward his American comrades. Spanish fire becomes more erratic. Sullenly the defenders withdraw. The red and yellow flag of Spain falls upon the roof of the blockhouse, an omen of defeat. Soldiers of the Sixth and Sixteenth are already at the brink of the reeking bloody Spanish trenches, piled full with Spanish dead.

Down through the depression from Kettles hill have swept the cavalry regiments pressing the retreating Spanish skirmishers. They have reached the foot of the great ridge even as the Sixth and Sixteenth have attained its crest. Captain Bigelow of the Tenth cavalry with his dismounted troopers has almost overtaken his in-

fantry brothers. Lieutenant Short and his troop of the Sixth cavalry is at his shoulder. All along the ridge the Spanish line wavers and falls back. The Thirteenth, Ninth and Twenty-fourth sweep in from the left and scour the ridge as far as the haciendo in front of the cavalry position. It was the Thirteenth which captured the fallen Spanish flag. Lieutenant Preston of the Sixteenth whose trumpeter sounded the charge, brings up the national and regimental colors, and they wave over the fort as the crowning signal of conquering success. Troopers have climbed the ridge to the right in open order, up to the haciendo, meeting a withering fire from the second line of Spanish trenches. Now the whole ridge is ours.

Dearly had we paid for it. More than 1,000 American soldiers who the day before had throbbed with vigorous, promising, useful life, now mangled into masses of insensate flesh awaited the awful repast of the low-circling vultures; or battered into moaning wrecks strewed San Juan field from foot to crest. Moaning soldiers lay scattered through the jungles. Mangled bodies were strewn bloodily in every thicket. Many crawled away in the agony of their terror and despair to die alone in the jungle fighting solitary with the awful vultures and land crabs to delay their feast until the merciful sleep of lethe had prepared the board. Fords of the stream were shambles; road forks a slaughter pen. Still the rain of death fell upon unhurt, wounded and dying, upon tent and hospital

ground. It seemed as though the trees, front flank and rear rained Spanish bullets.

Scarcely more fortunate were the wretches who had been picked up by the hospital corps to be taken to the rear. Loaded in springless wagons, jolted over well nigh impassable roads, thrown into mangled, smothering heaps, left in the tropical dews and tropical suns to live again in fever delirium the terrors of the march and the horrors of the battle, probably a more merciful fate befell those who perished at once.

San Juan had been taken and the disaster of an impossible retreat under fire averted, but the blue lines clung precariously to the ridge as a dizzy man might cling to a narrow ledge over a mountain precipice. Gen. Sumner was hard pressed with his cavalry, and sent an urgent request for support. The Thirteenth infantry was dispatched to their aid.

All the long afternoon, with but one slight interval of rest, the Spaniards rained a withering fire upon the lost ridge. A counter charge was momentarily expected. All the long afternoon the blue lines hung on desperately and prayed for night.

Where all this time was Theodore Roosevelt? Where were his Rough Riders of whom he was now in command, for Col. Wood temporarily headed a brigade? They were in the battle playing their part as gallantly as the rest, but it was a minor part. If Las Guasimas was exclusively a cavalryman's fight, San Juan and its victory belonged primarily to the infantry. But aside from that the cavalry division was only one-sixth

of the strength of the corps effectively engaged before Santiago on this July 1, and the Rough Riders made up but one-fifth or less of the cavalry. Therefore, the whole organization counted not more than one-thirtieth in the fight, for in this fight it was not prominent, and its commander could not have had a great influence upon the result. Bringing out such facts is not a grateful task, but Col. Roosevelt himself raised the issue.

Gen. Wheeler, like other officers of the Spanish-American war whose pens were no less mighty than their swords, wrote himself down as the head and center of the whole fight at San Juan. As he tells it, he reconnoitered the position, suggested the plan of battle and gave the order to attack. Non-military historians as well as military men of less literary distinction, have Wheeler ill on the day before San Juan and on the day of the battle. He was not at the war council the night before. Sumner had taken command of his division. This is not intended as a reflection upon Gen. Wheeler's veracity, but merely as indicative of his viewpoint. Gen. Wheeler, no doubt, sincerely felt that the whole responsibility of the fight was upon him, and the feeling was entirely pardonable.

Lieutenant Col. Roosevelt with a still more mighty pen, little experience in actual warfare and a robust imagination in this sense, finds himself doing most of the fighting and giving the really important orders at San Juan. In his "Rough Riders," which he evidently flung off while the white heat of war enthusiasm was still

upon him, Roosevelt finds a regular regiment awaiting orders at the ford of San Juan, declares himself the ranking officer, orders the charge, leads the charge and, scaling the heights far in the van, drove hence the Spanish hordes. Reading this account, one feels that Roosevelt alone, like Winkelried, had turned the tide of battle, but unlike Winkelried he lived to write a book about it. Winkelried's age was not that of the finest bloom in literary warfare. It was only after Roosevelt's men had cleared the trenches and had seen their commander use his revolver upon a retreating Spaniard, bagging him on the fly, that the infantry appeared upon the ridge. Then Roosevelt and his men were with difficulty restrained from following the enemy right into Santiago.

"Here I found myself at the front," says Roosevelt, "in command of fragments of all six regiments of the cavalry division." This in his introduction to Parker's "Gatling Guns." What had become of Wheeler, Sumner and Wood, not to speak of the other brigade and regimental officers, many of whom down to Lieutenant Colonel must have outranked Roosevelt? Did all think themselves in command of all six regiments? Disinterested civilians like Bonsal say the infantry took the hill and the cavalry came afterward. That seems to be the fact.

If one will follow his gatling story, Lieutenant Parker and his battery won the battle. After his four gatlings and his score of men had won San Juan, they actually made Santiago quite untenable for the Spaniards. Parker says many

other interesting things. He finds Shafter fighting a superior force of Spaniards. At San Juan Americans outnumbered the Spaniards at least two to one, while at El Caney we have seen that the Americans were still more overwhelming in numbers. And these facts do not detract in the least from the great valor of the American fighting men.

We do not wish to insinuate that either Parker, Wheeler or Roosevelt consciously prevaricate as to San Juan. Each saw the fight from his own standpoint. Each thought himself the center of the fray, the hub about which the whole military wheel revolved. Each thought this all the more when he took up his mighty pen for the enlightenment of his countrymen. Abnormal battle conditions when tense nerves make each man a kind of maniac, are not conducive to cool historical judgment. Accounts of participants in battle always lack perspective and are very unsafe as portrayals of what took place as a whole.

Had not political exigencies magnified out of all proportions the services of Rough Riders, and especially the services of Gen. Joseph Wheeler and Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, such a statement would not have been necessary. We would in that case, not have been obliged to go so fully into the details of the battle in order to show in true proportion the services of Roosevelt and his Rough Riders. Officers certainly cannot claim an undue proportion of the credit for San Juan. If ever a battle was bungled through inefficiency or recklessness in high places, it was San Juan. If ever desperate valor of

company officers and fighting men snatched victory out of defeat, it was still upon this gory ridge. To be sure when the higher officers found themselves enmeshed they struggled valiantly to extricate themselves. Their shame was in ever allowing themselves so to become enmeshed.

Only when the troops were found clinging precariously upon San Juan ridge, did the crime of their unpreparedness appear in all its hideousness. Soldiers themselves had thrown away blankets that they would sadly need in the desperate struggle to the ridge and up the slope. But in all else the officers must bear the blame. Exhausted soldiers were without food, without water, without medicines, without shelter from the tropical rain and sun, without adequate means of caring for dead or wounded. Without intrenching tools and without means of getting any of these necessities. In heaps at Siboney and on the transport were the things the absence of which were to mean death to many of the brave men who had passed unscathed through the hell of Spanish fire.

As soon as merciful darkness closed upon the American lines, the desperate struggle began for intrenchment. Then, too, started the awful procession of wounded for the rear.

CHAPTER XI.

SANTIAGO FALLS.

For two weeks after San Juan the siege of Santiago continued. Cuba's deadly climate and the reckless exposure of the troops made the American position each day more precarious. Fever proved more menacing than Spanish bullets. Never again in all this time did the Americans attempt to "rush" Spanish trenches. They had learned by experience that the Spaniard, like a hound at bay, would fight and fight hard, although he does not delight in fighting.

Commenting upon this changed attitude, Lieutenant Jose Miller y Tejeiro says:—

"They intrenched themselves and set up their artillery as fast as they received it and did not again come out from behind their fortifications. Did they think on that first day that all they had to do was to attack our soldiers en masse and put them to flight? God knows!"

Shafter the ponderous, and the Spanish commander now played a game of bluff. Spanish blunders gave the American blunderer the winning card. Fortune cared for her fool. Had Cervera decided to perish in Santiago harbor as gallantly as he did outside, or had Spain's military idiots in high place permitted him to do so,

official incompetency and the awful fever would have destroyed Shafter's army before Santiago could have been taken. Scarcely ten per cent. of the American soldiers were able to fight when Toral signed the capitulation. Col. Roosevelt said that it would have weakened his command to detach a detail of twenty-four men. It seemed a trick of fate that the blunders of the Spaniards should have been so deadly in their effect while those of the Americans made little difference as to the final result. The decrepit old sinner of centuries withered away under Fortune's frown while the blind fate which cares for children and idiots brought through in triumph the lusty western giant.

While sickening American soldiers clung to the trenches before Santiago, starved, fever wracked, politics were relegated to the background. Soon as the Spanish crimson and gold disappeared from the Morro, politics broke out afresh in the American army. Gen. Wheeler was ready to reap in political preferment the meed of his services against the troops of Spain. The tireless energy and horse sense concealed under Col. Roosevelt's brag and bluster had been of the greatest service to his command. Only when this work was done did he become again the circus manager, seeking notoriety.

Opportunities came quickly. Miles' expedition to Porto Rica was the occasion for a noisy pronouncement as to the Rough Riders being worth any three regiments of volunteers. With characteristic caution our warrior explained that the other volunteers had black powder and inferior

arms. Just at this time a good strong wind would have blown into the Caribbean sea all that was left of the Rough Rider regiment in Cuba. The great majority of the erratic fighters were deathly sick. They needed a hospital more than a fresh campaign. Mercifully the military authorities recognized this and the sage advice of the pugnacious colonel ended as it began—in a display of printer's ink.

This did not by any means exhaust Roosevelt's opportunities. He had often preached discipline and obedience to superiors. But now the good Colonel found himself confronted by a condition. He promoted an assault on his superiors in the shape of a round robin, telling everybody from division general to Secretary of War, what must be done and done quickly. Many other officers had attached their names, but the country knew it only as Roosevelt's round robin. He and his Rough Riders sailed north with flying colors. It was time that they were back to their native heath that their leader might answer the curtain call.

Fortunately Roosevelt's wonderful constitution kept him in exceptional health and he proved a good angel to the less fortunate ones of his devoted command. There were pathetic scenes at Montauk Point, but as time wore on this great military hospital camp was turned into a parade and reception ground. The eyes of the country were upon it. Oceans of printers' ink flowed over the broad land bringing tidings of Montauk, and right in the center of the stage were Col. Roosevelt and his Rough Riders. No

smallest piece of stage business which might impress the multitude was omitted. "Slouch" hats and brown duck ran a close second in popularity to "old glory" itself.

By the time the Rough Riders were mustered out, Roosevelt, commander of five hundred men in an army of sixteen thousand, loomed big above every living soldier of the Republic. It was a miracle of skillful self-advertising on the part of this gallant military man. Here we had the dramatic instincts of youth exercised with all the skill and purpose of resourceful and ambitious manhood.

At length this most skillful of all politicians of his day had secured the momentum which was to carry him to the long sought for heights in the "governing class." Before the Rough Riders were mustered out on Long Island Roosevelt's political fortune was made. We shall see.

CHAPTER XII.

ROOSEVELT GETS THE NOMINATION.

Before the August moon had waned greatly, Roosevelt and his friends were laying wires for the gallant Rough Rider's march upon Albany. Among the first of the men of mighty pen to turn out an account of Las Guasimas and San Juan written from the standpoint of the man in the fray who feels sure that the whole battle revolved about his belt, he naturally made the first great impression. Nursed and pampered while at Montauk, carefully as the invalided soldiers, this impression had become strong. Rough riding contests, statue presentations, sword fetes, auction sales, all these kept the public eye focused upon Roosevelt. He was a national figure as prominent in the newspapers, almost, as Secretary Alger or President McKinley. This put him in fine fettle for the Albany campaign.

Other conditions were found no less ideal for skillful manipulation. Governor Black had been giving an especially rotten administration. From civil service to canals he had gone the rounds and the odor of his actions smelled to high heaven. Withal the people of New York were not enamored of Richard Croker with his little Van Wyck puppet in the mayor's chair. Croker

at that time came nearer having the Democracy of New York in his vest pocket than has any Tammany political boss before or since.

This was an atmosphere in which the independent plant thrived amazingly. R. Fulton Cutting and a few kindred spirits had kept alive an independent organization, the Citizens' Union. John Jay Chapman acted as harbor pilot. Sage friends of Theodore Roosevelt whispered in the Cutting ear that if the Independents were looking for a man who would banish into outer darkness Black and his Payn, Aldrich and Platt, and Richard Croker with his little Van Wyck, Theodore Roosevelt was their man. Politicians, especially independent politicians, are proverbially short of memory. They had forgotten Blaine, civil service, the tariff of 1884, with their demonstration of the unswerving partisanship of Theodore Roosevelt.

Roosevelt had acquired a new reputation as civil service reformer. He had filled much newspaper space as police reformer, who knew not party. The Independents were de-lighted. To be sure Roosevelt had been a bit cautious. His friends in approaching the Independents had come of their own accord. Roosevelt had had the thing merely mentioned to him, they said. But they felt convinced that Roosevelt, if properly approached, would consent to be the standard-bearer of the Independents.

"Very well," remarked Cutting, Chapman et al., "we shall be de-lighted, but we do not care to take too much for granted. Suppose you friends see Roosevelt and tell him all about it.

Then if he consents we shall confer with him and start the ball a-rolling." You see the Independents were a bit cautious, too.

The friends saw Roosevelt. "Yes, it was really true. Barkis was actually willin'." Cutting, Chapman et al. conferred with the gallant colonel. All seemed of the same mind. Now had the opportune time come for casting out Platt, Black, Payn, Croker and all the legion of political devils who beset fair New York. The only question was one of tactics.

Cutting and his Independents were willing to make it a straight fight as Independents. They had sounded New York sentiment and they felt that non-partisanship would prove a strong card with the voters in both city and state affairs. Roosevelt more "practical" had his doubts. He loved the Independents dearly but he had some old sweethearts among the Republicans. How would it do to accept the Independents' nomination, stand for their principles, and use the nomination as a club to compel the Republicans to cast out in advance, Platt, Black, Payn and the rest? Then the Magdalen Republican maiden of New York might wed the chaste Citizens' Union and together they would make a pair for righteousness such as had hardly ever before been seen.

That was the one way of looking at the thing, the Independents admitted. They would nominate Roosevelt and let him after the nomination use the Independent backing as a club. If by its use he could capture the Republican nomination also, so much the better. It would insure his success, and he would then have the nomina-

tion in spite of Platt, Black and all the other powers of darkness. Such an administration as he would have for independence and virtue would be known even in Cohoes. If, however, the pious sword of the Independents did not prevail against the vile scimitar of Platt—if Roosevelt failed to capture the Republican nomination in addition to the Independents' nomination, he would reserve the right, then and in that event, to reject also the independent nomination. In other words, while the gallant colonel of Rough Riders loved the Independents and was enthusiastic for reform, he did not care to commit himself irrevocably to lead such a cause should it become a forlorn hope, as it might well become should the independent following fail to force the Republican machine to take its man. But if he was to run for governor at all, he was irrevocably committed to the independent nomination. The Republican nomination must be additional.

Cutting, Chapman et al. on their side, too, insisted upon one condition. Independents were to be free to select the other names which were to appear with Roosevelt upon the ballot. They were not to be all Republicans. It was a bargain and all parted happy and content.

Far and wide over the state spread the Independents seeking to interest other candidates, with Democratic as well as Republican leanings. A statement was issued which Roosevelt saw and approved, and things were happy as marriage bells.

Friends of Roosevelt, presumably not the same friends who dealt with the Independents, for

Roosevelt has all sorts, went to Platt, Odell et al. and told them that Roosevelt had the Independents behind him. Without the Independents, the Republican party loaded with Black, Payn and Aldrich, could not hope to win. The only salvation was the nomination of Roosevelt by the regular Republicans.

With surprising favor, Platt, Odell et al. received it. They were pretty tired of Black and his crowd. Politicians are noted for discarding dull and worn tools when better are at hand. Black, Payn and Aldrich would make excellent scapegoats for Platt and Odell. The time was ripe for unloading machine burdens upon somebody.

On Sunday, September eleventh came out what appeared to be an inspired statement from Col. Jerome. He said, speaking as one with authority, that Roosevelt had declared to him that Roosevelt was a Republican, always had been a Republican, and if elected would be governor of the ENTIRE PARTY. Mark ye of the ENTIRE PARTY, not the State of New York.

Like a douche of cold water this statement in the Sunday papers fell upon the enthusiasm of Cutting, Chapman et al. It looked like partisanship, and it was too boldly spoken to be classed as mere invention. Roosevelt was sought out and asked how about this? He strenuously denied the authenticity of Jerome's statement and let the good work of the Independents go on. While Platt was respectful, still he had not been "thrown and hog-tied," to use an expression from ranch life, familiar to Col. Roosevelt. Roosevelt

knew the political game well enough not to trust too far this wily old wolf of politics. Roosevelt soothed Cutting, Chapman and their followers and stimulated them to circulate nominating petitions, again inspecting personally the statement sent out with the petitions. Soon Platt would be where Roosevelt wanted him.

This went on until September 18. On that day Roosevelt met Platt and Odell in New York and a bargain was "signed and sealed." After that fateful Sunday word was sent down the line from the Platt headquarters that it was to be Roosevelt. Immediately the machine cohorts began to shout, "Roosevelt!" Black was left stranded high and dry with only Payn and Aldrich to do him reverence. Roosevelt had won the fight with Platt. The sword of the Independents in the holy cause had overmatched the iniquitous scimitar of Platt.

Then Roosevelt has a qualm of conscience. After a decent hesitation of two days he wrote Cutting, Chapman and their friends that he was in an impossible position, and wanted an interview. Just then Roosevelt was in the position of a coquette who had engaged herself to two suitors and found their joint attentions embarrassing. At the meeting, which took place September 23rd, Roosevelt, rather in sorrow than in anger, proffered back the ring to Cutting, Chapman and their Independents. Love in a cottage was all well enough as a means of getting the princely suitor interested, but really you know,—of course you understand,—as a serious proposition, it was quite impossible. Some

way out of it must be found. Before they parted finally the ring was returned and Roosevelt took up life with the more opulent prince,—Prince Thomas C. Platt of the political realm of New York. The final rupture took place September 24.

Cutting, Chapman and their friends, retired from their interviews with Roosevelt, sadder and wiser than they had been before. They would not compound this political bargain which they considered a political crime. As they viewed it the tempter had taken Roosevelt up into a high mountain and had shown him the kingdoms of the earth which would be his if he should fall down and worship. From their standpoint Roosevelt fell down. At least it was not recorded that he had said either to Platt or to Odell, "Get thee behind me Satan."

Independents resolved to put a ticket in the field. They issued a statement setting forth the facts merely, without recrimination. It was in reply to Roosevelt's letter. But the Independents had shot their bolt, and Roosevelt knew it. He had thoroughly seen to that. The work which they had done for him without reserve precluded effective work for any one else. Disgustingly the rank and file of the Independents, probably some of their leaders also, dropped back into their old partisan wallows, following their gallant betrayer. The bolt was all-sufficient for Roosevelt. It secured him the Republican nomination and that was what he started out to get.

If a cleverer piece of political manipulation can be found in the history of the United States,

it has escaped our notice. Roosevelt demonstrated himself a past master at the game of politics. Squeamish persons might object to the bad faith involved, but they show their want of appreciation of greatness by judging Roosevelt by ordinary standards. What would have been rank trickery in Platt, Quay, or Gorman might be quite laudable in a gentleman of high and holy motives seeking an end much to be desired. Roosevelt in proud consciousness of his own rectitude wondered why his old friends among the Independents felt aggrieved. Surely nothing could be wrong that would promote so important a thing as Theodore Roosevelt's progress to high place in the "governing class." Clearly that was the dominant issue. The little subterfuge was nothing compared to the good to be accomplished. As for the dicta of Roosevelt that he is the most unsafe adviser who would suggest the doing of evil that good may come of it, well, that applies to persons other than Mr. Roosevelt.

Strangely enough the faithful Riis shakes his head somewhat over this episode in Roosevelt's career and Friend Francis E. Leupp attempts to explain it. Usually Mr. Leupp is keen, but for some occult reason he reproduces the following personal letter written to him by Roosevelt September 3, as a document going to prove Roosevelt's good faith with the Independents. We must keep in mind that this letter was written after negotiations with the Independents had been practically completed, and a week before the statement of Col. Joyce which Roosevelt was specifically questioned about and the authen-

ticity of which he denied. Here is the letter which everybody will find worth reading:

Roosevelt remarks that he would rather have led the Rough Riders in Cuba than to be governor of New York "three times over." Then he continues:—

"In the next place, while on the whole I should like the office of governor and would not shirk it, the position will be one of such extreme difficulty, and I *shall have to offend so many good friends of mine*, that I should breathe a sigh of relief were it not offered me.

"It is a *party position*. I should be one of the big party leaders if I should take it. That means that I should have to *treat with and work with the organization* and I should *see and consult the leaders, not once, but continuously*, and earnestly try to come to *an agreement on all important questions with them*; and, of course, the mere *fact of my doing so would alienate many of my friends*, whose friendship I value.

"On the other hand, when we come to the Canal or Life insurance, or anything touching the Eighth commandment, and general decency, I could not allow any consideration of party to come in. And this would alienate those who, if not friends, were supporters.

"As for taking the honor without conditions or not at all, I do not believe anybody would as much as propose conditions to me. Certainly I would not entertain any conditions *save those outlined in this very letter*—that while a good *partisan*, who would honestly strive to keep in with the leaders of the party organization, and

work with them and to bring the Republican party into better shape for two years hence, yet in the last resort, I would have to be my own master, and when questions of honesty or dishonesty arose, I should have to pay no further heed to party lines.

"Now, as I say, I haven't an idea about the nomination. I know that some of the politicians, some for good, and some doubtless for less good or wholly bad reasons, are working for me, and that there are some, I may add, *I am glad to say, the worst*, are working against me. I should say the odds are against my nomination, but I can also say with all sincerity that I do not care in the least."

This letter, it must be remembered, was written to a newspaper man, not, it is presumed, for publication, but to give the man a "line" on what to say about the situation of his own accord. This is one method by which skilled politicians communicate to the public in advance tentative positions upon this and that matter in order to get a public expression of opinion before committing themselves. To the public, he must continue yet a while the St. George of the Independents slaying the Platt dragon.

It is safe to say that had this letter been addressed to Messrs. Cutting and Chapman and their Independents, Roosevelt would not have been asked to accept the Independent nomination. Several perplexing questions arise in connection with this letter when we remember that it was written *nearly three weeks before Roosevelt felt that he could afford to break openly with the In-*

dependents. If it would be a relief to Roosevelt not to be offered the governorship, why did he scheme for it? If he regarded it September 3 as a *party position* why did he have anything to do with the *Independents* whose *excuse for existence* was the view that it was not a party position? If he intended from the first to be a "good partisan" and to *treat* with the *organization leaders* (Platt and Odell) in *everything*, why did he bargain with the *Independents* the very kernel of whose proposition was that he should go in as a governor *wholly independent* of Platt and Odell and pledged to *overthrow* them and their *policies*? As to conditions, what conditions could Platt or any other boss want except those named in the Leupp letter?

Roosevelt, it must be remembered, promised to accept the Independent nomination, coupling therewith but one condition—that unless he should receive the Republican nomination also, he should have the privilege of withdrawing entirely from the race. If the regular nomination came to Roosevelt, *he was bound to accept it upon the terms of the Independents*, and to *accept also the nomination of the Independents*.

Questions of good faith in this transaction must be settled by each reader according to his notion of what constitutes good faith in politics. But nobody will question that the incident marked Theodore Roosevelt again as a partisan before all things, ready to sacrifice everything except personal advancement, to the call of party exigencies. The incident was reminiscent of the Blaine incident of 1884, the railway rate

incident of 1906, and scores of lesser like incidents between them. When cornered, or possessed by a strong desire for mounting politically, a desire ever present, Roosevelt has never proved choice in political methods or political associates. Good Historian Lodge might characterise the Rooseveltian political methods as Jesuitical. Sometimes Roosevelt, for purposes best known to himself, has used the mask of independence, but the partisan is not so deeply concealed as is the Tartar in the Russian.

The letter, too, sets forth an interesting view of public office, even the place of governor. "It is a *partisan* position." Should administer it as "a *good partisan*." I shall be governor of the Republican party, for the Republican party and by the Republican party. If partisan interests do not interfere, I shall look after the interests of all the people of the State.

Thus joyfully did Roosevelt enroll himself under the Platt and Odell banner in preference to the banner of independence, for he knew that banner was far more likely to lead to the heights. Now was Theodore Roosevelt on the high road to eminent place among the "governing class," and assiduously did he pursue his journey. Rough Riders had disbanded, but they still had the broad hats cocked with a rakish turn, and their brown uniforms which with their war thunder had made the very Cuban mountains tremble. Roosevelt knew well how to use them as political assets.

Immediately was organized a flying squadron

of Rough Riders mounted upon special trains. The Cuban war was refought upon many a glorious, though bloodless field. Conditions were far more favorable. Roosevelt and his command struggled in the red jungle at Las Guasimas, or scaled the bloody heights of San Juan for the edification of multitudinous rural patriots at country fairs. Again the bugle sounded "to the charge." Drums crashed, guns thundered, and the gallant fellows rushed the seething trenches. There were deafening cheers for victory and the hand-clappings were like the voice of the gatlings.

What had all this to do with canals, civil service, taxation, tenements and numerous other issues to confront the next governor of New York? Bless your simplicity, nothing at all! It was not supposed to have. In the light of Black's administration, the less said about state matters the better. These were dry, irksome and dangerous things to talk about. War stories never fail to interest, or war costumes to inspire. Our hairy ancestor of the stone age is not far concealed in the best of us.

Born showman, master of impressive stage business in politics, Roosevelt knew well the power of the campaign he was conducting. This knowledge gave him the governorship of New York, for with all his glitter, with the prestige of San Juan still upon him, with the weakness of his opponents promoting his campaign, Roosevelt slipped in by but a few paltry thousands in a vote of nearly a million and one-half. His plurality amounted to about one-seventieth of those voting at the election.

In the serene recess of his private apartments, away from critical eyes, Roosevelt must have had some moments of delicious entertainment over the grim humor of making a man governor because of his rakish hat and his war stories. Impossible! Well, if Roosevelt did not smile over it, the fact is proof positive that something akin to egoism must have ruthlessly crushed out a puny sense of humor.

Roosevelt had won. New York voters, like their brothers elsewhere, careless of nice distinctions, thought he had won as an independent. His partisan declarations were soon forgotten. Governor Roosevelt could have the hearty support of the great voting and working masses of his state, regardless of party. Never had governor taken a popular commission under outwardly more favorable auspices. New York was ready to believe in him. Of him it expected much.

Keen newspaper thrusts perforated the tough hide of the wily old political were-wolf, Thomas C. Platt. Now, at last, was he to suffer a Greenland of cold isolation.

Roosevelt started out bravely, but clamorously. A great noise had intervened between election and the oath of office. It was the thunderous pronunciamientos of great events to come. Legislative members assembled expectant. Roosevelt transmitted his first state paper. New Yorkers blinked, rubbed their eyes and blinked again. Had they after all elected Roosevelt president or had New York overnight become an independent nation?

The message congratulated the PEOPLE OF NEW YORK on carrying to a successful conclusion "one of the most righteous wars of modern times." Humanity and national honor demanded that we drive Spain from the Western hemisphere. Preachment followed preachment, with war as the moving text. Militia should be kept for home duty and regulars sent out to conquer and garrison foreign lands. Arms should be of the latest pattern. A regiment with Krag-Jorgensens (Rough Riders) was worth three with Springfields and black powder. Artillery with black powder suffered in Cuba. Moral—color your powder brown. Shotguns were best in a riot. (Here the problem is to commit maximum slaughter among unarmed working men at short range.) As for the naval militia, the pet aversion of Roosevelt the naval historian, they did their work in fine style in the Spanish war.

All this and more said the war-obsessed governor in his message. In fact five pages in nineteen were devoted to war and military matters, largely lugged in bodily by the ears. Possibly in the light of this message, Roosevelt's rough riding campaign for governor was sincere. Roosevelt might have imagined himself running for president on the issue of building up a great war empire. At all events his first message as governor was distressingly warlike.

Commonplace was the rule of the remaining pages. A Delphic preachment such as Theodore Roosevelt was famous for before the days of his infallibility, told the legislature that too much property should not be exempt from taxation,

nor yet should it be taxed so high as to drive it out of the state. Roosevelt worked in his perennial favorite about shackling force and shackling cunning. After these ornamental philosophic declarations, he made some excellent recommendations adopted from the labor unions, as to factory, tenement and sweatshop regulations. At the end he told about the evil of too many laws and recommended biennial legislative sessions and rigid economy. Curiously enough his administration proved the most expensive the state had had for years, with a single exception, and the laws of it filled two fat volumes each year, where up to that time one had sufficed.

It was an interesting session. The civil service law passed by the Democrats in 1883 and scuttled by Black, was re-enacted and extended. For some reasons not entirely clear, Roosevelt refused to extend the law to election inspectors. But the law itself was excellent.

As the session waned, Roosevelt harkened more and more to the voice of Platt. More and more did the Plattite courage rise. Aldrich and his friends had turned the canal into an asset of the up-state machine. It smelled to heaven. Every hungry political buzzard moistened his beak in the carrion. Investigation had been going on—aimless, pointless investigation. Platt smiled cynically. He did not see the use. It was useless to try to keep the semblance of cleanliness with fingers graft-reeking. Wiser than Platt, Roosevelt saw the need. He knew better the force of public opinion and the means

of directing it. For a whole year the legislature had been preparing the whitewash. It must be applied skillfully. If the legislature would not appropriate money for completing the investigation, he would raise a fund himself. The legislature appropriated.

In order to permit no questioning of good faith, Roosevelt commissioned two Democratic lawyers, Austin G. Fox and Wallace McFarlane, to go through the testimony of the investigating committee and find the Senagambian in the puzzle picture. It was all done with proper trumpet blast and drum-beat. His feline majesty of the United States Senate laughed again.

Through the long summer the Democratic lawyers toiled through the mass of evidence collected by the investigating committee. They reported to Governor Roosevelt. Theirs was a Scotch verdict. Rottenness had been found. Canal affairs reeked with it, but Campbell W. Adams, engineer, and Geo. W. Aldrich, superintendent, had been given immunity in advance by the absolute discretion vested in them by the legislature. Motives might be difficult to prove. For technical reasons well known to the legal profession, the lawyers could not recommend a prosecution.

Roosevelt interpreted the report as favorable as possible to the canal looters. With deft touch he applied the whitewash brush where it would do the most good. There had been no fraudulent collusion. A little mismanagement, but nothing really wrong.

This whole episode is prophetic of the Judson-

Harmon-Sante Fe episode of presidential years, and of the Judge Calhoun-Venezuela episode. In all three cases investigations noisily heralded and bravely started, fizzled out. Roosevelt learned something from the event of the canal. Here he gave out the report of the lawyers, and newspapers very awkwardly pointed out that Governor Roosevelt's conclusions of no wrong were not at all warranted by the lawyers' report. In the Santa Fe and the Venezuela cases the report was just forgotten.

Another very similar situation presented itself a year later. We cannot present it better than in extracts from a recent account of the incident written by Charles Edward Russell. After detailing how cleverly the State Trust Company had been built up as a portly and plethoric financial institution, and how the state bank examiner had found it good—in a wonderfully happy and prosperous condition, Mr. Russell says:

"Suddenly in the midst of this fair day and cloudless sky, a bolt fell. On January 11, 1900, Mr. Kling presented to the Governor of New York a long communication in which he made specific and very grave charges against the management of the State Trust Company, and petitioned the appointment of a commission to investigate the company's affairs. . . . These charges, if true, were enough to send the whole board of directors to the penitentiary for long terms. . . .

"The governor was much stirred by the revelations it contained. He declared at once that he must know the facts and all of them, and

to that end he appointed as special commissioner to investigate the company, former Adjutant General Avery D. Andrews, of New York City. General Andrews had been a member of the Police Board under the Strong administration.

. . . In more recent times he became one of the directing spirits of the Asphalt Trust. . . . His instructions in the State Trust matter were to 'go to the bottom of it no matter whom it might affect.'

"Now the State Trust matter properly belonged to the official care of H. P. Kilburn, who was then superintendent of the State Banking Department. For some reason not officially disclosed, the governor totally ignored Mr. Kilburn. . . . Whereupon Mr. Kilburn started an investigation of his own. . . . New York newspapers, taking the scent, conducted the third.

"General Andrews finished first. His appointment was telegraphed to him on the 12th, and he began work on the 13th. His investigation lasted something less than five hours. Then he ceased his labors and returned two documents. One was a report on what he had found and the other a personal letter asking to be relieved from further research in the matter. . . .

. . . "Gen. Andrews was relieved according to his request; no one was appointed in his place; his report was locked up in Albany; and Superintendent Kilburn's report coming in shortly afterward, that, too, was consigned to oblivion. In spite of all demands, the government refused to make either public, to give any idea of the

contents of either, or to take any action on either. . . .

"In New York City the district attorney and at Albany the attorney-general declined to act. A committee of the State Assembly was induced to demand a copy of the Kilburn report, but by the time it was produced, the committee had voted 6 to 5 to return it with seals unbroken. . . .

On March 12 the New York *World* managed to secure in some surreptitious way a copy of the Kilburn report (so sedulously suppressed at Albany), and published it practically in full. The country gasped at the official confirmation it contained of the worst charges made by Kling or hinted by the newspapers. There seemed no longer a chance to doubt that the official investigation had been muzzled because of the prominence of the persons involved, who now stood forth in the white light, painfully conspicuous. They were:—

"Elihu Root, then Secretary of War, now Secretary of State, a director in the State Trust Company, long the personal and confidential adviser of Mr. Whitney and Mr. Ryan.

"John W. Griggs, then Attorney General of the United States.

"Thomas F. Ryan.

"William C. Whitney.

"P. A. B. Widener.

"R. A. C. Smith.

"Anthony N. Brady."

Mr. Russell goes on to give the details of the rotten transaction, with its illegal loans to dum-

mies, politicians and directors. Lou F. Payn, insurance commissioner, was one of the men to profit by the crookedness to the extent of more than \$400,000. Elihu Root negotiated a loan to the dummy office boy.

Roosevelt was learning. No awkward tales of "indiscretions" should come from him officially involving personal and political friends. It was as important then to protect Elihu Root, the Union League reformer and patriot, as it was afterward to protect Paul Morton or Francis B. Loomis.

Roosevelt, as soon as he started the canal investigation upon its way, plastered a counter-irritant upon the devoted back of New York City in the shape of a new investigation. Legislator Mazet was placed in charge. Roosevelt would give the city troubles of its own. It would have less time to talk about canal affairs or trust companies.

A tax crusade, too, was on the boards. Tax sharps of New York City and their friends suggested a franchise tax. It was embodied in a measure offered by Senator Ford and taken up by Roosevelt. At first Roosevelt wanted a commission to report a measure for next year, but he changed and became most urgent for immediate action. There was much dramatic business. At the eleventh hour a measure was rushed through. It proved defective. Corporations considered it crude and unworkable. Possibly it was too drastic. At all events it required an extra session to get the law into form. In the light of what it has accomplished, the

measure was mild as a reform. Still it was a real reform measure in the right direction. The measure has added six per cent. or more to the taxable valuation of New York State. It has restored to the people a small portion of their substance, taken from them through franchise gifts. Without Roosevelt's advocacy such a measure would not have passed at the time. Of course, he did not originate the proposition, and had he never become governor, it is likely the agitation for franchise tax in New York would have resulted in legislation.

As the session waned, a very torrent of special messages was poured from the executive mansion into the legislative chambers. Canals, rapid transit, Rochester schools and many other things came in for such attention. Sixty millions were wanted to finish the canals. Everything of consequence before the legislature was declared an emergency measure. The one thing desired seemed getting more laws upon the statute books although Roosevelt in his message declared against this very thing. Dazed legislators decided that nothing was pressing. So far was the emergency plan followed that a purely local school matter was made the subject of a special message.

In one of these communications to the legislature, Roosevelt took occasion to work in a sentiment dear to his heart. "I have not the slightest sympathy," he said, "with the outcry against corporations as such or against prosperous business men." The sentiment was unimpeachable, but the solons were puzzled in applying it. Out-

cry had been directed against corporation crookedness and business greed, not against "corporations as such or prosperous business men." Roosevelt had not told them how to manage this particular outcry.

True to his programme outlined in the Leupp letter, of being in the governor's chair "a good partisan," Roosevelt consulted Platt on all matters. Benjamin Odell, then Platt's political lieutenant, Mr. Roosevelt afterward characterized as: "My trusted helper and adviser in every crisis." One of New York's most notorious machine politicians, Lou Payn, as insurance commissioner, watched over the interests of widows and orphans. His appointment and retention was one of the most flagrant of the many scandals of Governor Black's administration. Even had Black been re-elected, he could not have retained Payn.

Nobody knew this better than Senator Thomas C. Platt. But Platt must make a brave bluff at protecting his own. With noisy defiance Roosevelt refused Platt's request. Payn must go.

Roosevelt went from Albany and Platt from Washington to a conference in New York City. There was a tremendous battle with much newspaper detonation and black smoke. Roosevelt gained what everybody knew from the first he must gain. After valiant combat Platt yielded what he knew from the first he must yield. Payn went. Platt dictated his successor. There was no investigation of the Insurance Department. Insurance grafting became less notorious

but continued quite as extensive as before. It remained for Thomas W. Lawson and Charles E. Hughes nearly to accomplish several years afterward what Roosevelt neglected to undertake.

One finds some difficulty in determining why such a courageous man as Governor Roosevelt should have permitted Lou Payn to leave the Insurance Department red-handed and unscathed. Why was the way left open for additional years of insurance misdoing? At all events, this was one of Roosevelt's great conspicuous failures as governor, for it left him wallowing impotently in the Platt mire for the rest of his term.

Roosevelt had attempted the impossible. Political cleanliness and the rule of a corrupt political machine can no more be harmonized than the rule of Michael and Satan. Roosevelt attempted to compromise with evil. Faust-like he made his bargain with the devil of politics on that September Sunday when cheek-by-jowl with Platt he decided to jilt the Independents. Without Roosevelt realizing it, the unclean beast of politics had placed its mark upon him. However cunningly it may thereafter be concealed, Platt knew where to find it. It marked Roosevelt as Platt's own; made it certain that he must somehow pay the price of the favors he had received. Political bosses, like Goethe's devil, are egoists.

Summer came and went. In the mellow autumn Roosevelt talked much. His policies were varied and multitudinous and the good governor delighted to tell about them. When the time for

the next legislative session arrived, Roosevelt was in fine fettle for the fray.

There had been talk of Roosevelt for the vice-presidency, but the good governor had embarked upon a scheme for making a paradise, politically, of the Empire State. Roosevelt consulted Platt and Odell, each making a special trip to New York City for the purpose. As a result Roosevelt gave out a statement that:—

“Under no circumstances could I, or would I, accept the nomination for the vice-presidency.” Roosevelt added: “I am happy to state that Senator Platt cordially acquiesces in my views in the matter.”

This must have been highly flattering to his feline majesty of the United States Senate. Whether it was as flattering to Governor Roosevelt’s self-respect and independence of character may be judged each one for himself. The disgusted “*Nation*” explained later that Platt had discovered Roosevelt’s secret ambition to be president, and with that magic ring he could immediately bring the Rough Riding genie to heel:—

“Here am I, master; what will you.”

Roosevelt went on to explain that great problems had been met and partially solved. He wanted to complete his work. He must not be interrupted in producing that political paradise. Open avowal of Platt domination did not augur well for the solution of Empire State problems, yet Roosevelt faced them in 1900 as clamorously assertive as before.

Very moderate, indeed, is the roster of good legislation accomplished during Roosevelt’s sec-

ond year as governor. Some progress was made in dealing with labor problems and with tenement conditions. On the other side of the balance sheet were the rapid transit measure and the measure dealing with the creation of a metropolitan election district. Both amended earlier laws and in both cases the laws were made more rather than less dangerous.

Under the rapid transit act was carried to a successful issue the absorption by the Ryans, Whitneys, Bradys and the Elkins of franchises of untold value belonging to the people of New York. It meant literally loss to the Metropolis of hundreds of millions of dollars. Roosevelt advocated this law in an insistently importunate special message. Corruptly? Not at all. Roosevelt has irreproachable money integrity. The special student of political science and the lifetime office-holder and politician, merely acted ignorantly, not knowing what he did. Roosevelt himself charitably says that an official fool is as bad as or worse than an official knave. Possibly his actions confirm his words.

Roosevelt's connection with the Metropolitan election district superintendent bill will not bear the same explanation. This was a move on the part of the up-state machine to capture New York City. Since their opponents had the votes, the only chance of success was by controlling election machinery. It was a state "force" bill applied to Greater New York.

One with democratic prejudices might imagine this a peculiarly iniquitous measure, violating as it did every principle of local self-government.

But, of course, the high motive left this objection not of the weight of a feather. New York City's elections were to be taken out of the hands of New York's voters and turned over to an up-state partisan political dictator with an army of "inspectors" to carry out his will. Governor Roosevelt and his partisans extended the power of this election superintendent so as to include the New York police. No other portion of the state was subjected to such a law, thus demonstrating its partisan purpose. Why New York did not rise in open revolt against such iniquity is not so clear. It seems not to have accomplished the desired "up-state" domination. There was, as in all cases of this sort, a pious excuse, the preventing of election frauds. Curiously enough the method adopted had it become effective in practice, would have weakened the responsibility of voters and made clean elections finally impossible.

Roosevelt's success on the whole as governor of New York was extremely moderate. The New York *Nation*, which was almost enthusiastic over Roosevelt's election to the governorship, had some caustic things to say after the governor had been elected vice-president.

"For six months," said the *Nation*, "he has been out of the State most of the time, and the State has been out of his mind all of the time." When asked to co-operate in some work as governor, Roosevelt remarked: "Don't come to me. My work is done."

"An illusion about Roosevelt," said the *Nation* January 3, 1901, "is that he is fond of work.

Really he is fond of excitement. . . . It is the clamorous life that appeals to him." The *Nation* goes on to remark that Roosevelt would be glad to do great things if he could have a series of moving pictures to show him in the act.

"It is notorious," continues the ill-tempered journal, "that no governor of recent years has been so ignorant of the actual business of the State." As a result institutions suffered. The *Nation* found that politicians regarded Roosevelt as an "easy mark." He was impressed with vociferated logic. "Boss Platt found out Roosevelt's secret and played upon it to the discomfiture of his hopes and plans. Ambition, with a dread of breaking with his party machine was the magic ring which Platt discovered. New York's good governor was irreverently referred to as "Theodore the Sudden." He is further pictured in this wise:

"A restlessness of temperament almost pathological, love of excitement, a fatal fondness for haranguing the public, brilliant and dashing personal qualities, these characteristics are showy and win for their possessor troops of friends; but do they make the strong and efficient public servant?

"Bagehot said of Bolingbroke:

"We see in Bolingbroke's case that a life of great excitement is incompatible with the calm circumspection and sound estimate of probability essential to great affairs, that though the excited hero may perceive distant things, which others overlook, he will overlook near things which

others see; that though he may be stimulated to great speeches which others could not make, he will also be irritated to petty speeches which others would not; that he will attract enmities but not confidence; that he will not observe how true and plain are the alternatives of common business and how little even genius can enlarge them; that his prosperity will be a wild dream of unattainable possibilities, and his adversity a long regret that those possibilities have departed."

Lincoln Steffens, who in McClure's for June, 1900, writes most flatteringly of Roosevelt, said:

"There were no great pieces of legislation up to attract public enthusiasm and help the governor carry his will over the machine's. Neither was there any important executive act to give his position the force of public feeling." Steffens considers Roosevelt up to that time an experiment. Roosevelt says that at that time his work as governor "was done." This is the fact.

The New York *Tribune* of February 13, 1900, commenting upon Roosevelt's announcement of the previous day that he would not accept the vice-presidency, but would continue to give his energies as governor to problems "which were partly solved," remarks:

"It must be acknowledged that less has been actually accomplished thus far under his administration than prevalent estimate of his character and talents had led the people to expect. He would probably say that this was his misfortune, but there are many good citizens who think that it is partly his fault. He has never seemed to them to take full advantage of the fact that

the machine did not dare nominate anybody else, and that he virtually elected himself.

"His position at the beginning of his term was exceedingly strong, and he might have made it impregnable. Doubtless he has meant to do so, but he has not succeeded. He has rendered himself liable to attacks which will not be the easiest thing in the world to repel, and is now forced to admit that he needs another term to finish the work which his own indiscretions have made unnecessarily difficult. . . . In case his desire for re-election is gratified, we shall hope to see him grow to the full stature befitting a great office."

Certainly the *Tribune* was a friendly critic, and nobody doubts the justice of its criticism. Probably the vitriolic comment of the *Nation* was fully warranted. Roosevelt as governor was a disappointment to his most devoted admirers. To his opponents, he was a distinct failure. Odell, Platt's lieutenant, when finally made governor, far outdid Roosevelt in personal independence of Platt control.

Considering the way in which Roosevelt was already enmeshed in the Platt net, and the keenness of his ambition for presidential honors, it is probably fortunate for Roosevelt's fame that he was not accorded an additional term as governor.

CHAPTER XIII.

MENACED BY THE VICE-PRESIDENCY.

Scarcely had Roosevelt disposed of the legislature of 1900 when he was confronted with the menace of the vice-presidency. Roosevelt was generally understood to have considered the presidency as the ultimate goal of his ambition. He had been mentioned here and there for first honors. Even so, it was more than doubtful whether his hour had struck.

William McKinley had been a popular president, and the usual thing would be to give him a re-nomination. But one danger confronted President McKinley. As a rank outsider, Hanna had plunged in four years before and had made a president, before the men of Congress had awakened to what was being done. Suave, astute and winning as he was, McKinley did all he could to soften the resentment which rankled in congressional, especially senatorial bosoms. He had succeeded to a degree. But the inner Senate circle yet felt that Hanna should be disciplined.

Hanna did not want Roosevelt for vice-president. That was a good reason why the senatorial circle did. Hanna distrusted "the impetuous young man who wanted to reform everything

in a day." Senators Thomas C. Platt and Matthew Stanley Quay knew the young man better. Hanna suspected Roosevelt of having his eye on the presidency, and was not so certain about Rooseveltian patience. Suppose Roosevelt should get into the convention and decide that then was the appointed time? Roosevelt's friends all over the country were paying altogether too much attention to this Rough Rider business. It worried Hanna. He found no pleasure in keeping track of an ambitious young politician who had as a political asset a perennial circus parade.

Quay, Platt and their friends knew Hanna's fears and they demanded that Roosevelt should be the nominee for the vice-presidency. They had reasons beside Hanna hostility. Platt had done very well with Roosevelt thus far, but he was too uncertain a quantity for a comfortable executive in the domain of the "easy boss." It would please his feline majesty well to maroon Roosevelt for four years in the vice-presidential chair. At the end of that time Roosevelt would be pretty thoroughly tamed.

Consciously or unconsciously, Roosevelt lent himself to the plans of Platt and Quay. He had himself made a delegate to the convention. Coming there in Rough Rider hat and the rakish dash and swagger of the regiment, so well advertised a man as he, naturally attracted attention. Roosevelt did not "shirk it." Such dramatic situations are a trifle dangerous to settled programmes when the hero knows his metier and the audience is impressionable.

Secretary of the Navy John D. Long and Jonathan P. Dolliver had been given free entry by the machine for vice-presidential honors. Either was acceptable to Hanna. Neither was ready to yield to the other. Hanna was stubborn; Quay immovable. Hanna fumed and fretted. Quay worked blithely confident. He passed the word among his henchmen and sprung a resolution upon the convention to reduce Southern representation in future gatherings. There was clamor from Southern delegates.

Quay let it be known that his position was not irrevocably fixed in favor of the resolution at that time. If the delegates would just see the supreme merit of Col. Roosevelt, the gallant Rough Rider, as a vice-presidential candidate, Quay would withdraw his resolution.

Hanna seethed, but the cool, cynical Quay held his ground. He promoted gossip of a movement for Roosevelt as a presidential candidate. This was taken up by Roosevelt's more ardent friends. The situation was shaping itself so that a long-continued deadlock might prove dangerous to Hanna plans. Pennsylvania had spoken. If necessary the state of Quay might lead a revolt.

Up to this time Roosevelt had been coy. He did not want the nomination. But he circulated just the same keeping well toward the center of the stage. Hanna surrendered. He met with Platt and Quay and the three sent for Roosevelt. Roosevelt gracefully yielded to their entreaties. It was an awful sacrifice,

but—. He would second McKinley's nomination and while the ovation was still in progress, he would take his place upon the ticket.

The bargain was made overnight. Next morning it was in the newspapers which kept close touch with the situation. Roosevelt appeared according to programme, striding to the platform with Rough Rider mien, and the ovation followed. His was the speech of the day. He found himself on the ballot with McKinley. Quay had won.

Possibly Roosevelt had also won, for he expressed satisfaction as soon as it was settled that he should stand for the vice-presidency. There will always be room for doubt in the minds of outsiders whether Roosevelt was dragooned by Platt and Quay into taking the vice-presidential nomination in order to get rid of him as governor of New York, or whether he skillfully plotted to have it forced upon him by circumstances. Either theory will harmonize well with surrounding circumstances. Certainly, had Roosevelt remained in Albany or at Oyster Bay, Platt and Quay would have had a much more difficult problem upon their hands. Probably the fact is that Roosevelt even then had in the back of his head some budding hope that the presidential lightning might strike him then and there, if he made himself sufficiently conspicuous at the convention. At least the worst that could happen, was becoming a vice-presidential candidate, and getting rid once for all of the perplexities of his position as governor, which to

put it mildly, had up to that time proved many and serious, as his accomplishment was disappointing.

Such an attitude would have been quite consistent with Roosevelt's record as an officeholder. He tired of legislative work, as soon as he realized the real difficulties of the place. No sooner had the civil service place ceased to yield excitement than he looked for fields less serene. Roosevelt's police commissioner's seat got uncomfortably hot and he moved on to the navy. Before he had fallen fairly into the spirit of his position he was seeking honors on the gory field. Soon the toys of the soldier palled and he sought distinction as governor. Now he was ready to make another change. Roosevelt's history has proved him a political climber. Position has been used as a stepping stone to higher position, and he remained upon each step only sufficiently long to get a firm foothold for another move upward.

To persons who appreciate Roosevelt's marvelous skill as a politician, it must always remain a question whether Platt and Quay in this matter of the vice-presidency made Roosevelt their unwilling but lucky victim, or were really his unconscious tools.

As never before in his career, Roosevelt now had full opportunity to "harangue the multitude" on every topic under the sun. According to the *Nation* this meant undiluted happiness. President McKinley could not make a speaking campaign. Roosevelt was

made the mouthpiece of the administration. Immediately his field of operation became nation-wide. He dropped his work as governor. There was no time for such prosaic business. The presidential campaign was on at once. First a Rough Riders' meeting in Texas as an impressive prelude. Then speech-making tours covering most of the country. Crowing over the war; justifying our treachery to the Filipinos; lauding high tariff; boasting of currency reform and prosperity—these were the burdens of his political peans, varied a trifle to suit conditions. President McKinley kept a dignified silence. Roosevelt talked and talked.

Campaign exigencies found Roosevelt doing some interesting things. As an advertising scheme certain New York newspapers virulently assaulted the "Ice Trust." No doubt the trust deserved it all, however mean and sordid the motives of the attack. Charges against Mayor Van Wyck and District Attorney Gardiner developed in the course of the fight. Roosevelt, who must finally pass in a judicial capacity upon the cases of the mayor and district attorney, prejudged both in a public interview. It was prophetic of his "undesirable citizens" declaration in the Idaho assassination cases.

From far South Dakota, Roosevelt issued a proclamation as governor of New York, overlooking the fact that while in South Dakota his gubernatorial powers were in suspense. He

was never over nice about the legality of his actions.

A conscientious civil service reformer, Roosevelt had a good deal to condone in supporting the McKinley administration. Roosevelt ignored the issue. He contented himself with making "Apaches and Boxers" of the Filipinos, and in denouncing as "traitors" all those who failed to take his view of imperialistic expansion. Of the eighty tribes in the Philippine Islands, he said, but two opposed their subjugation by America. Mr. Roosevelt neglected to say that these two included practically all of the five millions of civilized natives in the islands. There were good reasons for respecting the prejudices of the polygamous Sultan of Sulu, but the idea of Filipino Christians setting up an independent republic could in no wise be tolerated.

Mr. Roosevelt wanted President McKinley, and incidentally, Governor Roosevelt, elected as an expression of approval of the Philippine war. By a lusty carnival of killing, this nation must show to the world that it was not a nation of hucksters.

Approval from the voters of the country indicated that they agreed with him in his position. McKinley and Roosevelt won easily. Finally was Theodore Roosevelt to preside over the deliberations of the grave and dignified senators.

CHAPTER XIV.

TRAGEDY MAKES ROOSEVELT PRESIDENT.

Theodore Roosevelt enjoyed to the fullest extent the elegant leisure which the vice-presidency gave him. Again he turned to literature and hunting for outlets for his surplus energy. Both gave him occasion for appearing in print at intervals, lest the people should forget.

So strong was the ardor of the chase upon him, that Theodore Roosevelt, after the opening of the final act in the tragedy which was to place William McKinley among our presidential martyrs, left his chief lingering between life and death in Buffalo, and plunged into the Adirondack wilderness. There was reason to believe that the nation might be left without an executive. Informed persons knew that the crisis of the wound had not passed. Timid persons feared grave complications should officers fail to locate the new president and place the responsibility of affairs in his hands.

With splendid recklessness, characteristic of him in certain matters, Roosevelt did his utmost to cut off all communication between him and the outside world. Fate, the thing which

has fought long and mightily upon his side, prevented him from losing himself as utterly as he would wish.

The fact that he had tried, gave his entrance upon the last and highest stage of his political career, far more dramatic impressiveness than it otherwise could have had. When the audience asks itself: "Can the rescuer arrive in time?" and awaits the answer breathlessly, they are much more delighted to see him and more likely to applaud his effort, than they would be had he hung about during the whole previous act, awaiting an opportunity to take part in the rescuing. President Roosevelt's entrance upon the duties of the presidential office lacked no element of dramatic force.

Tragic crime had cut down the man whom the great bulk of Americans delighted to honor, and whom many of them loved. For the time the president was a demigod, the presidential office a fetish. Naturally the new incumbent shared in the veneration. It was a most auspicious beginning. With a wonderful sense of what was expected of him, President Roosevelt announced at the bier of his dead predecessor, that it would be his ambition and his study to carry out the policies of the distinguished public servant who had come to so untimely an end.

This must have been a great sacrifice for Theodore Roosevelt. It was not the first time he had made such a sacrifice, and it came easier to him than it would have come to most persons with fixed convictions. President Mc-

Kinley had been an extreme high-tariff man. Roosevelt, once a free trader, had probably always leaned toward low tariff. It must have irked President Roosevelt greatly to feel bound to adopt a tariff policy even more extreme than that of President McKinley. In his last speech, President McKinley had declared for reciprocity and broader foreign markets. President Roosevelt has not found such a policy necessary in practice.

President McKinley had dealt the merit system of government appointment a staggering blow. The *New York Nation* rightly credited him with having given this particular fad the worst setback it had encountered in twenty years. President Roosevelt, regarded by many as the only great and original civil service reformer, possibly accepted this part of his predecessor's policy with mental reservation. Mental reservation had met all of Roosevelt's needs in the case of Blaine.

Ship subsidies were another legacy left to Theodore Roosevelt by his predecessor. He has striven faithfully, but thus far unsuccessfully to execute this clause in the will of his testator.

Then there was "benevolent assimilation," the "duty and destiny" business which the McKinley administration was carrying out in the Philippines through its pious and devoted missionaries, Gen. "Hell-Roaring Jake" Smith and Majors Glenn and Waller, of watercure and other fame. President Roosevelt took up this work with praiseworthy enthusiasm and

is still carrying it on. To be sure, most of the pious mastication was done in the sunshine of McKinley benevolence, and the assimilation is always a pleasant task.

Roosevelt was called upon merely to demonstrate by the might of many thousands of American soldiers that unless a people is ready for the most advanced type of Anglo-Saxon, "democratic" Republican government, they are not fit for self-government at all. Deluded mortals have divided into scores of nations, each is left alone, governing itself in the way that suits it best. But these have missed the pious masticators and "benevolent assimilators" who speak English and rule everybody they can overcome in battle—always for the benefit of the person governed. To be thus neglected in the divine scheme of Anglo-Saxon imperialism is the misfortune of many nations. Roosevelt, following McKinley, has done his best to show these nations that they should not try self-government at all until they are rather better adapted to it than anybody else. If only Roosevelt had a Taft of medicine to teach the doctors before beginning practice to practice as those other doctors of eminent talents and decades of practice; if Roosevelt would only direct Elihu Root to have a law that no lawyer should be admitted to the bar until he was as efficient in the law as Root himself, what a wonderful bar and bench and medical profession we would have! If! If! There's the rub. These doctors and lawyers would be no whit more wonderful than the

nation which should become proficient in the highest form of self-government through being governed by an alien race. One doubts whether all the rare wisdom and ability of President Roosevelt will be equal to the task of accomplishing either miracle.

Having put down effectively the "dangerous elements" in 1896, and having placed the ban of disapproval forever upon "dishonest money," "free riot" and a number of other very wicked but wholly fictitious bugbears, it was not necessary thereafter for the American public to worry over any other sort of dishonesty in business or government. A group of Wall Street financial saints, with the strangest sort of perversity, seemed to regard the victory of 1896 as their own victory. Possibly it was because, as the *Review of Reviews* afterward announced, the campaign was financed in Wall Street and conducted therefrom. The pious honesty and the smug respectability secured by the victory was all considered their own, just as though they had purchased it with their own money as they might have purchased a franchise from New York, Chicago or St. Louis aldermen.

The inauguration of the great and good McKinley, this Wall Street group took as a signal for raising the black flag of financial and industrial piracy on every sea, foreign and domestic, and such a carnival of loot, public and private, as held sway for four or five years thereafter, cannot be matched in American politics. Grant's second administration would

serve as a rival, except that the theatre was much smaller and the stage setting less impressive.

Euphonious and respectable names took the ugly edge off these raids. They were "promotions," "consolidations," "organizations," "expansions" of industry and a thousand and one blessed things. Whether it was the looting of the Postoffice Department, the purloining of a franchise or a railway or the crucifying of an island people fighting for their rights, a sanctimonious countenance and a pious phrase were always there to justify it by high and holy motive. An unsympathetic foreigner might have called it the apotheosis of hypocrisy, cant and villainy. But we good Americans must regard it as the time of our deliverance from uncouth, menacing and entirely wicked doctrines.

Added to this, the Spanish war, like all other wars, loosed restraint. Taut moral principles snapped like threads. The net of conscientious action hung flabbily. A twentieth century community was plunged into the stone age of elemental consciencelessness and ferocity. Its centuries of softening civilization fell from it like a cloak.

Policies which fostered such conditions were the policies President Roosevelt pledged himself in Buffalo to carry out. It was not an easy task he had set himself. Sorely did he need to employ generously the saving mental reservation. With Napoleonic stroke the country had been divided into industrial prov-

inces, principalities, and empires to be ruled over by industrial potentates, who yearned to be industrial dictators. The warring interests of these must be harmonized.

President Roosevelt took hold with a vim. His mental reservation as to the merit system was the first to be put to use. Revenue officers at Louisville and El Paso who had become too thoroughly inoculated with the laxity of the McKinley regime in civil service, were brought up short. At the same time Roosevelt appointed a thoroughly disreputable Pennsylvania politician, too strong for the McKinley stomach, to a responsible consulship in Canada. As governor Roosevelt had been considered "easy" for the politicians. Here was like weakness. Was he still to be Platt and Quay ruled?

McKinley's taking off and the insane burst of vengeful sentiment which it engendered, colored Roosevelt's first message. Because a poor, deluded wretch had killed a president, the spokesmen of our country were ready to throw to the winds constitutional safeguards fought and striven for since the time of King John. President Roosevelt recommended that Federal courts should be given power to deal with crimes against the person of the President, or any man in the presidential succession. The punishment of an attempt should be commensurate with the "enormity" of the offense.

Out of the public clamor that gave rise to this recommendation or at least made it opportune, he would fashion a law making crime

against a few Federal officers and foreign diplomats, different from crimes against American citizens. Roosevelt may be given credit for trying to embody in law the principle which in Germany makes speaking disrespectful of the Emperor a greater offense than killing a mechanic—if the killing be done by a member of the military caste. Our whole national life until the administration of President McKinley had been a protest against this very thing—this giving of greater rights and privileges to persons in office than to persons out of office. We were getting back to the precious principles of Charles Stuart.

Our sapient historical statesman explained the queer retrogression on the ground that the attack upon the officer was an attack upon the institution. They had assassins murdering the presidency and the chief justiceship, rather than merely killing the man who happened at the time to fill the position; although they would hardly contend that the street-sweeping service was murdered by the violent and felonious taking off of Mike Clancy, the street-sweeper. Theretofore, whether it was Mike Clancy or William McKinley was killed, the crime was just murder. Now one must become regicide, a new crime in the American calendar. But we would not call it by that name.

Undesirable and wholly misguided citizens contend that both the presidency and the supreme justiceship, as institutions of free people, are murdered when their incumbents are made

a class by themselves in the eye of the criminal law. If murder of a president is different from the murder of another man, they argue, then the murder of any other officer of the government is also different. We have a law for our officers and another for ourselves. The thin edge of the wedge of caste, class and privilege has begun to cleave our constitution.

Our most useful citizen, it is pointed out, may be given protection of the law not equal to that given the proxy of a foreign potentate. A queer corollary is found in the interesting performance of the Joe Murrays of our public service censoring the opinions of our distinguished foreigners to determine whether they are not too strong for the digestion of the feeble American intellect. We have freedom of speech in our constitution and laws upon the statute books of recent vintage which seek to deny freedom of thought. It is the first great triumph of the Roosevelt administration, giving the government a luff toward respectability—the respectability of king, czar and emperor.

At this stage in his career, President Roosevelt was a little skeptical about the "trust-busting" business. He had not yet recovered from the effect of the great victory. "Much of the legislation directed at the trusts, he said, would have been extremely mischievous if it had not been entirely ineffective." Unfortunately President Roosevelt has left us in the dark as to whether this applies to the Sherman anti-trust law or to the numerous state laws

incontinently bowled over by the Federal courts. An awkward statute in Illinois, the product of sinister Altgeld influences, was declared unconstitutional because it playfully excluded agricultural trusts from the trusts to be "busted," even though there were not then, are not now and never shall be, any such combinations.

"In dealing with business interests," Mr. Roosevelt very sagely remarked, "for the government to undertake by *crude* and *ill-considered* legislation to do what may turn out to be bad, would be to incur the risk of such far-reaching disaster that it would be better to do nothing at all."

Still more unfortunately, Roosevelt neglected to explain why *crude* and *ill-considered* legislation usually, as everybody knows, so eminently helpful, would not do in this case. Nor did he explain why it was necessary to have the legislation *crude* and *ill-considered*. But at least he has told us what to avoid, a thing no legislator would for a moment suspect. The strength of this proposition is like the strength of so many of Roosevelt's political propositions, in its specificity and helpfulness.

In this message, too, President Roosevelt initiates as a policy of his administration the thing which most sensible and respectable people, in addition to all corporate interests, have long been clamoring for:

"Therefore, in the interest of the whole people, the nation should without interfering

with the powers of the states in the matter itself, also assume power of supervision and regulation over all corporations doing an interstate business." If the constitution had not given power to the general government to assume such supervision, Mr. Roosevelt wanted the constitution amended to fit the case.

Harassing doubts still perplex our statesmen as to how the general government can assume such regulation without interfering with the power of the states. There are indications that up to this time the principal business of the general government, through its courts, has been making ineffective the attempts of states to meet this corporation problem. President Roosevelt has not yet seen fit to illuminate the dark places in this problem by the white light of his statesmanship. There are indications that his opinion has been modified as to the need of the general government interfering with the activity of the states.

We could not expect, the President said, to have the Filipinos learn in a few years what required us thirty generations of practice. He left us to draw our own conclusion that if we were to prepare the Filipinos, we must hold them in tutelage for thirty generations. That may be putting it mildly, for there is a question whether our leading strings will prove as effective a preparation for self-government as the hard knocks which a race encounters in looking after its own affairs. If it should prove as effective this would be the first

instance where either an individual or a nation has developed in any such way.

In fact in his first message President Roosevelt ran the gamut of his policies, except as to railway rate regulation. Philippines, Cuban reciprocity, Chinese exclusion, big navy, improved army and all the rest.

Tariff was treated gingerly, but the statement in regard to it indicated that Roosevelt had finally and for all time washed away the taint of free trade heresy. Reciprocity must be considered the handmaiden of protection; duties must never fall below the difference between labor cost here and in Europe.

The handmaiden has been since left in lonely isolation. Roosevelt evidently believes in a generous margin for difference in labor cost. Some of Roosevelt's former associates, the foolish and impracticable free traders, boldly contend that the American laborer does more for the money he receives than does any European laborer. If Roosevelt's rule was put in practice, the tariff tax would be a minus quantity upon all competing goods. Nobody is recorded as having seen President Roosevelt wink when he wrote this recommendation.

CHAPTER XV.

RACE PROBLEMS CONFRONT ADMINISTRATION.

Race problems met President Roosevelt at the threshold of his administration. Scarcely had he warmed his White House seat when Booker Washington, the negro educator, became his dinner guest. Floodgates of race prejudices were opened and torrents came forth.

President Roosevelt's motives cannot be suspected. Nobody will deny his right to choose his guests. This incident helped in no way the solution of the race problem. It hampered Roosevelt mightily thereafter in dealing with the South.

Democracy had no part in President Roosevelt's decision to make Booker Washington his guest. As a matter of fact the invitation was, no doubt, extended without taking thought of consequences. As President Roosevelt sees it, neither negroes nor any other human beings take part in government as a right. It is a privilege handed down by their betters. This creed has been reiterated so often that it is unnecessary to refer to specific quotations:

Holding this notion in common, probably drew Roosevelt and Booker Washington to-

gether. Washington would make his people free and self-respecting by "keeping them out of politics" and teaching them trades. Roosevelt likes that plan. At some future time we may have a race of colored people satisfied and prosperous as well fed oxen.

Since the Booker Washington incident, President Roosevelt has managed to keep the race problem pretty well stirred up, South and North. The Indianola post-office incident was quite as offensive to Southern people as the Booker Washington incident. It also offended other persons who believe that in America no officer should be forced upon a community against its will. As a corollary to the notion that participation in politics is a privilege and not a right of the citizen, President Roosevelt holds that citizens have no right to say who shall become their public servants.

Perversely enough, this Mississippi community had a choice as to its postmaster, and expressed the choice in a way more forcible than diplomatic. Such impudence in the governed class must not go unpunished. It was the will of the President that these people must be served in their postoffice by this particular colored woman, well, just because he willed it that way. To punish them for setting their own puny wishes against his royal will, President Roosevelt closed up the postoffice and obliged the community to send thirty miles for its mail. The community thought that action illegal, autocratic, tyrannical, but that was because of excited imagination. It was a

salutary lesson for the recalcitrant governed class.

Very similar was the Crum case in South Carolina. President Roosevelt with nice discrimination picked a negro for a place in a community where he knew it would give a maximum of offense. He chose a position where negro officiousness would have a particularly irritating influence upon white men. This negro was the only negro of importance to whom President Roosevelt at that time had given office in the South. It would have been as well to have left the slate white from top to bottom. But he wanted to make an instance.

With the infinite bulldog stubbornness which President Roosevelt displays when he knows he is wrong, he clung to this appointment. Under the constitution, confirmation by the Senate is as necessary to make a valid appointment, as the nomination by the President. It is part of the constitutional process of appointment for places requiring Senate confirmation. When the Senate rejects, a president who obeys the constitution nominates another man. When the appointee fails of nomination and his appointment lapses, it is a violation of the constitution and an insult to a co-ordinate branch to renew the appointment. But constitutional provisions do not apply to President Roosevelt. Any administration newspaper will demonstrate that. Some way or other this confirmation by the Senate is supposed to be a mere formality, although the constitution-makers looked upon it as a most

important thing. Presidents are supposed to know personally thirty or forty thousand applicants for seven or eight thousand places, or to get information about them from politicians coming from the locality of the applicant. It would be a great crime to let a senator or a congressman pass upon the qualification—a violation of the president's "prerogative." Roosevelt stuck to his "prerogative" and fritted away much of the surplus executive force and influence in a struggle of which he alone appreciated the use or meaning.

On the other side of the account was the discharge of Brownsville troops. Somebody shot up a Texas town. The troops could not or would not tell an army investigator the details or give the names of the guilty ones. Very well, they would talk! President Roosevelt summarily discharged the whole battalion. There was no very convincing evidence that any person in the battalion had taken part in the "shooting up." There was no charge that more than an insignificant number took part. Peace reigned supreme throughout the land. There were plenty of idle officers and any amount of time to find the guilty ones. Military procedure had provided orderly methods for reaching such results. But President Roosevelt decided that the innocent should suffer with the guilty. If they could not convict the real culprits, so much the worse for those who had nothing to do with the case. Men who had given their lives to the service of their country in the ranks of the soldiery

and had served faithfully and well, were dismissed "without honor" and with a reprimand, and their re-enlistment or civil employment by the government forbidden.

When the storm came, President Roosevelt found precedent, war precedent. Lincoln was the offender. There are some clever military lawyers on President Roosevelt's staff.

In a speech, we think it was at Springfield, Ill., in 1903, President Roosevelt said: "A man who is good enough to shed his blood for his country is good enough to be given a square deal afterwards. More than that no man is entitled to, less than that no man shall have." This was before the Brownsville affair.

"In many cases of lynch law which have come to my knowledge, the effect has been healthy," etc. (Winning of the West, page 172.) Probably the President made up his mind that this was a case for official lynching. This is one method of increasing respect for law—"orderly liberty," as Roosevelt is disposed to designate it.

Democrats of the South applauded. The bolt had fallen upon a despised race. Such democrats make autocracy popular. Negroes, however, seem quite unable to forgive Brownsville. They have been the victims of unofficial lawlessness so long that it frightens them to see official lawlessness added thereto. Even negroes are capable of learning by experience.

CHAPTER XVI.

PRESIDENT TAKES UP REFORM.

In a half score of the states there was pernicious activity against industrial and transportation combinations. Ohio, Texas, Illinois, Washington, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, and other states, populist-tainted, were determined to check the carnival of loot. Already the great public were showing signs of revulsion.

Sensational papers had flayed the packing interests, bringing out the same facts that came to light years afterward in the Garfield report. The investigator failed to ascertain, as Mr. Garfield did, that the plethoric millions of the Armours and other great packers had been garnered from a modest two per cent. profit. Their reports did not leave one in perplexing doubt as to whether the packers were exploiters or benefactors in disguise.

S. R. Van Sant, of Minnesota, then governor of the state, inspired, it is said, by powerful rival interests, had gone after the Northern Securities merger. Washington State was also hot upon the trail. After these two commonwealths had prepared public sentiment and made absolutely unmistakable the popularity

of such a move, Philander Knox, President Roosevelt's attorney general, inherited from President McKinley, took up the fight. President Roosevelt could not afford to embark in any plan of this sort without in advance making sure of public approval.

About the same time he began his assault upon the unpopular packing interests. In both cases the government won. Just what it won might be made plain to a technical lawyer. In speaking to the public it is best to say that the government won a victory. This victory was not intrusive. It did not prevent the merger, nor make less the price of beef. In fact the merger has been a hard fact in the Northwest since those days in 1901 when the Hill-Morgan interests gained control of the Northern Pacific and the Burlington railways. It was as hard a fact after the government victory as before. Now it is as hard a fact as it was before the government brought its suit.

Beef prices have been going up to the consumer and down to the farmer for 10! these many years. They went on as steadily and uninterruptedly after Mr. Knox had enjoined them as before. Still Mr. Knox's victory was a great triumph for the administration. The merger decision established a recondite legal theory so occult as to divide the experts of the Supreme Court, that the holding company way of merging railways is an illegal way. Very well, the railway people merged in a way not yet decided illegal. There are more ways than one of "skinning a cat." As to results, the rose is

just as sweet by any other name, the merger just as profitable by any other title or no title at all as by the title of the "Northern Securities Company." In the same way the "Beef Trust" case established theoretically that the labor-shackling injunction may be used to threaten the manufacturer. This lesson, no doubt, is worth the advanced price paid by the public for its meats.

Postoffice affairs had grown odorously rank. Tulloch made definite charges of wrongdoing. Roosevelt's postmaster general sneered at them. When they could no longer be suppressed or blinked, their investigation was taken up. A few men, mostly small men, suffered, and suffered justly. One James N. Tyner, bowed down by the infirmities of age, acquitted by the courts, was pursued to his grave by the implacable vengeance of the President.

There were grave abuses in the Postoffice Department, such as scandalous overpayment for mail service, but these were not touched at all. On the contrary, the activities of the Postoffice Department were turned to the censoring of literature and the suppression through postal discrimination, of publications not meeting the approval of Roosevelt's bureaucrats.

The chief instrument of the postal disclosures, Assistant Postmaster General Bristow, was shunted off to Panama as an easy step in the descent to obscurity.

CHAPTER XVII.

ROOSEVELT CAPTURES A CANAL SITE.

Isthmian canal was one of the interesting legacies that came to President Roosevelt. Secretary of State Hay, also a legacy, had dug up, somewhere in the files of his department, an obsolete and lapsed treaty manufactured for some obscure reason a half-century before and known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This treaty gave the good Mr. Hay an excuse for asking his friend John Bull if he would graciously give Uncle Sam permission to dig a canal at Uncle Sam's expense in territory with which John Bull had no earthly concern, provided Uncle Sam would bear the cost of maintenance and give John Bull more benefit of the canal than Uncle Sam got himself.

It was really a daring thing for Mr. Hay to ask his British friend for such self-sacrifice, he who had been so clamorously our friend in the Spanish-American war. True, we had paid him by our moral support in snuffing out the Boer republics. This moral support had been extended under President Roosevelt to making United States territory a recruiting ground for British military trains. The United States was then in the same business of de-

stroying republics and acquiring territory by sword might. By a "gentleman's" understanding each was to look the other way so as not to see things not intended for him. What Kitchener was doing with Boer non-combatants might not look well to Americans who had found so much that was monstrous in Weyler's reconcentration camps. This government, as any polite gentleman would do, engaged to see that its children did not look through the cracks in the British fence and see the demonstrations. On the other hand, the British government was to keep British subjects from prying into the actions of Gen. Jacob Smith, with the Stygian appellation, or of Major Waller or Major Glenn of water cure fame.

British Tories and Mr. Hay had a perfect understanding, but it might be well that some tangible evidence be given to the world of this entente cordiale. What better opportunity? Mr. Hay bowed politely to his friend: "Will you permit me, my dear."

John Bull was never known to permit anything unless there was something in it for him. Nothing ever took place in this world that this supreme meddler among peoples did not consider especially his affair. The less he has to do about it, the more, seemingly, he wants to say about it. He could not think of having his cousin Jonathan build that canal if it were not for their great friendship. But seeing it was a case of fast friends, if Jonathan would only give some concessions about New

Foundland fisheries, give John a strip of the Alaskan coast, make the canal neutral by sanction of the powers, and give foreigners more rights than Americans, John might see his way clear to do it. Always seeing it's you.

John Hay, the great diplomat, the wonderful diplomat,* actually in his (Hay-Pauncefote) treaty got the permission of Great Britain to do a thing Great Britain had not the slightest interest in, and which anybody less punctilious about the feelings of friends, would not have asked about at all. As the sequel shows, there was not such tenderness about the rights of Colombia, but in the language of Kipling, "that is another story."

Some strange acrobatic feats have been performed in connection with the canal. A million-dollar commission was at first pretty certain that Nicaragua was the place to build it. Under the persuasion of the highly eloquent French owners of the Panama concession and a collection of machinery rapidly being transformed into Panama junk, it decided later that Panama was really the only place. This Panama Canal Company had long since given up all hope of building the Panama canal. Its franchises had lapsed. Tropical rains and tropical vegetation were rapidly destroying the

*We recognize fully the sterling worth of John Hay as a man, but in our judgment, with the exception of his insistence upon the integrity of China, his diplomacy was a series of embarrassing, if not humiliating blunders.

appearance of value in the machinery accumulated and abandoned on the isthmus. When America began to talk canal seriously, the moribund Panama company showed new signs of life. It got a sort of New York transit company extension of franchise from some claimant to authority in Colombia who was willing for a price to sell what did not belong to him. Then the Panama company came to the United States with its shady franchise and its worthless junk.

"Colombia can eliminate the French company at pleasure," said the *Review of Reviews* in April, 1902. "The alleged extension of franchises under which the company claims its present rights, seems not to have been granted in a legal way." That was certainly putting it mildly.

Congress was unanimous for the Nicaragua route, and the House passed a measure authorizing the President to build a canal through Nicaragua. Panama lobbyists had more influence with the Senate. President Roosevelt became convinced that Panama junk was worth \$40,000,000. As a football the thing was tossed about Congress for a session. A villainous lobby swarmed in Washington and some of its minions got extremely close to some of the departments. Finally that great patriot, Senator John C. Spooner of Wisconsin, found a way out. Congress abdicated and left the whole matter in the hands of the president. It was a way easy, as it was cowardly, of dodging responsibility. Also an eminently

effective way of betraying the interests of the people of the United States, who commission a Congress to look after the important affairs of the country, instead of turning them over to an executive dictator and his serviceable bureaucrats.

To be sure, the Spooner act attempted to limit within very broad bounds the discretion of the executive. It provided for a commission of seven to look after the details of the work. President Roosevelt in this as in other cases, did not permit himself to be unduly hampered by laws, constitutional or statutory. That is one of his great qualities. While he is president it is unnecessary for any other authority to change in any manner the constitution or the laws of the country. Executive orders are more prompt, more effective and more available for putting in force the supreme will of the president.

By the Spooner act the President was authorized to buy the assets of the New French Panama Canal Company on the isthmus for \$40,000,000, and to negotiate with the Republic of Colombia for a canal strip at the best obtainable terms. Should he fail to make terms with Colombia or to get satisfactory title from the French Company, he was to construct the canal at Nicaragua.

There was opposition to this law in the Senate. Morgan of Alabama, stuck to Nicaragua, Congress' first love. Panama interests saw to it that Morgan left the head of the Senate Committee having this business in charge.

They wanted a clean man, a man fully conversant with Wall street business ethics—this without the least disparagement to the venerable Alabama senator. Senator Marcus A. Hanna was selected for the place. Senator Hanna gave the Senate the benefit of his discovery. He had learned upon unimpeachable evidence that should the canal be constructed at Nicaragua, it would surely be destroyed by earthquake. True, Panama made the distance to the Pacific hundreds of miles further; its belt of calms would make the canal useless for all time for sailing vessels; it had a climate which meant liberal death toll and additional millions for sanitation,—but we must dodge those earthquakes. Mount Pelee and Martinique, argued for Hanna.

"It is natural," said the *Review of Reviews* in February, 1903, "that there should be strong pressure brought to bear on our government to conclude any sort of arrangement with Colombia by the various interests, legal, journalistic and otherwise, that are serving the cause of the French Company that expects to get \$40,000,000 in cash out of the United States Treasury to pay for assets of an abandoned enterprise and for franchises which on their face were non-transferable, and which had expired some time ago, although renewed for a short term by means that would hardly bear investigation. . . . It is a relief to turn from the Panama scheme which suggests infinite confusion, if not infinite lobbying and

corruption," etc. (Commenting on the Tehuantepec railway of Mexico.)

At that time the *Review of Reviews* contended that the President could afford to wait until a correct solution of the problem could be found. "A right solution is far more to be desired than a prompt one."

With the casting out of Senator Morgan and the installation of Senator Hanna at the head of canal affairs in the Senate, everything began to run smoothly for the Panama company. Congress, as related above, turned a back-somersault following the canal commission. Roosevelt wanted to buy the Panama junk. Only an arrangement with Colombia stood in the way of giving the suave French gentlemen and their American representatives of the "Third House" \$40,000,000, good American dollars, for something of small value to anybody. If the United States has realized \$5,000,000 from its Panama purchase there is nothing on record to indicate that fact.

There was a question as to title, and Mr. Philander Knox, the astute attorney general, decided that the Panama company could give good title "to the property of that company" upon the isthmus. In other words, it could give title to any property to which it might have had title. This was Mr. Knox's quaint way of putting it.

Having been given permission by Great Britain, Mr. Hay commenced negotiations with Colombia for a final arrangement. No great difficulty was found in dealing with Mr. Her-

ran. Things Panaman thrived like a green bay tree, in the atmosphere of Washington. Uncle Sam had lots of money. Colombia was to get \$10,000,000 for its right of way. The Panama company was to get four times that sum for its junk, and no embarrassing scrutiny of title or values.

Just at that time, unfortunately for Colombia, Panama interests were not so well represented in that little state. Finding everything so highly satisfactory at Washington, Panama interests seem to have neglected the South American end. For ten millions of dollars, Colombia, as the treaty provided, was to give the United States control of a strip of land six miles wide from ocean to ocean, except for certain purposes. The United States agreed to pay a perpetual rental of \$250,000 a year. There were those who thought the arrangement over-favorable to Colombia. The *Review of Reviews*, certainly not lacking in loyal support to the administration, complained in this wise:

"When one protests against this sort of thing" (permitting Colombia to have sovereignty over the canal strip) "at Washington, one is told rather cynically that we do not really mean it, but that this gives us a foothold, and that once down there at work, we shall gradually improve our advantages and usurp what we may need." Thus at that time we had the honorable intentions of making a treaty with Colombia in order to break it.

Colombia upset all calculations. With crim-

inal perversity the little state decided that since the Panama Canal Company had permitted its franchise to lapse, the company had no interest in the canal except to dispose of its junk. Colombia objected to the Panama Company receiving pay for franchises which belonged to the Colombian people. If any one was to have the big end of the purse so recklessly bestowed by the Yankees, Colombia ought to have it. Herran's agreement was rejected, and Colombia prepared to take steps formally to annul the franchises, or rather formally to declare that they had lapsed.

According to the *Review of Reviews*, Francis B. Loomis, assistant secretary of state, in a "remarkable" address before the Quill Club of New York, justifying Roosevelt's coup, declared that Colombia's motive in rejecting the Hay-Herran treaty was "to gain time in order to nullify the French franchise, appropriate the assets of the company, and sell the canal on its own account to the United States."

Loud was the hungry voice of Panama in protest. It was indistinguishable from the voice of the administration in Washington. A most iniquitous thing was it for Colombia to try to save for its people the value of the canal franchise. Indignation deep and righteous as that of Wall street saints over political and financial iniquity spread over official America. Colombia wanted just a bribe. It had no government anyway. Great was the infamy of the men who wanted for wicked Colombia rather than for the pious Panama Company,

the plethoric Yankee millions. Colombia did not know its opportunity. It had let it slip.

In its simplicity Congress suggested turning to Nicaragua, as the President had been instructed to do should such a situation arise. There was plenty of time. If terms could not be made for the Nicaragua route, Colombia and the Panama company might be left to fight it out. When they had done, the United States might make its bargain. It could not do worse than it was doing at any rate. Panama junk would be worth less next year or the next.

"The special opportunity," said the *Review of Reviews*, "of the Panama movement lay in the powerful support in the United States and France of the Panama Canal Company, which had already made a conditional sale of its assets to the government."

With strange prevision, the *Review of Reviews*, notoriously close to the administration and sharing administration secrets, told in its issue for November, 1903, the story of the Panama revolution, which took place after the magazine had gone to subscribers. This story was circumstantial, and missed no essential detail. To be sure, it was forecast, but it made the writer a prophet or a sharer of administration secrets denied the general public. Panama, it was hinted, might revolt. The United States might support it. Panama might give authority to dig the canal and take the Yankee millions. More Yankee millions might in that way find a lodging place in the

hands of the good and patriotic Panama company.

Panama took advantage of the condition. A handful of Panama company agents, said to have been paid liberally for their activity, raised the standard of revolt. One of the number "confessed" at a later date and told of the generous thousands of Panama cash that served as the life-blood of this uprising. Bunau Varilla, agent, promoter and lobbyist of the Panama company, was made diplomatic agent of the Panama Junta. Lawyer William Cromwell, lobbyist, legal adviser and stockholder of the Panama company, became a confidential adviser of the Washington administration in Panama business.

November 3, 1903, the standard of revolt was raised. American warships immediately guarded the isthmus from both sides. Good Mr. Hay, who had so politely asked England's permission to build the canal, forgot that Colombia had any interest at all. Panama was recognized as a new nation November 6. Immediately an insurrectionary Junta was on its way to Washington to sign a treaty offensive and defensive for the new republic, and sell canal concessions.

Suddenly it became important to keep traffic open on the isthmus. American warships confronted Colombia when she talked of putting down the insurrection. The old treaty, of 1846, made by Colombia with the undoubted intention of insuring Colombia peaceful possession of the isthmus, was with gravely judi-

cious countenance twisted about to mean that it gave the right to the United States to exclude Colombia. That is, we said with a smile and with a wink scarcely perceptible, that a sovereign state had made a treaty with us by implication abdicating its sovereignty. This was not Great Britain with a big, ugly navy, but poor little Colombia. The wolf licked his chops and winked. "This lamb made a treaty with me permitting me to bite off its left hind leg. It became my duty to bite off the leg for the benefit of the lamb, and I did it out of consideration for her."

When Colombia got ready to whip the handful of Panama company employees and adventurers into subjection, she looked into Yankee rifles.

"Sorry," said the polite Mr. Roosevelt, "but Panama is a sovereign state under a treaty of alliance with us, offensive and defensive. Its patriots are now enjoying their reward in anticipation of the ten millions I am about to give them for making my pathway smooth across the isthmus. Monsieur Varilla, Mr. Cromwell, and their high-minded friends, look forward with serene confidence to the possession of forty millions of good Yankee dollars, representing lapsed franchises, a pile of selected junk, a personally conducted revolution, a Junta treaty, and an infinite amount of skillful lobbying and greasing of ways. It is a closed incident. Your property! Receiving stolen goods! Abetting a robber and sharing his plunder! Why, my dear Colombia. You

talk as though the decalogue had a place in international affairs. Don't you know, Miss Colombia, that in this business we act in—

"The good old way and simple plan,

"That he shall take who has the power,

"And he shall keep who can."

In fact it was a closed incident. "The more the matter was considered, the more plain became the fact that everybody who wanted the Isthmian Canal dug would have to support the policy of the administration," said the *Review of Reviews*. In a later issue it hurled defiance in this wise:

"It is enough to say that the course was one for which the government is ready to assume responsibility in the face of all comers."

Mr. Roosevelt could hardly have phrased it better. "What are you going to do about it?"

To be sure, the treaty was to be ratified. An enlightened clique—the same that "had brought strong pressure upon the government to buy the assets of an abandoned enterprise and the privilege of franchises on their face non-transferable, and which had long since lapsed"—this enlightened clique vociferously demanded the ratification of the treaty.

President Roosevelt is nothing if not practical. To the question is it right he gave the convincing retort: "We have the power. This canal will be a wonderful thing for the country, especially the South."

Such pure unsullied patriots as Francis B. Loomis, later of Venezuela asphalt fame, went forth to demonstrate to the public the high

ethical ground of the administration in this business. With such a sponsor, there could be no suspicion of wrong.

It was a ninety day sensation. Democratic Congressional leaders, as usual, got their price, a miserable mess of pottage, for their constituents in canal value, especially to the Gulf states. This was far more important to the country than law, manhood, conscience, right. Territorial buccaneering was canonized as a pious thing, and became a most righteous piece of gentlemanly appropriation. Raffles could have had no higher motive.

Every patriotic — and credulous — person must accept the righteous good faith of our government in this transaction. We must believe perforce that the programme told in advance by administration friends, carried out to the letter by administration friends with the full and active support of the administration, was a movement springing spontaneously from a different and an independent source. Following the rejection of the treaty, the revolution was only a coincidence. It was only a coincidence that America's government was ready to support it with ships and marines; only a coincidence that the ships and the marines were there ready for the work; only a coincidence that Bunau Varilla, the agent for the Panama company, was the representative at Washington of the new Panama government; only a coincidence that he and his new nation were recognized immediately by our State Department; only a coincidence that

William Cromwell, attorney and promoter of the Panama company, was adviser of our government. All these things get further integrity as coincidences by later stories of those who took part in the revolution, to the effect that they had an assurance in advance of support from this government, and were paid handsomely for their activity in the uprising. It all just happened luckily for our government by a sort of special providence, the special providence which looks after the especially righteous ones who could not on any account have guilty knowledge or give guilty support to any enterprise. Even though it may appear piratical the thing was most proper and righteous.

Unquestionably the thing looks probable—more probable than some of the tales of the truthful Munchausen. A specially high-minded government was not supposed to know what influences were at work in Washington. How could a man like Francis B. Loomis recognize the spoor of the “unclean beast” making smooth the path of Panama?

“This belligerent, or more properly speaking, piratical way of looking at neighboring territory, was very characteristic of the West, and was the root of manifest destiny.” (Roosevelt’s *Life of Benton*, page 16.)

In this case, frontiersmen were encroaching as settlers upon practically uninhabited contiguous Spanish territory. Piracy to be sure! The rape of Panama was therefore “manifest destiny.”

"The general feeling of the West afterward crystalized into what became known as the "manifest destiny" idea, which reduced to its simplest terms was: That it was our manifest destiny to swallow up the land of all adjoining nations that were too weak to withstand us; a theory that forthwith obtained immense popularity with all statesmen of easy international morality." (Roosevelt's *Life of Benton*, page 40.)

Statesmen of easy international morality evidently were not confined to Benton's time, nor to the West.

Colombia missed its pocketbook and its back lot. If it had been an individual, it would have been robbery. The offense was expiated somewhat by passing the plunder over to the good Panama company and its tools of the isthmus. America showed that it was ready to take its own medicine. The process of retribution is still going on. Before the big ditch is finished we will have spent as much thereon as it would require to build and equip two double-tracked lines of railway from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast. But since this might induce a rational solution of the railway problem and develop millions of acres of American land, and build millions of American homes, it would have been very wicked. The government can only engage in water transportation problems, where the benefit may accrue to the whole world, but more particularly to nations like Great Britain, with great merchant fleets. Then we could not

transport our big battleships upon the railway, and above all things we must remain armed to the teeth. Probably half a century hence the canal may have some important influence upon American transportation problems.

Sapient engineers who showed such agility in turning somersaults upon the proposition of locating the canal, seem to have been quite as accurate in its estimates. It was to cost \$134,000,000, and several dollars and several cents. It was all figured down to 23-100 of a dollar. Not a cent more, not a cent less. Now we are told by equally good authority—the engineers in charge, that it will cost \$300,000,000. This time the cents have been neglected. The estimate is not final.

Given carte blanc to construct the canal, Roosevelt has plunged into the task with characteristic modesty. This is the one enterprise on earth where no mistakes have been made—by the administration. Critics who have found defects are mendacious carpers. Roosevelt's portly friend of the War Department says so.

Roosevelt has refused to be hampered in this affair. When he got tired of the commission provided by Congress, he just discharged the commission, installed nominal successors—for Roosevelt always wants to be within the law—and placed the power in the hands of a commission of his own under the attractive appellation of an executive committee. This committee quit. In Theodore P. Shonts that was considered entirely within his discretion. He was

treated pleasantly. J. F. Wallace, chief engineer, quit the place a traitor. Roosevelt's portly secretary told him plainly the enormity of his offense. Wallace was obliged to listen. So great was Wallace's offense that the administration would not touch the tainted information which he was willing to give. Wallace must be made an example for all time. There are those who regard Wallace entirely within his rights in quitting the canal, just as Roosevelt was within his rights in quitting the Navy Department when he did. As to the question of patriotism, carping critics raise it in each case.

When Chief Engineer Stevens got enough of the big ditch, he was treated something like a human being, with the right of directing his own activities and his fortunes. By his resignation, he probably brought so strongly to light as to defeat the plan a proposition by which such men as Thomas F. Ryan were to get some millions out of the canal as nominal contractors, whose duty it was to look on while government employees superintended and planned the work, and the government financed it.

Changes in personnel and executive organization have followed one another with kaleidoscopic rapidity—all in the interest of efficient administration. No mistakes have been made. After Wallace had refused to sacrifice his wife and family to the Roosevelt canal god, and Stevens had become tired of being meddled with, President Roosevelt or-

dered army engineers to do the work. He has them where he wants them as their commander-in-chief. A government paper gives the "facts." There is no danger anywhere now of anything going astray.

The great ditch has already given Roosevelt a background for all sorts of wonderful portraits, showing him literally digging the canal. It has also been the occasion for thousands of columns of presidential advertising, and a sensational outing, leaving the country governed by wireless telegraphy. There are some few imperfections which with another administration might have been magnified into scandals, such as the meditated eating concessions and the peculiar attempt to furnish feminine society and domestic comfort to the workmen. But these do not count. Roosevelt himself hunted for misdoing on the Isthmus with a megaphone and a brass band. His portly war secretary made widely heralded visits, and pronounced all well. It could not be otherwise when we have infallible persons in charge.

If any other person than Roosevelt had engineered Panama, especially the raid upon Colombia, and the payment of those millions to the Panama company, we would at least have had our suspicions. His being "easy" for such men as Platt and Quay, explains, no doubt, his being "easy" for such other men as Bunau Varilla and William Cromwell. Seeing it is Roosevelt probably it is not worth while regretting that we could not have begun

this great canal enterprise without an act which future historians may characterize as piracy, just as Roosevelt, historian, has characterized some of our earlier acquisitions of territory. A few years delay in the opening of the canal would not have made a great difference, but an act of piracy in the life of the nation is an act of piracy throughout all history.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ROOSEVELT REVISES MONROE DOCTRINE—
VENEZUELA—SANTO DOMINGO.

Roosevelt's success with Panama made a precedent for making over the whole South American pudding to his taste. He announced officially and unofficially that the nations of South America which did well (according to Anglo-Saxon standards) had nothing to fear, but those which showed weakness in "orderly liberty" were likely to have this government point out the way in which affairs governmental are properly conducted.

There was the Monroe doctrine, well enough in its way, but not quite the doctrine it would have been had President Roosevelt been there to formulate it—a misfortune made quite unavoidable by the accident of his birth-time. President Roosevelt did his best to remedy the defect. He made an announcement which his admirers heralded as the "New Monroe Doctrine," which might be summarized as a declaration that the United States felt responsible for the action of all other American states, and it would not shirk its "duty." Do wrong and your big brother of the North will get you!

Punctillious honesty has always been dear

to President Roosevelt. It has grown upon him since in 1896 he witnessed the high-minded Wall street financiers foil the plundering hordes of the West and South. Especially does President Roosevelt sympathize with persons who lend out money, through motives of generous service to their fellow men. Their security is Roosevelt's care. Bischoffsheim and Goldschmidt, of the Netherlands, the thrifty home of Roosevelt's ancestors, bought for fifty cents upon the dollar a claim of about three millions of dollars against Santo Domingo. The original lender, with overwhelming generosity, had taken only 25 per cent. for his commission. So generous were the money-changers that somebody connected with Santo Domingo actually got about \$190,000 and pledged for its payment about \$300,000 a year for twenty-five years. Mr. Isaacs of the three gilded balls never drove so sharp a bargain.

The people of Santo Domingo were called upon to pay only about \$3,800,000, for the loan on which their government realized \$190,000. This was a typical case. American, English, French, German, Italian, and other European promoters of adventurous and impecunious temper, love the soil of South America. By smooth wiles these adventurers get from some officer or pretender of brief authority a "concession" or license to rob the nation of public property, either perpetually or for a period of years. Possibly these adventurers are the agents of money-lenders who finance some revolution, giving the borrower the commis-

sion and retaining the principal. "Concessions" are not unknown in North America, but here they go to respectable and substantial natives, as a reward for exceptional service in financing country-saving campaigns.

But to return to our theme. Adventurous foreigners had been especially active in the more unsettled states of Central America and of Northern South America. Everything worth having seems to have been "conceded." Forests, asphalt mines, navigation rights, all had been bestowed upon impecunious foreigners. As soon as the "concession" was given, the foreigner went to a foreign country and "capitalized" his concession. Millions in "capitalization" were put out on the strength of these gifts of public plunder. After this "capitalization" had reached the hands of "innocent purchasers,"—holy innocents, the concessionaries or the money-lenders pressed their claims against the state. European chancelleries were appealed to and force was forthcoming to extract the blood-money. Now and then the South American countries fell into the hands of officers not sufficiently vile to acknowledge these iniquitous claims. That was repudiation and an occasion for the "big stick."

This was the situation in Venezuela when Great Britain and Germany, with their gallant fleets so valorously engaged the dismantled fleets of that country. Venezuela had been through all this sort of exploitation. It seems to have been cursed with a perennial

crop of foreign adventurers and approachable officers.

When Castro came into power he decided that this business had gone far enough. Castro refused to recognize the validity of these claims. "Concessions," the terms of which had not been kept by the beneficiaries—for terms were sometimes attached to these "concessions"—Castro decided to have cancelled. It was something as though this country had an administration sufficiently wicked to try to reclaim the public patrimony of mine and forest given away to promoters without money and without price.

Loud was the howl of "concessionaires." That dishonest scoundrel of Venezuela actually objected to having his people robbed for the benefit of foreigners. He was opposed to giving away the wealth of mine and forest as a free gift. So also was he opposed to saddling millions upon his people for the payment of bogus claims.

Monstrous! That model of Anglo-Saxon piety, Great Britain, joined hands with the sturdy and upright Kaiser in sending warships to Venezuela. Gallantly did the combined fleet attack and sink defenseless vessels. Dismantled hulks moored in the harbor felt the weight of Anglo-German naval power. Venezuelan lives were crushed out. Venezuelan property was destroyed. They would teach Castro morality if they had to shoot it into him.

Castro moved back from the shore.

"Fire away, gentlemen."

Then the exponents of highly civilized government, in the support of their adventurers, destroyed one of Castro's seaports.

Had Roosevelt wanted to announce a new doctrine which might have taken an honored place by the side of that of President Monroe, he had the opportunity when the intention of making this demonstration came to him through the crooked mazes of the interested chancelleries. "This nation recognizes no such international right as the collection of contractual debts by the might of warships. It protests in the name of the American people against making the refusal to pay contractual claims a cause for war."

President Roosevelt might have said this. He would have been in the company, in making such a declaration, of Adams, Marcy, Seward, Fish, Evarts and Blaine. And Roosevelt could have pointed out that in civilized countries claims for money are no longer enforced at the point of a revolver. If honest claims are not enforced in this way, nations can hardly claim the right to enforce by such method iniquitous claims of adventurous promoters who never did give value for the things they claim as theirs.

Men of this kind go into these disturbed countries knowing the condition in these countries of politics and laws. There are plenty of orderly places on earth for their activities. If they choose these unsettled conditions for purposes neither high nor holy, let them abide

the consequences. Let their claims be adjusted by the courts of the country with which they dealt in getting privileges. If that country's laws were good enough to give "concessions" they are good enough to interpret them.

With the might of America behind this doctrine, and the friendship of America depending upon its being respected, European nations would respect the doctrine. Then would we have an end of the disgusting spectacle of seeing men killed and property destroyed to collect blood-money—to enforce claims of adventurers and Shylocks.

There was plenty of opportunity for good red-blooded action, such as President Cleveland took when Great Britain a few years before tried to hector Venezuela out of territory. Our heroic president, however, has shown aversion to wounding the feelings of great powers. He begged the powers to desist and urged Castro to pay.

"Send your claims to the Hague," said Castro. "I shall abide the result."

Kaiser Wilhelm wanted his friend Theodore Roosevelt as arbitrator. Roosevelt was not looking for that sort of trouble. The gallant fleets of Germany and England withdrew after having committed a final act of murderous bad faith and vandalism. To the Hague went the dispute, where it had a true opera bouffe denouement. It was fully demonstrated that there was no basis whatever for nine-tenths of the claims which Germany and England tried to enforce by murderous brute might. Little

Castro had taught a lesson to several big foreign bullies.

Americans had been in the same concession-hunting business. Horatio R. Hamilton, of New York, had in the eighties received asphalt, timber and navigation concessions from somebody in temporary control in Venezuela. In turn he was to make certain rivers navigable, and to colonize and develop a portion of the country.

There was no pretense of carrying out the portion of the concession requiring outlay by Hamilton or his assigns. For Hamilton pursued the usual course and "capitalized" his concession. But the asphalt mine promised more riches than a mine of gold. There were miles of city streets to pave and aldermen willing to give good prices for the work. Asphalt flowed forth generously. The timber stood for future years. Rivers remained unnavigable. Acres remained in their pristine wildness.

Barber Asphalt Company, General Asphalt Company, New York and Bermudez Asphalt Company, different names for associated asphalt interests, the last named a mere subsidiary company of the General Asphalt Company, had fastened their tentacles upon American city streets. There was but one danger to this trust. The asphalt supply in Castro's dominions might some day be turned loose in other hands, and then the monopoly so painfully built up through years of unremitting toil in secret places and dark chambers, would

have to be established all over again. Faithful trust minions had the American title to Venezuelan concessions, but the rascally Castro threatened to saw off the limb upon which the leisurely concessionaire was sitting. He had started suit for annulment of the franchise.

Two dreadful things would follow the success of Castro in such a suit: United States cities might get cheap asphalt paving; Venezuelans might get some of the benefit of their own natural resources. The problem for the State Department at Washington was how to prevent these dire calamities.

Those patriotic gentlemen of asphalt fame who had been seeing to it that American municipalities paid \$3 a square yard for paving worth \$1.50, now invaded Washington to prevent their labors from being undone. Lobbies were organized about the State and other departments. Newspapers scored Castro. Statesmen denounced Castro. He was ambitious, self-seeking, crooked, bent upon holding up saintly foreigners and despoiling them. His country was going to the dogs. He was about to be overthrown. There was a terrible state of affairs in Venezuela.

Filibusters had been sent into Venezuela by the asphalt interests and by a French cable company which had another concession. This gave Castro another handle against the interests which wanted to get rid of him for a more tractable patriot. Castro stuck to his text. The suit for annulment went serenely

forward. If the concessionaires had a claim, let them press it in the courts of Venezuela. The concession rested upon Venezuelan governmental authority. Its interpretation should certainly rest there also. Castro was at the head of a sovereign nation, the same sovereign nation which was recognized when the concession was accepted. No objection was then made to the authority of Venezuela's government. Then it was giving away the heritage of the Venezuelan people. Now that the Venezuelan government was trying to reclaim that heritage for its people, it would hear no questioning of its authority.

Castro's position was unimpeachable. He had justice and law, too, upon his side.

Then came forward that pure and ingenuous public servant, Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Loomis, one of the high-minded men whom President Roosevelt delighted to honor, and suggested that Castro arbitrate. Castro was barely polite. The courts of Venezuela were open. American concessionaires would get all they were entitled to, no more. There were veiled threats. As the case against the concessionaires progressed in Venezuela, the lobby inspired more drastic fulminations against Castro. Always Castro remained immovable and always Castro won.

Faithfully did the State Department stand by the Asphalt trust. Diligently, with Francis B. Loomis as spokesman, did the administration at Washington labor to preserve to the asphalt trust its monopoly of the paving ma-

terial most favored in American cities. This phase of the case was critical, for Castro had caused a receiver to be appointed for the New York and Bermudéz Asphalt Company in Venezuela, and the receiver was mining Venezuelan asphalt and placing it upon the American markets in competition with the trust. Such villainy greatly shocked the Washington administration. Strenuously did it strive to rob the Venezuelan public of the wealth in its asphalt mines, as strenuously as it strove to protect the paving monopoly at home.

So insistent did the State Department urge and threaten that its attitude brought out a protest from the American minister in Venezuela. He could not properly exert such pressure for concessionaires. Their case lacked righteousness. Besides he was embarrassed by the fact that the former American minister to Venezuela, and the then Assistant Secretary of State, his superior, had, when in Venezuela, openly pressed against the Venezuelan government claims in which the minister had a pecuniary interest. He had used his position for private gain. Loans had been made by asphalt interests to the American minister while he was actually engaged in looking after asphalt interests. All this had injured the standing of America's representative. Venezuelans, probably not saints themselves, looked for a nicer sense of honor and integrity in America's diplomats.

Protests from the American minister in Venezuela found their way into the hands of

the officer whom the minister criticized. It goes without saying that they were not made public. On the other hand, the things required of the minister grew more galling. In control at both ends, Mr. Loomis redoubled his efforts to win the case of the threatened asphalt company.

Minister Herbert W. Bowen stood this until he could stand it no longer. If he could not move the State Department, he would try the American people. Getting its material from Bowen, the New York *Herald* printed an expose of the whole unsavory mess.

Angry was the storm that burst over the devoted head of Minister Bowen. It might have been true that Francis B. Loomis, now practically Secretary of State, for John Hay was a very sick man and much absent—it might have been true that the real head of the State Department had as a diplomat been guilty of “indiscretions.” Considering his connections at that time, his borrowings from claimants and his other queer capers, he might now be overzealous in the interests of the asphalt trust. But this was as nothing compared with the heinousness of giving the public an inkling of what was going on. It was scandalizing the administration. Graft in the Roosevelt State Department! Perish the thought!

Minister Bowen was angrily recalled by the man whom he had accused. Hot with indignation, Bowen came. Secretary of War Taft, the general utility man of the Roosevelt ad-

ministration, was assigned to apply the white-wash. The big secretary gave the white coat to Francis B. Loomis. It seemed as agreeable to him as taking a dose of wormwood, but it was done heroically. Mr. Taft has never balked yet at a job set for him by the "Dutch Uncle," whose heir expectant he is. Shades were pretty dark for the thickest coat of white-wash—but it sufficed.

Hot in the anger of an honest man, Minister Bowen went before the President and offered to prove his charges to the satisfaction of a disinterested person who might go into them. That was not the point. His charges might or might not be true. He was undiplomatic. State Department iniquity could do the administration no harm while it was unknown to the public. Minister Bowen made it known to the public. He was obviously a traitor to the administration. No! no! there was no explanation. He had violated diplomatic courtesy. He had been insubordinate. Honesty was all right in its place, but it was not in a class with courtesy, and subordination in an administration that was absolutely above suspicion.

Minister Bowen was officially branded as an Ananias. Roosevelt himself gave the mud bath, as he insists upon doing on such occasions. Minister Bowen, who mingled too much blunt and straightforward honesty with his diplomatic tact, retired from the service in disgrace. Loomis was promoted to a min-

istry and permitted later to drop silently out of sight.

With a flourish of trumpets, Judge William J. Calhoun, a man who had public confidence, was sent to "investigate" asphalt and Venezuela. His report sleeps with the Harmon and Judson report upon Paul Morton and Sante Fe rebating. Like the report upon the State Trust Company, it may be available to the future historian.*

There were some of the same elements in the Santo Domingo coup that we have found in the Venezuela-asphalt episode. In this case President Roosevelt decided to forestall the foreigners by himself seizing the customs houses of the island republic and proceeding to collect the taxes imposed upon the natives for the benefit of foreign creditors and concessionaires.

As we saw above, the Monroe doctrine furnished the general commission. As historians know that doctrine and as other American administrations had interpreted it, it expressed determined opposition upon the part of the United States of America to the subversion by any European power of any independent government on the American continent. It did not declare the right of the United States to subvert such governments, or to declare a

*Castro-baiting in the interest of the asphalt combine has recommenced as we go to press, and a dispatch says Calhoun's report has been made public with correspondence sent to Congress.

protectorate over them, or to guarantee their debts, or to become receiver for them. That was the misfortune of the original Monroe doctrine.

This doctrine, at all events, and the righteous claim of Bischoffsheim and Goldschmidt, which we have referred to above, made occasion for President Roosevelt's action. Some sort of native government was found to give the proceedings verisimilitude. Morales, an adventurer contending for the presidency, made a bargain with the American State Department. This bargain was made by Naval Officer Dillingham, as we now recall, by direction of Francis B. Loomis, our conscientious statesman-friend of the Venezuela-asphalt episode. In sheer modesty, the administration kept this agreement secret from the Senate of the United States and from the public. It provided practically that the United States should become receiver for Santo Domingo, seize its revenues, pay fifty-five per cent. to foreign creditors and give over forty-five per cent. to the Santo Domingoans to apply to governmental expenses.

The constitution of the United States does not provide for the President acting as receiver for bankrupt nations and using the executive departments for carrying on the business. So much the worse for the constitution. When Congress had discovered the proceeding, February, 1905, a protocol was presented to the Senate, and it was asked to ratify the seizure of an island nation for the benefit of

alleged creditors. Shoulder to shoulder with Bischoffsheim and Goldschmidt stood the Santo Domingo Improvement Company, the important American claimant. A whole shoal of worthy fellows must be protected.

With laudable forethought, the administration had the claims "arbitrated," and Congress had only to witness the levying of the execution, and attend the sheriff sale. Congress thought the thing a trifle drastic and held back. Then the newspaper claque, which is always at the back of every administration, if the fireworks are sufficiently brilliant, went to raising a great noise.

Encouraged by the din, the administration decided to persist in its course, Congress or no Congress. It had made an agreement, although this, too, had been omitted from the constitution as a thing which might be made by the President against the will of Congress.

Pious motives more than made up for the irregularity. Roosevelt and his noisy newspapers friends demonstrated that in a republic based upon government by the people, the chief executive is given autocratic powers over weak neighboring nations, as well as American dependencies. It could not be denied. Finland has far more to say in its own affairs governmental than the people of the Philippines, Cuba, or Santo Domingo have to say in theirs. It is a question if the Finlanders are not more nearly free than the Porto Ricans. Nicholas of Russia has less power over Fin-

land than has Theodore Roosevelt over some of America's wards.

This was all in the interest of "orderly free government."

When the Senate refused to ratify a treaty with Santo Domingo, carrying out the President's plan, the President carried it out anyway. By a clever subterfuge, our conscientious upholder of law got the nominal president of Santo Domingo to appoint the same men whom President Roosevelt had appointed to carry out the receivership plan. American warships were placed on duty, and American soldiers guarded these agents in doing their work. The agreement must be carried out.

When this high-minded plan of chasing the devil about the stump was pointed out later in Congress, Senator Spooner, then spokesman for the administration, showed triumphantly that the constitution of the United States had not been violated—not technically. Aided by the "Democratic" Joseph Blackburn of Kentucky, who is now reaping his reward in Panama, the treaty was finally ratified.

This probably does not bring the plan at all within the constitution. But let that pass. One of the chief merits of a plan of this kind is the exhibition of autocratic power which is necessary to its carrying out. Some day the precedent may be needed by a booted and spurred man in the White House.

CHAPTER XIX.

PIOUS MASTICATION AND "BENEVOLENT
ASSIMILATION."

Theodore Roosevelt, according to his biographers, felt it a merit that he had aided in bringing about the Spanish war. Specifications have not been given. Possibly it was he who sent the Maine on its precious Don-baiting expedition to Havana Harbor, with its more than tragic sequel. The man who gave that order, whoever he may be, can claim full credit for bringing about the war. Few men other than Roosevelt would be capable of such splendid recklessness.

President McKinley lagged back for a time, but the war spirit finally got hold of him. When Spain conceded everything, April 5, 1898, making conditions only which would save her face, the administration brushed the concessions aside. War was wanted, nothing else. If there is merit in blood atonement, this country has certainly paid the price in full. But this war gave our heroes, Mark Tapley like, a chance to come out strong. What matter though history may call the war iniquitous, fraught with deadly consequences to the Republic.

Once his hand was put to the reeking plow, President McKinley insisted upon turning to the very end the furrow of death and destruction. This was an important reason given by Theodore Roosevelt in 1900 why the American people should re-elect President McKinley, and incidentally elect with him Vice-President Roosevelt. Spain had been vanquished. We had turned our guns against our former allies. The administration had decided to push the Philippine war to the bitter end. Filipinos must be piously masticated and benevolently assimilated, something as the tiger did the Lady of Niger.

Come forward now good Historian Roosevelt and tell us what we may expect from the administration policy in the Philippines.

"At best the inhabitants of a colony are in a cramped and unnatural state. At the worst, the establishment of a colony prevents all healthy popular growth."

"At present the only hope for a colony that wishes to attain full moral and mental growth is to become an independent state, or part of an independent state."

"Under the best of circumstances, therefore, the colony is in a false position. But if the colony is in a position where the colonizing nation has to do its work by means of other inferior races, the condition is much worse. From the standpoint of the race, little or nothing has been gained by the English conquest and colonization of Jamaica. Jamaica has merely been turned into a negro island with a

future much like Santo Domingo. British Guiana, however well administered, is nothing but a colony where a few hundred, or a few thousand white men hold the superior positions, while the bulk of the population is composed of Indians, negroes and Asiatics.

"Looked at through the vista of centuries, such a colony contains less promise of true growth than does a state like Venezuela or Ecuador. The history of most of the South American republics has been both mean and bloody, but there is at least a chance that they may at last develop after infinite tribulation and suffering into a civilization quite as high and stable as that of such a European state as Portugal. BUT THERE IS NO SUCH CHANCE FOR ANY TROPICAL AMERICAN COLONY OWNED BY A NORTHERN EUROPEAN RACE. It is distinctly in the interest of civilization that the present states in the two Americas should develop along their own lines, and however desirable it may be that many of them should receive European immigration, it is highly undesirable that any should be under European control." (Roosevelt's *American Ideals*, pages 235-7.)

"English rule in India, while it may last for decades, or even for centuries, must eventually come to an end and leave little trace of its existence." (Roosevelt's *Benton*, page 261.)

"A man is not a good citizen, I care not how lofty his thoughts are in the abstract, if his actions do not square with his professions." (Writings of Theodore Roosevelt.)

"The most unsafe adviser is the man who would advise us to do evil that good may come of it." (Writings of Theodore Roosevelt.)

President Roosevelt fondly hopes that America may be an exception to the rule laid down by Historian Roosevelt. If it should not be, then let the wrong of it rest where it belongs, upon the head of William Jennings Bryan. According to Mr. Roosevelt, Bryan's action in aiding the McKinley administration to ratify the Spanish treaty, despite the protest of such men as Senator Money, was directly responsible for the whole devil's dance of colonial and imperial policy. In schoolboy phrase: "Now see what you made me do, Willie Bryan!"

O rare and wonderful Mr. Bryan! How could you be so cruel as to force the good President McKinley to insist upon the cession of the Philippines! How is it that your sinister shadow fell over the reluctant American treaty commissioners and compelled them to hold out for the Philippines as an American colony? What evil genius prompted you to turn American guns upon our Filipino allies and shoot to pieces that government which the venerable Senator Hoar found capable of administering Filipino affairs and keeping excellent order? What devil prompted you to hypnotize the majority party in the Senate to approve the Spanish treaty without having in it a distinct pledge for immediate liberty and independence for the Filipinos?

Don't tell me that you thought the Filipinos

safer in American than in Spanish hands. You ought to have known better. Away with your excuse that the American traditions of liberty and independence were your security that America would not crush out the liberties of another people and hold them in subjection. Do not tell me that the American Declaration of Independence was your bond.

You got a few minority senators to join with the majority in ratifying this treaty without pledging in the treaty itself the good faith of the administration. Do not now try to shirk your responsibility for General Jacob Smith, he of the sulphurous nickname—and record; or Major Glenn, of water cure fame; or Major Waller; or Lieutenant Arnold; or General “Reconcentrado” Bell. To your action can be traced directly the villainous treachery of Gen. Frederick Funston in claiming as a mendicant the hospitality of Aguinaldo and then betraying him. Let the consequences of your acts to the third and fourth generation of fallacious inference fall upon your devoted head. O rare and wonderful Mr. Bryan! Who would have thought you capable of such dire mischief? Who would have suspected your responsibility for so much of the wickedness in our colonial experiments. Who, except Theodore Roosevelt, would have discovered your more than hypnotic influence upon the McKinley administration. Thrice rare and wonderful Mr. Bryan!

Carried away with the fire of righteous wrath, Theodore Roosevelt, candidate for

the vice-presidency, mercilessly applied the scourge to the Democrats in this Philippine business. They had approved the rescue of the legation in China and the withdrawal of soldiers as soon as it was done. How did that differ from the Filipino policy of the administration? Everybody had to take their three guesses. But it would have been quite as difficult to tell how one resembled the other. That was the especial merit of the comparison.

These Filipinos were worse than Boxers. Giving them self-government would be like setting up a republic under an Apache chief. Here again it took rare insight to appreciate fully the comparison. But two out of the eighty tribes in the island opposed American rule. These two tribes contained more than five millions of the inhabitants of the island, and included every civilized soul. In a brief discussion, Mr. Roosevelt could not be expected to mention such irrelevant details.

Fortunately for Mr. Roosevelt, the lines of the "duty and destiny" business had been laid down before he succeeded President McKinley. "This belligerent, or more properly speaking, piratical way of looking at neighboring territory, was very characteristic of the West, and was the root of 'manifest destiny.'" So had Historian Roosevelt written. When he took the helm of state the piracy was an accomplished fact. We had arrived at "manifest destiny." President Roosevelt had only to retain the plunder and divide the spoils.

For a presidential Mark Tapley, there was

much that was encouraging in the situation. Roosevelt forgot his historian's view of colonization. India and Egypt had trained up great soldiers for England. The Philippines might do the same for us. If there was anything the Republic was pining for, it was great soldiers. If America could only have a Cæsar or a Napoleon, its future would be obvious enough.

About this time our war for "humanity" to rid the Western Hemisphere of "Weylerism" had traveled the whole circle, and had returned upon Weyler's old trail. If Filipinos objected to being piously masticated as a preliminary to "benevolent assimilation," why we must teach them better. Gen. Jacob Smith, of the sulphurous appellation, told his subordinates to "kill everything over ten." They were to burn everything in sight. Conquer the place if it must first be made a howling wilderness. Majors Waller and Glenn tried to carry out the order literally.

Half crazed by the tropical climate and the strange conditions of life, aroused by the sullen resistance of an elusive foe, American soldiers forgot their traditions of manly fighting. Even women and children suffered. Torture and murder went hand in hand with war. Major Waller and Lieutenant Arnold were caught red-handed. The discovery interfered somewhat with their promotion. Gen. Jacob Smith, of the sulphurous appellation, was actually reprimanded. We have the impression that he was also fined. Even the gallant Chaffee was

not overnice in the methods he was willing to use to overcome the "enemy."

Following one of Roosevelt's "investigations" an officer who shot a Filipino in the back lost a number in his promotion order. Sentinels found it easier to shoot Filipino amigos than to try to understand them. These sentinels were warned against carelessness, but lost in no way by the practice.

American soldiers whose traditions were theretofore the most manly on earth, engaged in the valorous pastime of placing Filipino prisoners with hands tightly bound behind them on a slippery plank, pushing their feet from under them and watching them fall. Another military sport was standing Filipinos on their heads in a vessel of water and watching them strangle. Some were triced up and others poured full of water.

Strangely enough, these highly elevating pastimes were concealed from the country. Dispatches from the Philippines were censored to suit military tastes. Highly humorous administration newspapers in the United States said "real cute" things about the "aunties" who saw no cause for pride in a twentieth century Republic, in the van of civilization, reverting to the practices of Mediæval Spain.

All this, however, did not suffice to conquer the island men, and Gen. Bell finally put "Weylerism" in full force by establishing "reconcentration" camps. For Spain there must have been humor deliciously grim in seeing the much-heralded "war for humanity."

degenerate in four short years into just "Weylerism."

Self-righteous Anglo-Saxons are not good in seeing a joke when it is on themselves. The blackest crimes for other peoples are actions of great merit for Anglo-Saxons. They are too self-centered to realize their own hypocrisy. President Roosevelt branded as "traitors" those who doubted the wisdom and the righteousness of the Gen. (Sulphurous) Jake Smith and the Gen. (Reconcentrado) Bell programme. Gen. Funston, with the glory of Aguinaldo's capture still upon him, referred to Senator Hoar as the man with a superheated conscience. President Roosevelt could not approve that. Roosevelt was the only man with full privilege to say contemptuous things and call ugly names. Funston "denied the interview."

"The horrors and the treachery were the inevitable outcome of the policy on which they (the British) had embarked. It can never be otherwise when a civilized government endeavors to use as allies in war, savages whose acts it cannot control and for whose welfare it has no real concern." (Roosevelt's *Winning of the West*, Vol. 4, page 99.) To be sure, nothing like this could apply to our using "scouts" from among the most savage tribes of the Filipinos to run down the more civilized natives.

The humane character of our warfare in the Philippines is indicated by the more recent incident at Mount Dajo. Only about six hun-

dred men, women and children, defending themselves with antiquated weapons, were penned upon the mountain top and wiped out almost as completely as the tender-hearted Sioux did Custer's devoted band. The difference was that the Sioux fought against soldiers with weapons as good as their own—not against women and children. Fifteen Americans were killed and sixty-five wounded in the Dajo fight. This tells one whether it was a battle or a massacre.

Gen. Miles, head of the army in the early portion of Roosevelt's administration, suggested that if he were permitted to go to the islands he might secure peace without such drastic measures. Miles talked too much. Hadn't he helped to make public the "water cure" scandal. He was not the sort of military man to let loose in our island possessions. The world might know what was going on, to our shame and confusion. Gen. Miles remained at home—for the present.

Finally there was "pacification." Mr. Taft said so. The pacification of exhaustion, death, starvation. (Mount Dajo massacre came long afterward.) Up to this time the government had been entirely autocratic, as autocratic as the government of Siberia, far more autocratic than the government of India, as autocratic as the government of Egypt.

By presidential proclamation (imperial ukase, his majesty wills it) an American commission was appointed and given all power over the Philippines, legislative, executive,

judicial. These aliens, imposed by an alien authority, assumed the power of life and death over the people of the Philippines. They assumed to give away their public resources, to regulate their affairs with exactly the same warrant that the Russians acted in Manchuria or the British in Egypt. Not for nearly four years did the American Congress temper in any degree the power of the American autocrat. With calm assurance of the Anglo-Saxon I-am-holier-than-thou quality, American citizens overlooked their own beam and grew excited over what Russia might intend to do in Manchuria.

Urged forward by the pressure of the Executive and the imperialistic newspaper clique, the United States Supreme Court, always on the side of what appears to it immediately the stronger force, decided that American officers deriving their power from the constitution were superior to the constitution and not bound by its limitations. In other words, they were properly autocrats. They could govern aliens, denying rights which Americans hold as fundamental. Woolsey did meritorious service in finding a way for Henry VIII. Richelieu served Louis well, the Grand Dukes are reasonably efficient in finding excuse and avenues for the autocracy of the czar, but considering circumstances, the work of American ministers and courts was far more meritorious than the work of any of these. Neither Woolsey, nor Richelieu, nor the grand dukes can compare with modest, unobtrusive Elihu Root,

Thomas F. Ryan's friend, in finding a way. In a country whose very sanction is a statement that all men are created equal (with equal civic rights, or equal rights before the law), and are endowed naturally with inalienable rights among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; in a government with this declaration as a sanction and with a constitution adopted to secure the blessing of equal liberty, the finding of a sanction for pure autocracy one would suppose an awkward problem. It was easy enough for Mr. Root. By some hocus pocus which ordinary mortals are not supposed to understand, a president elected to carry out the will of a free people as expressed in their laws, becomes by that commission an autocrat over alien nations, governing them according to his will. Verily have we progressed.

Later Congress sanctioned the plan autocratically installed. Why it needed such sanction, or how Congress got power to give it sanction, or whence, under American institutions, remains as deep a mystery as the sanction of the original ukase. Indeed that might by a pretty fiction have been posited upon military power, the right of the keenest sword, but we search in vain for a theory of congressional sanction. Congressmen will tell you it is just territorial government. Perhaps!

William A. Taft, who had gone to the Philippines as a representative of President McKinley, was later to become the first civil governor of the islands. Schools were started,

Railways were projected, to be built by government aid but owned by individuals for individual profit, we Americans are so generous with our promoters.

With true business foresight, Mr. Taft stood for laws permitting individuals and corporations to appropriate more generously the land of the Filipinos. If we were to exploit the natives and their islands, we should give opportunity for exploitation on a scale that was worth while. Sugar planters should be permitted to own 20,000 acres at least. Since Mr. Taft knows that prosperity comes from above down instead of from the bottom up, since it is founded upon the generosity of big business men rather than upon the industry of the masses, such an arrangement would do wonders for island prosperity. At least it would make these landowners prosperous, and that was a point gained. Now he wants land and mines opened indiscriminately to appropriation by corporations or individuals.

Under the benign American despotism the Filipinos could get everything they wanted except freedom and independence. They could enjoy all rights except the right of being men. Their good father would provide for and protect them, if they would only continue good, tractable children, and mind what was said to them—just as the Czar provides for and protects his children. There was still disorder in the islands, as Mount Dajo later demonstrated, but the natives still in arms had become ladrones (robbers). Many Americans, the

English found, turned "robber" at the time of the American revolution.

"We are often told that the best of all governments is a benevolent despotism. Oliver's failure is a sufficient commentary upon the dictum of the parlor doctrinaires." (Roosevelt's *Cromwell*, page 236.)

Recently the Filipinos have been GIVEN an assembly. Filipino suffrage is about as carefully guarded as the good Czar guards the suffrage of the electors for the Russian Douma, and for exactly the same reason, to prevent a true expression of public sentiment toward the rulers of the country.

"But it must be noted that the difficulty in the Hawaiian Islands resulted not so much from the establishment of a popular assembly as from the undue extension of the electoral franchise. In the Philippines the franchise has been restricted and duly guarded.

"I am not blind to the troubles that the legislative assembly would doubtless bring to the executive and the commission, in rousing public discussion over unimportant matters that now pass without notice." (*Civil Government in the Philippines*, page 95.)

Notwithstanding the curtaining of the suffrage and the almost absolute lack of power in the Filipino assembly, this assembly, like the earlier Russian parliaments, is overwhelmingly in favor of independence.

Good Mr. Taft, Roosevelt's portly war secretary, has made several visits to the islands. He says that the government is going to give

Filipinos self-government when they are ready for it. President Roosevelt says that we cannot expect Filipinos to arrive immediately at the condition in political evolution that the men of America have attained after thirty generations of effort. Are the Filipinos then to wait for thirty generations before they are given self-government?

Unless the Filipinos prove different from all other peoples, unless laws of human progress are revised for their especial benefit, neither thirty nor three hundred generations of alien rule will prepare the Filipinos for self-government. If President Roosevelt would consult Historian Roosevelt and harken to what he says, the historian would tell the executive, as he has told us in effect at the beginning of the chapter, that self-government was never GIVEN by any people to any other, except by leaving them to their own devices.

Our historian would have pointed out how the world has divided itself into scores of self-governing nations, each, if left alone, with a government suited approximately to its own needs. As with the American Indians, and the Saxon tribes, the earliest and most primitive, as well as the highest, is democratic self-government. At least a score of brands of self-government have appeared among men, and a government of and by Filipinos, while it may in no sense mount to the perfection of a government of and by Americans for Americans, may be as truly self-government. A gov-

ernment by Americans for the Filipinos can never be self-government.

"The way to resume, is just to resume," said an American statesman, referring to resumption of specie payments. The way to have self-government in the Philippines is just to have it. Leave the Filipinos to their own devices. They will do the rest. This can be done in this year of our Lord, 1908, as well as in 2208 or 2508.

All this Historian Roosevelt would tell President Roosevelt, if President Roosevelt would seek a serious interview. Within six months this country could arrange a guaranteed neutrality for the Philippines and cut loose without loss of prestige and with infinite gain for this nation and for the Filipino people. This would, it is true, leave less opportunity for American statesmen "to come out strong."

Bitter, as the natives view it, has been the injustice of American rule in the Philippines, bloody has been the American occupation. These natives forget that the loss that has come to the Philippines and the humiliation they have undergone is as nothing to that which the people of America have borne and suffered. We do not refer to financial loss, although this has been almost inconceivable in extent. We may remember that immediately before the Spanish war we were spending less than fifty millions of dollars annually upon the army and the navy, where we are now spending over two hundred millions. Four-

fifths of the increase in naval expenditure is directly traceable to the Philippines. Senator Henry M. Teller, of Colorado, and George L. Wellington, of Maryland, former senator, estimate that the Philippines have already cost this nation eight hundred millions of dollars. The loss in life has been 20,000, with 50,000 additional men utterly corrupted. Our outlay is not likely to decrease. Our national defenses, like a chain, are no stronger than their weakest link. A possession six thousand miles away must require ten times the regular military force to defend it that is required by the nation at home. This is accentuated when the enemy is close to that possession. Military power is required to keep the colony in subjection. The subjecting force and the defending force must be different from a home-defense army. It must be an army of mercenaries, who make fighting a profession, like the Roman legionaries. Alien dependencies are inseparable from crushing military establishments.

Mere cost, as the Filipinos must readily see, is but trifling as compared with the cost to America of its colonies. If the money loss had been eight billions, instead of one-tenth of that sum, it must still loom not as the largest item. In destroying the Filipino Republic and subjecting its people we have made excellent progress in undermining the foundations of our own liberties. Already they are crumbling away. Filipinos must not forget that Americans suffer with them for the imperialism of their common rulers.

Ten years ago America held aloft the beacon light of liberty. Like the pillar of fire to the hosts of Israel, that light guided the footsteps of liberty-loving peoples over all the earth. It inspired deeds of patriotism. Of free government upon the earth, it was the hope and promise. In the white radiance of its chastening flame cowered tyrants everywhere, afraid to strike.

That light has gone out and great is the darkness. Patriots in other lands grope painfully, fearfully, searching for the guiding light extinguished forever.

At home we see the ideals of a century abandoned. Our immortal Declaration of Independence has become to the greatest of Americans but a string of meaningless platitudes. If the bell be broken, it gives forth a hollow sound. Unless we have the ideals of liberty within us, not even a Declaration of Independence can find within us a responsive chord. We have lost our place among nations as the government as high in ideals as it was righteous in action. Instead we are just a military power, piling ship on ship and gun on gun in the weird devil's dance of imperialism. Faint glimpses only have we of liberty and righteousness as we struggle onward in darkness with the military millstone about our necks, the millstone that has been submerging also, Germany, France, Russia, Italy, England and the other military powers for half a century. We have gone back to the ideal of force, back to the ideal of our hairy paleolithic an-

cestor as he snarled in his cave and drank the hot blood of his victim. Ours is again the ideal that knows no brother, that since the dim twilight of civilization in the prehistoric cave has filled the world with war, rapine and strife.

Friend of the Philippines, we realize that from Rome to England every nation that has tried imperialism has gone down to death under its weight. England, with its caste, its unemployed, its paupers, its hooligans, seems to be traveling the same road as Rome, bowed down under the weight of imperialism. Yet England's is an enlightened, a decentralized imperialism. Ours is the imperialism of vanished Rome. Brothers of the Philippines we bow our heads with you in sorrow, shame and humiliation, for we realize that your loss is our loss, your crucifixion our crucifixion. But you know the meaning of false pride. Following our heroic president we must march grimly on, deviating not from the road that leads to death.

CHAPTER XX.

CUBA BECOMES FREE—ALMOST.

In dealing with Cuba the United States has been far more fortunate than in dealing with the Philippines. In the very beginning, before it had fallen from grace, it put aside the temptation.

"The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

So ran the resolution of intervention. It looks sufficiently specific. The meaning of it seemed then sufficiently plain. This country was to drive the Spaniards out of Cuba, see that order was maintained while the Cubans organized their government and then leave them to work out their own salvation.

Bitter was the heartburning felt in the blase America of 1900 over this sophomoric declaration of 1898. But it was too plain and specific to be ignored altogether. If it were not for this declaration this country would undoubtedly have swallowed Cuba.

As to the administration of the island, it was easier, because the majority of the Cuban people, at first, at least, trusted our good faith and disinterestedness. Filipinos were deprived of the possibility of such trust. But the administration was much the same—merely autocratic. Being closer to our shores, we have known more about it. Shameless attempts at exploitation were made. To some extent they succeeded. Postal matters in Cuba took on a rank odor. So high-minded a gentleman as Bishop Canler, of Atlanta, made some ugly accusations against Gen. Leonard Wood, the Cuban governor. He had fastened upon the Cuban people against their will a gambling concession for ten years, accepting in appreciation of his work a gift of silver service worth several thousand dollars from men who would benefit by the concession. This was just one instance of exploitation.

Gen. Wood had a free hand. He spent money lavishly without the necessity of accounting for it. Public funds maintained at Washington a Cuban lobby, directed and supported by the Governor General. Possibly everything was all clean and pure. It had every appearance of being just the opposite. If entirely honorable, as we may hope they were, Wood methods were unfortunate. Worse than that, they were directed toward unworthy ends.

After all this is not an important phase of the Cuban regime. The wrong of it and the shame of it was satrapy government.

Reluctantly did the United States let go of Cuba, even in the face of its unequivocal pledge. Had President McKinley served out his term there is doubt as to whether the withdrawal of the American troops from Cuba would ever have been accomplished. President McKinley's administration had a somnolent effect upon the American conscience not enjoyed by the administration of President Roosevelt. Worthy potentate Wood at length left the island to pursue his course under his lucky star. The Cubans got a president and an assembly. But America could not quite live up to its pledge. Deterioration in public character had become too drastic. An American string was tied to Cuba as the Platt amendment. Cuba was left a nation largely free, but still under tutelage.

Before Americans had withdrawn they had aroused serious suspicion in Cuba. So serious was this suspicion that Cuba leaned toward Great Britain and other foreign friends, as was shown in its treaty with England. Sugar Trust influences prevented the island from getting from America what the islanders considered trade justice. It looked as though Cuba might break entirely away and become really independent. Pressure applied at the right spot prevented such a denouement. Concessions by Congress put the Cubans in a better mind.

American intrigue had not ceased, although to the credit of the administration, be it said, it was not official intrigue. Elections were manipulated, a clique got control of the gov-

ernment, and the fires of insurrection were kindled. President Palma, headstrong enough in clinging to conscienceless political advantage, showed a broad and deep yellow streak, if in fact he was not a traitor to his Cuba scheming to destroy its independence and place it under American control. At all events he seems to have asked the President of the United States for troops to support his rule.

American marines landed. They were pulled back and pushed forward again. Secretary of War Taft went to Cuba as representative of President Roosevelt, autocrat of Cuba and the Philippines. This nation had guaranteed Cuban "independence," and, of course, government by an alien autocrat was "maintaining the independence of Cuba!" just as I might preserve another's liberty by throwing him into jail.

Thus has been started the delectable game of football, with Cuba as the missile. It is free and not free. Independent and not so independent after all. It may govern itself unless the President of the United States decides that he can do the job better as an autocrat, through a satrap supported by the military power of the United States. Where anything except might of arm gives sanction to this arrangement, goodness only knows.

In the light of our experience, there seems to be but one way of dealing with Cuba. America must cut it loose entirely without the Platt amendment or other string, tell the rest of the world that Cuba is neutral territory, and there

shall be no trespass, and leave the island and its people to work out their own salvation. Or we must take Cuba into our union of states with full political rights. Governing by military pro-consuls, personal representatives of President of the United States, autocrat of Cuba, is a very dangerous arrangement for the people of the United States, and is a trifle disconcerting to the Cubans. Cuba can hardly bear it. This country cannot permit it. But a short step from Autocrat of Cuba may be Autocrat of the United States. Not necessarily in name. Indeed that is a remote possibility. An autocrat may be an autocrat just as much while still called president. President Roosevelt certainly can appreciate such a possibility.

CHAPTER XXI.

BATTLING WITH THE RAILWAY "OCTOPUS."

Fortunately President Roosevelt does not permit his innate modesty to interfere with his taking up and solving public problems which less efficient men have vainly struggled to dispose of. A striking instance is his action with regard to railway rates. His party in the campaign of 1904 was silent as the grave upon railway matters. Not a word upon the subject appeared in the party platform. Roosevelt's speech of acceptance did not refer to a railway problem.

It has been intimated that he was asked by railway interests to take issue with the opposition platform upon that theme. He was expected to come out unequivocally against meddling with the railways. But certain railway interests did not meet expectations in yielding him support, and President Roosevelt remained silent, ominously so.

In the platform of the opposing party railways played an important part. There was a distinct pledge that if Democracy had proved successful the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission would be increased so that the wrongs of the shipping and the traveling

public would be righted. This Democratic declaration followed two other national Democratic platforms in that regard.

This platform and all its "vagaries" was rejected by a vote quite as decisive as had been given in a national election in recent years. If the verdict of the country meant anything, it meant that the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission ought not to be enlarged. Yet in his message immediately after the election President Roosevelt adopted the policy of the defeated Democrats. The Interstate Commerce Commission must be given power to fix a rate, and it must remain fixed until changed by the courts.

President Roosevelt had a great joke upon the people of the country. They had decided against railway-rate legislation, but he knew what they wanted better than they did and decided for them that they should have it. They thought they had cast aside the Democrats and all their works and pomps, only to find a cardinal Democratic policy a cardinal Roosevelt policy. The position was undoubtedly taken deliberately, for President Roosevelt has repeatedly written down his contempt for the people of the governing class who will heed the will of a majority in deciding upon state policies.

Sometimes this principle may be used with awkward results. The next President may decide that the thing which the public pines for is a restoration of the old National Bank of the last century, and even though the people

have declared against it, he may get up a newspaper clique and dragoon Congress into passing the bill. Why not? President Roosevelt has made the precedent.

President Roosevelt selected the issue cunningly. A dozen states were at that moment pushing the reform. Shippers everywhere were becoming indignant over rank discrimination and conscienceless gouging. They had for years been fighting the iniquity in courts before state legislatures and before the Interstate Commerce Commission. Even though in the indeterminate voting upon blanket platforms, the railway problem had been entirely lost sight of, there was, no doubt, a strong public sentiment in favor of having something done. In addition, it would give several bad half-hours to railroad people who had not in the past campaign come to the support of Roosevelt with sufficient heartiness. Tariff reform, too—that troublesome perennial issue—might be sidetracked by making railways the cardinal issue.

President Roosevelt was no more silent about this new issue than about some of the other things he had undertaken since and before. His journalistic clique joined vociferously in the clamor. Like his "original discovery of the ten commandments," Roosevelt was the only originator of the railway rate proposition. That it had been a Democratic football for years, did not count.

Railway rate reformers took the President seriously. Private and quasi-public investiga-

tion of rebating and discrimination had aroused some of the American fighting blood to the boiling point. State agitation had made smooth the way to public opinion. Many were thinking railway rates. Agitators took advantage of the Rooseveltian newspaper claque to rip loose stories of railway wrongdoing. These stories were sown broadcast. Soon the country was talking railway rates.

Congress was skeptical. It was not going to be stampeded into railway rate legislation. No mandate had come from the country through the proper channels. Congress was not so sure it had a right to flout the will of the majority expressed at the polls, or to accept executive and newspaper vociferation as "public sentiment."

In fact Congress had done little in the preceding four years but create new executive bureaus. These bureaus had done wonderful service in creating work for the public printery and creating week-end sensations for the newspapers, but the business of the government moved on no more swiftly. In fact each bureau had its own keedge anchor, dropped out to keep things stationary.

The session passed without railway rate legislation. Measures had been presented to Congress. There were hearings without end. Conditions were disclosed which indicated clearly enough that there was need of some sort of solution for the railway problem. There the thing ended—for the time.

President Roosevelt was well pleased. He

had not before in years hit upon a device equally capable of raising sustained clamor the country over. Railway rate recommendations were given first column, first page, in his new annual treatise on universal knowledge, sometimes called a message. By this time the journalistic clique had forgotten that anybody beside Roosevelt had ever had an original thought upon railway-rate legislation. It was a Roosevelt policy, copyrighted and protected by domestic and foreign patents. "No trespass" signs were placed all over the new pronouncement.

Dr. Albert Shaw of the "Review of Reviews," chief claqueur, hit upon an ingenious device. The people of the country, he said, had spoken unmistakably in favor of having Congress carry out "President Roosevelt's policies," presumably past, present and to come. To be sure, no voter at the last election knew that railway rate legislation was a "Roosevelt policy." But Roosevelt has since established ownership to this railway rate problem.

Pious old Joseph Cannon, Speaker of the House of Representatives, consumed as he always is with righteous ardor in battling for the people's cause, dragooned the railway rate bill through the House. That same House of Representatives would just as quickly have passed a bill for the canonization of bullfrogs, if the journalistic clique had convinced the members that "public sentiment" (ascertained through vociferous iteration by the most noisy) demanded it, and it was wished for by President

Roosevelt and "Uncle Joe." For be it known that in these later days, the House of Representatives has become in practice an aggregation of automatic mimes used in recording the will of a little self-perpetuating group of which Joseph G. Cannon is the center. Journalistic clamor, White House influence and the lash of "Uncle Joe's" whips, are the three forces now ruling the popular branch of the national Congress.

For the stolid old Senate, however, there is no god but Mammon, and Aldrich is prophet. Consequently, through the Senate the railway rate bill moved with painful slowness. One of the grandest battles of forensic eloquence witnessed in a generation raged for months. Great lawyers, taking up the narrowest point they could find in the whole controversy, hurled hundreds of thousands of legal missiles at one another. Senators Foraker, Spooner, Knox, Bailey, Rayner, one after another expounded the law and the prophets in extenuation or condemnation of the thing about to be done. So the battle raged until the wind-batteries had literally blown themselves out.

But the bill moved on. Aldrich was worried, although still prophet. As a master stroke he forced upon Senator Tillman, the dearest foe of the President, the task of reporting to the Senate what was supposed to be the President's pet measure. It was hardly less of an affront from Aldrich to the President than was the President's earlier insult to Senator Tillman. Senator Tillman, hot-blooded as he

was, forgot the gratuitous slap in the face that the President had once given him, and reported the bill with favorable recommendations. Aldrich's trick proved very small politics.

Finding that Tillman's generous manhood had destroyed the force of his strategy, Aldrich tried a more subtle assault upon the measure. There was still time to draw its teeth, and in this sort of an attack, he could have the support of numerous senators who would not openly defy "public sentiment." Senators Spooner and Knox had raised a sufficient constitutional dust to cover any sort of political manipulation. President Roosevelt had conferences with the friends of the bill and became convinced that some of the Republican senators were in a plot, by amendments, to destroy its effectiveness. He could not count upon sufficient votes within the party to pass the bill in effective form. The President considered the cause well nigh lost.

So desperate did the situation look to him that he sent Former Senator Chandler, Senator Tillman's close personal friend, as an emissary to Senator Tillman, the President's old enemy, and made overtures for an alliance between Democratic and Rooseveltian forces in the Senate to save the integrity of the measure. Spooner, Knox and Foraker, the President told Chandler, were making assaults upon the measure through clever amendments based upon "constitutional" points. Their manipulations threatened to leave the bill a mere shadow of itself.

Senator Tillman remembered the Greeks bearing gifts and fought warily of the proposition. His old friend Chandler reassured him. Tillman would see Senator Joseph Bailey of Texas, who was then floor leader of the Democrats, in the Senate. Senator Bailey was even more suspicious than Tillman, but he, too, was assured that the proposition was in good faith.

An interview was arranged between Attorney-General Moody, representing the President, and Tillman and Bailey representing the Democratic senators. The three men talked and came to a virtual agreement upon the scope of the amendments to be supported. Democrats would support an efficient amendment to the rate bill. President Roosevelt would, on his part, hold out for an amendment limiting court review to the question of ultra vires (exceeding of power) by the commission, and the violation of constitutional rights. Bailey and Tillman also wanted an amendment prohibiting interlocutory injunctions. The attorney-general was not prepared to say whether the latter amendment was within the power of Congress.

Senator Tillman had begun to revise his estimate of the President. The gratuitous slap that Roosevelt had given him on the occasion of Prince Henry's visit rankled. Tillman had always felt that deep in their natures there was a fundamental antagonism between him and President Roosevelt, as fundamental as that between the wolf and the sheep dog. Their sentiments and ideals, he considered, were war-

ring, irreconcilable. He had doubted from the first whether any good could come of such an alliance, but it seemed as though he had been mistaken.

Several interviews had already taken place between Tillman and Chandler and Chandler and Roosevelt. Bailey had not seen Chandler, nor had Tillman seen the President, but now that they had met with a member of Roosevelt's cabinet on the same subject, they felt that there could be no longer any room for error. The preliminary interviews had extended from March 31 to April 14.

A second interview took place between Tillman and Bailey and Attorney-General Moody. A written memorandum of the amendments agreed upon was prepared by Moody and submitted to the Democrats. It was revised and submitted to President Roosevelt. His approval was forthcoming. On that basis Bailey and Tillman would furnish twenty-six Democratic votes. Roosevelt's party must furnish twenty.

All this is of record, placed there in open session of the august Senate and printed in the Congressional Record. What went on behind the Republican scenes is not a matter of written history. Possibly President Roosevelt rounded out in this case the tactics by which he had captured Senator Platt and the New York gubernatorial nomination eight years before. Roosevelt's friends might have told Senator Aldrich that the bill could be passed without him, and if it was, it would go upon the

statute books stronger than it had come from the House of Representatives.

It was high time for Aldrich to act. He acted. On the afternoon of May 4, while Senators Tillman and Bailey were still dreaming dreams of Rooseveltian alliances and rate amendments limiting court reviews and interlocutory injunctions, President Roosevelt was bidding the gentlemen of the press to come and listen to what he had to say.

Roosevelt told the correspondents that he was fully satisfied with the Allison amendment, a mere declaration of the right of the courts to review the work of the commission, giving the broadest sort of authority—authority to try the case *de novo*, if thought expedient. It was silent upon interlocutory injunctions. The things which Roosevelt told Chandler he would stand for “unalterably,” he now characterized as of no consequence.

When newspaper correspondents told Bailey and Tillman what had taken place, it almost took away the breath of the good Democratic senators. Tillman and Bailey, full of wrath, sought out Chandler where he was dining at the Portland. Question marks were written all over their countenances. Would Chandler explain? Why was it that this “right about face” on the part of the military President had come stealthily and unheralded, like a thief in the night? Was it not their due, since their aid was sought, that when their aid was spurned, they should be given some intimation of that change?

Chandler had not been taken into the President's confidence, upon the new tack. All three sought out Attorney-General Moody.

Was that the fact? No, he had heard nothing of the change of front on the part of the President. Moody was going South to rest—just starting for a train at that moment. He did not tarry to hear the whole story.

All over the broad land on the morrow the story was sown broadcast. Aldrich smiled. Bailey, Tillman and Chandler felt a sudden tremendous slump in their market price.

For a whole week Tillman stewed in the Senate in silent rage. Then his righteous wrath broke forth. Tillman knew his weakness and to save the day and his temper, he came into the Senate with a written statement detailing all that had happened from the time that the President's private secretary, William Loeb, had bidden Chandler to the White House to the eventful evening when Roosevelt had assembled the correspondents and said something important to them.

In his story was the charge of the President that Knox, Spooner and Foraker were bent upon emasculating the rate measure by amendments, and that a sufficient number of Republicans could not be marshalled to defeat their plan. Tillman's statement, although dignified and temperate in language, did not picture President Roosevelt in an enviable light.

Friend Henry Cabot Lodge, the same who with Bellamy Storer was ready to vouch for Tom Watson, got the White House telephone

and told Roosevelt what was going on up the avenue. Chandler said:—Lodge repeated the statement about Knox, Spooner and Foraker. Did the President say it?

No; the thing was an unqualified and deliberate falsehood.

The Ambassador of the White House to Emperor Tillman of the Senate had in a few short minutes been catalogued in the Ananias Club with Thomas Jefferson and the whole line of prevaricators from his time to that year of our Lord 1906.

With only a two-days' interval, President Roosevelt in a letter to Senator Allison gave his version of the tale. Chandler, the busy-body, had been sent by Tillman with sycophantic solicitation to beg the good President to combine with the Democrats in order to take the rate bill out of the hands of its Republican foes. Graciously the President consented to hear Chandler in Tillman's behalf. He would, if necessary, have conferred with Tillman personally, so liberal had he become. But not for one moment did he take the Democratic view. The amendments under discussion were of no consequence. Allison's declaration, colorless and unnecessary though it may be, covered the whole case. The President was in full accord with Knox and Spooner. In fact the statement of the President indicated that Chandler, Bailey and Tillman had dreamed the same bad dream about railway rates and the President. This dream

seems also to have infected Attorney-General Moody.

There were but two things which seemed to give positive proof that the episode was not the stuff of which dreams are made—the Moody memorandum, setting forth exactly what Bailey and Tillman asserted it set forth, and the letter of Secretary Loeb to Chandler inviting him to conference in the White House, showing upon its face that the President and not Tillman had first brought Chandler into the rate business and used him as an emissary.

Surrounded as the President's statement was with an unmistakable air of coy improbability—for everyone who knows Tillman knows that he would take as great pleasure in opening negotiations with Roosevelt at that time as he would in cutting off his good right arm—it taxed the reputation for veracity which had been built up by the President among those who did not know him, to make his version at all convincing. The dispassionate historian reviewing the documents several years hence will find the record so baffling that he will probably accord to the President the privilege claimed for him by his admirers of making "facts" to suit the interests of the administration.

Looking at this episode in the light of the methods pursued by President Roosevelt in getting the New York nomination for governor and in altering and editing the correspondence between Roosevelt and Harriman so as to deceive the public into the belief that Harriman had initiated negotiations with Roosevelt in-

stead of, as was the fact, that Roosevelt had opened negotiations with Harriman, one is inclined to be rather charitable toward Senator Chandler for his lapses in truthfulness.

One glaring fact stands out boldly in all the mass of controversy—Roosevelt again proved himself a partisan. It was the third important test with him where the interests of country and party clashed. As in the other two cases, the interests of the party were considered paramount. He would prefer a weaker rate measure to giving Democrats credit for strengthening it. There is still room for doubt whether Roosevelt would choose the society of Hades with a governor general who believed in the tenets of Alexander Hamilton, rather than occupy a celestial throne among the democratic followers of Thomas Jefferson. We are inclined to give the President the benefit of the doubt.

After the Allison letter the administration quickly changed the subject. Senator Bailey, said the Rooseveltian journalistic kitchen cabinet in an inspired article, was responsible for the Chandler-Tillman episode. Neither Chandler, nor Tillman, nor the President trusted Bailey. They thought the man from Texas was also trying to kill the bill with amendments. Bailey used the same sort of complimentary language toward the author of this story as the President had used toward his quondam friend Chandler. Tillman corroborated Bailey.

Republicans lined up again under their old

leader, Aldrich, and voted for the Allison amendment. Then they voted down every amendment intended to strengthen the bill, including the amendments curtailing court review. Thus amended, the bill passed by an almost unanimous vote, the advocates of these amendments considering the bill without them better than no bill at all. Senators Pettus and Morgan on the Democratic side, and Foraker among the Republicans, voted against the bill.

Probably not in the recent history of the government has the legislative mountain labored so long and so painfully to bring forth so small a legislative mouse. For eighteen months the new law has been in effect, and it has enabled the Interstate Commerce Commission to keep good its record of uninterrupted uselessness proudly sustained over the score or so of years that had gone before. True, the new law has meant more commissioners, more salary for each, and more agents and more work for the government printer—some additional tons of "reports" which nobody reads. The anti-pass amendment, an after thought, the fruit of the agitation of the strenuous Congressman Baker, has had some effect, regardless of the commission. But if any appreciable body of railway rates has been made lower through the workings of the new rate law, that fact has wholly escaped an observing public. Rebates were already doomed, but not through Federal bureau activity.

The commission was not given power to do the one thing it is fitted to do, make a valuation

of railway property as a basis for determining the justness of rates. That was a plan of Senator La Follette, the insurgent, and just at that stage Senator Spooner, an unselfish and loyal popular champion and reformer, was the mouthpiece of the Roosevelt administration. Measures supported by La Follette had short shrift.

Railway rates are to be changed only after protest and hearing. Our hundreds of thousands of rates would require commission sittings of a half-century to have a perceptible influence upon railway rates. If the sense of American humor had not been lost, the whole thing would appear deliciously absurd.

Its merit is said to be in establishing the right of the government to regulate railway rates through a commission. That right was conceded for ten years, when the Supreme Court put an end to the concession. What the Supreme Court may do in future no man can guess. Rebate prosecutions thus far have been under the old law.

Some day this plethoric commission, with its bureaucratic irresponsibility and its bales of red tape, will prove an excellent barrier to the solution of the railway problem by state or nation. Then the people of the United States may find far more trouble in getting rid of the cumbersome bureau than they have found in giving it power. If the commission idea had in it anything of vital service in dealing with the railway problem, this fact would probably

have been at least hinted at by the results of its twenty-one years of life.

America has lost the power of meeting new problems in a new way, or of learning from wiser nations how to meet them. Like a case of small-pox, its railway problem must run its course, through legislative ointment and commission bandages. The country will finally come out with the marks of the disease upon it. We can afford to bear a little pitting if it teaches something new.

CHAPTER XXII.

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM AS PRESIDENT.

As President, Roosevelt's influence upon civil service reform has been unique. With technical knowledge, gained as commissioner, of all the highways and by-ways, the back doors, secret panels and side gateways of the service, he was able to mold it to his will.

The back doors, the secret panels, the side gateways, have all been closed and locked. President Roosevelt alone carries a pass key.

President McKinley, the Spanish war, and other subsequent imperialistic adventures, had dealt the merit system blow after blow. Suspensions, exceptions, transfers of unclassified and temporary employees to the classified service, had undermined its integrity. Hostile commissioners tended to make the whole thing a farce. Here came in Roosevelt's reservation. He balked here at the policy of McKinley, although he would not acknowledge to the country the decimation of the merit system which had taken place preceding 1901. Roosevelt stuck heroically to the declaration so dramatically made in Buffalo that autumn day. Nevertheless, for the past six years, most of the energy exerted by Roosevelt in improving the

civil service has been wasted in recovering the ground lost by his immediate predecessor. For practical purposes, Grover Cleveland had applied the merit system to the civil service almost as fully as it has yet been applied by Theodore Roosevelt.

In 1903, seven years after Grover Cleveland had made his sweeping order of May 6, 1896, the executive service had grown to 271,169, and but 134,000 places were classified. In other words, practically one-half were unclassified. This was almost exactly the unclassified percentage in 1896. There was a patronage of 134,000 places, which was far in excess of 1896 or any other previous time.

Since that time the executive civil service has expanded as never before. Foreign possessions mean executive satraps and their underlings. Canal construction, as the President may direct, means other thousands. July 1, 1906, the service included 326,850 places. Of these, 184,178 were classified and 142,672 unclassified. This represents the greatest number of unclassified executive Federal employees ever recorded in the United States. Such growth of the civil list is quite out of proportion to the growth of the population. There was a modest increase of about thirty thousand or about twenty per cent. in executive places from 1886 to 1896, with an increase in population of about fourteen millions or approximately twenty-five per cent. From 1896 to 1906 there was an increase of 148,000 or eighty per cent. in the number of executive employees, with an in-

crease in population of scarcely thirty per cent. In other words the increase in the executive civil list was fourfold greater with approximately the same increase in population. The percentage of classified to unclassified places has increased but eight per cent. since Cleveland.

Abuses, too, have crept in. Temporary appointment amounted to 14,256 in 1905. These were of such nature as to admit of being used as spoils. It is a clever way of beating the civil service. Thousands of places in the new forces and new services organized under Roosevelt were spoils of office when the appointments were originally made, if they are not, indeed, spoils of office still.

During the year 1905-6 the classified service increased from 171,807 to 184,178, about seven per cent., while the whole executive service increased from 300,615 to 326,850, or about eight per cent. The classified service did not hold its own proportionately. This is said to be due to the digging of the Panama canal "as the President may direct."

New principles have been introduced into the service by President Roosevelt. If introduced by any other man they might be considered sinister. Men in the classified service now may be dismissed without hearing, without charges, and without a statement by the department head as to the reasons for dismissal. President Roosevelt has so ordered it. Yet one of the most important advances made in the civil service under Cleveland was doing

away with just such irresponsible dismissal. Postmaster General Bissell got commendation from all civil service reformers for requiring that all officers in making removals of subordinates should file reasons therefor in writing and the employee should be given opportunity to answer.

Roosevelt found arbitrary dismissal, when practiced by political opponents, especially mischievous, and is on record as having so declared. Everybody who knows anything about the civil service in Washington knows that protection when in office is even more important to efficient men than competitive opportunity for entering. That happy and contented Roosevelt admiration society, the National Civil Service Reform League, regrets that "Jove nodded" in this respect.

Another pretty plan of beating the civil service law is the presidential ukase, or "special order," making individual exceptions. It can be used artistically in placing a friend or a henchman in the desired spot. There were sixty-six of these special orders in one year, sixty in another and forty in another, representing one hundred and sixty desirable berths for persons who had done Roosevelt special service.

It was under a ukase of this sort that "Joe" Murray, Roosevelt's original discoverer, was without examination placed in a classified position, assistant immigration commissioner of New York City. One could not expect Roosevelt to forget his original political discoverer

after Roosevelt had arrived and the delectable sweets of the pie counter were being distributed. It was Murray's misfortune, not his fault, that he happened to be an illiterate ward heeler. What is a little matter like a civil service law between friends? What matters any law when Jove is on your side?

"There is a certain difference between being paid with an office and paid with money, exactly as there is a certain difference between the savagery of the Ashantee and that of the hottentot, but it is small in amount." (Speech in St. Louis, quoted in Leupp's "Life of Roosevelt," page 44.)

"Where we allow the offices to form part of an immense bribery chest, the effect upon political life is precisely the same as if we should allow the open expenditure of immense sums of money bribing voters." (Roosevelt in "Public Opinion," April 4, 1895.)

Roosevelt computed that patronage in the State of New York at that time amounted to \$25,000,000. This, when used for party purposes, he regarded as a bribery fund. Much of it was available for use by the governor.

"The man who is in politics for the offices," says Roosevelt, "might just as well be in politics for the money he can get for his vote, so far as the public good is concerned."

Vice-President Hendricks' statement about taking the boys in to warm their toes caused Mr. Roosevelt to arise and remark that such doctrine was "morally on the same plane as giving the boys \$5 each all round for their

votes." Men who talked that way were "champions of foul government and dishonest practices." Anti-civil service reform men "had a gift of office-mongering, just as other men had a gift of picking pockets."

Mr. Roosevelt might have classed them with cutthroats and murderers, but he showed the conservative and generous spirit with which he deals with those who disagree with him, by classing them merely with pickpockets. One may therefore realize the critical emergency which would induce a patriotic President, knowing full well the quality of the offense, to use the public patronage to control politics in Ohio or New York, to make the South solid for a new Martin Van Buren, to dragoon legislation through Congress, to castigate such men as Wadsworth for daring to disagree with the views of the President as to the righteousness of a piece of proposed legislation. Serious indeed must be the situation which would induce a pure and high-minded patriot like Roosevelt to resort to the bribery of voters, even with offices.

Washington Dispatches of March 27, 1907, gave in detail a story of the appointment of thirty-two postmasters to help Secretary Taft control Ohio. Washington newspaper friends of Roosevelt told us a year ago that he had proposed to place Federal patronage at Governor Hughes' disposal in New York if Hughes would in turn support the Roosevelt administration. Hughes declined. For weeks there have been general charges of Federal patronage being used for political purposes.

Whether as Governor or President, since Roosevelt has had patronage at his disposal, he has used it notoriously to strengthen his party and promote his own fortunes. More than that, in no campaign since Roosevelt has been President has he failed to help with Federal patronage the regular machine organizations of his party in local contests. Cox's man Herrick was helped in Ohio. Quayism was tolerated if not supported in Pennsylvania. Friends of decent government appealing to Roosevelt for sympathy in an important fight were told that they must not make trouble between the senators of that state and the President. Huldah Todd walked the plank in Delaware because she was not to the liking of Addick's man—Allee in Delaware. District-Attorney Byrne became a constructive recess man in his important office to bolster up the fortunes of the delectable gas man. Platt did not suffer in New York, or Spooner in Wisconsin. Strange to say, this "office-mongering" which the President so picturesquely characterizes as bribery, has always under Roosevelt been for the benefit of the reactionary machine. Only a tried and true civil service reformer could so meritoriously and patriotically use public patronage as a "bribery fund."

Private Secretary Cortelyou mounted rapidly as the servitor of President Roosevelt. First came the new cabinet position, Secretary of Commerce and Labor. As chairman of the Republican National Committee, in personal

charge of Roosevelt's campaign for the presidency, he was doing still more patriotic service. Therefore the President was justified in promising him the Post Office Department if he "made good." Mr. Hitchcock went with Cortelyou from the classified service, detailed for the work, so to speak. Both did their work so well that they landed higher up, Cortelyou at the head of the Post Office Department, which had been promised him; Hitchcock as his assistant later on. Cortelyou managed the Republican party while in the pay of Uncle Sam. Private Secretary Cortelyou still mounts. Now he has reached that highly-to-be-desired stage of progress where he may graduate as a high-salaried bank president. Hitchcock is to take a fresh start. Newspapers say that this member of Roosevelt's executive ministry has been loaned to Secretary Taft. If so, he might use the knowledge and influence gained in the Post Office Department in helping his candidate, just as Cortelyou is supposed to have used knowledge gained in the government service to help Roosevelt.

In minor places, where the work is done under the guidance of skilled chiefs, civil service reformers insist that experience means efficiency. Strangely enough, experience is wholly useless in administering a gigantic department. Roosevelt cabinet officers can master department after department of the government in an incredibly short time. The more they are shifted about, the better it seems for the de-

partment—and the men. Postal problems? No experience is necessary in meeting them!

Shameful it was in Hendricks to talk of taking the boys in to warm their toes. But very properly could President Roosevelt appoint John S. Clarkson, the offensive spoilsman of Harrison's administration to the surveyorship in New York for services past and to come. His giving places to Frantz, Curry, McIlhenny, Ben Daniels and the other host of Rough Riders that he has remembered, was entirely just and proper. Generals Wood, Bell, Grant, personal friends, vaulted over the heads of others through the most patriotic motives on the part of all concerned. We do not overlook the fact that upon the face of the returns, Roosevelt had nothing to do with the surprising advancement of the medical military men. Therefore we cannot hold Roosevelt responsible for the effect upon discipline and efficiency. Nor should we mention, except in passing the effort of Roosevelt to have such promotion in the army made the rule—leave it all to the discretion of the president and his staff advisers. Such things would look very bad in Hendricks. They were cause for praise of Roosevelt.

Roosevelt has labored assiduously, and not without success, to confine violation of the merit principle in civil service to the President alone. If place is to be given for political service, it must be service to the President. If personal or political loyalty is to be rewarded with Federal patronage, it must be loyalty to the President. If partisan lines are to be

crossed in appointments as in the South, it is because the President has a loyal supporter on the other side of the line. The more strictly civil service rules are enforced as to all other persons the more useful is the presidential prerogative of breaking them.

Should spoils apply, even to the 143,000 unclassified places indiscriminately, the President must perforce permit congressmen and senators to distribute the plums. A President of Roosevelt's industry in office for a century might intelligently pass upon such a mass of appointees. If congressmen and senators were permitted to choose, each lawmaker might become the center of a little political machine. Loyalty would be first to the lawmaker. When it came to a test, the machine might be used against the President. It might be made an engine to defeat his policies. With civil service rules enforced and place to be reached when needed by "special order" only, or by other executive device, all must come to the President. Loyalty must run to him. In fact, with the "special order" and the presidential places, the President has all the patronage he can keep sufficiently centralized, or useful. Theodore Roosevelt has four times the spoils to distribute enjoyed by such an unholy spoilsman as Andrew Jackson. Eight thousand good places, supplemented by the possibilities of the "temporary appointment" and "special order," are amply sufficient for all presidential purposes. One's personal friends and supporters

of tried loyalty are necessarily limited in number.

In another respect, Theodore Roosevelt has made a clever use of Federal patronage. Friends of Roosevelt's policies in Congress have reaped reward. Opponents have suffered. Of late, helped on by public patronage and the Roosevelt newspaper clique, the notion has been gaining ground that the Senate and House of Representatives are political recording machines intended to register in statutes the presidential will. Any senator or representative who questions this view comes dangerously close to being a traitor. Monopolizing, as he does, the right to violate civil service rules has strengthened Roosevelt mightily in his heroic battles for his political policies. High motives cover a multitude of spoils.

President Roosevelt has taught the nation what quality of men should constitute the "governing class." Never since the time of Adams has the service been made up so exclusively of proper gentlemen. It was not Roosevelt's fault that Harvard graduates were not available for all positions at his disposal. Lacking that ideal condition, he has invited other universities and colleges to the feast. This is emphatically the day of college men in government. Since Jackson's "hoi polloi" followed him to Washington, never has the "unwashed mob" been so nearly excluded from important government place as under Roosevelt. Exceptions like Clark, Sargeant and "Joe" Murray prove the rule. Exceptional personal loyalty

may overbalance lack of caste. Humble interests must be recognized to some extent.

Hampered as he has been by confining himself in the main to personal considerations in making appointments, President Roosevelt may be excused for collecting about him rather small men. Larger men are not so useful in carrying out the policies of a mighty chief. Moody, Metcalf, Bonaparte, Holmes, Shaw, Day, Morton and Garfield may be cited as examples. Then, too, it is not every cabinet officer who will permit a President to use him as a messenger boy; to go over his head and under his feet as Roosevelt is constantly doing with Metcalf, for instance. Gage would not stand it. It disorganized his department and destroyed his efficiency. His stay in the cabinet was short after the advent of Roosevelt. It humiliated Hay beyond measure, but he bore it to the end. The big men of the administration—Hay, Root, Taft, Hitchcock, and in his way, Wilson—were inherited from McKinley, who was an uncommonly keen judge of men. If Roosevelt has used Root, the compliment has certainly been returned.

It must be trying to the manhood of a big man to have the gag tightly applied unless one wishes to become an executive sounding board. Of course we do not refer to the minor men in the Federal service, those pathetic political eunuchs denied all rights of citizenship except sneaking home to vote. Our wise civil service reformers have found civic activity incompatible with Federal office-holding, and the Presi-

dent has bound and gagged Federal employees politically, by common consent. Some bedlamite President may yet decide that a fourth class postmaster, a postal, a patent, or a treasury clerk who is an American citizen has as good a right to speak his mind on politics as has a cabinet officer. We are still happily spared from such dangerous heresy. It seems, however, a compromise might be effected.

It has been found highly meritorious for cabinet officers to leave their departmental business in the hands of subordinates, and go up and down the country justifying administration policies, or helping to re-elect their chief. This important phase of a cabinet minister's official duty has never received proper emphasis until a civil service reformer like Roosevelt gave it point. Heretofore, it was not deemed necessary for a colonial governor to cable an official report for the purpose of supporting a presidential candidate in a campaign, as was done in 1904 from Manila.

Roosevelt has carried the matter still further by loaning cabinet officers to political machines to help them out in close campaigns, as in Pennsylvania and Ohio.

All in all, we have made progress under Roosevelt. What the President has done in the line of civil service extension, has been recognized as never before. He was applauded for placing Panama under the classified service and equally applauded for withdrawing it from classification. It was praiseworthy to leave 4,000 pension examining doctors outside the

bars. We shall have renewed applause when the 65,000 fourth class postmasters all become Roosevelt partisans and are made secure in their places under the protection of the classified list, as were so many employees made secure before Harrison left office.

The mill can never grind with the water that is past. If those postoffices now become the permanent reward of past political service, they will not be available in future in paying for like service. This is all we can expect until we realize that the constituency capable of electing a congressman might successfully elect a postmaster.

Future presidents can hardly use the personal machine built up by Roosevelt. His work may therefore strengthen greatly our civil service, although he has left for designing successors many awkward precedents.

CHAPTER XXIII.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ROOSEVELT'S POLITICAL
IDEAL.

Alexander Hamilton, in Roosevelt's estimation, stands head and shoulders above all other American statesmen. It was he who originated nearly everything good, great and lasting in our government.

"No American after Hamilton has done greater service than Chief Justice Marshall in making the nation." (Winning the West.)

Come forth, oh mighty Shade of the Revolution! Teach us your political philosophy so that we may understand the political philosophy of your strenuous disciple, Theodore Roosevelt.

Alexander Hamilton was a member of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. His recognized intellectual force gave him a place. But the perverted citizens of New York distrusted his ideas of government. Hamilton was a minority delegate. His light was hidden. Hamilton's theories of government could not find expression in votes. Delegates voted by states—the unit rule of our later political conventions.

For weeks the suppressed Hamilton smoked

and fumed, a human Vesuvius. On a bright June day, the seventeenth, the eruption came. Then the red-hot lava of his pent-up political wisdom broke forth.

He doubted whether Republican government could be established over so large a territory, but he thought it unwise at that time to propose any other sort because the people would not listen to it. He had no scruple, however, in saying what sort of government he favored. Supported as he was by the opinion of so many wise and good men, he had no hesitancy in declaring that the British government was the best in the world and he doubted much if anything short of it would do in America. (Kings, lords, the established church, nobility, caste, the whole mediæval mess.)

The members most tenacious of republicanism were, he observed, loud as any in declaring against the views of Democracy. The progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the time when others as well as himself would join in the praise bestowed by Mr. Necker on the British constitution, namely, that it is the only government in the world which united public strength with individual security.

Their House of Lords is a most noble institution. They form a permanent barrier against pernicious innovation. The Senate proposed was not adequate to such a purpose. They (some people) suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the Senate adequate firmness, because they fail to consider the amazing vio-

lence and turbulence of the democratic spirit.

Hamilton freely confessed that he was opposed to popular government, as his associates well knew.

As to the executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established upon republican principles. Can there be a good government without a good executive? The English monarchy was the only good model upon this subject. The hereditary interests of the king were so interwoven with that of the nation and his personal emolument so great he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad. We ought to go as far in order to attain stability and permanency as republican principles admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their office for life, or at least during good behavior. Let the executive also be for life. He argued that we must go as far at least as an elective monarch.

Hamilton did not expect immediate adoption of his scheme, but he expected the confederacy to fail and he saw evils operating in the states that would cure the people of their fondness for self-government. Firmly fixed in the belief that the delusion of popular government would pass, Hamilton went on to outline the government which he would establish as a step toward the more perfect English system:

Assembly with limited powers elected for three years.

Senate for life elected by a few electors.

President for life elected by a few electors.

Absolute veto, treaty-making power, as well

as the appointment of officers, in the hands of the executive.

Senate to declare war and approve treaties, also approve appointments, except the cabinet.

Judges for life.

National executive to appoint all state governors. These governors to have absolute veto upon acts of state legislatures.

State militia was to be under the control of the general government.

His idea was to destroy the states utterly as autonomous entities in charge of local affairs. They were to be mere departments of the Federal government.

Popular government to Hamilton was "but pork still with a change of sauce."

After Hamilton had outlined his plan for a new constitutional monarchy for America, he left the hall to return no more until mid-August. But his plan has been preserved in Madison's Journal, as outlined above.

Born in a British colony with little power in the hands of the people, Hamilton naturally turned to the kingly order. Narrow, intense, autocratic to the weak, sycophantic to the strong, without imagination, he could only grope along the trail of mediæval governmental forms, still in a modified condition surviving in Europe.

With the heads of the deluded people full of Jefferson's foolish Declaration of Independence, which, of course, sounded absurd to a strong man like Hamilton, our monarch-loving patriot knew that at that time his scheme could

not be put in practice. The people of America could not just then be cheated out of the freedom they had fought for. Hamilton would bide his time. Let the foolish weaklings with democratic tendencies have their fling. Soon they would call upon the strong man, then there would be kinghood and respectability.

Hamilton came back in August, but he had little to do with the making of the constitution. A life judiciary was set up, but Hamilton's ideas upon that point were not unique. Madison really outlined the plan. Occasionally Hamilton raised his voice in protest against too much power for the people, but his influence in the making of the constitution was very slight.

Hamilton had many sympathizers in the constitutional convention, even though he had little support. While made up of as able men, perhaps, as any similar convention ever assembled on earth, and as patriotic, the convention had little of the democratic taint. Franklin was a thorough Democrat. Madison, Randolph, Mason, Ellsworth, Gorham, Sherman, and a few others, showed at times some taint of democracy. This was especially true of Mason, who actually attacked black slavery, although coming from slave-holding Virginia. But not one had delusions as to the popular temper. They well knew that unless large concessions were made to those deluded with the theories of popular self-government, the constitution could never receive the ratification of the states. Therefore they swallowed their

disgust and made a constitution permitting of remarkable democratic development. Hamilton would have made the issue, let the states separate and give the "strong man" opportunity to assemble them on a better basis.

Naturally in making such a constitution as was made, such men as Randolph, Mason, Madison, Ellsworth and Franklin would be given greater scope than their aristocratic colleagues. With few exceptions, among whom were Hamilton and Morris, nobody seemed willing to face the chaos which might have followed failure to make a constitution which could be adopted, and to count upon reaction to secure a more autocratic and therefore a better government.

In his Federalist papers Hamilton gave a much milder exposition of his theories governmental, sugar-coating his statement to the taste of a weakling public. He wanted the constitution adopted as the least evil possible of attainment at that time. It might be interpreted into shape by that life judiciary.

"Various reasons," says Hamilton, "have been suggested in the course of these papers to induce the probability that the general government will be better administered than the particular governments, the principal of which are that . . . through the medium of the state legislatures, which are select bodies of men and which are to appoint the members of the National Senate, there is reason to expect that this branch will usually be composed with peculiar care." (Federalist, No. 27.)

Somehow this election of senators by the legislatures, notwithstanding the sublime and altogether infallible political wisdom of Hamilton, has done as much as any other one thing to corrupt our politics and make special interests secure in the control of the Federal government.

Electoral colleges have been made a farce by the march of the Democratic spirit, but their ghosts still have power for mischief.

"No man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his own were known to be," said Hamilton in finally deciding to support the constitution, "but is it possible to deliberate between anarchy (state governments?) on the one side and the chance of good to be expected from the plan on the other." (Madison's Journal, page 746.)

"A well constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to obtain in a government wholly elective." (Ford's Federalist, 433.)

Probably the genesis of Roosevelt's notion that officers should ignore the will of those who elect them, is found in Hamilton's statement: "When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be guardians over their interests, to withstand the temporary delusions." (Ford's Federalist, 477.)

Hamilton had a keen appreciation, as Roosevelt has, of the danger from states' rights: "The danger which most threatens our political

welfare is that the state governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union." (Ford's *Federalist*, 203.)

"It will always be more easy for the state governments to encroach upon the national authorities. than for the national government to encroach upon the state authorities." (*Federalist*, 17.)

Hamilton's wonderful foresight in this regard is indicated by the sequel. State encroachment on the Federal governmental authorities has been a caution. Hamilton, Madison and other good men seem to have overlooked the power of party in politics to give the Federal government overmastering domination over the states. The majority of states are ruled usually by the majority party in the nation. Party loyalty will require them to stand by the Federal government in a contest with any one state, especially in a state of the minority. Thus the Federal government will overmaster the states in detail. As Federal power grows, the people of all other states, almost regardless of party, will take the side of the Federal government against almost any state but their own. Only when identical interests draw contiguous states together in opposition have we an exception to the rule.

Hostility to state government had a deeper significance with Hamilton. He recognized that local self-government was the only means of maintaining popular institutions. Putting responsibility upon citizens, it develops in them resistance to interference from without.

Legislative branches, Hamilton thought, might encroach upon the executive, especially might this be expected from the national House of Representatives. In view of the present supineness of the body this prediction seems almost grotesque, but Hamilton being without imagination, was wrong in almost every prediction. English Commons were cited as a parallel. Progress toward democracy could not fail to strengthen the Commons, for the Commons are its only means of expression. In America all three branches get power from the people, and all get similar support. The executive is best organized to bid for such support and does so most effectively.

"Government," says Hamilton, "is instituted more for the protection of property than the persons of individuals. The one as well as the other may be considered represented by those who are charged with the government."

Such was the meaning of property qualifications for voting in New York State. In the United States government, "The RIGHTS OF PROPERTY are committed to the same hands as personal rights." The opulent citizen has large influence because of his wealth, and "through this imperceptible channel the RIGHTS OF PROPERTY are conveyed into the representation. (Federalist, No. 54.)

An individual's right to the possession and enjoyment of property has been dinned into the average citizen until he thinks he comprehends it. But to him the "RIGHTS OF PROPERTY" has a bizarre sound. He may

see clearly enough in his humorous moods that a gold dollar should have the right of free speech and immunity from cruel and unusual punishments; a diamond ring ought not to be subjected to false imprisonment; false arrest should not be inflicted upon a brick house. When one takes concrete examples, like these, the dullest mind can see the absurdity of denying property its "RIGHTS." But when it comes to making a generalization, as Hamilton did, as to the "RIGHTS OF PROPERTY," and finding government protection for property in these "RIGHTS," the Jeffersonian mind is totally unable to follow him.

Some of the milder Jeffersonians contend that Hamilton's "rights of property" was merely an inoffensive way of asserting that men with dollars had greater political rights than men without dollars, and were entitled to greater privileges and better protection. Then they howl "plutocracy!"

An irresponsible type of Jeffersonian has paraphrased Hamilton's philosophical proposition in this way: "Government is instituted more for the protection of household furniture and live stock than the persons of individuals. The one as well as the other may be considered represented by those who are charged with the government. The rights of flour mills are committed to the same hands as personal rights. Rich men have great influence. Through this imperceptible channel the rights of donkeys (property) are conveyed into the representation."

Absurd and foolish persons, of course, can give a grotesque twist to the wisest philosophy. Hamilton's discriminating doctrine has been accepted by his followers from Adams to Roosevelt. Roosevelt speaks repeatedly of the "RIGHTS OF PROPERTY." In fact, if property had not "rights" as set forth by Hamilton, there would be no foundation at all for laws granting special privileges. The so-called plutocratic strain in our institutions would be missing. We would guard property and contracts less carefully and pay more attention to human life. The rights of men without dollars might count for as much as the rights of men with dollars. One may readily imagine the chaos to follow such a state.

Hamilton's advocacy of the constitution, defective though he thought it to be, had something to do with its adoption in the State of New York. Once adopted his energy was exerted toward interpreting it in a way agreeing with his own ideas of what a government should be. But his opponents were sufficiently strong to get the amendments embodying a bill of rights. In fact, had that not been promised the constitution would have failed of confirmation.

His place in Washington's cabinet gave Hamilton peculiar opportunity to secure the thing he wished. Hamilton had gone into the cabinet some time before Jefferson. Already when Jefferson entered, Hamilton had given the government the Hamiltonian trend. For a little time Jefferson did not seem to realize

just what Hamilton was doing. In some respects Jefferson fell in with Hamilton's plans:

Washington trusted Hamilton. In matters governmental their sympathies ran much more nearly parallel than those of Washington and Jefferson. Hamilton's great intellectual force and his superior knowledge of law and of governmental details, made Washington his debtor. Washington accepted Hamilton's advice upon organization and policies.

England was the ideal in government Hamilton labored to attain. His whole energy was bent upon repeating, as nearly as may be, the British government in the revolted colonies. In his position at the head of the national finances, he had opportunities to put English policies into practice. Protection, following the British policy of the time, was one of his early cares.

Hamilton realized that the debates of the constitutional convention were too fresh in the public mind to admit of an interpretation of the constitution radically different from that indicated in these debates. Chartering of miscellaneous corporations by the general government was no part of the constitutional programme. Neither was there to be any interference with subjects of local taxation. But taxes were to be collected. This Hamilton argued implied a fiscal agent for their collection. The fiscal agent might be a bank! Thus was the thin edge of the wedge of implied powers inserted in the constitution. Soon the rent was sufficiently large for the national

bank. Implied powers, and "general welfare," judging by their application, seem to have meant more than all the rest of the constitution, except possibly taking property without just compensation or due process of law.

In our day we have gone beyond these feeble Hamilton subterfuges. Theodore Roosevelt knows that the constitution authorizes the incorporation of any body which Congress may see fit to charter. To him the laws of inheritance, the laws which Hamilton instanced as peculiarly the province of the state, are the subject of Federal modification. For more than a century the Supreme Court has been expanding the constitution to suit its own growing power. Debates in the constitutional convention have been forgotten.

In our foreign relations, Hamilton believed in courting the friendship of Great Britain and turning a cold shoulder upon France. True, Great Britain had wantonly violated the Treaty of Paris. Posts which in this treaty it had agreed to surrender were still held by British garrisons. American merchantmen were still being captured on the high seas. American seamen were being impressed, American vessels searched. Border Indians were being incited to pillage and murder. In fact, Great Britain was treating the revolted, but now independent colonies, with all the cruel, cold-blooded, insulting arrogance that this most piratical of all nations was capable of imposing upon a weaker victim.

This did not matter to Hamilton. Great

Britain was his first love still, his ideal. He must keep her toleration at any cost of cowardice and humiliation. On the other hand, France, which had helped us in our hour of need, had become saturated with democracy. It had overthrown kings and nobles and was at bay before king-ridden Europe. Such a friend was thoroughly disreputable—impossible to a man of Hamilton's sympathies.

Jefferson as ambassador of the young nation, had been snubbed and insulted by the arrogant swinish British king. He had no sympathy with kingly government, but had learned to love the French, even the more because they were toppling over thrones.

Hamilton's ideas of governmental policies could no more harmonize with those of Jefferson than could oil mix with water. They became disturbing elements in Washington's administration. Drifting farther and farther apart, each attracted to himself a group of followers with ideas akin to his own. Soon there were two distinct political parties, although while Washington remained President they were not clearly defined. On broad lines these parties still persist, although their names have often changed.

Jay's treaty with England had been signed. Genet had come and gone. Hamilton's policies secured full ascendancy in the administration. He was all powerful. Jefferson retired. Still he watched the course of events with eager solicitation. Hamilton had not made friends. Jay's treaty had caused him to be stoned in the

streets. One can well imagine why. He had intrigued against everybody associated with him in Washington's government. A veritable granny for sharp-tongued gossip, he had attacked and destroyed reputations. Adams took him as an inheritance, even though he had tried to cheat Adams out of the presidency by elevating to that position a candidate for the vice-presidency.

While Washington remained at the head of the government, his influence protected the unpopular Hamilton. When Adams succeeded the great chief after one of the bitterest campaigns imaginable, there was no longer the shadow of the great chief as a refuge. Then Hamilton and his forces must meet in open battle with Jefferson and his clans. Soon Adams found in Hamilton an awkward inheritance. The arrogant leader of the Federalists wanted to dictate Adams' policies. He even had spies in Adams' own household.

Hamilton had had a most picturesque career. Coming to New York as a nameless adventurer of doubtful parentage, he had married into the rich and powerful Schuyler family. This with his exceptional ability had made him a power in New York politics. As a natural leader he insisted upon ruling with an iron hand.

Aristocratic in sentiment, exclusive, vindictive, tricky, he had made as many enemies in his own state as in the Federal government. These he pursued. Once in control, he succeeded in shutting out the Livingstons from

political preferment. Rufus King and General Schuyler were made senators. It cost Hamilton the Empire state, for the Livingstons were men of power, and withal fond of battle.

This was in 1800. Always a bad loser, Hamilton was beside himself, and actually proposed to Jay to call together a legislature which had adjourned sine die and whose successors had been elected, nullify the election, and by putting in force a new plan, turn the state over to the Federalists. Jay, who walked straight in his aristocratic boots, rejected the tricky counsel.

In these numerous political contests, a man as different as possible from Hamilton had crossed his path. This time was the clash most irritating to both. Aaron Burr was one of the best born of Americans. His military reputation was as good as that of Hamilton. He was Hamilton's rival in law and politics. Neither was a political fighter choice of methods. Yet Burr was the more generous and less vindictive of the two. Both were inordinately ambitious; both implacable haters.

While this rivalry had been in progress, Hamilton had repeatedly attacked Burr bitterly in speech and letter. He had reflected upon Burr's character, attacked his integrity, made him out a mean, despicable, conscienceless intriguer. With Washington, Hamilton had ruined Burr's standing. He had injured Burr with everybody who gave weight to Hamilton.

It is probable that during most of this time Burr was ignorant of Hamilton's slanders. The

men met socially and professionally. They dined together. On the surface all was serene. After Hamilton's defeat in 1800, these slanders redoubled. Soon Hamilton had an opportunity to retaliate by shutting Burr out of the presidency, not that he hated Jefferson less, but he hated Burr more.

With Jefferson's election to the presidency, Hamilton's influence in national politics was gone. The attempts to destroy freedom of speech and of the press and to make the President an autocrat in dealing with aliens had destroyed utterly the Federalist party. But still Hamilton had influence in New York. Joining forces with the Livingstons and Clintons, he defeated Burr for the governorship. Burr at this time was becoming morose and dangerous, embittered as was Hamilton by disappointment and thwarted ambition.

As the swelling tide of democracy arose, Hamilton became more bitter and implacable. Both men in New York, the Burr-Hamilton feud blazed forth afresh. Hamilton had written new letters slanderously assailing Burr and attacking his integrity. Burr at length discovered Hamilton's treachery. Local newspapers taunted Burr. Had the vice-president of the United States fallen so low as to permit himself to be insulted by Hamilton without resenting it. This new indignity was more than the fiery Burr could bear. He sent a copy of the attacking epistle to Hamilton and asked an explanation. It was the day of the code duello. Both Burr and Hamilton had been

mixed in other affairs of "honor" settled by blood-wager. Hamilton's favorite son had fallen on the "field of honor" without protest from Hamilton. As second Hamilton had engaged himself in the duel. Burr's communication therefore meant explain, apologize, or fight.

Hamilton equivocated. The dashing soldier seemed at last possessed of something like fear. Burr coldly stuck to his text. At length the great Federalist had seen into what a critical place his slanderous attacks had brought him. Appleton's cyclopedia of biography says:

"Hamilton was haunted with the belief that democracy was going to culminate in the horrors of the French revolution, that a strong man would be needed and that society would turn to him for salvation. In that case he would be disqualified if he failed to fight Burr." Possibly visions of that much-to-be-desired monarchy with the crown upon Hamilton's brow floated before him. At all events, Hamilton went very reluctantly into this fight. He feared the cold relentlessness of his antagonist.

That early morning meeting on the grassy shelf at Weehauken is history. Hamilton fell after having written a statement intended to put upon Burr the stigma of murder and to hold Hamilton up as a martyr. It was an act almost infinite in its meanness. Impartial judges, at this time, are inclined to think that Burr did the only thing possible at that time in his environment. The consequences were such as nobody could foresee. The bullet

which killed Hamilton made Burr an outlaw. It cut off two brilliant careers and rang the death knell of the duel in that section.

Possibly Burr's bullet saved the Republic from the powerful trend toward monarchy which Hamilton would undoubtedly have given it had he ever become arbiter of its fortunes. At that time it looked as though Hamilton had shot his bolt and had been hopelessly and permanently eliminated from national politics. Still, had Hamilton lived, it is hard to say that his overpowering intellectual force, driven forward by his restless ambition, might not have elevated him again to a place of power and authority. The lack of poise shown by Hamilton in the Jay and other incidents, left no criterion for forecasting the exact direction which his activities might have taken. Possibly had he lived our government would have developed the "stability, the strength" and the caste enjoyed by the English people. Or possibly Hamilton, failing in such a plan, might have been branded with Burr one of the "traitors" of the Republic.

Strange, indeed, it was that two such men as Burr and Hamilton should have crossed each other's pathways. Burr with his brilliant, restless, reckless, passionate intensity, his generosity, his strength, and his weaknesses. Hamilton of intellect so powerful as to lift him from the place of mere adventurer to the highest station. Wedded with relentless ardor to that aristocracy of which he was not and against which fate had compelled him to strike a tell-

ing blow. Clashing ambition brought him and Burr to the field of "honor." Burr's bullet made Hamilton a victim and started Burr on the downward road to destruction. The bullet that made Hamilton a martyr insured generations of praise for the one man in all history who has had the most sinister influence upon the Republic.

To the democratic student of history the high estimate which historians have placed upon Hamilton is most perplexing. Every fear he expresses as to the evil tendencies of democracy, time has proved utterly groundless. Few evils in our governmental system but can be traced to the distrust which Hamilton had in the people and the devices which his school employed to prevent the masses from exerting real power. Legislative election of senators and electoral choosing of Presidents have been the prolific parents of numberless carrion broods. An irresponsible Federal judiciary has bound us hand and foot and delivered us to special interests. Executive power has grown to unwieldy proportions. Federal usurpation threatens to degrade states into provinces and transfer our government into a bureaucracy. Hamilton was a false prophet. His influence upon the Republic was almost wholly sinister.

Born a Hamilton "Republican," a profound believer in strong government, Theodore Roosevelt naturally looks upon Hamilton as his political patron saint. If we have reached such an elevation in political philosophy that we can overcome our prejudices in favor of

self-government and see the superior merits of the forms of government which the older and wiser nations approve, we shall agree with Hamilton and Roosevelt. If our vision be narrow, if we are obsessed with the vagaries and sophistries of the Declaration of Independence, we shall still strive for the ideals of theorists and doctrinaires like Jefferson.

But whatever view we take, we must yield the palm of merit to Theodore Roosevelt. Hamilton had lived for years under the British flag. Love of Britain had been bred in his blood and bone. In Hamilton's time no considerable experiment in applying democratic republican principles to government on a large scale had proved successful. It was most natural for the practical, unimaginative, efficient Hamilton to prefer monarchy. He can claim no great credit for it. But President Roosevelt and his ancestors for generations have prospered under what is by many considered a successful experiment in democratic republican government. Naturally he would be expected to favor the democratic republican form through sheer predilection. That he realizes its weaknesses, its shortcomings, its inadequacy, and favors the Hamilton ideal, shows the broad liberality of his mind and his firm grasp of the problems of practical government.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, AND HIS SINISTER
DEMOCRACY.

In our introduction to this narrative we have given some indication of how Roosevelt, historian, regards Thomas Jefferson. This touched the surface merely. Contempt hardly expresses the feeling of the Spanish War hero for the Revolutionary weakling doctrinaire. There are scores of references, direct and indirect, in Roosevelt's writings to Thomas Jefferson. With few exceptions they show that Thomas Jefferson was utterly despicable in Theodore Roosevelt's sight. In fact, Roosevelt seems to harbor an intense and bitter hatred for the man who foiled Hamilton's plans for a centralized American government.

Just as Roosevelt agrees with Hamilton in his theories of government and loved and admired him for them, he takes issue with every tenet of Jefferson and despises the man who gave voice to such folly. Roosevelt and democracy are not more irreconcilable than Roosevelt and Jefferson, for to Roosevelt, Jefferson means democracy. Here are some of the references in Roosevelt's writings to this

most despicable of our American statesmen as Roosevelt views him:

"Though a man whose views and theories had a profound influence upon the national life, he was perhaps the most incapable executive that ever filled the presidential chair; being almost purely visionary, he was utterly unable to grapple with the slightest actual danger, and not even excepting his successor, Madison, it would be *difficult to find a man less fit to guide the state with honor and safety* through the stormy times that marked the opening of the present century." (Roosevelt's writings.)

"Morris despised Jefferson for a tricky and incapable theorist." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, pages 330 and 331.)

"Jefferson was President and Madison was Secretary of State. The country never had two statesmen less capable of upholding the dignity of the nation. . . . Jefferson loved France with a servile devotion." (4, *Winning of the West*, 271.)

"It was these two timid, well-meaning statesmen who now found themselves pitted against Napoleon and Napoleon's minister, Talleyrand; against the greatest warrior and law-giver and against one of the greatest diplomats of modern times; against two men, moreover, whose sodden lack of conscience, was but heightened by the contrast with their brilliant genius and their power of character." (4, *Winning of the West*, 271.)

Strangest of all, the two "timid, well-meaning statesmen" won in the contest with all this

brilliancy and unscrupulousness. They got Napoleon's American empire for fifteen millions of dollars and got it bloodlessly.

"Napoleon was quite as incapable as any Spanish statesman or as Talleyrand himself, of so much as considering the question of breach of faith or loss of honor, if he could gain any advantage by sacrificing either." (4, *Winning of the West*, 271.)

Making Jefferson's victory all the more remarkable.

"It" (acquiring Louisiana) "was at the cost of violating every precept which they had professed to hold most dear, and of showing that their warfare on the Federalists had been waged on behalf of principles which they were obliged to confess were shams the moment they were put to the test." (4, *Winning of the West*, 282.)

"The real history of the acquisition must tell of the great westward movement begun in 1769, and not merely of the feeble diplomacy of Jefferson's administration." (*Winning of the West*, Vol. 4, page 261.)

One may take that view of the matter if one be looking into the causes of policies and leadership, but if one does take that view, he eliminates all heroes and weaklings,, all devils and saints, for everything in history is due to forces which no man can control or even direct. If Washington deserves credit for leadership in the Revolutionary war, or Hamilton in statesmanship afterward, then we cannot deny Jefferson the honors due his leadership.

It requires a historian, like Roosevelt, of great discernment to see how acquiring practically uninhabited contiguous territory, in which a young, vigorous, democratic nation might grow and become strong, violated any democratic principle. Others beside Roosevelt see democracy in carrying out the will of the people, and the people clamored for the acquisition of Louisiana. Federalists opposed this very thing, but Jefferson in doing it, justified the Federalists. It is really too bad that some way cannot be found to discredit Jefferson in the Louisiana purchase. This weakling who overcame the strongest; this man who strangely surrendered to Federalistic principles in doing what the Federalists fought tooth and nail. Queer fellow this Jefferson. Shameful that Hamilton could not have acquired Louisiana instead of opposing it. Roosevelt found much fault with Washington, and later with Jefferson, for not going to war with Spain and taking Louisiana. That might have been the trouble. Sufficient blood was not shed in its acquisition.

"In the year 1784 Jefferson put into his draft of the ordinance of that year a clause prohibiting slavery in all the western territory south as well as north of the Ohio river." (3, *Winning of the West*, 254.)

"Jefferson, who never understood anything about warfare, being a timid man, and who belonged to the visionary school who always denounced the army and navy, was given a legitimate excuse to criticize the regulars." (For

failure in the West.) (3, Winning of the West, 278.)

"The absolute terror with which even moderate Federalists had viewed the victory of the democrats was in a sense justified for the leaders who led the Democrats to triumph, were the very men who had fought, tooth and nail, against every measure necessary to make us a free, orderly and powerful nation." (Centralized.) (Roosevelt's Life of Morris.)

"We have, indeed, a set of madmen in the administration and they will do many foolish things," said Morris, as Roosevelt quotes approvingly.

"The indignation naturally excited by the utter weakness and folly of Jefferson's second term, and the pitiable incompetence shown by him and his successor," justified Morris' opinion. (Roosevelt's Life of Morris, page 345.)

"For the sin of burning a few public buildings was as nothing compared with the cowardly infamy of which politicians of the stripe of Jefferson and Madison and the people whom they represented were guilty in not making ready by sea and land to protect their capital and in not exacting *vengeance* for their destruction." (4, Winning of the West, 98.)

"Jefferson had no gift for government. He was singularly deficient in masterful statesmanship of the kind imperatively needed by any nation which wishes to hold an honorable place among the nations." (4, Winning of the West, 196.)

"This war (1812) was in itself eminently

necessary and proper, and was excellent in its results, but it was attended with incidents of shame and disgrace to America, for which Jefferson and Madison and their political friends and supporters among the politicians and the people have never received a sufficiently severe condemnation." (4, *Winning of the West*, 196.)

"They" (sympathizers with the French Revolution) "were already looking to Jefferson for their leader, and Jefferson, though at the time Secretary of State under Washington, was secretly encouraging them, and playing a very discreditable part toward his chief." (4, *Winning of the West*, 176.)

"Marchand was agent for the French minister (Genet), though nominally his visit was undertaken on purely scientific grounds. Jefferson's course in the matter was characteristic. Openly he was endeavoring in a perfunctory manner to carry out Washington's policy of strict neutrality between France and England, but secretly he was engaged in tortuous intrigues against Washington and was thwarting his wishes as far as he dared in regard to Genet. It is impossible that he could have been really misled as to Marchand's character," etc. (4 *Winning of the West*, 179.)

"Jefferson was the father of nullification and therefore of secession. He used the word nullification in the original draft which he supplied to the Kentucky legislature, and though that body struck it out of the resolutions which they passed in 1798, they inserted it in those

of the following year. This was done mainly as an unscrupulous party move on Jefferson's part, and when his side came into power he became a firm upholder of the Union; and being constitutionally unable to put a proper value on truthfulness, he even denied that his resolutions could be construed to favor nullification, though they could by no possibility be construed to mean anything else." (Roosevelt's *Life of Benton*, page 95.)

Students of the Constitutional Convention know, and it is to be presumed that Historian Roosevelt is such a student, that in every debate where the proposed powers of the government were considered, action just such as that taken by Kentucky and Virginia was contemplated on the part of the states where there was a question of the abuse of power by the Federal government. Such action was constitutional from the standpoint of the framers of the document. The principle of it was appealed to in the Hartford convention as well as in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions. Neither secession nor nullification in the sense afterward urged in South Carolina was intended in Virginia and Kentucky at that time. It was the only method then known by which the abuse of Federal power could be protested against and checked. Such at least is the explanation of historians who are not especially committed to finding unworthy motives for every act of Jefferson. Historian Roosevelt may know better.

If Roosevelt found in the Democratic leader

a man "constitutionally unable to put a proper value upon truthfulness," he found the motives of the democratic masses who followed him still meaner and more despicable. "Four-fifths of the talent ability and good sense of the country," he said, "were to be found in the Federalist ranks." "An assault upon what Benton calls the money power is apt to be popular in a democratic republic, partly on account of the vague fear which the poorer and more ignorant voters regard a powerful institution whose workings they do not understand, and partly on account of the jealousy they feel toward those who are better off than themselves."

"Federalists passed the judiciary bill supplanting local courts, and Adams promptly used his remaining days in filling the offices." Roosevelt did not approve of this. It was an outrage, but the effect was all right. In fact Jefferson's secretary had to stop the appointment proceeding at midnight on the day of inauguration.

There were Federalists in every public place in the government. It was most important that the Federalists should grasp the judiciary before they let go. Not a follower of Jefferson was in office.

Yet John Adams, you know, was not a spoilsman. As a patriot at the head of the party containing four-fifths of the talent and good sense of the country, it was his bounden duty to place his partisans in office, and to exclude Jefferson's followers rigidly. This was

not spoils, it was patriotism. Jefferson, Roosevelt says, introduced the spoils system.

As a matter of fact, it looks as though Jefferson was sufficient of a wild-eyed reformer to anticipate Roosevelt something more than three-fourths of a century in advocating the merit system. He laid down the principle that office-holders who did well would not be disturbed and he carried it out. He did remove many of Adams' appointees for what was later called "offensive partisanship." Jefferson put his followers in place in sufficient number to be sure of sympathetic co-operation in carrying out his policies.

Jefferson was meeting a critical situation for Democrats. For nearly twelve years the young Republic had been under influences hostile to popular government. Hamilton had colored all of Washington's policies, and had dominated the early years of Adams' administration. Jefferson alone withstood this reactionary wave. When he came into power, he took steps to regain so far as possible the lost ground.

To proper, gentlemanly, scholarly historians, who share Hamilton's contempt for self-government, Jefferson must always appear as a misguided mischief-maker. Theodore Roosevelt, enlightened though he may be, can claim no great merit, therefore, in seeing Jefferson's smallness and meanness. That others should take different views, however, is most difficult for him to understand. Such misguided persons hold that in his "Summary View of the

Rights of British America," Jefferson blew the first bugle blast for liberty and independence when he said: "The British Parliament has no right to exercise authority over us." This was at a time when Otis, Henry, Lee and Washington were talking compromise.

Many vulgar persons consider the "Declaration of Independence," Jefferson's work, the greatest charter of human rights ever produced by mind and pen. In the original draft of that charter black slavery was denounced as Lincoln denounced it eighty years afterward.

Jefferson, they contend, disestablished the church in Virginia, thus giving full effect to religious liberty. The British, Hamilton's ideals in government, have not yet reached that happy state, although a century and a quarter have gone by. It was he who did away with primogeniture and entail, things which still curse that perfect Britain. By such action Jefferson opened to those who work it the much needed land. Thus did he destroy at a blow the foundation of caste in one of the greatest of American states.

Virginia's archaic laws were turned by Jefferson into an enlightened code, his admirers say.

Jefferson was an original abolitionist, as even Roosevelt testifies.

George Rogers Clark, at the instance of Jefferson, made his famous expedition which held the northern Ohio valley for the United States. Fort Jefferson, built by this pioneer at the instance of Jefferson, was the first tangible evi-

dence of title made good to the east bank of the Mississippi.

If Jefferson while governor of Virginia permitted the British to ravage the state, his admirers say, it was because Virginia's fighting men were operating in other fields. There were no troops available for Jefferson, who was not a military genius.

Jefferson is credited with having written the address of Congress to General Washington.

In collaboration with Gouverneur Morris, Jefferson originated our present monetary system. He it was who originally organized the Treasury Department, or at least made the plans. His ordinance of the northwest territory contained the germ of the plan for making new states.

John Adams called Jefferson the father of the American navy. It was Jefferson, the timid, inefficient, who broke up the practice then universal in the West, of paying tribute to the "Barbary pirates," a practice submitted to in his day by the strongest states in the world. He put a period to the humiliation of American naval officers becoming messengers for Mohammedan potentates.

Jefferson's advice and sympathy was of great value to the French patriots, struggling for liberty.

He was among the leaders who insisted upon a bill of rights in the constitution of the United States.

In Washington's cabinet Jefferson fought, practically alone, the battle for Democracy.

It was he who opposed the Hamiltonian plan of giving wealthy manufacturers the right to tax the American people for the benefit of the manufacturers. Hamilton's national bank, which gave into private hands the finances and the money of the country, was opposed by Jefferson. He fought against an irresponsible judiciary. By sheer persistent force and devotion to principle he led the revolt against centralization and in favor of popular liberty which gave this nation a democratic trend preserved to this day.

Admirers of Thomas Jefferson contend that in his treatment of Genet, he merely tried to pay a debt of gratitude which America owed France, the republic struggling, as our republic had struggled against the kingly order of the world. France asked only sympathy and such financial aid as we could give her. America's people were willing.

Great Britain had broken its treaty with us and in a thousand ways treated us with contempt. Our border settlers, our seamen, our merchantmen, were safe neither in person nor property. American citizenship was no protection to the sailor whom England wished to impress. Never in all our history has this nation submitted to such contemptuous arrogance as this nation submitted to from Great Britain in the early years of our existence.

Hamilton's policy in swallowing these insults was apparently as cowardly as it was unwise. Had we again taken sides with France

we would have fought Britain supported by a powerful ally. As it turned out, we fought Great Britain alone. Hamilton's policy of peace at any price with our barbarous step-mother, permitted Great Britain to dispose of France first and then bring its whole military power against this country. Jefferson is certainly not responsible for this supineness.

Jefferson is responsible for the government mints.

When the "Holy Alliance" (the most unholy ever conceived among nations) threatened to conquer the colonies of Spain which had gained their independence, President Monroe wrote Jefferson for advice. Under date of October 23, 1823, Jefferson replied to Monroe's letter. He wrote:

"The question presented by the letter you have sent me is the most momentous that has been offered to my contemplation since the Declaration of Independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time. Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America—North and South—has interests distinct from those of Europe. She should therefore have a system of her own. While Europe is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere the domicile of freedom." He would join with England in guar-

anteeing South American independence. He would have the United States acquire Cuba. He held that a declaration should be issued to the effect that "we would oppose with all our means the forcible interposition of any other power as auxiliary, stipendary, or under any other form or pretext, and more especially their transfer to any other power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way."

This letter announces every essential element of the Monroe doctrine, and is its first recorded announcement. In December of that year it appeared in President Monroe's message. It did indeed mean more for democratic government than any declaration since the Declaration of Independence.

Jefferson inaugurated public improvements in 1808 in undertaking the construction of the Cumberland road and the improvement of rivers and canals.

Louisiana came to us through the far-seeing statesmanship of Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson saw that as against Spain Louisiana must inevitably be ours. He recognized that in the hands of France it was a menace. If it should go into the hands of England, it would probably have remained like Canada, a barrier to the development of the great Republic. He acted at exactly the proper moment, when the empire could be secured without bloodshed and at the smallest cost.

Jefferson was a pioneer in general state education, the principle of our public school. He

founded the University of Virginia, with its ideal freedom of government.

It was Jefferson who sent Lewis and Clark to explore the far Northwest, thus establishing a precedent for scientific research by the government and laying the foundation for our claim to Oregon.

Jefferson was a pioneer in scientific farming and other practical experimentation.

More important than all these, Jefferson found the liberties for which the American people fought and suffered slipping away from them. Hamilton in full control, Washington sympathetic. An aristocracy being built up. America being placed in the hands of a "governing class." There were coaches and six, levees, formality and flummery of the European courts. Directing it all was the man to whom democracy was but "pork still, though with a change of sauce."

Hamilton was frankly corrupt in politics. He intrigued against everybody, kept faith with few. An intelligent author makes Hamilton the father of plutocracy, the lobby, and the trust. Our government was frankly becoming a government of and for the rich. All classes not associated with the narrow Federalist clique were, under Adams, denied a place in the government. Implied powers were being invoked to give autocratic authority to the judiciary, and enlarge the scope of Federal control.

Jefferson was one of the very few men of his time who saw the trend of the ruling forces

in the Federal government. Immediately he had satisfied himself that Hamilton was bent upon destroying democratic government, he took up the gage of battle. Almost alone among the leaders of the time, he battled for pure democratic ideals. With heroic tenacity, with supreme intelligence, with splendid courage, he fought the powers of aristocracy gathered under the august shadow of Washington. Jefferson won. It was one of the epochal victories of history. He won because the American people were essentially democratic despite their Rulers. This victory is the one thing no disciple of Hamilton can forgive. It is Jefferson's unpardonable sin. This fully explains the attitude of Theodore Roosevelt toward Jefferson.

To Jefferson more than to any other one man is it due that the Revolutionary war was not fought in vain. By his acts, by his influence, but more than all, by his pure democratic ideals, he has exerted greater influence than any other man in the history of the Republic. As a prophet statesman Jefferson towers above even Washington and Lincoln. No other name in the history of the Republic is worthy of mention with his.

It does not matter so much that Jefferson was not a great warrior, or that in mere executive routine there were others who could claim greater efficiency. Ideas are the real motive force of civilization. The things which any one man can do are insignificant indeed. The things which he can inspire may be truly

monumental, living through all the ages and growing in power as the years go by.

But even on the score of actual achievement, as has been amply shown in the foregoing, Jefferson towers above other American statesmen. But the thing upon which his fame rests is his democracy. He saw to it that monarchy, aristocracy and social caste had to fight for their foothold on American soil. He scotched militarism almost as soon as it showed its head. If any other public man in the history of America can show such wealth of achievement, such tremendous influence, such undying ideals, it would be interesting to have him pointed out.

Lincoln, next to Jefferson, probably the greatest of all great men in our Republic, had no such mean idea of Thomas Jefferson as has Theodore Roosevelt. To be sure, Lincoln was somewhat lacking in the aristocratic comprehension of our executive of to-day. He might not have known real greatness. Lincoln said:

"But soberly, it is no child's play to save the principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation. One would state with great confidence that he could convince any sane child that the simpler propositions of Euclid are true; but nevertheless he would fail utterly with one who should deny the definitions and the axioms. The principles of Jefferson are the definitions and axioms of free society. And yet they are denied and evaded with no small show of success. One dashinglly calls them 'glittering generalities.' Another bluntly

calls them 'self-evident lies.' Others insidiously argue that they apply to 'superior races.' These expressions differing in form are identical in object and effect, the supplanting the principles of free government and restoring those of classification, caste and legitimacy. They would delight a convocation of crowned heads, plotting against the people. They are the vanguard, the miners and sappers of returning despotism. We must repulse them or they will subjugate us. This is a world of compensation, and he who would be no slave must consent to have no slave. Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves, and under a just God cannot long retain it. All honor to Jefferson, the man who in the concrete struggle for national independence by a single people, had the coolness, forecast and capacity to introduce into a merely revolutionary document, an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times, and so to embalm it there, that to-day and in all coming days it shall be a rebuke and a stumbling block to the very harbingers of reappearing tyranny and oppression."

Letter to N. L. Pierce and others, by Abraham Lincoln, dated at Springfield, Ill., April 6, 1859.

CHAPTER XXV.

OUR "IGNORANT" PRESIDENT, ANDREW JACKSON.

Jefferson, as Roosevelt saw him, was our weakest President, and, taken all in all, our most despicable President. Jackson was but a trifle better. Ignorance rather than weakness was his fault. The gang of dolts and clodhoppers making up his followers only excited the pitying scorn of Theodore Roosevelt. Altogether incomprehensible to him was it that the American people should show such fatuous idiocy as to turn their backs upon the aristocratic propriety of the younger Adams and his followers, and give themselves over to Jackson's Goths and Vandals. Mr. Roosevelt says:

"The classes in which were to be found almost all of the learning, the talent, the business activity and the inherited wealth and refinement of the country, had hitherto contributed much to the body of its rulers." There was one hiatus in this altogether proper arrangement when Jefferson, and his "skillful political workers" carried the day by "marshalling that unwieldy and hitherto disunited host of voters who were inferior in intelligence to their fellows."

"The Jacksonian Democracy stood for revolt

against these rulers; its leaders, as well as their followers, all came from the mass of the people. . . . There was nothing to be said against the rulers of the day. . . . They were dismissed, not because the voters could truthfully allege any wrong-doing whatsoever against them, but solely because in their purely private and personal feelings and habits of life, they were supposed to differ from the mass of the people. This was such an outrageously absurd feeling that the very men who were actuated by it . . . were ashamed of it," etc.

Roosevelt saw with the shame, which every cultured American must feel, the replacing of aristocratic propriety by the mob rule of democracy. It did not matter in the least that the democratic masses were up in arms against the special interests which were then for the first time becoming an important factor in the nation. They were embodied in the National Bank and the protective tariff programme. The fact that mass democracy noisily revolted against what it looked upon as an insolent, centralizing aristocracy of "inherited wealth" and family, makes the uprising all the more objectionable to those who appreciate, as Roosevelt does, the importance of respectability in the "governing class." To Roosevelt it was all merely a question of personal wrong-doing. No institutional problems can be considered for a moment.

Democrats of to-day profess to see in Jackson's victories a militant protest against the

anti-democratic policies of Adams and Henry Clay. It was then, as they view it, that the masses gained full control at Washington. Then for the first time they became part of the government. A turbulent, swelling democratic deluge submerged the distinctive "governing class." Vitalizing was the sympathy which with Jackson throbbed and swelled into the very White House, for the masses and the government were at length one, to remain one until the days of Roosevelt's administration, when the country was again to know a proper "governing class" of rich, elegant, cultured gentlemen. Jefferson, as democrats see him, saved the democratic ideal; Jackson helped realize it.

"The two great Democratic victories," said Roosevelt, "had little in common, almost as little as had the two great leaders under whose auspices they were respectively won—and few men were ever more unlike than the scholarly, timid, shifty doctrinaire, who supplanted the Elder Adams, and the ignorant, headstrong and straight-forward soldier who was victor over the younger. The change was the deliberate choice of the great mass of the people, and that it was one for the worse was then and ever since the opinion of most thinking men," etc. (Who would not be thinking men if they did not agree with Roosevelt.)

As a conscientious historian, Roosevelt felt that he could not make too clear the inevitable connection between ignorance and democracy. In speaking of Jefferson's followers he put

strong emphasis upon this view. Again the same rule holds as to the Jackson horde:

"The Jacksonian Democracy held in its ranks the mass of ignorance of the country; besides, such an organization requires in order to do its most effective work, to have as its leader and *figurehead* a man who really has a great hold on the people at large, and yet can be managed by such politicians as possessed the requisite adroitness; and Jackson fulfilled both of these conditions." (Roosevelt's *Life of Benton*, page 95.)

That Andrew Jackson was a tool and a figurehead will probably be news to other historians. Roosevelt knew.

Jackson had glimpses of the light. Roosevelt says: "Jackson promptly vetoed the bill in a message to Congress which stated some truths forcibly and fearlessly, which developed some very queer constitutional and financial theories, and contained a number of absurdities, evidently put in not for the benefit of the Senate but to influence votes at the coming presidential election." (*Life of Benton*, page 127.)

Roosevelt knew Jackson's motives were mean. He had his doubts about the wisdom of Jackson's attack upon the politico-financial machine centered in the National Bank; however, Roosevelt hastens to say: "But the presidential power of veto is among the best features of our government."

Roosevelt sees the drollery of Benton's dictum that the President was the tribune of the

people. Benton, unfortunately, was not present to see Roosevelt, the President, turn the tables upon Roosevelt the historian when he appealed to "public opinion," whose delphic voice newspaper-toned is heard as an echo of the listener, to uphold him in riding roughshod over Congress. Such pleasantries are unavoidable in a President who "does things."

"If there ever was a wholly irrational state of mind," says Roosevelt, historian, "it was that in which the Jacksonians constantly kept themselves. Every canvass on the part of Jackson was full of sound, fury and excitement, of appeals to the passions, prejudices and feelings, but never to the reason of the hearers. A speech for him was usually a frantic denunciation of whoever or whatever opposed him, coupled with fulsome adulation of the old hero. . . . The cool judgment of the country was apt to be against them." (Life of Benton, 135.)

To appreciate fully the distress which must have been caused the modest, meek and retiring Mr. Roosevelt, one should study his own quiet political methods. His generosity to his opponents as instanced in his Review of Reviews article in September, 1896, and his speeches in 1896 and 1900. The man who toured New York with a band of Rough Riders must have been mortally offended with this "hero" business. Think of calling a tin soldier like Andrew Jackson a hero when no stronger compliment could be paid to a man with a military record like Theodore Roosevelt. How

excruciating must be sound, fury and excitement to the ears of Mr. Roosevelt!

"Van Buren faithfully served the mammon of unrighteousness, both in his own state and later at Washington; and he had his reward, for he advanced to the highest office in the gift of the nation. He had no reason to blame his own conduct for his final downfall; he got just as far along as he could possibly get; he succeeded because of, not in spite of, his moral shortcomings; if he had always governed his actions by a high moral standard he would probably never have been heard of."

"Jackson liked Van Buren because the latter had served him both personally and politically. Indeed Jackson was incapable of distinguishing between a political and a personal service." (Life of Benton, 181 and 187.)

President Roosevelt subjected himself to the same unkind remark when, for personal service, he gave a cabinet position to an excellent gentleman of Tyler-like littleness. This little man, they found out, Roosevelt advanced from one important post to another of more importance with no regard, apparently, to the efficient management of the positions, but rather with an eye to put the friend in line for lucrative employment in the financial world.

Persons who make remarks of that kind about President Roosevelt do not distinguish rightly. Jackson was just an ignorant politician with no high and holy ideals of civil service, while Roosevelt with fine moral discrimination has said repeatedly that public appointments

for personal or political considerations is just plain bribery.

Jackson might have loved Van Buren as Roosevelt loved his Mortons, Littauers, Loomises, Murrays. There is an interesting parallel between the methods of Andrew Jackson, as disclosed by historian Roosevelt, and the later methods of President Roosevelt. This line of resemblance between the ignorant democrat of the thirties and the scholarly statesman of the next century ran from methods of campaigning and of using public popularity, even to the rewarding of political and personal services with public place.

"The charge of extravagance was one of the least charges urged against the Jacksonian Democrats during the last days of their rule. While they had been in power, the character of the public service deteriorated frightfully, both as regards its efficiency and infinitely more as regards its honesty, and under Van Buren the amount of money taken by the public officers as compared with the amount handed into the treasury was greater than ever before or since. For this the Jacksonians were solely and absolutely responsible; they drove out the merit system of making appointments and introduced the spoils system in its place; and under the latter they chose a peculiarly dishonest and incapable set of officers whose sole recommendation was to be found in the trickery and low cunning which enabled them to manage ignorant voters who formed the backbone of the Jackson party. The states-

men of Democracy in later years forgot the good deeds of the Jacksonians; they lost their attachment to the Union, and abandoned their championship of hard money; but they never ceased to cling to the worst legacy their predecessors had left them. The engrafting of the spoils system upon our government was of all the results of Jacksonian rule, the one which was most permanent in its effects." (Life of Benton, page 231.)

We can appreciate better the extravagance of Jackson and Van Buren when we consider that Federal taxes during their administration varied from about eighty cents to one dollar and seventy-five cents per inhabitant during their terms of office. The larger figure is seven-eighths of the per-capita tax levied for the support of President Roosevelt's army and navy, and varied from about one-sixth to one-fourth of the present Federal taxation. The Federal government is doing now just about what it did in Jackson's time, with comparatively unimportant exceptions. It still administers justice, provides for the common defense and promotes the general welfare. To be sure, Jackson did not in his day have all the sapient bureaus making frantic efforts to consume wood pulp and keep the public printer busy. Men versed in "trickery and low cunning" do not seem to have had any such efficient method of making government expensive as the high-minded scholarly gentlemen of the present time who dote upon investigations, plethoric reports and red-tape.

Spoils must have loomed big in Jackson's time. Jackson had actually about one-half the number of persons in the whole executive services under him that Theodore Roosevelt has now in the class of presidential appointees. The salary fund of Jackson's executive department was something like three to four millions against Roosevelt's one hundred and twenty millions of dollars. Thirty men are appointed under Roosevelt outside of the classified service for one appointed under Andrew Jackson. Roosevelt's "bribery chest" has grown mightily in recent years. And the public service—it has grown a hundred fold since Jackson, while the population has increased about six fold!

Vulgar democrats, who have not the perspective of a scholar like Roosevelt, consider the merit system a matter of very small moment in Jackson's day compared with the problems he met and solved—compared with the mighty impetus which Jackson and his "ignorant and knavishly low followers" gave toward democracy. They feel, too, that not only were Jackson's tenets not forgotten by democracy, if one spells it with a small "d," but many of the men who rejoiced with the iron Tennessean followed the patient Kentuckian through the struggle which saved the Union. Historian Roosevelt knows better.

CHAPTER XXVI.

ROOSEVELT DISTRUSTS DEMOCRACY.

Alexander Hamilton frankly sneered at democratic republican government. To him it was "pork still, though with a change of sauce."

In this respect Roosevelt follows Hamilton. Both have indicated their objections to a democratic republic, and they are nearly identical. Roosevelt has not spoken so frankly as Hamilton, but from numerous references to its foundation principles he undoubtedly holds self-government to be a delusion. The masses cannot be given real power. They must have their government handed down to them by their betters.

"We have," said Gouverneur Morris, speaking of Jefferson's administration, "indeed a set of madmen in the administration, and they will do many foolish things."

Commenting upon this enlightened Morris opinion Roosevelt remarks:

"He took an **EQUALLY JUST** view of our political system, saying that in adopting a republican form of government he not only took it as a man does his wife, for better or for worse, but what few men do with their wives,

knowing all of its bad qualities." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 344.)

"In their state constitutions, the hard-working backwoods farmers showed a conservative spirit which would seem strange to the radical democracy of the western states to-day. . . . Representation was proportioned, not to the population at large, but to the citizens who paid taxes, for persons with some little property were still considered to be the rightful depositories of political power. . . . But it (the constitution) contained some unwise and unjust provisions." (Roosevelt's *Winning of the West*, vol. 4, page 170.)

Unfortunate was it indeed that these farmers did not hand down to posterity their method of identifying the persons who really did pay the taxes.

"Her" (Kentucky's) "people were saturated with the ideas of those doctrinaire politicians of whom Jefferson was the chief. . . . Their influence in America was wholly and distinctly evil; save that by a series of accidents they became the especial champions of the westward extension of the nation and in consequence were identified with a movement all essential to the nation's well-being." (*Winning of the West*, vol. 4, pages 176-177.)

"St. Clair's supporters struggled to keep the territory (Ohio) from statehood, and proposed to cut it down in size, nominally because they deemed the extent of the territory too great for governmental purposes, but really because they distrusted the people and did not wish

them to take the government into their own hands. . . ."

"They" (St. Clair in Ohio and Sargeant in Mississippi) "were both high-minded men, with SOUND IDEAS on government and policy" (their distrust of the people leaves no doubt of this), "though Sargeant was the abler of the two; but they were out of touch with the westerners." "They distrusted the frontier folk, and were bitterly doubted in turn." (Roosevelt's *Winning of the West*, vol. 4, pages 215 and 216.)

"The Jeffersonian Republican party did much that was evil, and it advocated governmental principles of such utter folly" (manhood suffrage and self-government) "that the party itself was obliged to abandon them." . . . It "only clung to them long enough to do lasting and serious damage to the country." (Roosevelt's *Winning of the West*, vol. 4, page 218.)

Jefferson and his followers believed that the Westerners should be permitted to govern themselves. Hamilton and his followers opposed it. The West followed Jefferson, much to the scandalization of good Historian Roosevelt.

"The essential point was that they" (the Westerners) "had been GIVEN the right of self government. . . . Whether wise or not, it was inevitable. . . . When Ohio became a state it adopted a very foolish constitution." (Roosevelt's *Winning of the West*, vol. 4, pages 218 and 219.)

Roosevelt regretted that the Federalists did not accept the inevitable "GIVE" self-government to the West, remain in power and modify the whole government to suit themselves.

"A narrow, uneducated, honest countryman, especially in the backwoods, then looked upon a lawyer with smothered envy and admiration, but always with jealousy, suspicion and dislike, much as does his successors to this day look upon bankers and railroad men." (Roosevelt's *Winning of the West*, vol. I, page 167.)

Mr. Roosevelt was commenting on the constitution drawn so awkwardly by the evil-minded, envious, jealous farmers of "Frankland," in which they excluded lawyers from office. It made an excellent occasion for a rebuke to their vicious successors who did not love with a sufficiently ardent passion the good and disinterested bankers and railway owners who so unselfishly look after the welfare of the farmers with an especial care.

"But it must be noted that the difficulty in the Hawaiian islands resulted not so much from the establishment of a popular assembly, as from an undue extension of the electoral franchise. . . . In the Philippines the franchise has been restricted and duly guarded." (Civil Government in the Philippines, page 95.)

Elective franchise in the Philippines has been so restricted as to shut out the great mass of the inhabitants.

"They" (the English of Cromwell's time).

"were not fit to govern themselves unaided; such fitness is not a god-given natural right, but comes to a race only through the slow growth of centuries and then only to those races which possess an immense reserve fund of strength, common sense and morality." (Roosevelt's *Life of Cromwell*, page 100.)

It is an interesting fact that savage communities, when not overgrown, have democratic self-government, as had the early Saxons and later the American Indians. Probably the principal reason why the English at that time were not able to assert self-government was Cromwell's army and Cromwell's ambition to be dictator.

"Free government is only for those nations that deserve it, and they lose all right to it by licentiousness no less than servility. . . . When people will not or cannot work together; when they permit groups of extremists to decline to accept anything which does not coincide with their own extreme views; or when they let power slip from their hands through sheer supine indifference, then they have themselves chiefly to blame if the power is grasped by stronger hands." (Roosevelt's *Life of Cromwell*, page 190.)

In other words, a licentious, corrupt, extravagant, brutal aristocracy, if it have the power, is fully justified in committing wholesale murder to sustain its glorious rule, but democracy must be quite perfect to justify its existence. Nicholas, because he could use "stronger hands," was fully justified in quench-

ing in blood the aspirations of the Russian masses for greater liberty. One can easily see the beauties of this doctrine. It is most comfortable—for tyrants.

"If a nation, whether free or unfree, loses capacity for self-government, loses the spirit of sober and orderly liberty, then it has no cause to complain of tyranny." (Roosevelt's *Life of Cromwell*, page 237.)

If! And always the tyrant is to decide when that capacity has been lost, and to enforce that decision even by an alien sword.

"He" (Benton) "was an enthusiastic believer in the extreme Jeffersonian doctrinaire views, as to the will of the majority being always right, and as to the moral perfection of the average voter. Like his fellow statesmen he failed to see the curious absurdity of supporting black slavery, and yet claiming universal suffrage for the whites as a divine right, not as a mere matter of expediency, resulting on the whole, better than any other method. He had not learned that a majority in a Democracy has no more right to tyrannize over a minority than under a different system, the latter would have to oppress the former; and that if there is a moral principle at stake, the saying that the voice of the people is the voice of God, may be quite as untrue and do quite as much mischief as the old theory of the divine right of kings." (Roosevelt's *Life of Benton*, page 122.)

"He" (Morris) "denounced with fierce scorn, that they so richly merit, the despicable

demagogues and witless fools who teach that in all crises the voice of the majority must be implicitly obeyed, and that public men have only to carry out its will. Sounder and truer doctrine was never uttered." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 344.)

"He" (Benton) "also speaks of Tyler having, when the Legislature of Virginia disapproved of a course which he wished to follow, resigned his seat in obedience to the democratic principle, which, according to his views, thus completely nullified the constitution providing for a six years term service in the Senate. In truth, Benton, like most other Jacksonian and Jeffersonian leaders, became both foolish and illogical when he began to talk of the muddle of vague abstractions which he knew collectively as the Democratic principle."

"Although not so bad as many of his school he had gradually worked himself up to the belief that it was almost impious to pay anything but servile heed to the will of the majority, and was quite unconscious that to surrender one's own manhood and judgment to the belief in the divine right of kings was only one degree more ignoble, and was not a shadow more logical and little more defensible, than it was blindly to deify the majority, not of the whole people, but merely a small fraction who happened to be a certain sex, to have reached a certain age, to belong to a certain race, and to fulfill some other conditions. In fact, there is no natural nor divine law in the

matter at all; how large a proportion of the population should be trusted with the control of the government is a question of expediency merely. . . . There is no more natural right why a white man over twenty-one should vote than there is why a negro woman under eighteen should not. Civil rights and personal freedom are not terms that necessarily imply the right to vote." (Roosevelt's *Life of Benton*, page 243.)

Far be it from us to argue the case with President Roosevelt, or to find fault with his political notions. We simply want to understand him so as to be able to place him.

If it were any other philosopher-historian, we should suspect him to have a strange partiality for the pastime of demolishing straw figures. Wonderful is the summary way in which he disposes of those mythical democrats who hold to these extraordinary but wholly fictitious doctrines. But several things must be understood before we join in Historian Roosevelt's righteous denunciation.

Neither Jefferson nor any intelligent follower has held that the will of the majority is always right.

They have no delusions as to the moral perfection of the average voter.

Jefferson did not support black slavery. No true follower of Jefferson now supports or has supported black slavery. Certainly, Benton did not on principle.

Neither Jefferson nor any follower contends that the majority has a right to TYRANNIZE

over anybody. They insisted upon a bill of rights in the constitution (omitted by Hamiltonians) to prevent the possibility of such tyranny. Jeffersonians merely contend that under the American system the majority has a right to control the government.

In the same way it is necessary to fix with some certainty Historian Roosevelt's meaning before we can apply the wisdom of his words upon the right of suffrage and the sanction of government. Stripped of his skillful but baffling qualifications, they seem to mean:

Human beings have no natural right to self-government.

The suffrage is not a right, but a privilege.

A king has as much right to rule as a majority of the free citizens of a country.

He is a witless fool who thinks the will of the majority in America should be obeyed.

It is the duty of an officer in this republic to ignore the wishes of those who elected him and use his brief lease of authority to carry out his own policies even contrary to the will of the electors.

This makes the issue between Theodore Roosevelt and Thomas Jefferson reasonably clear. Each American can decide for himself whether he takes the Hamilton-Roosevelt view, justifying king and dictator, or that of Jefferson, holding to popular sovereignty.

Historian Roosevelt leaves us perplexed with a harassing doubt as to the extent which persons not demagogues and witless fools

may ignore mandates of majorities in our republic.

Laws and constitutions in the United States and in every state and municipality provide that the will of the majority shall determine policies and fix laws. All officers are obliged to take oaths faithfully to uphold and execute laws as they find them. What officers, then, are to be a law unto themselves and to what extent? They, of course, are to judge whether the law is binding in any given case, but is the criterion to be their own sweet will? Or is this superiority to the law to be exercised only by certain grades of officers? Judges of the supreme court, governors, senators, and the President? Or is the President the only officer above the law? Unfortunately, Historian Roosevelt has left this matter in a distressing state of doubt and perplexity for persons without his great insight. It is so difficult, too, to apply his rule to the Republic. If one were discussing Turkey and the Sultan's powers, one could much more easily harmonize this idea of placing the wills of rulers above the law.

Historian Roosevelt makes the situation all the more difficult by an occasional passage like this smacking of the Jefferson taint:

"Cromwell's extreme admirers treat his impatience of delays and the shortcoming of ordinary constitutional and legal proceedings as signs of greatness. (Much as Roosevelt's extreme admirers treat the same qualities in him.) "It was just the reverse. In great

crises it may be necessary to overturn constitutions and disregard statutes, just as it may be necessary to establish a vigilance committee, or to take refuge in lynch law; but such a remedy is always dangerous, even when absolutely necessary, and the moment it becomes the habitual remedy, it is proof that society is going backward. Of this retrogression, the deeds of the strong man who sets himself above the law is partly the cause and partly the consequence, but they are always signs of decay." (Roosevelt's *Life of Cromwell*, page 54.)

"With his death" (Cromwell's death) "came the chaos he had foreseen, but he had not foreseen that it could be averted only by the substitution of some form of self-government by the people for the arbitrary rule of one man, however great and good that man might be. . . . For some months there was confusion worse confounded, and the whole nation turned toward Charles II and the Stuart kingship. . . ."

"For twenty-eight shameful years the Restoration lasted; years of misgovernment and persecution at home and weakness abroad; oppression of the weak and obsequious servility to the strong." (Roosevelt's *Life of Cromwell*, pages 232 and 233.)

In this case arbitrary government failed, it seems, to bring "orderly liberty," and the "strong hands" bettered it little.

"All men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights,

among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." These are what the "shifty doctrinaire," Thomas Jefferson, mentioned as self-evident truths—in that archaic document, the "Declaration of Independence."

We could not expect Theodore Roosevelt to accept such rubbish, but in deference to the deluded ones who accept Jefferson, it was unfortunate that Historian Roosevelt did not make plain baffling queries which naturally arise:

If all men are created equal (with equal civil rights) and endowed congenitally with the right to liberty, by what authority are some denied the civil right of suffrage which others enjoy? Who *gives* it to those to whom it is *given*? Who withholds it from those from whom it is withheld? By what authority is it *given*? By what authority is it withheld? How comes it that a man with civil rights equal only to my own can *give* me the suffrage or withhold it?

If he can withhold from me the right to a voice in making the laws which control, prescribe or circumscribe my actions, does he not control my liberty, my happiness, my life? Do I not cease to be a free man? Am I not his slave, subject to his will? If he has greater rights than mine, whence come they? If I am not a free man, who has authority to enslave me and whence? By divine authority? Show me the commission. By might? Ah, I may learn to understand that! That is the sanction of Nicholas' rule. Because of possession

of property. Then has property rights superior to the man, that it may endow a man possessing it with rights denied the man who has it not?

Children, it is true, cannot claim the suffrage under the Jeffersonian regime while children. Neither can they build and manage houses, rear other children, take husbands or wives, enter business, as a rule, or do a hundred other things which they do when grown. Nature brings them to their full rights with their full capabilities. But every child born into a nation of manhood suffrage has an equal right with every other human being born therein. He comes to the suffrage at the same time in life. Nature regulates that just as it does seed-time and harvest.

Kaisers and Emperors hold that one man is divinely commissioned to rule millions—show me the letters of authority from on high? No? Cannot? Are Kaiser and Czar men? Are they then if only men my equal? If born to rule over me, why?

There is this difference to the ordinary mortal between the rule of the majority and the divine right of kings: Common consent of the governed, deliberately given, has made majority rule the workable plan in democratic government. Majorities shift. Each man has a voice, though none a ruling voice. It has its sanction in applying the resultant of social opinion, will and aspirations to government. Neither majority nor king can have any sanction for wronging any man.

Thomas B. Reed, late speaker of the House of Representatives, said: "In the long run the average sense of the many is better for the many than the best sense of any one man." This is what Jeffersonians mean when they say that the voice of the people is the voice of God. To their superficial minds, it seems that so far as the Deity expresses himself in affairs of government, the voice of the people is the voice of God. In civilization advancing toward righteousness, it would seem to those less wise than Roosevelt that the will of the people must be in harmony with the will of God. Otherwise their trend would be down to destruction instead of upward to God; otherwise they would be a dying nation, headed for the abyss. So far as we can read His message, God has so ordered it, that this expression of the great aggregate intelligence and conscience of mankind is always finally more nearly right than that of any one man, however wise or good—even more nearly right than the will of a self-seeking, egotistical autocrat, claiming to rule by divine right.

The great human heart, though often temporarily deranged, finally beats true to the anthem of humanity for its all-permeating nerve strings are attuned to every impulse of the living mass. No palsied autocratic brain, insulated by the egoism of sycophantic laudation can take up the refrain. The collective human intellect arrives at its proper goal through trials and mistakes, perhaps; along by-ways, beckoned on by false prophets, past

reactionaries with face to the setting sun, the great world-intellect finally arrives—because it is so ordained, because Supreme Wisdom has so ordered it. And if any race is incapable of this accomplishment en masse, if it is not headed toward the right, no individual influence will avail to turn the torrent, leading to the abyss, any more than the autumn leaf upon its bosom can turn the mighty current of the Mississippi.

No man, however great he may regard himself, would seem fit for one moment to a place of power in a democratic republic, who has not an abiding faith in the trend of this collective conscience. It was this faith which enabled Thomas Jefferson to save for American generations to come the liberties won by the blood of the Revolution; that enabled Andrew Jackson to speed our free government on its way, and enabled Abraham Lincoln to preserve the heritage handed down to him.

They were not wise historians; just democrats in high place.

CHAPTER XXVII.

RICH AND POOR IN POLITICS AS ROOSEVELT SEES THEM.

During most of his political career, President Roosevelt held the opinion that the rich man has been a power for good in politics. Envy, class-hatred, jealousy, are the motives ascribed to the poorer classes who complain of adverse political or industrial conditions.

"We are certain to fail if we adopt the policy of the demagogue who raves against wealth, which is simply a form of combined thrift, foresight and intelligence; who would shut the door of opportunity against those whose energy we should especially foster, by penalizing the qualities which make for success." (Addresses, 95.)

"It is inevitable in a period of business prosperity that some men thrive more than others, and it is unfortunately also inevitable that when this is the case, some unwise people are sure to try to appeal to the envy and jealousy of those who succeed least." (Address, April, 1902.)

"The worst foe to the poor man is the labor leader, whether philanthropist or politician, who tries to teach him that he is the victim

of conspiracy and INJUSTICE." (American Ideals, 220.)

"Probably every man of power by that very fact is capable of doing damage to his neighbors, but we cannot afford to discourage the development of such men merely because it is possible they may use the power for wrong ends." (Addresses, 14.)

"It is probable the greatest wrong done by vast wealth" (vast private fortune) "is the harm that we of moderate means do ourselves when we let the vices of envy and hatred enter deep into our natures." (Addresses, 15.)

Roosevelt says some men fail to use their intellects decently, just as other men fail to use their wealth, "but such fact warrants us no more in attacking wealth than in attacking intellect."

"There is evil in these conditions, but you cannot destroy it unless you destroy the civilization they have brought about."

"It is a base and infamous thing for a man of means to act in a spirit of arrogant, brutal disregard toward his fellow who has less means, and it is no less infamous and no less base to act in a spirit of envy, rancor and hatred against the man of greater means merely because of his great means." (Address at Butte, May 27, 1903.)

"The line of demarcation we draw must always be on conduct, not on wealth."

"The outcome was equally fatal whether the country fell into the hands of a wealthy oligarchy which exploited the poor, or whether

it fell under the dominion of the turbulent mob that plundered the rich." (Address, Syracuse, Dec. 7, 1903.)

"It is probably true that the large majority of fortunes that now exist in this country have been amassed, not by injuring our people, but as an incident to conferring a great benefit upon the community. There is but the scantiest of justification for the outcry against men of wealth as such, and it ought to be unnecessary to state that any appeal which directly or indirectly leads to suspicion or hatred among ourselves . . . is an attack upon the fundamental properties of our citizenship. Our interests are at the bottom common. In the long run we go up or down together. Yet more and more it is evident that the state, and if necessary the nation, has to possess the right of supervision and control over the great corporations which are its creatures." (Address, Minneapolis, September, 1901.)

"We wish to face the facts, declining to have our vision blinded either by the folly of those who say there are no evils, or the still more dangerous folly of those who see, or make believe they see, nothing but evil in all the existing system, and who, if given their way, would destroy the evil by the simple process of bringing ruin and disaster to the entire country." (Address, Cincinnati, September 20, 1903.)

"A big corporation may be doing excellent work for the whole country, and you want, above all things, not to interfere with well-meaning corporations." (Addresses, 41.)

"In dealing with business interests, for the government to undertake by crude and ill-advised legislation to do what may turn out to be bad would be to incur the risk of such far-reaching disaster that it would be better to do nothing at all." (Message, December, 1901.)

"Much of the legislation directed at trusts would have been exceedingly mischievous, had it not been entirely ineffective." (Message, December, 1901.)

"There is a growing tendency to demand the illegitimate and unwise transfer to the government of much of the work that should be done by private persons singly or associated together." (Chamber of Commerce, New York, November, 1902.)

Panic, fear, envy, hatred, ignorance—"There can exist in the Republic no man more wicked, no man more dangerous to the people, than he who would arouse these feelings in the hope that they would redound to his political advantage." (Addresses, 64.)

"If in a spirit of sullen envy they" (the common people) "insist upon pulling down those who have profited most by years of fatness, they will bury themselves in a crash of common disaster." (Address, Providence, August, 1902.)

"An assault upon what Benton calls the money power is apt to be popular in a democratic republic, partly on account of the vague fear with which the poorer and more ignorant voters regard a powerful institution whose workings they do not understand, and partly

on account of the jealousy they feel toward those who are better off than themselves."

These are but samples. They might be multiplied indefinitely. One dominant note rings through all of Roosevelt's statements upon this theme. "There is but the scantiest justification for the outcry against men of wealth." "Corporations are more sinned against than sinning."

Opposite is the tone of the minor key. Complaining poor are actuated mostly by jealousy, ignorance, envy, they have no cause for complaint. If it were not for the wealthy the poor, who are usually poor through incompetence, would be ten times worse off.

The dominant note and minor chord were both in full evidence right up to the time that Roosevelt made his famous "muckrake" speech at the laying of the corner stone of the House of Representatives building about two years ago. That speech sounded the dominant note and the minor chord in higher keys than ever before. True, there was the Delphic utterance, the ambiguous statement, the cunning qualification, the good Lord, good devil, preachment. "Wealthy as such." "Crude and ill-advised" legislation. "Well-meaning corporations," etc. But we must assume that Roosevelt really intended to say something.

In a speech in New York City in February, 1904, Elihu Root said of Roosevelt: He is "the greatest conservative force for the protection of capital in the City of Washington in the years which have elapsed since President

McKinley's death. On more than one occasion he threatened extremists of his own party with the veto in protection of capital."

Roosevelt in turn complimented most highly the services of Root. We all know where Elihu Root stands. We know his relations with William C. Whitney, Thomas F. Ryan, and the rest. We know him as the most powerful and resourceful servant of "predatory wealth" that this country has ever known. We know, too, that Root knows Roosevelt and that his estimate of Roosevelt was correct.

When Roosevelt made his "muckrake speech" there was no doubt at all but the people of America had been aroused to a dangerous frame of mind by the indubitable evidence of widespread and general iniquity, political and industrial, on the part of wealthy men and powerful corporations. That had been made very plain by writers and state and city officers throughout the land. Such acts could no longer be apologized for. The man who would persist longer in denying them would find himself on the unpopular side—without popular support.

It was not necessary to change one's convictions, but it was necessary to seem by one's acts to change, or to lose one's popularity. One might plunge in, fight his way to the front, and direct the hunt, he could not stop it. In the face of these conditions we find a change coming over the spirit of Roosevelt's dreams. Muckraking, of course, was infamous, but there was a sort of high-minded criti-

cism by high-minded men which was most proper. Leave criticism to the President and you are sure of having the right sort. Other men cannot distinguish the genuine. I cannot tell its distinctive marks. The genuine is known by intuition, a sixth sense. The signature of Theodore Roosevelt upon the package is your guarantee.

Attacks, too, upon wealth and the wealthy, upon individuals and corporations, are most unholy, especially when made as the ordinary man makes them from motives of jealousy and envy. Leave the attacks to me. Nobody can question my motives. Presto and Roosevelt is at the head of the "muckrake" squad manipulating the slime and applying deodorizing agents, if not disinfectants. His plume waves in the van of the attacking column. It is his to choose the weapons and direct the manner of the attack. He is to choose the battlefield. There are to be no other attacks, no other commanders.

We are not of those who believe that Roosevelt wishes to do intentional wrong, least of all harm to his country. In but one emergency will Roosevelt stoop to evil deeds—when his own interests are at stake. But Roosevelt has no sympathy with the toiling masses. He does not understand them. Ordinary farmers, laborers, or artisans, have nothing in common with Theodore Roosevelt. He has profound contempt for the "trader," the "bourgeoisie." Roosevelt has no comprehension of institutional wrong. It is all a mere matter of holy

or unholy individual action. Neither can he realize that Theodore Roosevelt can possibly do an unrighteous or an unwise act. No act of Theodore Roosevelt can be unrighteous or unwise.

Roosevelt has no idea of the fierce intensity of the feelings beneath the jeans of the farmer and the mechanic. To him the problems that give vitality to populism, equity societies and trades' unions are a sealed book. Tools of demagogues consumed by jealousy is the way he diagnosis the case. Envy to him is the meanest of sentiments. It is a sort of spontaneous toadstool, growing out of the essential wickedness rank in human nature.

Insane would he pronounce the man who saw in envy the thunder blackness of the toiling, human mass which lives and suffers silently. Who recognized it as the gathering cloud from which leaps the quick lightning of retribution, whose bolts fall upon the robbers and oppressors of toil. Clouds gathered in the murk of wrong; lightnings stirring the whole human mass into revolt against its oppressors. Not beautiful; grim often; sometimes terrible; never mean. Symptoming a dull pain in the breasts of the inarticulate ones who feel rather than think. Of obscured mental vision, they cannot see except as a dread formless thing the cruel iron thrust into their souls, nor the force that makes the thrust. But they can feel the dull torturing pain. Symptomatic agony telegraphing to the brain the tragedy of the crushed limb; like the red signal of disaster

ahead, it means vital danger. Lurid and menacing are envy's clouds and from them flash lightnings of outraged feeling. There are those who see in all this a warning to political mariners. Continue to disregard these black lowerings, these low mutterings, these sullen flashes; interpret them as petty displays of shallow meanness; under the pressure of exploiting interest, steer the ship of state into their gathering storm—but beware the thunderbolt!

For a time even the miserable rabble will bear the heel of the oppressor, but every bruise leaves a rankling pain. Finally it grows into agony quite unbearable. Then the dumb, suffering thing will rise in its inarticulate wrath and crush its tormentor. Believers in democracy would give them freedom, voice, manhood. They would credit them with a heart like their own hearts, with souls like their own souls; would let them see whose heel has bruised them; help them to ward off the blow. Then they say, this sullen envy would burn itself to ashes. It would no longer have need of being.

Roosevelt takes a different method. He would have wise and great "rulers" give them what they ought to have, not what they aspire for. He would direct the force into other channels. That explains his putting himself at the head of the discontented mass and trying to control it to the safe harbor of centralization and bureaucracy.

Whether there are serious real wrongs or

not Roosevelt knows that among the masses just now there is an overmastering sense of wrong. Opposed and challenged, it would be irresistible. Guided, it may be used as an irresistible instrument to attain ends dear to President Roosevelt.

With supreme skill Roosevelt has put himself in control of this voiceless discontent. It wants something, but knows not what. Roosevelt will tell it. The masses will hearken to his voice. Congress, the courts, newspapers who disagree with Roosevelt, are enemies of this mass, trying to shield its despoilers. Hence the mass will overbear Congress, courts, newspapers. A strong central government, power by the President over corporate and great individual wealth, this is the one thing wanted. A bureau will be constructed, subject to the executive will, which will make everybody do right, will correct every abuse, solve every problem. Always will the executive be a beneficent autocrat; always will the bureau be his efficient instrument of holiness.

There are defects in the plan. Fine a monopolistic corporation and you fine its patrons. Imprison its officers and it has others ready to break the law, provided there is a motive for breaking it. You cannot drive carpet tacks with a pile-driver nor piles with a tack-hammer. Power adequate to deal with the great corporation is dangerous to the individual. Criminal courts will not do. The process can readily destroy democratic-republican govern-

ment. It can easily get every regulated corporation head-over-ears in politics, corrupting and destroying nation and state. But if one wants to solve the problem and save the Republic it must be done by throwing the responsibility back upon the people through state governments so as to build up a citizenship wise enough and strong enough to recognize the evil and destroy it.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

ROOSEVELT IN LITERATURE.

Theodore Roosevelt entered literature even before he became a law-maker and practical politician. History was his favorite field. In history Roosevelt found greatest interest in chronicles of strife and bloodshed. For Roosevelt is atavistic. His imagination harks back to the battlefield and the chase. He loves the blood-thrill of the prognathic, hairy, forest man whose rude stone axe or strong blunt spear laid lifeless wolf and bear. The hot breath of the death struggle is new wine to his spirit. Triumph comes to him with the ebb of the red life-tide, the final sigh of dissolution. School, college, parlor glossed over these traits. They were covered with an enamel of civilization. But when manhood came, the real Roosevelt shone through.

Choosing first a war theme, he wrote of the "Naval War of 1812." This was Roosevelt's initial literary effort, and curiously enough, it is thus far his best, although given to the public in his twenty-fourth year.

Later Roosevelt wrote more entertainingly. His style gained something in terseness and power of expression. But for scholarly re-

search and calm judgment, his first effort overshadows all others. Literary fledgling as he then was, he recognized his own limitations. Roosevelt knew he was not an "authority" upon anything. He wanted to become an "authority." The subject suited him. Roosevelt's judgment of military matters is superior to his judgment in any other field. His faults were kept in the background, mere embryotic mannerisms, later to become so obtrusive. That all-pervading ego denied itself. The dogmatism and intellectual arrogance of the later man appeared only in glimpses here and there.

There was promise in the work, albeit it was rambling and incoherent in plan. All the facts were there, laboriously assembled if not thoroughly digested. It showed industry and some historical discrimination.

Roosevelt has a mania for winning a reputation for judicial fairness, yet from the first he distrusted his own impartiality. Almost from the first he fell into the trick of showing disinterestedness by abusing or condemning both sides with apparent impartiality. British naval historians, no doubt very justly, came in for a share of his flagellation. Mr. James was too clever an author not to know; therefore Roosevelt stamped him with the badge of Ananias, which later was to become so popular among Roosevelt's friends. There was danger of this James condemnation giving the young historian a reputation for American bias. Therefore our wise young man said James was not a whit more blameworthy than

his American co-liars. His own inaccuracies and misstatements, of which there were many, were to be checked up later.

As the fledgling grew older his literary flight grew more deft and more erratic, but never stronger. There is a world of enlightenment in his books as to the real Roosevelt. The very subjects reflect the man. His autobiography thunders in every line. His bump-tious individuality is written profusely on every page. Such sublime subjectiveness is rare, even in ego-obsessed mortals.

Before becoming civil service commissioner he wrote his lives of Thomas H. Benton and Gouverneur Morris, as well as two of his essays on politics. All were written after Roosevelt had almost reached thirty years. Immaturity could have marred only the naval history, and this is of Roosevelt's books the most mature. Following close, in the civil service commissioner period, come his "Ranch Life and Hunting Trail," "History of New York," "Winning of the West," "Essays on Practical Politics," "Wilderness Hunter." Only a little later came "American Political Ideals," "Oliver Cromwell," "The Strenuous Life." Then the deluge of state papers, messages, etc.

Without a knowledge of his writings, one does not know Roosevelt nor appreciate his public acts. In his books the Roosevelt sea is sounded and charted. The longitude and latitude of every rock and shoal is set down. With these enlightening documents before one, one

might prick out Roosevelt's course to a nicety on the chart. His navigation code for the ship of state is there set down. We can see whither he would steer her.

"Winning of the West," like the *Lives of Benton and Morris*, has much of the Roosevelt political doctrine displayed. He writes himself down in all three as a Hamiltonian, an aristocrat, a doubter of democracy, a partisan of war, an advocate of conquest, a believer in great military power, physical size and expansion as elements of national greatness. Probably the most difficult of his books is his "Winning of the West." Throughout its pages is a dreary monotonous repetition of violent deeds, strung together in loose and chaotic order. It is more like the notes for a book than a book itself. But the style of the writing is attractive, and the stories not bad if one enjoys the recounting of violent deeds.

Critics say that most authors exhaust themselves in a single volume. It is emphatically true of Roosevelt. Each volume of his, so far as it contains abstract ideas, is a repetition of every other in scarcely different form. The faces of his thoughts become as familiar as old friends.

Roosevelt's state papers have become most bulky. He has a mania for messages to the legislative branch, which are really appeals to the country. Each delivery is longer than the last. His annual messages to Congress have become annual cyclopedias of universal knowledge. Instead of sharp, clear recommenda-

tions as to governmental needs and governmental policies, they are series of essays upon history, politics, science, theology, sociology, political economy and government, put forward in a spirit of aggressive boastfulness and self-glorification. Here and there, too, is interspersed a sermon. These state papers, like all of the writing of Roosevelt since he became a public figure, are colored throughout with the necessity of defending his own course in this and that situation.

Except in matters of denunciation, plain statement is lacking. Coming from a less distinguished citizen, the matter would be characterized as platitudinous or Delphic: good Lord, good devil, preachments; bolstered up by vociferous fulminations. But in great men such statements are things of supernal wisdom.

CHAPTER XXIX.

ROOSEVELT, WAR AND PEACE.

No president in the history of the country has so assiduously cultivated the war spirit as Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt does not look upon war as a necessary evil, but a thing to be desired for itself as a promoter of human virtue. The militant dominating man with blood lust is to him the only true man.

"We must not forget that an ignoble peace is worse than any war," said Roosevelt. Peace must be "righteous" to justify itself. If "ignoble" it is worse than an ignoble war.

That was why Theodore Roosevelt wanted war with Spain and boasted of having helped to bring it about. For that reason the silent service of the Naval bureau did not satisfy him. He wanted the gory field because: "I wanted to count for one in the fight for order and for the republic; if the crisis should come, I wanted to take a man's stand; that was why."

Successfully to carry on the trade of war, we must have a great army of regular soldiers and a big navy:

"An efficient navy of adequate size is not only the best guarantee of peace, but it is always the surest means of seeing that if war

does come, the result will be honorable to our good name and favorable to our national interests."

"Remember, the Monroe doctrine will be respected as long as we have an efficient navy and not much longer." (Speech at Proctor, Vt.)

The Monroe doctrine was enunciated December, 1823. It has been respected since that time. The United States has had a strong navy at the time of the Civil War only. It had scarcely any navy when Cleveland gave his famous ultimatum to England. But let that pass.

Believing in a strong military establishment, Roosevelt wants regular troops. He has no patience with militia. They cannot bring "honor to the country on foreign fields."

"They" (colonists of revolutionary times) "had the same illogical fear of the executive that demagogues to-day profess to have of a standing army."

"In accordance with their curiously foolish theories, the democrats persisted in relying upon the weakest of all reeds, the militia, who promptly ran away every time they faced a foe in the open. This applied to all, whether Eastern or Western or Southern; the men of the Eastern states in 1812-13 did as badly as, and no worse than, the Virginians in 1814. Indeed, one of the good results of the war was that it did away forever with all reliance on the old-time militia, the most expensive and inefficient species of soldiers that could be in-

vented." (Roosevelt's *Life of Morris*, page 349.)

Here is some history with which Roosevelt supports his theory:

"On the Niagara frontier an honest and estimable old gentleman and worthy citizen, who knew nothing about military matters, General Van Rensselaer, tried to cross over and attack the British at Queenstown." (Roosevelt's *Naval War of 1812*, page 13.)

This "old gentleman" was at that time thirty-eight years of age, having entered military life at eighteen, and having seen much hard fighting in which he was twice severely wounded.

"The small British army marched at will through Virginia and Maryland, burned Washington, and finally retreated from before Baltimore and embarked to take part in the expedition before New Orleans. Twice, at Bladensburg and North Point, it came in contact with superior numbers of militia in fairly good position. In each case the result was the same. After some preliminary skirmishing, maneuvering and volley-firing the British charged with bayonets. The rawest regiments among the militia then broke at once. Others kept pretty steady, pouring in a destructive fire until the regulars came close up to them, when they also fled. . . . At North Point, however, the militia—being more experienced—behaved better than at Bladensburg." (Naval War of 1812, preface.)

At Bladensburg five thousand British mil-

itia, utterly worn out by the heat, frightened into panic double their number of American militia, well posted." (Naval War.)

Lossing's encyclopedia has General Winder with seven thousand American militia, only nine hundred of whom were enlisted men, giving stubborn battle to five thousand or more British regulars. The Americans fled from their position finally. While they lost twenty-six killed and fifty wounded, the British lost five hundred men.

At North Point two thousand three hundred American militiamen, battling with General Ross and five thousand British regulars, beat them off with a loss to the British of their general and two hundred and ninety men.

Roosevelt has Lundy's Lane a battle between nearly equal forces of Americans and British, in which the British were victorious. Other historians have the Americans outnumbered nearly two to one and the British loss the greater.

Plattsburg furnishes an instance where a very inferior force of militia defeated an army of regulars with great slaughter. New Orleans was a striking instance of the superiority of militia fighting. Roosevelt knew of both. Yet he wrote:

"I originally intended to write a companion volume to this which should deal with the operations on land. But a short examination showed that these operations were hardly worth serious study. . . . British regulars, trained in many wars, thrashed the raw re-

cruits opposed to them wherever they had anything like a fair chance. It is not cheerful reading for an American nor yet of interest to the military student." (Naval War, of 1812, page 22.)

Roosevelt was fully conversant with Bunker Hill, King's Mountain, New Orleans, and a dozen smaller engagements of like result when he made such an extraordinary statement as the above.

Non-military persons hardly understand Roosevelt's distinction between militia and the volunteer soldiers who fought the Civil War. Both are citizen soldiers of exactly the same class. It takes experience to develop high efficiency in either. Every American war has been fought by citizen soldiers. None has been lost. No nation can show a history of more gallant fighting. If the cause is good, no fault can be found with citizen soldiery.

Militia or other citizen soldiery, however, do not readily become human engines of murder. They are still men in sympathy with the rank and file of their countrymen. Such men cannot be relied upon by a hero on horseback to obey like automatons any order which he may give, even to turning their guns upon their own brothers. They have not been brought under the control of military hypnotism. They cannot be made Hessians or Cossacks. Citizen soldiers will not destroy their country's liberties. They cannot be relied upon to destroy the liberties of other peoples. Your true

imperialist loves not the militia, or the citizen soldier.

Curiously enough, Theodore Roosevelt and his Rough Riders, who were irregular soldiers, did most all of the fighting before Santiago, according to Roosevelt's account. Switzerland, the strongest military power in the world for its population, in defensive warfare, relies entirely upon citizen soldiery.

Aside from the development of mechanical accessories, which goes on outside of, as well as within the army, the profession of fighting is easily learned. Six months in the field makes a veteran. Each great war trains its own fighting men. There is no other way.

Americans who love liberty will no more give over their protection of their fundamental rights to a hireling soldiery than they will surrender their salvation into the hands of a priestly class or their government to a governing caste. Each man in the last analysis must defend himself and his own, just as he must look after his government or the salvation of his soul.

But those who look forward to imperialism must place their trust in regular soldiers. "It is the great expanding peoples which bequeath to future ages the great memories and material results of their achievement." . . . With this ideal Roosevelt realizes that trained legions must be provided. The citizen will not leave home to drown in blood the liberties of other peoples.

"The troops and police were thoroughly

armed and attacked the rioters with a wholesome desire to do them harm. . . . Two millions of property had been destroyed and many valuable lives lost, but over 1,200 rioters were slain, an admirable object lesson to the remainder."

"So-called upper classes developed along the lines of a wealthy and timid bourgeoisie type, measuring everything by a mercantile standard (a peculiarly debasing one if taken wholly by itself), and submitting to be ruled in local affairs by low, foreign mobs, and in national matters by their arrogant southern kinsmen. The military spirit of these last certainly stood them in good stead in the Civil War. The world has never seen better soldiers than those who followed Lee; and their leader will undoubtedly rank as without any exception the very greatest of the great captains that the English-speaking peoples have brought forth, and this, although the last and chief of his antagonists, may himself claim to stand as the full equal of Marlboro and Wellington." (*Life of Benton*, page 38.)

Roosevelt shows clever judgment of soldierly merit. But the fact remains that the Southern chivalry was overborne, and Lee's great military genius was without avail. "Poor whites" made up the bulk of Lee's fighting men. Frequently Roosevelt speaks of nations of great breeders and great fighters being the ruling nations of the earth.

To those who have followed current events it is unnecessary to multiply quotations indi-

cating that war spirit is a dominant note in the character of Theodore Roosevelt. His first book treated of war. War narrative makes up a large part of all his other books. He fought as eagerly as he had studied and written of war. His policy as President has been punctuated with military display. All the dramatic arts of the most dramatic of presidents have been exercised to arouse in the nation a spirit of war.

Military appropriations in a few years have increased fourfold. Exclusive of pensions, the war budget approximates \$200,000,000 a year, more than the whole cost of government before the Civil War. Each inhabitant now bears a military burden one-sixth greater than all government burdens at the time of Van Buren.

Programmes of navy-building the largest in the history of the nation are going forward. Historical celebrations are made military and naval pageants. This country is now witnessing a naval pageant such as the world has seldom seen, costing more than can be earned in a year by the agricultural workers of such a state as Nebraska. Already we have sunk close to a billion dollars in a new navy, and it is a question whether it would mean strength and security or weakness and disgrace if war were now to come. This great, costly, naval pageant has been planned especially to stimulate the people to the expenditure of other hundreds of millions in fighting ships. Armor plate men are reaping a golden harvest, selling

armor to the government at ten times its cost, turning the sweat and blood of our productive workers into profits for over-rich steel monopolists.

Yet no great continental power in history has been saved from defeat in any war by the prowess of its navy, nor has the prowess of its navy given it victory. Certainly in a vital military contest no foreign nation could destroy us with its navy. Yet we are hanging more ships like millstones around the nation's neck.

Sufficient money has been spent in those useless ships which, please the Lord, will go to the junk pile before they fire a hostile shot, to gridiron the country north and south, east and west, with trunk railway lines, and cover the important seas with government mail and commercial steamships. Governments may claim the power to kill, never to engage in the transportation business. The money sunk in our fleet would have reclaimed the desert places in our land, planted trees on the barren rocky slopes. But that would be making homes for the happiness of man, not preparing to destroy him. We must necessarily sacrifice our hundreds of millions to the Moloch of war while the nation dances before him in paleolithic devil worship.

Commercialism, President Roosevelt finds, as we have seen, the alternative of war. As history tells the story war and commercialism in its most sinister sense go hand in hand. Greatest war nations have finally sunk under

plutocracy's load. In our country the fighting spirit goes hand in hand with the spirit of lawless wealth. The most primitive, violent and militant communities have the lowest civic spirit, the most offensively cruel displays of greed and business unrighteousness. Commercialism is the handmaiden of war. Following every great contest of blood and iron since the world began, there has been a loosening of moral restraint. Men have committed deeds that they would not think of committing before. Speculation, cruel exploitation, extravagance, harlotry, corruption, have stalked boldly in the track of every army since the world began.

The "golden age" of commercialism coincides with the age of maximum military strength. Predatory instincts of the commercialized man find their counterparts in the savagery of military impulse. The rough border where adventurous men fight their way becomes soon the best soil for business greed and political corruption.

And why not? War is the rolling back of the scroll of civilization to the day of the cannibal forebear, who, with knashing teeth, fell upon his fellow, butchered and devoured him and carried away his female to slavery. Says Gen. W. T. Sherman:

"When I had my headquarters in a house it began to burn before I fairly got out of it. The truth is, human nature is human nature. You take the best lot of young men, all church members, if you please, and put them into an

army and let them invade the enemy's country and live on it for any length of time, and they will gradually lose all self-restraint to a degree beyond the control of discipline. It always has been and always will be so."

Carl Schurz quotes Sherman and adds:

"The sayings of such a man as General Sherman upon the effects of war upon the morals of soldiers themselves may be commended to the sober contemplation of those who so glibly speak of war as a great moral agency—how war kindles in the popular breast the noblest instincts and emotions of human nature; how it lifts a people above the mean selfishness of everyday life; how it stops the growth of groveling materialism which is too apt to develop into a dominant tendency in a long period of peace; how it turns the ambitions of men into the channels of generous enthusiasm and lofty aspirations; how it is such a fire bath from which human society emerges, cleaned of its dross, of low propensities, refined in its best energies and more earnest than ever in devoted pursuit of its higher ideals."

But such men as Sherman and Schurz cannot be supposed to know war as Roosevelt knows it.

As if to emphasize his war tendencies, Roosevelt attacks peace advocates:

"A class of professional non-combatants is as hurtful to the real healthy growth of a nation as a class of fire-eaters, for a weakness or folly nationally is as bad as a vice, or worse,

and in the long run a Quaker may be quite as undesirable a citizen as a duelist. No man not willing to bear arms and to fight for his rights can give a good reason why he should be entitled to the privilege of living in a free community." (Life of Benton, page 37.)

"It is a bitter and unanswerable commentary on the workings of a non-resistant creed when reduced to practice, that such outrages and massacres as these committed on these helpless Indians, were more numerous and flagrant in the colony the Quakers governed than in any others; the vaunted policy of peace which forbade them to play a true man's part, and put down wrong-doing, caused the utmost possible evil to fall on white men and red. An avowed policy of force and fraud carried out in the most cynical manner could hardly have worked more terrible injustice. Their system was a direct incentive to crime and wrong-doing between the races. . . . No other colony made such futile, contemptible efforts to deal with the Indians; no other colony showed such supine selfishness." (I, Winning of the West, 98.)

It is a shame that some Roman fighting man with real red blood did not rewrite the Sermon on the Mount, so that the infamous creed of non-resistance, of peace on earth, good will to men, could not have reached the world and caused such mischief as Roosevelt here portrays. Strange it is that the Preacher of this very creed should be worshipped as divine by all the nations of the west and that even

Roosevelt should preach and pray in a temple devoted to His worship. Strange it is that this creed should grow in strength and spread over the earth for two thousand years as a dominant civilizing force, while the men ready to "play a man's part," the legions of imperial Rome are but unsubstantial shades. Rome's hosts have vanished like guilty shadows from Britain, and Spain, and Gaul, from the land of the Goth, the Frank, the Jew, the Moor. Her valiant short sword, her thews and sinews hardened as steel by lanista and arena have passed like the snowflake before the breath of spring. But the soft unmanly ideal of this One of the non-resistant creed, has spread in conquering power over all these lands, claiming them as its own. O arise, ye shades of fighting, dominating, expanding Rome, and tell us in your shame, how such a weakling with such an unmanly creed could conquer you all. Tell us why your Coliseum has crumbled in spite of your strength; why your walls are overgrown, your palaces in ruin, your scholars, your heroes, your fighting men, are almost forgotten, crowded out of men's memories by the soft words of this weakling creed!

Come forth ye hairy ape like forms of paleolithic times and tell us how your fierce strength, your readiness to "play a true man's part" has not saved you from extinction!

"Sprawling, huge and hairy on the blood-smeared reeking stones

"Onkh, the paleolithic man, was gnawing a foeman's bones,

"Snarling thus to the strangers—his mind in a righteous maze:

"'Ouff, ye smoothers of axes! I bide by the good old ways.'

"What, not eat my captives? Kill them and let them lie?

"And waste the good meat I fought for! Ye weakling fools! Not I.

"Besides, did not great Ingu, the Doer-of-Deeds-in-the-Air,

"Show me their trail in the forest and guide my feet to the lair?

"He made me fiercer than they were; he sharpened my flint for the kill;

"And if I slay them and eat them, am I not doing his will?

"Ouff! Ye would scorn high Ingu? What folly is this ye speak!

"As long as the belly knows hunger, the strong man will eat the weak."

"And loud snarled Onkh at his feasting on the blood-red reeking stones,

"Lusty and huge and hairy, gnawing a foe-man's bones."

* * * * *

"Gone are these tear-stained ages of ceaseless, merciless strife;

"Slow wakes the world from the night of blood to the dawn of love and life;

"But still some sodden sleeper from the promised morning turns;

"Some fiend-bewildered, foolish heart for the
ghastly vision yearns.

"And lips that beg for His mercy, by martyr
pangs that He bore,

"Yet plead the will of the Prince of Peace for
the hell that men call war.

"Oh, thou divine Compassion—whose mercies
never cease—

"Spirit, however men name Thee, of Goodness
and Love and Peace—

"Through slow unwearied eons, Thy tender
unwearied art

"Has loosed the ape from Thy creature's form
and the tiger from his heart.

"'Tis only Thy measureless Tenderness can
pardon that bloody dream.

"May the pity that led us from beasthood and
set our face to the light

"Still bide till the love of our brother man
shall teach us Thy will aright!"

(George Meason Whittier in the Independent.)

CHAPTER XXX.

WHAT ROOSEVELT HAS DONE FOR WASHINGTON SOCIETY.

Society writers tell us that individualism characterizes the present regime in the White House. Mrs. Roosevelt, young Archibald, and little Quentin contribute to this happy attribute.

Washington social ethics are pronounced unique. In fuss and feathers the White House cannot compare with the European court. But its social life is tremendously important. Through it a grave responsibility rests upon the mistress of the mansion. She must be a woman of rare dignity and tact.

Some of the Rooseveltian innovations have stirred social Washington to its depths. The abolition of the Saturday afternoon receptions to the common people, otherwise the "hoi polloi," or the "unwashed mob," aroused rebellious criticism. It was the one and only time when any person of sound mind could pay homage to Mrs. President and go home sublimely happy or critically severe. This was woman's day at the White House. Mrs. Cleveland, Mrs. Harrison and, even the invalid, Mrs. McKinley, followed the precedent.

It had become the unwritten but still the binding social law of all Washington. Mrs. Roosevelt, as her worthy lord would have done, smashed the precedent. Social touch with "unwashed mobs" was not for her. Her subjects were pleasanter companions outside the White House fence, where they had the cat's privilege of looking at the king—and queen, too.

There have been other changes. Casual and undistinguished guests go around the back way when they visit the show rooms of the White House. "Ye olden times," when everybody except the butcher and the baker entered at the main entrance, are forgotten as a dream of social indiscriminateness. Mr. President and his family were given more privacy. They put themselves in position better to choose their own social set. Yet there is much criticism of this much-needed change.

The exclusion of the general public from the main building has enabled the Roosevelts to enjoy a great measure of privacy. Police clear the driveways when the presidential carriage approaches. "The King! the King!" No, it is not announced in this way. Bated breathing on the part of the officers, grave abjurations in low tones of persons unhappily on the walks, solemn warnings and shaking of heads, announce the comings and goings of the great.

Where and when the presidential family is going is kept a profound secret. Mrs. Roosevelt rides frequently with the President. They drive to the suburbs of the city, where an attendant has their magnificent saddle horses

awaiting them. They are off, secret service men on bicycles following in their wake. A merry chase these wheelmen have, for the President rides like mad and Mrs. Roosevelt sees to it that she is not left behind. Women of the diplomatic set take up the fad, and are seen in National Park in great numbers on pleasant afternoons.

Roosevelt's family for many generations was identified with McAllister's New York "Four Hundred." With Roosevelt in the President's chair, the "Four Hundred" came to Washington and the Capital assumed a gayety and propriety unknown to it before. One after another, members of the wealthy, leisure class are coming to Washington to build their winter homes and enjoy or ornament its high society. Ground is being sold at fancy prices and mansions worth hundreds of thousands, or even millions, are being constructed. The courtly set of Washington have again come to their own. Inherited wealth and leisure hold sway.

The trend of travel has been westward and northwestward to historic old Georgetown and the Rock Creek district. Sheridan circle will be famous for millionaires' homes long after once exclusive Dupont circle has been known as the transfer spot from Georgetown to Washington Heights.

Mrs. Sheridan, the widow of "Little Phil," was the pioneer in this locality. Now she is scheduled to have for neighbors the George W. Vanderbilts, Harry Lehrs, Frank O. Low-

dens, Mrs. George M. Pullman, Mrs. Marshall Field, Mrs. Hennen Jennings, diamond king of South Africa; Frederick H. Keep, lumber rich; Mme. Hauge, Mrs. Albert Barney, and Representative Edgar Ellis of Kansas City.

John Hays Hammond, of New Jersey and South Africa, has begun the construction of a "palazzo" with spacious grounds, to eclipse everything in that line of which Washington can boast.

Mrs. Perry Belmont enthusiastically approves Washington society. Hers is to be a million-dollar French chateau in the heart of the residential district. Thomas Nelson Page, the Huidekopers, Mrs. Sampson, widow of the late rear admiral; Dr. Duncan McKim and the Glovers are to be neighbors. All these plethoric millions and these oceans of elegant leisure are giving Washington society a different atmosphere. The Roosevelts gave the initial impulse.

What Washington society has lost in its stately simplicity, it is said to have gained in brilliancy—the brilliant display of millions. But a few years ago but two ambassadors (personal representatives of rulers) graced the diplomatic corps—the British and the French. Now there are nine, with prospects of more. This gives a "brilliancy" (gold lace brilliancy) to the social event in official life never dreamed of under Madison, Lincoln, or Cleveland. Up to Roosevelt's administration it was possible for the humblest citizen, his wife and daughter, to shake the hand of the chief executive

and be presented to his wife, now it is impossible unless the meeting is arranged by an influential official or a personal friend of the President.

"Social secretaries" have become a necessity for persons who would shine in Washington society. Relatives had attended to that for Mrs. Grant, Mrs. Hayes, Mrs. Cleveland, Mrs. Harrison and Mrs. McKinley. Mrs. Cleveland, a charming bride in the White House, attracted much social attention.

Although her husband was no stranger to Washington, Mrs. Roosevelt came to the White House with but slight knowledge of Washington official society. While her husband had been climbing she was rearing a large family. First a clerk from the War Department was detailed. Then Congress employed for her a "social secretary." A dashing and self-reliant young woman now arranges the details of Mrs. Roosevelt's social activities. Boldness of spirit, tact, sophistication, are the desired attributes of this social chamberlain. Socially, Washington is governed by social secretaries, just as Europe is governed by prime ministers.

Mrs. Roosevelt has encouraged a greater variety of entertainments at the White House. They have a different flavor from those of the years gone by. Gold lace is more in evidence, and medals, and epaulets. Brilliant young subalterns, fresh from West Point or Annapolis, are more sought after than grave senators who have done life service for their coun-

try. There is a strong military flavor to every gathering.

Afternoon and evening musicales have been made a feature at the White House. Eminent and showy men and women, birds of brain, or of gaudy plumage, listen. Garden parties are given in the historic grounds south of the executive mansion—at least one such brilliant gathering each summer. Following the precedent of Mrs. James Robert McKee, daughter of Benjamin Harrison, Mrs. Roosevelt has entertained the young friends of Miss Alice Roosevelt, now Mrs. Longworth, with dances in the East Room of the White House. Her own daughter, Miss Ethel, will next season be a social belle with still younger, if not more, brilliant friends. Thus far, informal little dinners have been the events in honor of Miss Ethel, after which the young girls and boys dance away the hours in the room which looked so impossible in the early days to Abigail Adams that it became useful for drying clothes in the winter season.

Mrs. Roosevelt has made her social duties less exacting than those of her immediate predecessors. The social secretary serves as a barrier against the miscellaneous throng. Mrs. Roosevelt has shrunk into a charmed circle of highest official people and social favorites, a select elite among elite. Cabinet and legislative circles have followed her in making their weekly receptions more exclusive. Before they had learned propriety from her the host-

ess of each particular circle had large public levees on certain days of the week, when anyone and everyone was received, the hostess having a group of attractive and prominent women to assist. A heavily-loaded table in the dining room was done full justice to by hosts of callers. It was costly, but considered an excellent way of keeping in touch with a great man's constituents.

The Roosevelts have changed all this. A few days "at home" are announced in the newspapers, but the viands and their hot cheer are totally lacking. Sometimes there is a dainty tea table. The circle of callers is smaller and more select.

Cabinet women wished to retain their tea tables, but this was vigorously opposed by Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Root, who took her part. Mrs. Leslie M. Shaw refused to be dictated to. Other wives of cabinet members gracefully submitted.

President Roosevelt abolished the evening reception to the general public, given since the earliest history of the White House by the President and his wife. This public reception had always closed the series of evening levees. There was a storm, but the Roosevelts declined to meet the public indiscriminately. Invitation lists for the four large evening functions have been curtailed these last five years. In consequence there is greater comfort for those fortunate enough to be bidden. Only on New Year's day has the general public an op-

portunity to get a peep at the President and his cabinet. After their betters have been received, the President remains in the blue room and receives a certain number of men and women not expected. By the time the plain people have reached the blue room, Mrs. Roosevelt and the women of the cabinet have escaped up stairs. Ordinary people can get their comfort from Mrs. Roosevelt's photograph.

In the White House, Roosevelt lives on a scale more magnificent than most presidents. He has an extraordinarily good stable. All sorts of entertainment are open to him. Roosevelt has a contingent travelling fund of \$25,000. Before the railway agitation became acute, and irresponsible critics called attention to the fact, Roosevelt travelled on special trains and fared sumptuously at the expense of the railways. Anti-pass legislation made this look queer and it was discontinued.

Uncle Sam's treasury provides lavishly for the servants, fittings, furnishings, and incidentals of the White House. Unsophisticated persons wonder how the President can live in splendor on even \$50,000. He does not. His expenses are more nearly \$200,000 a year—or at least the presidential menage costs the government that amount including the President's salary. President Roosevelt has greatly increased these expenses. During both terms he has disbursed for personal and White House matters something like \$2,000,000 in government money.

Social caste has been accentuated in the White House. Not since Washington has the presidential office, on its social side, resembled so strongly the kingly court.

CHAPTER XXXI.

A BIT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY.

Roosevelt when a member of the legislature of New York, about the end of his last session of service, gave a sketch of himself. Here are the things he thought worth mentioning:

"I was born in New York October 27, 1858; my father of old Dutch Knickerbocker stock; my mother was a Georgian, descended from the revolutionary Governor Bullock. I graduated at Harvard in 1880; in college I did fairly in my studies, taking honors in natural history and political economy;* and was very fond of sparring, being champion light weight at one time.† Have published sundry papers on ornithology, either on my trips to the north woods or around my summer home on the wooded broken slope of northern Long Island. I published also a 'History of the Naval War of 1812,' with an account of the Battle of New Orleans, which is a textbook in several colleges, and has gone through three editions. I married Miss Alice Lee of Boston on leaving

*C. Guild, Jr., in Harvard Grad. Magazine, 10-177.

†C. Guild, Jr. Same.

college in 1880. My wife and mother died in February, 1884. I have a little daughter living.

"I am very fond of both horse and rifle, and spend my summers either on the great plains after buffalo and antelope, or in the northern woods after deer and caribou. Am connected with several charitable organizations, such as the Children's Aid Society, Orthopædic Hospital, National Prison Association, and others, in which my father took a leading part.

"I was elected to the assembly from the 21st dist. of New York in the autumn of 1881; in 1882 I served on the committee on cities. My chief work was endeavoring to get Judge Westbrook impeached on the ground of malfeasance in office and collusion with Jay Gould in connection with railroad litigation.

"Was re-elected, and in 1883, when the Republicans were in a minority, was their candidate for speaker, thus becoming their titular leader on the floor. My main speech was on the report of the democratic committee giving Sprague, Republican, the seat wrongly held by Blair, Democrat, which report was reversed by the action of the Democratic House. Was again re-elected. The Republicans were in the majority; was a candidate for the speakership, and in the caucus received thirty votes to the forty-two received by the successful candidate, Mr. Sheard, who was backed both by the half-breeds who followed Senator Miller and the Stalwarts of President Arthur's train. This winter my main work has been pushing the

municipal reform bills for New York City, in connection with which I have conducted a series of investigations into its various departments. Most of my bills have been passed and signed.

"In the primaries before the Utica convention I led the independents in my district, who for the first time in the history of New York City politics won against the machine men, though the latter were backed up by all the Federal and municipal patronage. At Utica I led the Edmunds men who held the balance of power between the followers of Blaine and of Arthur; we used our position to such good effect as to procure the election of all four delegates for Edmunds' men, though we were numerically not over seventy strong, barely a seventh of the total number of men at the convention. Am fairly well off. My recreations are: reading, riding (sailing?) and shooting."

This modest summary throws a flood of light upon the Roosevelt character. He emphasizes his prowess with rifle and fist. Hunting, riding and sparring are some of his notable achievements. He was once light weight champion, he says.

Upon two points he differs from his college biographers. They give him credit for success in but one branch in college and for honorable mention in but one branch—natural history.* It is distinctly stated that he failed to attain the light weight championship of the school.*

*C. Guild, Jr. Same.

In the legislature, the things which he calls attention to are the spectacular things, the abortive Westbrook impeachment; the contest; the investigation. In each case the sketch is used to strike at his opponents upon these occasions. Then there is the modest mention of what he did in connection with the speakership against a strong combination. More remarkable was his prowess in winning for Edmunds against overwhelming odds. No wonder Roosevelt should "point with pride."

CHAPTER XXXII.

SIDELIGHTS UPON ROOSEVELT'S PUBLIC ACTS AND
POLITICAL TENETS.

TARIFF.

For four years Theodore Roosevelt belonged to a free trade club. He resigned only when he finally decided to support Blaine upon an anti-civil service and high tariff platform against Grover Cleveland, then the best official exponent of civil service reform and free trade.

Roosevelt sneered at the "American system" in his *Life of Benton*. The Clay tariff was discriminatory against the South and unwise as a national policy, he said. In others of his writings he doubts the wisdom of the protective system.

When Roosevelt became a candidate for the vice-presidency, all this was changed. From that hour he became a thick and thin advocate of protection:

"The present phenomenal prosperity has been won under a tariff that was made in accordance with certain fixed principles, the most important of which is a determination to protect the interests of the American producer, business man, wage worker and farmer alike." (Addresses, 142.)

"The general tariff policy is fundamentally based upon *ample* recognition of the difference between the cost of production—that is, the cost of labor, here and abroad." (The same.)

"The trusts can be damaged by depriving them of the benefits of a protective tariff only on consideration of damaging all their smaller competitors and all the wage-workers whom they employ."

It is safe to say that Roosevelt as member of the free trade club often sneered at the shallow sophistry concealed but thinly in each of the above propositions. In fact, he probably thought them mere demagogic buncombe.

ROOSEVELT'S FRIENDS, POLITICAL AND PERSONAL.

Roosevelt has a distinctly miscellaneous collection of political friends. We pass over "Joe" Murray, his discoverer. This friendship is natural enough. One would expect Roosevelt to be a friend of Senator Lodge. Probably their political opinions are more nearly identical than those of any other two prominent public men. This is still true, although Lodge is a reactionary machine politician, notwithstanding his blue Massachusetts blood. No furious dust storm obscures Lodge's political faith.

Elihu Root, the defender of Boss Tweed, the William C. Whitney and Thomas F. Ryan strategist, is next to Lodge one of Roosevelt's closest friends. Common aims and common sentiments have drawn them together. Both

are "practical men," and both aim at the Hamiltonian brand of government. Mr. Roosevelt's friendship for these men is easily explained.

Lucius Nathan Littauer, of Gloversville, N. Y., is in the list of Roosevelt's close friends. There was a time when Roosevelt doted upon Francis B. Loomis, of Ohio. It is not recorded that Roosevelt ever refused to receive Quay, of Pennsylvania, or withdrew from him a White House invitation. J. Edward Addicks at one time worked shoulder to shoulder with Theodore Roosevelt in the vineyard of the Lord. Thomas C. Platt for a time was Roosevelt's political father confessor. Roosevelt himself announced that Platt consented that Roosevelt should not be a vice-presidential candidate. Benjamin B. Odell, Roosevelt said, "was my trusted friend and adviser in every crisis." Senator Chauncey Depew was beloved of Roosevelt, just as was Ben Daniels, Gen. Leonard Wood and the rest.

So far as history records Roosevelt preferred Spooner to La Follette in Wisconsin. He loved Henry Payne. To Mark Hanna, of Ohio, he had no objection, except that Hanna was a possible presidential candidate. There is no indication that Roosevelt ever made strenuous objection to the political record of any man who had anything to give Roosevelt in the way of support or could further his political fortunes in any way. It might have been different with Platt and Odell when it was no longer theirs to give.

ROOSEVELT'S "ANANIAS CLUB."

Disciples of Ananias have sorely beset the path of Theodore Roosevelt. His first recorded meeting with the tribe was at twenty-three years of age, when he was collecting material for his naval history.

Napoleon fed fat upon mendacity; scarcely better than Talleyrand.

Thomas Jefferson was "constitutionally unable to place a proper value upon truthfulness."

Just a plain liar was the late Senator A. P. Gorman; and Congressman Williams, of Mississippi, and several others were no better.

Judge Alton B. Parker made statements "unqualifiedly and atrociously false."

Senator Chandler's statement was an "unqualified and deliberate falsehood."

Herbert W. Bowen, W. M. Whitney, Bellamy Storer, Mrs. Storer, E. H. Harriman, and several others, secured honorable mention by the President as different types of prevaricators or plain liars. In each case, except that of Parker and Harriman, it was a question of veracity between the President and his victim. Sworn testimony in a collateral matter proved that Judge Parker's statement was not false. Harriman convicted Roosevelt of manufacturing testimony to support the President's side by altering the written record.

So utterly wicked and untrustworthy had become the visitors to the White House that the President for sheer self-protection was

obliged to issue through Secretary William Loeb a statement that the President would be responsible for no statement made in conversation. To hold the President responsible the statement must be made over his own signature, or it must appear in a public document.

In this connection the President has an interesting time with Washington correspondents. He talks freely enough, takes them into his confidence, asks their advice, flatters them, gives them a notion of how to castigate the enemies of the President to the President's liking. But if they dare make a statement upon the authority of the President, or take a view of a public question different from that of the administration, thereafter there shall be one vacant chair. It is found in practice an excellent way of "trying out" public sentiment without committing one's self. It is also a first-class method of making the press of the country a department for the justification of administration views and policies. Senator Bailey, of Texas, probably realizes the force of this method when directed against a member of the national legislature.

So well recognized is the Roosevelt peculiarity of remembering facts differently from all others who confer with him, when a different view of them becomes important, that Biographer Francis E. Leupp makes explanation. It is all because of Roosevelt's rapidity of speech, his failure to give heed to what others say, and his trick of slyly qualifying every statement.

Senator Smith has looked over a list of applicants filed for the district attorneyship of his district. "Jones is far and away the best man for the place, Mr. President," the senator remarks to Roosevelt.

"I fully agree with you, senator, Jones is almost the best qualified of all the candidates."

"Almost" has been slurred over and missed by the senator. "I fully agree with you," tells the whole story to him. He tells Jones the place is his for sure. When the next day the name of Robinson is sent to the Senate for the place, a whole sheaf of affidavits would not convince Senator Smith that the President had not deliberately deceived him.

Roosevelt should have the benefit of Leupp's explanation. Its force depends upon whether we prefer being deceived by prevarication or by direct statement.

ROOSEVELT AS A PIONEER REFORMER.

"I am responsible for turning on the light, but I am not responsible for what the light shows," said Theodore Roosevelt in a recent address in Tennessee.

President Roosevelt forgets. The searchlight was in full glare when he came forward with his rushlight in order not to miss the illumination entirely. Henry D. Lloyd laid bare Standard Oil history twenty years before Roosevelt attacked the Standard Oil. Ida Tarbell had newly beaten the path in which Roosevelt and his prosecutors walked. Thomas W.

Lawson had exposed the "system" and the Standard Oil while Roosevelt was still apologizing for men of great wealth. He had held up to public scorn the crooks who had been exploiting life insurance while President Roosevelt was freshly enjoying the office won partly by funds misapplied by these life insurance crooks from policy-holders' money and paid into the Roosevelt campaign barrel. Governor Hughes, as counsel for the Armstrong Committee, was laying bare the iniquities of life insurance exploiters while President Roosevelt was furnishing the companies with new officers from his cabinet.

Charles Edward Russell told the country of the railways and the packing house iniquities before Roosevelt's man Garfield had ever dreamed of them. It was an old story to the "muckrakers" when Knox got his wonderful injunction. Ferguson, of Duluth, and shippers all over the country were fairly besieging the Interstate Commerce Commission before Roosevelt noticed the railways. Governors of half a dozen states were fighting rate battles while Roosevelt was having Harriman furnish him a campaign fund. Van Sant, governor of Minnesota, started the Northern Securities case. Lincoln Steffens was exposing municipal corruption while Roosevelt was using the corruptors as steps to political preferment. Graham Philips read aloud in his "Treason of the Senate" the records of the very men whom Roosevelt most delighted to honor. Roosevelt attacked "muckrakers" to put a stop to this

carnival of "turning on the light." It was after finding that the light would not go out that he added his to the illumination.

LITERARY ALLUSIONS OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

Roosevelt's "muckrake" speech indicated how liable to error even a literary man may be in exploiting his knowledge by literary allusion. Muckrakers with Bunyan were the over-rich of whom America has numerous examples, who set their heart upon the piling up of millions. He had no mind to find fault with their critics.

Recently Roosevelt made an address at the dedication of Pennsylvania's state house. He took occasion to praise in that delectable stronghold of Hamiltonian political theory, the great work of the Hamiltonian school of politicians. As a striking example he brought forth James Wilson, of the Constitutional Convention and of the Supreme Court. The burden of his song was the great services rendered by Wilson. It was striking. None but a ripe student of our history could have known of the exceptional services of this once great but now forgotten statesman. The newspaper claque took it up. Wilson ought to have a monument. But still riper scholars soon discovered that Wilson had earned deserved ignominy and obscurity by dishonoring high position and marked achievement. It was fitting that he should become the patron saint of the greatest monument of graft ever erected in

the most corrupt state in the Union. But there is no other evidence that Roosevelt intended to be grimly ironical.

THIS WAS DIFFERENT.

"There are certain legislative actions which must be taken in a purely Pickwickian sense. Notable among these are the resolutions of sympathy for the alleged oppressed patriots and peoples of Europe. . . . During my term in the legislature resolutions were introduced demanding the recall of Minister Lowell, assailing the Czar for his conduct toward the Russian Jews, sympathizing with the Land League, the Dutch Boers, etc., etc., the passage of which we usually strenuously and successfully opposed.

"Recently the Board of Aldermen of one of our great cities received a stinging rebuke, which, it is to be feared, the aldermanic intellect was too dense to fully appreciate." (Practical Politics, 43-44.)

Roosevelt goes on to tell how an under secretary of the Russian legation returned the pro-Jew resolution, stating that so far as he was advised Russia had no diplomatic relations with the aldermen in question and saying that the Czar's government was utterly indifferent to what the aldermen thought upon the subject.

When Roosevelt was President, strangely enough, he undertook to present to this Czar a petition protesting, as the resolutions had

protested, against the Czar's treatment of the Jews. It was received more politely, but no more hospitably than the aldermen's resolution. But Roosevelt succeeded by a sharp "Yankee trick" in getting it before the Czar. This was different.

Possibly Roosevelt had concluded that the aldermen were not so dense after all, and that the opinion of the people of a great American city was of some importance to the Czar even, as he found out later, to the dire disaster of his empire. Public opinion of the world was largely responsible for the Russian-Japanese war and its serious results to Russia.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY MODIFIED.

"The men who object to government by injunction are, as regards essential principles of our government, in hearty sympathy with their remote skin-clad ancestors, who lived in caves, fought one another with stone-headed axes and ate the mammoth and the woolly rhinoceros. They are interesting as representing a geological survival. . . . They are not in sympathy with men of good minds and sound civic morality."

The fact that President Roosevelt is now sending message after message to Congress recommending the curtailing of this very "government by injunction" does not indicate that he is a "geological survival," or that he is "not in sympathy with men of good minds or sound civic morality." It means none of these

disagreeable things. Simply that the labor vote cannot now be securely caught by the promise of the "full dinner pail," and that Roosevelt's "Martin Van Buren" needs strengthening with the labor vote if "my policies" are to escape imminent danger.

ROOSEVELT SQUEAMISH ABOUT HIS ASSOCIATES.

Thomas C. Platt, Benjamin B. Odell, the late Matthew Stanley Quay, have all been welcomed at the White House. Prince Henry was to be entertained. An invitation to the President's hospitality had been issued to Senator Benjamin Tillman, of South Carolina. Tillman is respected as one of the cleanest and most honorable men in the United States Senate. He had a personal encounter with his colleague. Roosevelt withdrew the invitation. This punctillious gentleman who boasted in his biography of being a light-weight pugilistic champion; this gentleman whose biographers have him participating in a hotel-lobby brawl; this gentleman who entertained and associated with prize fighters and wrestlers, as well as with the impossible Quay and the unspeakable Platt, insulted Tillman by withdrawing the invitation. A gentleman's view of social propriety, properly takes no account of personal character.

ROOSEVELT DISTRUSTS IDEALISTS.

"The disunion movement among the North-

ern abolitionists was probably the most senseless of all, for its success meant the abandonment of every hope of abolition." (Life of Morris, 359.)

"After the war and until the day of his death his (Wendell Phillips) position on almost every question was either mischievous or ridiculous and usually both." (Life of Benton, 160.)

"The assembly of puritan nobles were no more competent to institute self-government than a congress of abolitionists in 1860 would have been competent to govern the United States."

"If the constitution had made such a declaration, the abolition of slavery in all the states, it would never have been adopted, and the English-speaking people of America would have plunged into a condition of anarchy; while if the Republican platform of 1860 had taken such a position, Lincoln would not have been elected, no war for the Union would have been waged, and instead of slavery being abolished, it would have been perpetuated in at least one of the confederacies into which this country would have been split." (Life of Cromwell, 193.)

"The cause of the abolitionists had such a halo shed around it by the after course of events which they themselves did very little to shape, that it has been usual to speak of them with absurdly exaggerated praise. . . . Their share in abolishing slavery was far less than had been represented. . . . During all

of the terrible four years that the sad, strong, patient Lincoln suffered for the people, he had to dread the influence of the extreme abolitionists only less than that of the copperheads. Many of the leaders possessed no good qualities beyond their fearlessness and truth—qualities that were also possessed by the Southern fire-eaters.” (Life of Benton, 158, 159, 160.)

Probably few historians, turned prophets, would have been so cocksure that material causes alone figured in the great Civil war, and that had they not figured in just that way slavery would have continued indefinitely. There is another view. If it were not for the anti-slavery agitation, there would have been no Republican party, no Abraham Lincoln, as a public man of prominence, no emancipation.

Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips raised and held aloft the ideal-emblazoned standard around which rallied the hosts that followed Lincoln. They made straight and smooth his path. Only when Lincoln took up emancipation did he insure the success of the great war. Few men would have fought for “state’s rights,” or against them, had they not then meant slavery or no slavery to the contending hosts. Moral devotion to human freedom, sympathy for human suffering, were the things which nerved the arms of the North in the struggle for the destruction of slavery. All honor to Abraham Lincoln, say the idealists. But in honoring him we cannot fail to honor also the Stowes, the Garrisons and the Phillips who made possible Abraham Lincoln and

Abraham Lincoln's success. In fact, Lincoln himself probably did greater service in giving to the world such prophetic utterances as the speech at Gettysburg and the letter to Pierce than he did in bringing the great Civil war to a successful issue. The great war was necessary in the sense in which it was inevitable, considering the condition of our civilization. But it really settled nothing, except relative military strength, least of all, that there should no longer be human slavery. It merely put a period to a certain form of this wrong. It did not settle or define the scope of "state's rights" in the sense of local self-government—merely that a state must not secede from the Union.

[Note—No moral issue was ever settled nor will a great moral issue ever be settled by taking human life, whether it be by individual assassination or by the wholesale murder men call war.]

ROOSEVELT AND SLAVERY.

"Black slavery in Hayti was characterized by worse abuse than ever was the case in the United States, yet looking at the condition of the Republic now, it may well be questioned whether it would not have been greatly to her benefit in the end, to have slavery continue a century or so longer, its ultimate extinction being certain, than to have her obtain freedom, as she actually did, with the results that have flowed from her action." (Life of Benton, 158.)

"The presence of the negro in the Southern states is a legacy from the time when we were ruled by a transoceanic aristocracy. The whole civilization of the future owes a debt of gratitude greater than can be expressed in words, to that Democratic policy which has kept the temperate zones of the new and the newest world as a heritage for the white people." (American Ideals, 289.)

"A perfectly stupid race can never rise to a very high plane—the negro, for instance, has been kept down as much by lack of intellectual development as by anything else." Roosevelt sees misfortune in the ignorant negro electorate.

Slavery could not have lived in any event. Whites must rule. The great war after all did not accomplish so much?

REVERENCE FOR THE LAW.

"Let reverence for the law be taught in schools and colleges, be written in primers and spelling books, be published from pulpits, be proclaimed in legislative houses and enforced in the courts of justice."

And, one might add, be practiced by the chief executive of the nation and the executives of the states.

WEALTHY YOUNG MEN AND POOR YOUNG MEN.

"I would teach the young man, that he who has not wealth owes his first duty to his fam-

ily, but he who has means owes his to the state. It is ignoble to go on heaping money on money. I would preach the doctrine of work to all, and to the man of wealth unremunerative work."

Should government then be turned over to the wealthy men of leisure? We have men whose ideals are: "Let everybody earn his way and then everybody will have leisure to serve the state. Until that time let everybody take time to do so."

PUNISHMENT FOR CRIMINALS.

In a letter to Governor Durbin, of Indiana, Mr. Roosevelt says that lynching might be prevented by proper administration of the law to "secure swift VENGEANCE upon the offender." This is not the present day theory of modern penologists. They doubt the "swift vengeance" idea.

"In many of the cases of lynch law which have come to my knowledge, the effect has been healthy for the community, but sometimes great injustice has been done. Generally, vigilantes, by a series of executions, do really good work." (I, Winning of the West, 172.)

SOME WRONG-DOERS IN ROOSEVELT'S CALENDAR.

"It would be difficult to over-estimate the damage done by the example and action of a man like Governor Altgeld of Illinois.

Whether he is honest or not in his beliefs is not of the slightest consequence. He is as implacable a foe of decent government as is Tweed himself, and is capable of doing far more harm than Tweed." (So would agree William C. Whitney, Anthony Brady, Thomas F. Ryan, John D. Rockefeller, E. H. Harriman, Elihu Root, and other very respectable friends of Mr. Roosevelt.)

"The governor who began his career by pardoning anarchists and whose most noteworthy feat since was his bitter, undignified, but fortunately, futile campaign against an upright judge, who sentenced the anarchists, is the foe of every true American and the foe particularly of every honest workman." Roosevelt classes with Altgeld, Tom Watson, and several Western governors. In the case of Altgeld the very temperate and intelligent denunciation is almost as well founded as in the case of Tom Watson.

Reckless labor agitators, Roosevelt says, are a real peril. The man who denounces the judiciary or military is just as bad. Stock speculators exert an influence worse than the average murderer or bandit.

GOUVERNEUR MORRIS.

Next to Alexander Hamilton, Roosevelt found most to admire in the political philosophy of the aristocratic but cynical Revolutionary patriot, Gouverneur Morris. A single incident will place Morris and his political

philosophy. He and some of his South Carolina co-workers were contending strenuously for life senators with large property qualifications, as well as for a radical curtailment of the suffrage, when Dr. Benjamin Franklin, one of the very few real democrats in the Constitutional Convention arose and remarked that he did not concede the elected the right to curtail the rights of those who had elected them. Some of the worst rogues he had ever known were the richest rogues. It did not change Morris' conviction, but the property qualification went glimmering.

PENSION ORDER "NO. 78."

For some years old soldiers had been besieging Congress for a law making a certain age proof conclusive of disability in Pension matters, or an old-age Pension for veterans. Pension commissioners, pensioners, congressmen and presidents all tacitly agreed that it was strictly a matter for legislation.

Roosevelt's pension commissioner became a strenuous advocate of the idea, but congressmen were immovable. The commissioner thought of an easier way than that to put his ideas in effect. Promptly he laid his plan before President Roosevelt. President Roosevelt might issue an order to that effect and the thing was done. Without hesitation Roosevelt cut the legislative knot by an executive order, amending the pension laws so as to give graduated old-age pensions to veterans above

sixty-two years of age. There was a storm of protest against fiscal legislation by the President without the concurrence of Congress. Roosevelt met the criticism by a tricky and pettifogging interpretation of the pension laws. Partisanship prevented Congress from taking the President to task for illegal assumption of powers. Finally the order was sanctioned by legislation, thus admitting its original illegality.

ADMIRAL WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY.

This is not the time nor the place to open the unfortunate Schley-Sampson controversy. Theodore Roosevelt had nothing to do with its inception.

Schley, as everybody knows, was the ranking naval officer in the Santiago naval battle. It was the chief naval battle of the Spanish war. With brother officers he had submitted obediently to seeing a junior of slighter experience jump over his head and thrust into the place of promised glory.

Fate was with Schley. He fought the engagement. His Brooklyn was longer under fire, bore more directly the brunt of a concentrated Spanish attack, received greater punishment, left more of her peculiar marks on the foe than any other American vessel. Distinctly did Schley lead the battle.

Yet the absent Sampson, with inconceivable meanness, tried to rob Schley of the credit for what he did, and the naval clique, sharing in

his jealousy, took up the Sampson fight. Their minion charged Schley with cowardice and obliged him to defend himself by demanding an inquiry. Of course the absurd charge was not proved. Schley's bravery had been almost reckless in the battle. But it gave his persecutors an opportunity to brand him with the iniquitous charge of inefficiency, although he located the Spaniards and took a leading part in destroying them. He got results, the real test of military efficiency. But Schley was not sufficiently obsessed by the Eighteenth century notion of "Gentleman." He would treat his "bullies" like human beings. Schley was civil even to the enlisted varlets. He must not have the glory.

No naval officer in the history of the country has been treated so outrageously by official America as has Schley. Roosevelt distinctly lost an opportunity for the display of moral courage and a sense of justice when he refused to award Schley the meed of praise and gratitude which Schley so richly merited.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

SOME RECENT HISTORY.

President Roosevelt's power and popularity had reached its zenith in 1907.

Thomas B. Reed, late speaker of the House of Representatives, had recognized in Roosevelt the "original discoverer of the ten commandments." Newspaper claquers were sure that he had originated all good government policies. But the quizzical smile was absent from the vociferous assertion of it. The fact that it was a Roosevelt policy was proof conclusive that it was a good policy; the fact that it was a good policy was equally conclusive that it was a Roosevelt policy.

Naturally it followed that anybody who doubted the supreme wisdom of Roosevelt or the supreme holiness of his policies was an enemy to the public, a fool, or a knavish corruptionist in the pay of the "interests."

Nobody knew exactly what the Roosevelt policies really were. The millions of words, spoken and written, in which these policies were set forth, had been used in the diplomatic sense—to conceal the ideas of the author. Only one policy was absolutely unmistakable: Trust the President; give all power to the

President; he will see to it that his dear children, the American people, do not suffer.

Through the persistent hammering of newspaper claquers, and a skillful use of political influence and the spoils of office, the majority of congressmen and senators of both parties had been dragooned into submission. In important things, the House was absolutely supine. It made a nasty, childish exhibition of spite in connection with the characteristically egotistical and illegal order intended to revolutionize by presidential ukase the spelling of the American people. But that was merely a national joke, a Rooseveltism. Cuba, Santo Domingo, Panama, the Philippines, the corporations, the trusts, the tariff, had all been turned over to the tender mercies of the President, the good or the bad, each to receive the deserved reward.

Some state governments had become perniciously active, especially in railway and trust matters. He had told them solemnly some time before:

"No advance whatever has been made by the states, *as a collective body*, in dealing with these corporations."

That was one of Roosevelt's jokes, for he knew that the only representative of the states, "as a collective body," was the Federal government, and he did not want to say right out that the Federal government had made no progress. But individual states had made all the progress thus far made. Roosevelt was warning them off his preserves.

Every small politician seeking preferment had hitched his little cart to the Roosevelt bandwagon and had joined in the shouting. Little politicians with enterprise and imagination began to proclaim loudly that the country could in no way get along without Roosevelt. Precedents set by Washington and followed by Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Jackson must be cast to the winds, for this "greater President." "My policies" must be carried out without halt, and but one man in all America could be relied upon to do this. Four years more of Roosevelt would mean the Ultima Thule of governmental wisdom and righteousness. No problems would ever again disturb the serene and well-earned slumber of the Republic. Even the American people, heretofore independent and self-reliant, seemed ready to accept the estimate of the claquers and the small politicians with the "little father" idea of government which it implied. "Now it was Rome indeed, and room enough when there is in it but one only man."

Roosevelt had made his moving-picture trip to Panama, in order to beat down with the weight of presidential assertion, all carping criticism. Bigelow and others of his kind had been put to confusion. With the facility of a "lightning change artist" Panama had again shifted its management. President Roosevelt had secured two prominent western railway attorneys and lobbyists, presumably of the repentant class, to hunt down Harriman and the Standard Oil crowd. Harriman had said un-

kind things about Roosevelt and had refused to contribute to a campaign the fall before, in which Roosevelt was so much interested that he sent a cabinet officer to New York to make a public speech charging the anti-machine candidate with the murder of President McKinley or responsibility therefor. But seeing it was Roosevelt and his chief strategist, there could be no suspicion that this at the time was demagoguery, or that now President Roosevelt was trying to get even with Harriman or to play against one another the feuds of big business interests. Curiously enough, however, the newspaper friends of Roosevelt announced at the time that Harriman made the unkind remarks, that Roosevelt was going after him.

The always interesting, though sometimes cynical New York *Sun*, thirty years ago, in advising a western young man with oratorical aspirations how to secure popularity leading to political preferment, told him to denounce the Mormons and flay the Chinamen. Neither had any friends. It was perfectly safe. Also sure to be popular. Otherwise he must confine himself to platitudes and boasting of the greatness of the country. Roosevelt tried a similar system with Harriman and the Standard Oil. He has, indeed, been most fortunate in his enemies. In this case, as in many others, the interests attacked richly deserved it on general principles. As to whether these interests or the Roosevelt methods are the greater menace is a fit subject for meditation.

Other "interests" had been in a desperate

fight in Chicago. Defeat stared at them. They wanted the millions concealed in Chicago franchises. Roosevelt was asked for aid. Righteously he responded. This municipal election was especially a Federal affair. Local self-government—the divorcing of national politics from municipal problems—was not to be considered. Roosevelt's postmaster, a machine politician, became the candidate of the "interests" with Roosevelt's consent. Roosevelt in a statement appealed for support for this candidate. The Federal machine did the rest. Municipal problems were decided according to the exigencies of national politics, and to the everlasting benefit of the "interests." Franchises worth many millions, which the people of Chicago were about to reclaim, went to the enrichment of overwealthy promoters. No doubt Roosevelt drew a fine distinction between this case, a similar action which he had declared so wicked in New York City.

Through the long hard winter, railroad transportation had broken down so completely as to show the trouble to be fundamental and radical. Exploitation of the transportation system for private gain was demonstrated as the real cause of the trouble, making apparent the ridiculous inadequacy of such measures as the railway rate law.*

Private Secretary William Loeb, Jr., had

*See article by the author in Moody's Magazine for March, 1907.

discovered a conspiracy to defeat Roosevelt's policies. Roosevelt's newspaper claquers exploited it and then denounced it. When dragged in all its deformity to the light of day this infamous conspiracy was found to be an expressed preference on the part of certain gentlemen of wealth for a presidential candidate other than Roosevelt or any person whom he may name as his successor. An intimation was given that these wealthy men might be willing to spend some money to secure their preferences.

It was just such a conspiracy as nominated and elected President McKinley in 1896; Roosevelt and McKinley in 1900; Roosevelt in 1904, and others before. In this case the "conspiracy" was contemplated merely. Then Harriman and the insurance interests and other wealthy men actually contributed hundreds of thousands in support of Roosevelt's campaign. The "conspiracy" was carried out.

But there was a difference. Most other men would either have refused the Harriman and insurance contributions, and the support of such men as Platt, Depew and Penrose, or he would have refused to hold them up afterward to public execration. But Roosevelt is practical. Accepting the benefit of tainted funds puts Roosevelt under no obligations to anyone. He can campaign with groups of political friends upon a definite platform or agree with them upon a programme of legislation, and when he has been elected he can repudiate this programme, adopt one of his own and de-

nounce everybody who fails to follow him, including his quondam friends. It is all perfectly proper and highminded—seeing it is Roosevelt.

Roosevelt had been awarded the Nobel prize for the promotion of peace. By a paradox, if not an irony of fate, the man who in this generation has done most to glorify and foster the military spirit in America was crowned as a prince of peace. That, too, for merely promoting a meeting of parties in a settlement which was inevitable, in a war which his diplomacy had aided in precipitating.

As a result of the award, America and Roosevelt loomed larger in The Hague conference soon to open—a conference somewhat disappointing in its accomplishment.

Japanese menace in San Francisco had been handled skilfully by the administration, promoting in a measure the plan of the general government to regulate internal affairs at home indirectly by treaties with foreign powers. Elihu Root's justification clouded the issue. States were undoubtedly bound by treaty regulations covering matters properly subject to regulation by treaty. Whether local public schools is a proper subject for treaty regulation, however, still remains a problem of some importance.

John Temple Graves, speaking ostensibly for Southerners, proposed in all seriousness that the Republican and Democratic parties should unite upon President Roosevelt as their next candidate for the presidency, and that William

J. Bryan should make the nomination. Roosevelt had good reason to believe that the country would approve anything he might do or say.

At the Jamestown Exposition, using the modest "we," President Roosevelt told the country with commendable frankness what his intentions were as to the future of the Republic. Other chapters were added at Indianapolis and elsewhere. He would be tolerant, even generous, with everybody who behaved to suit him, but those who did wrong, from his standpoint, would do well to have a care. The income tax which Roosevelt had denounced ten years before, became in a twinkling a "Roosevelt policy," given a place of honor with the good ship-subsidy scheme. Inheritance tax, too, heretofore left to the states, was to become a source of Federal revenue and incidentally inheritances a subject of Federal regulation and control.

About this time Roosevelt had discovered the peculiar infamy of his good friend and former adviser, E. H. Harriman. So disreputable had this gentleman become that it was necessary that Roosevelt should change the text of correspondence before publication, in order to demonstrate Harriman's untruthfulness. At this time three western labor leaders were on trial for their lives. Roosevelt, in order to show his fair-mindedness to all classes, included them with Harriman in a blanket denunciation as undesirable citizens. If he had denounced Harriman alone men of

Harriman's trend of thought might have thought Roosevelt inspired with class prejudice. Denouncing labor leaders alone might subject the President to the same charge. Denunciation of both at once would demonstrate fairness and bring approval.

Unhappily this episode marked the beginning of a decline in Roosevelt's popularity. Despite the strenuous noise of the newspaper claquers, the public murmured disapproval. Presidential attacks upon men on trial for their lives looked like interfering with the course of orderly justice. It was worse than the denunciation of judges in some of the Federal prosecutions and of the jury in the Tyner case. The thing hardly harmonized with the "square deal" doctrine of the President, especially since land cases had been held up to strengthen or at least to avoid weakening the prosecution. Roosevelt's justification was distinctly pettifogging. The public was growing weary. When the "nature fakir" fulminations came out there was almost a guffaw. Americans had not lost altogether their sense of proportion. They could still recognize palpable folly, even in a popular hero.

Roosevelt held serenely to his dramatic methods. An attack by a Federal bureau upon the Standard Oil Company, rehearsing ancient history, to a great extent, was timed so as to coincide with a sensational fine (\$29,000,000) and produce a maximum public thrill.

Financial clouds had been gathering. As early as March, Secretary Cortelyou, of the

Treasury Department, came with government money (\$25,000,000) to the aid of the Wall Street fraternity. Stocks continued to decline. By August the slump had reached three billion dollars in shrinkage of securities. Financial storm was clearly presaged.

Roosevelt at Provincetown took up the defense of the administration. He conceded that it needed a defense. "Not guilty," was the verdict. He had not caused the slump. Extend Federal powers and all would be well. He had the last generous word in the Moyer-Haywood case. Well pleased, Roosevelt started for the West and South. Here he repeated what he had said many times before upon multitudinous subjects. He would not modify or change his policies. Many speeches were made in the Middle West and the Southern Mississippi region.

A characteristic incident took place on Roosevelt's trip down the river. The boat upon which the President travelled got into a race with a rival packet, and the rival came out ahead. Not sufficiently manly to take his defeat, the Roosevelt captain charged his rival with having violated navigation regulations. President Roosevelt had been placed in danger. The President peremptorily and arbitrarily ordered by telegraph that the rival skipper be suspended. As it turned out the skipper was acting properly within his rights. Roosevelt's act was illegal and unwarranted.

President Roosevelt plunged into the Louisiana wilderness for his favorite pastime, the

chase, just as he had hunted in Texas and Colorado in 1905. Shooting defenceless animals from ambush with repeating rifles, or worrying them to death with dogs, is no doubt a very manly form of sport. It indicates such supreme courage. Considering the newspaper exploitation given such an elevating pastime when indulged in by the President of the United States, it is especially fortunate that Roosevelt was willing to experience the joy of it while still in the lime-light as chief magistrate.

Politics, national, state and municipal, had been President Roosevelt's especial care during the years of his incumbency. Inspired newspaper writers let it be known that President Roosevelt would dictate his successor. Secretary of War Taft was the heir-apparent. Small politicians, still seeking to ride into place on the wave of Roosevelt popularity, joined newspaper claquers in urging Roosevelt as a third-term candidate. Roosevelt remained silent. He let it be understood that he wanted Taft. All other candidates were under suspicion of not being sufficiently wedded to "my policies." It was hinted darkly that if Taft was not accepted Roosevelt might be forced into the nomination to save the "policies."

Secretary Taft took a spectacular trip to the Philippines. There he told the Filipinos, in parliament assembled, how they would be favored if they were good, but how unwise action might put off indefinitely the day of

their independence. It all kept the big secretary in the public eye.

Federal influence and patronage, the newspapers said, were used generously in promoting Taft sentiment and securing Taft delegates. Certain it is, the inner circles of politics knew that Taft was to be the man, if the administration could so order it. Private Secretary Cortelyou, so talented as to do equally well in any cabinet position, was warned not to trespass upon the Taft preserves. An assistant of Mr. Cortelyou in the Post Office Department, who had been using postal patronage in shaping political destiny, was obliged to transfer his allegiance to Taft.

Beginning with the San Francisco school episode, Japanese troubles loomed big as the year advanced. Rumor came that President Roosevelt feared developments and had ordered the battleship squadron to the Pacific coast. This was denied at the White House, for some obscure reason. Soon it proved correct. Many Americans interpreted the move as a demonstration to overawe the Japanese by a show of superior strength. This was the view generally taken in Europe. No doubt the administration had information of sinister activity on the part of the tricky, treacherous, Oriental Yankees. Since the demonstration of their hypocrisy in Korea and Manchuria, Japanese pleas of disinterested holiness are not so likely to be taken at full face value. Admitting all this, it is more likely that the cruise of the fleet was quite as much a piece of stage business

intended to arouse the American military spirit and secure more generous naval appropriations. This cruise served to demonstrate the humiliating weakness of the navy in one respect—its total lack of adequate colliers for extended cruises. But if the country is to have three-fourths of a billion in useless warships, it is difficult to see why anybody should object to have the President use them as a bogeyman to frighten the Japanese or as a circus for the delectation of the American people.

A most important municipal election was in progress in Cleveland, Ohio. The "best mayor of the best governed city in the United States" was on the eve of consummating a solution of the traction problem of that city especially advantageous to the people of Cleveland but peculiarly distasteful to the men who had been making millions out of traction franchises. In fact, these franchise beneficiaries, pressed relentlessly to the wall by Cleveland's efficient mayor, were fighting for life. All other beneficiaries of municipal franchises the country over were interested in their menaced brethren. Cleveland's mayor was standing for re-election in order to complete the work in hand.

Menaced "interests" appealed to Roosevelt as they had in the Chicago case. By a massing of forces against Cleveland, they hoped to defeat the popular champion, save the rich grazing ground, and discourage such attempts on the part of other cities. Roosevelt's response was quick and hearty. Congressman Theodore Burton, of tried popularity in Cleve-

land and of recognized value and ability in the national legislature, but with no experience in municipal government, was appealed to personally by President Roosevelt and Secretary Taft to save the situation. Burton was to enter the field as a partisan candidate, cloud the issues, and save the municipal fleshpots for the menaced "interests." Probably it was not put in just that way, but that would have been the only possible result of a Burton victory.

Congressman Burton yielded to the skillful blandishments of President Roosevelt and Secretary Taft. It was said that he was offered the Ohio senatorship in return. That was certainly a paltry price for Burton's enviable record as a high-minded public servant.

Federal power wielded by so skillful a politician as the President failed to save the menaced interests. Cleveland's electorate was too intelligent to be fooled by the false partisan note, even from the White House. Roosevelt lost. If any other President, politician, or political boss, had attempted what Roosevelt attempted in this case, the action would have been recognized among all friends of decent government as sinister to the last degree. Indeed, in any other person the motives would have been infinitely mean and unworthy, and the whole scheme utterly indefensible. Said Roosevelt in his *American Ideals*:

"The party man who blindly follows party, right or wrong, and who fails to make that

party in any way better, commits a crime against the country."

This was probably intended to apply to such men as Congressman Burton.

Oklahoma's constitution offended President Roosevelt. It was too hospitable to advanced democratic ideas. At first Roosevelt announced unofficially through the inspired press that he would refuse to approve this constitution and deny statehood to the populist territory, notwithstanding the mandate of Congress. The "feeler" indicated that such action would be dangerous to Roosevelt's popularity. Roosevelt "hedged." He sent Secretary Taft into the territory to try to defeat the constitution at the polls. Taft failed, and Roosevelt accepted the constitution with some minor changes.

Threatened financial trouble came in October. The last push to the tottering fabric of Wall Street finances was given by a clique engaged in the profitable pastime of "freezing out," of desirable corporate enterprises, a weaker group of rivals. Panic came. "Sound" money, that thing which had called forth such peans of worship for the past decade, was so sound as to disappear promptly from the channels of business. Banks saved themselves by abandoning other business enterprises to their fate. They grabbed all the "honest" money in sight and held it in their vaults. Most men, not bankers or Wall Street gamblers, kept their heads and saved the country from one of the worst panics and industrial smashes in

the country's history, but not from a serious panic and subsequent depression.

Causes of the trouble are undoubtedly deep-seated. This is not the place to discuss them. Suffice it to say that our banking system was demonstrated to be the weakest of weak reeds. Metal money, as has always been the case in crises, scurried out of sight. Despised paper money, issued without the pretense of legality in the form of clearing-house drafts or certificates, helped to tide over the difficulty. Until we become sufficiently civilized to cease worshipping certain heaps of yellow metal as our financial saviors, such interesting little episodes are likely to recur.

Secretary Cortelyou, of the Treasury Department, loaned bankers more than two hundred millions of dollars without interest, which they in turn promptly loaned out to the needy at the usurious rates of interest which bank hoarding had brought about. Bankers made some fat "killings," and financial kings gathered some very juicy plums which up to that time had dangled out of their reach.

All of which demonstrated that our banking and money systems recently held up as sacred things are insecure from capstone to foundation, not only in methods but in principle. Incidentally, it started a wave of distress at the Atlantic which rolled quickly to the Pacific, engulfing thousands in its path. A period of commercial and industrial depression was pretty clearly indicated.

Naturally, in the light of precedent, the ad-

ministration was blamed for the panic. Financiers, politicians, even Supreme Court justices, criticised Roosevelt sharply. His clamorously menacing methods had frightened timid capital and caused the smash. Immediately the newspaper claquers, White House inspired, started the defense. Roosevelt was still a third term possibility. His prestige must not suffer. Cabinet officers took up the defensive fight. Roosevelt himself joined in the fray. Secretary Taft made lengthy speeches intended to prove Roosevelt entirely innocent.

Such a situation was not new to Roosevelt. As a historian he had written:

"It being almost always the case that the existing administration receives more credit if the country is prosperous, and greater blame if it is not, than in either case it is rightfully entitled to." (Life of Benton, 196.)

Roosevelt had received his full meed of credit for prosperity. The clamor of it had been dinned into men's ears for ten long years, and six of them had been written down to Roosevelt's credit. But Roosevelt preferred that others should bear the counterbalancing blame.

"It is not possible to secure prosperity by law, but it is possible to destroy it," said Roosevelt years before in denouncing the dangerous doctrines of his opponents. That was before the Roosevelt regime. Now the proposition of Roosevelt was to be reversed. Roosevelt's policies had secured prosperity by law.

Had not the claquers demonstrated it. But to destroy it—perish the thought!

Things were different in 1893, when the wicked Cleveland had engulfed the country at one fell swoop.

"The distress was a Godsend to the Whig politicians. They fairly raved at the administration and denounced all its acts, good and bad alike, with fluent and incoherent impartiality." (Life of Benton, 205.)

Roosevelt wrote this of the Whigs of 1837-40. He might just as truthfully have written it of his own partisans of 1893-6. And, extraordinary as it may appear, the sophisticated Roosevelt "raved" with the rest "with fluent and incoherent impartiality." The platform of 1896, which he so strenuously supported, said:

"For the first time since the Civil war the people have witnessed the calamitous consequences of Democratic control of the government. . . . In the broad effect of its policy it has precipitated panic, blighted industry and trade with prolonged depression, closed factories, reduced work and wages, halted enterprise, crippled American production," etc. . . .

In 1900 the platform upon which Roosevelt was elected asserted:

"After a term of Democratic legislation and administration, business was dead, industry paralyzed and national credit disastrously impaired. . . . Capital was hidden away; . . . labor distressed and unemployed. . . . The Republican party . . . promised to re-

store prosperity by means of . . . the protective tariff and . . . the gold standard. . . . Prosperity more general and more abundant than we have ever known has followed these enactments. . . . Capital is fully employed, labor profitably occupied. . . ."

Roosevelt was re-elected in 1904 on a platform containing this declaration:

"We found the country after four years of Democratic rule in an evil plight. . . . Public credit lowered, . . . revenues declining, . . . debt growing, . . . labor unemployed, . . . business sunk in depression, . . . hope faint, . . . confidence gone. . . . We met these unhappy conditions vigorously, effectively and at once. . . . Industry stimulated by wise laws has expanded to a degree never before known. . . . Under the Dingley tariff labor was fully employed," etc.

Evidently President Roosevelt had not read his party platforms when he declared that "it is not possible to secure prosperity by law." He must have forgotten all about them now that he is contending that legislation and administration did not destroy it.

One of the most important campaign documents circulated for Roosevelt in 1904 was entitled "Lest We Forget." It told how Cleveland and his policies killed prosperity.

That was patriotism. Now that the steel is at Roosevelt's breast, to hint that Theodore Roosevelt has done what Theodore Roosevelt

in like circumstances accused Grover Cleveland of having done, is pure demagoguery. It was a king, too, who saw things so differently when his own ox was gored. Possibly the American people have lost their sense of humor.

Roosevelt was not bowed down by the accusation. It seemed to stimulate his rabbit-like literary fecundity. Enemies were literally overwhelmed by a deluge of annual message. It discussed and settled off-hand every question under the sun. Summed up it was a hodgepodge of all of Roosevelt's former speeches and messages, vitalized by an urgent appeal for more power for the Federal government in general and for the executive in particular. Newspapers failed to publish it in full. Few read the text.

Despite Roosevelt's skillful maneuvering his political antagonists in his own party pushed him into a corner where in order to protect the candidacy of Taft, he was obliged to reassert his own decision against a third term.

Immediately Congress became indifferent to Roosevelt and his policies. Roosevelt was eliminated from newspaper "scare heads." Even the faithful claquers grew languid. There were indications that Roosevelt would be pushed to the side of the stage. Always is Congress averse to a big legislative programme before a presidential election. By common consent it was merely to pass routine acts this session.

An attack upon Admiral Brownson and

naval critics brought Roosevelt again to the front. Even former admirers shook their heads over the violence of the assault upon the conscientious, honorable and courageous officer. Indeed it looked as though a medical favorite had caused the President to ignore orderly procedure and adopt a course which persisted in would make "ducks and drakes" of naval discipline.

President saw his critics gaining ground. Public attention was turning toward others. Roosevelt decided that he must keep up the clamor if he would hold the center of the stage to the end of his term. He would give Congress a programme that would keep the country looking his way at least until adjournment.

Heralded properly in inspired papers, the fulmination came January 31. It was attached to a court decision upon a labor law. In many respects the special message coincides peculiarly with the "rotten planks," "put together with such perverted skill by the Chicago architects." (In 1896.) Several of the message recommendations put Roosevelt in the same class as the Chicago "geological survivals," who are out of "sympathy with men of good minds and sound civic morality."

But above all the din, sounds the Roosevelt major note—"more power for the Federal government; more power for the President; the states have failed."

It is intimated that Roosevelt will prevent the ebb of his popularity by hammering Con-

gress for radical legislation and attacking the now unpopular exponents of "predatory" wealth. There are those who see in the message a recrudescence of the third term idea. We may be certain that Roosevelt will not permit himself to drop out of sight before he leaves the White House. Should Taft succeed him, Taft must play Martin Van Buren to Roosevelt's Andrew Jackson. Otherwise let Taft beware.

[NOTE.—Some real democrats have accepted Roosevelt as sounding a true note of democracy in his message of January 31, 1908. We may be excused for remaining skeptical. The man who when in prominent place at thirty-eight years of age, with fully mature mind, denounced as sympathizers with their remote skin-clad ancestors men who wished to curtail the injunction, may now wish sincerely to curtail it in the interest of workingmen. Elihu Root, Thomas F. Ryan, strategist and life-long servant of "Predatory wealth," may, by his great influence over Roosevelt inspire him with undying hate for unholy rich men. Roosevelt may have changed his mind since he attributed attacks upon wealth to mere jealousy or envy on the part of the inefficient poor. He may now accept ideas of men whom he accused of hostility to certain court decisions because they stand between these men and plunder. A President who seized Panama possibly has become conscientious. Roosevelt may now harbor undying hate for the special privileges he so promptly defended in Chicago

and Cleveland. If one be sufficiently credulous he may believe that Roosevelt has suddenly abandoned his dearest convictions, and adopted policies he has fought all his life with implacable bitterness. We prefer to regard Roosevelt as the same skillful, cunning political general that he was yesterday, last year, ten years ago. Viewing him from that point an all sufficient reason for his special message is his knowledge that the people are aroused against "predatory wealth" and will not be denied. Opposition means destruction for himself and his party. Advocacy will keep his popularity untarnished, his power undiminished. It will enable him to humble his enemies, dictate a successor, guide the current into safe channels of increased Federal power, and maintain in control the party for the promotion of whose supremacy he has heretofore sacrificed some of his dearest convictions. In practice Roosevelt has placed the fortunes of that party above all else—next to his own personal political advancement. Roosevelt, no doubt, verily believes Hamiltonian centralization and Roosevelt personal government necessary to the Republic. Do a majority of Americans agree with him?]

CHAPTER XXXIV.

CRITICAL VIEW OF ROOSEVELT—HIS QUALITIES,
ACHIEVEMENTS, HIS IDEALS, AND HIS AIMS.

Roosevelt is popular—as popular as any President in our history. America has a hysterical element. Official hysterics appeal to them. With some of our people physical size means greatness. In them Roosevelt touches a responsive chord. Many of our people are boastful and self-assertive. Roosevelt is their ideal. Fulmination, bluster, clamorousness, appeal to some of us. Roosevelt satisfies us. Millions of us love Roosevelt for what he is not, but what we think him; for what we think he has done, not for what he has actually done. We adore a Roosevelt very largely mythical, the heroic creation of newspaper imagination. Curiously enough, Roosevelt is liked least by those who know him best, and best by those who know him least. From East to West his popularity grows; from West to East his popularity wanes. Reactionaries who detest him, detest him more because of his attitude and his personality than because of his policies. Radicals who love him, love him more because of the enemies he has made than the work he is doing.

Roosevelt is ambitious, inordinately ambitious, probably more ambitious than any other American President. He is narrow. No man in high place has shown greater intellectual arrogance and intolerance. He cannot conceive how any honest and intelligent person can differ with him upon any point. Differing with him is proof positive that one is foolish, ignorant, or corrupt. His experience, he is certain, covers all experience of all others, and his impressions are right, while different impressions must necessarily be wrong.

"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

Roosevelt is a partisan. Alexander Hamilton being his political ideal, he distrusts popular government profoundly. The masses are fools, the sport of rogues, inspired by envy and jealousy. It is necessary that a righteous, strong man should guard them against themselves as well as others. Government must be left to the strong, the efficient, the righteous, who are nearly all found among the classes who for generations have been wealthy, cultured and blessed with leisure. These men are the best judges of their own strength, righteousness and efficiency.

Since Roosevelt takes this view, all those who take any other view of government are ignorant, vicious, visionary, demagogic, crooked, dangerous. It is therefore the bounden duty of every decent man, believing as Roosevelt does, to be a partisan, to place partisan

success above all other considerations, above the interests of state or country.

Caution is strikingly developed in Theodore Roosevelt. With a front of bluster, passion, impulsiveness, his statements turn out painfully timorous, except when, denouncing some person whose tenets or whose actions disagree with his own. Every statement he makes has as many avenues of escape as the den of the red fox. When analyzed, the statement is found so qualified and hedged about that it asserts a mere platitude, or is of such Delphic ambiguity as to mean anything which its author may assert it to mean, or to mean nothing at all. Clamorously audacious statements turn out to be mere dust-storms, whirling about a grain of sand. Jagers was reckless in committing himself as compared with Theodore Roosevelt.

Roosevelt is cunning. Beneath his noise and fury is the coldest calculation. He weighs his moves most carefully and considers results. No more skillful politician than Roosevelt has ever sat in the presidential chair. He knows politics from precinct club to National Committee. To him it is a game like football or draw poker. A smashing scrimmage where he "hits the line hard." Or a cunning matching of wits, where he bluffs, draws or stands pat; or has a "square deal." Big game hunters have the best training for citizenship and civilized life. It is a matter of stalking and killing.

Dramatic, almost melodramatic, is Theodore Roosevelt. He is a born showman. Roose-

velt knows how to produce an effect upon the crowd. With natural dramatic instincts of the highest order, he has spent a lifetime in developing them. If Theodore Roosevelt cannot get and hold public attention nobody else need try. He would out-Hearst Hearst as a sensational journalist.

Besides, Roosevelt knows how important is this talent in politics; as important as well rehearsed stage-business in the theatre. Roosevelt is practical. When he wishes to attain an object, he uses the means most likely to bring results. In such cases Roosevelt has no scruples. He would use Satan as his chaplain if he knew Satan to have the keys of the Kingdom, although they had been stolen. Platt, Quay, Addicks, every puissant crook of politics, has served Roosevelt's purposes.

One of the folk-lore stories, the story upon which the immortal Goethe founded his still more immortal Faust, tells a tale of a certain great and wise man selling himself to the Evil one. In the grim pagan tale the wise man paid the price in a tragic end and an eternity of darkness. But good Christian narrators improved upon that. At the last moment after the mortgaged wise man had enjoyed the kingdoms of the earth for which he had bargained to fall down and worship the Evil one, and when the Evil one had come to claim the bartered soul, the good priest stepped upon the scene and exorcised the evil spirit. This wise man had had all the good things provided by the Evil one and, in addition, still had entree

into the Kingdom. He had actually cheated the devil out of his due. Roosevelt, with his unholy political alliances, and his tainted campaign funds, is the only modern proving equally clever.

Roosevelt is selfish. He will tolerate any method in support of his own plans, ambitions, or schemes, but will denounce with the fiercest invective the use of like methods for the benefit of others. Furthering his fortunes is legitimately everybody's care.

Imperiousness is one of the strong points of Theodore Roosevelt. No man can continue to differ with him on an important tenet or policy and retain his good will. No newspaper writer can criticise the administration and still remain welcome at the White House executive offices. Roosevelt cannot conceive that such criticism could come from other than unworthy motives. If the writer were not a fool, a dunce, or a knave, he would know Roosevelt to be right.

Roosevelt is vindictive. He never forgets real or fancied injury, and will wait years to "get even." Wadsworth, Burton, Tyner, Bowen, Storer, Mrs. Morris, a whole list of unfortunates, have felt and are feeling the weight of his implacable displeasure. Regarding the government and the powers thereof as a personal asset of the President, he does not hesitate to use them to castigate his enemies or reward his friends. Instance, Harriman and Paul Morton; Bowen and Francis B. Loomis. Veracity is not a Roosevelt virtue. Were

Washington correspondents in position to speak their minds freely, many would tell one that no statement made by Roosevelt verbally can be relied upon if his own interests will be advanced by denying it, or he is embarrassed by affirming it. President Roosevelt's reputation in this regard with those who have frequent contact with him is almost notorious. In the Harriman, Chandler, Bowen, Parker, Storer, and a dozen other episodes where veracity was at stake, circumstances were against Roosevelt. Parker and Harriman absolutely proved the President's disingenuousness. Such episodes led to an admission by the President of the weakness in a statement declaring that the President would be responsible for no verbal assertion, none not appearing over his name or in a public document.

After all, Roosevelt is very human in this regard, and if he were not himself so quick to hurl the contumelious stone, it might be left out of consideration.

Roosevelt's vanity is colossal; his egotism monumental. They really possess him. Such tremendous factors are they in his character that they color all his acts. A keen judge of the motives of men en masse, he is quite blinded by flattery to the characters and motives of men with whom he comes in close contact. Men who say nice things to Roosevelt and about Roosevelt can get anything Roosevelt has to give. Their appreciation of him is proof positive of their wisdom and virtue. These qualities with his imperiousness, meddle-

someness, and want of consideration, account for the small men Roosevelt has collected around him, except where larger men were an inheritance, or are supported by interests which Roosevelt dare not offend. Vanity and egotism have caused Roosevelt to take excursions into every field of activity, settle every mooted question under the sun, whether in government, war, science, or theology, and to denounce everybody who differs with him. These qualities were strikingly exhibited in the undignified and childish "nature fakir" controversy.

Moral courage is not characteristic of Roosevelt. Once wrong he remains wrong. With immovable stubbornness he sticks to a mistake once made, even though it forces him to the most puerilely ridiculous pettifogging for justification. The Moyer-Haywood incident, and the Brownsville episode, may be cited as instances in point. Vain egotism, making it necessary that the President should be considered infallible, is the only explanation of these queer actions. And it has made Roosevelt unjust. Wounded vanity is largely responsible for the brutal treatment of General Miles, Moyer and Haywood, the Brownsville troops, James N. Tyner, Herbert W. Bowen and others.

Roosevelt is cynical. He attributes mean and sordid motives indiscriminately to all men. No man of prominence has assailed so many other men with such vindictive virulence as he. Good motives are never attributed to an

opponent where his actions can be explained by mean and sordid ones. Roosevelt's political methods are based upon this view of human nature. Says a veteran Washington correspondent:

"Mr. Roosevelt's system is based upon the theory that people fool themselves if given the initial suggestion, and that hatred is a stronger impulse to human action than admiration or gratitude. He is always ready to prove an alibi, if a thing attributed to him in one quarter promises to prove more injurious to him in another, but however inconsistent may be the sentiments and actions attributed to him by the various classes of people and antagonistic communities, he accepts all praise, unless the conflicting impressions of him come close enough in contact to be injurious, and in that case he repudiates that which meets favor with the fewest persons.

"Any man, or set of men, desiring to fool themselves, are welcome to do so to his benefit." This correspondent goes on to say that Roosevelt gets the support of opponents who bitterly hate each other, by castigating each so thoroughly as to make the other rejoice. "Each praises Mr. Roosevelt for the punishment which he inflicted upon the other, his enemy, and praises the President in order to make light of the punishment which he himself has received. By this method Mr. Roosevelt wins two supporters if he does not make two friends, and he smiles cynically over the

accuracy of his own conception of the frailties of human nature."

While this characterization is hostile, and a trifle overdrawn, it is essentially true. This method is used not only with individuals but also with corporations, communities, factions, parties. Some men resent it, resent it bitterly. They object being exploited as horrible examples. Therefore, Roosevelt has some bitter enemies.

Roosevelt is shallow. In his private career he touched American life at the point of the New York "Four Hundred," and the other point of the lawless western frontier. Neither gives any true idea of American character and American aspirations. Neither is in tune with the great heart-beat of the nation. Roosevelt comprehends broadly human characteristics common to all men, civilized or savage, but he does not understand the distinctive characteristics and aspirations that have made America what it is.

He sees only the surface of things. Regulation of trusts, combinations, corporations, tariff, taxation, depend upon individuals doing good or doing ill. "Good trusts" cannot do harm; "bad trusts" must be restrained. Roosevelt has no comprehension of institutional wrong; no idea that there is an institutional and a democratic side to problems confronting the Republic.

As he sees it, some beneficent political giant must rule over men, as little children, and see that they deport themselves seemingly. If

they err, he must punish them individually. Benign autocracy, the big stick, the criminal courts, these are the only instruments of correction, or redress. Taking this view Roosevelt threatens to make absolutely useless all trust and corporation-restraining laws by making it necessary to prove a combination a "bad" combination before its acts can be declared unlawful. The very gist of the Northern Securities decision was that combination restraining competition was illegal per se.

No hypocrite is Roosevelt. Armored in an impenetrable shell of self-conceit, no action of his own could appear to him other than praiseworthy. He has done and received praise for many things he has denounced most bitterly in others, yet one who knows Roosevelt would no more call him a hypocrite than he would call Oliver Cromwell a hypocrite. He simply can't see himself.

Roosevelt is inconstant. Necessarily he must remain popular if he would carry out his plans. With shifting winds of public opinion, and changing public conviction, Roosevelt must appear to veer. He must be found upon the popular side. We find him denouncing muckrakers as scarcely less bad than public plunderers. Immediately afterward he is officially at the head of the pack in full cry after the quarry. Soon he is the original "muck-raker"—the man "who turned on the light." Roosevelt referred evidently to "muck-raking" by others. For years he consistently denounced attacks upon wealthy corporations or

individuals, as promoted by ignorance, jealousy, envy. All at once he becomes generalissimo of the attacking party. One may imagine the seriousness of the attack.

"The people who do harm in the end," says Roosevelt, "are not the wrong-doers whom all execrate; but they are the men who do not do quite as much wrong, but who are applauded instead of being execrated."

Demagogy is one of Roosevelt's striking characteristics. He has played upon every string of passion and prejudice to further his own ends. Roosevelt knows, as few men in history have known, how to play effectively upon these passions and prejudices. A few years ago those who objected to the abuse of the injunction were "geological survivals," "not in sympathy with men of good minds nor of sound morality." Yet Roosevelt is sending special messages to Congress urging legislation to meet this very abuse. Roosevelt knows how necessary it is that one should lead the chase if he would direct it. He therefore becomes leader of the most popular public movements in order to direct them into his own safe harbor.

For Roosevelt is a reactionary. No prominent American since Hamilton has set his face with such determination toward the setting sun for political inspiration. His ideals in government are monarchical ideals. Centralization; unlimited power in the executive; commingling of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the same hands—the hands of

the executive; imperialism, militarism, caste, aristocracy. With Roosevelt the powers of the President are "unqualified," plenary, unlimited. As he views it, the "executive must possess the executive and magisterial attributes of the people and the people retain no undelegated attributes nor passive sovereignties." At least his practice has so assumed, although possibly he would not make such definite claim.

He would not change the constitution. Elihu Root, the strategist of the administration, and other interests, has pointed out a better way. "Sooner or later constructions of the constitution will be found to place the power where it will be exercised, in the hands of the national government." With Roosevelt the government is synonymous with the executive. Roosevelt's problem has been to justify this construction, to obtain acquiescence in exertion by the executive of arbitrary power. America's impatience, its love of short cuts to results, have aided him mightily.

Do the people want railway rate regulation? Place the power to regulate in the hands of the President. Incorporate railways under Federal law. Unused reserve power in the hands of the state is the obstacle to solving this problem.

People want tariff reduction? Certainly! Support the President in making "agreements" with foreign executives. It eliminates the necessity for legislative action; eliminates Senate confirmation of treaties. "Agreements" may

not be known to the constitution, but they are assumed to be within the sovereign implied powers of the President.

Do we want a canal? Support the President in seizing the territory for a site and give him authority to construct it according to his own sweet will.

Would you regulate trusts? Incorporate them under Federal law; give them into the power of the President.

Do you want forests and mines conserved? The President will look after them. His bureau will take control.

Is freedom from spoils desirable? Eliminate the Senate; require it to approve as a matter of course all the President's appointments. He alone can be trusted to handle patronage honorably. Let him enforce or suspend the civil service laws at will.

Would you have Cuba orderly and happy? The President will seize it and rule it through an imperial pro-consul.

You would have Santo Domingo behave itself? Certainly. The President will take it over through an "agreement" of his naval officer and will administer it through his personal representatives.

The Philippines? Why the President of the United States, and the emperor of the Philippines, is making of them a heaven on earth in accordance with the imperial will. The weightiest man in the administration says so. Philippine subjects of His Majesty are contented and happy.

Currency? Finance? Banking? The President is looking after them.

Wrong-doing by corporation heads? President Roosevelt will see that they are punished.

There is but one answer to every inquiry; one solution for every problem—more power for the Federal government—the President. It is the same old tune with variations. Whatever may be present or absent in President Roosevelt's recommendations, one is sure this thing is not overlooked—more power for the President.

And the newspaper clique shout "amen!" Citizens, feel happy. It is so nice to have all of our burdens, troubles, problems and perplexities supported by such willing shoulders.

Already has been gathered by this method colossal powers and prerogatives in the hands of the President. He has made the House of Representatives a mere tool, bargaining with its dictator for legislation which the President desires. Roosevelt overshadows Senate and courts. No man nor institution can set bounds to his activities. All this has been done on the plea of protecting popular interests. Roosevelt has so skilfully maneuvered in each case as to impress the unthinking public with the idea that anybody opposing the grant of additional executive powers is in league with "predatory" interests to defeat reform and permit the despoiling of the people. Roosevelt's newspaper clique and cowardly self-seeking politicians in and out of Congress make such a plan possible. Roosevelt believes that if the

people think they are getting what they want, they are indifferent as to the means employed in getting it.

State integrity is the stronghold which must be taken and destroyed before this invasion of centralization can finally succeed. As long as the reserved powers of the state remain unabsorbed by the implied powers of the Federal government the centralizing campaign will not have reached the ambitious goal of its promoters.

This government was grafted upon a foundation of sovereign states. Colonial fathers knew that these states as republics could best meet and solve local and internal problems and dangers. But they would be insecure against external attack by larger and stronger bodies. This danger was more imminent then than it is to-day. No republic on a large scale had theretofore been successful. But one plan promised permanence—small individual states with power over local internal affairs; a general government looking after external interests and interstate relations. At all events, with the states firmly determined to retain their individuality, it was the only practicable plan. This plan was tried. It has succeeded for more than a century. Hamilton tried to destroy it by centralization. He failed. Roosevelt is repeating the assault.

Stealthily Chief Justice Marshall absorbed power for the Federal government. Implied powers and general welfare meant more than all the rest of the constitution. The law

against impairment of contracts by legislation covered a multitude of grabs. But the process was slow. The executive methods of Roosevelt work more quickly. Since the Spanish war this invasion has made more progress than it had made in the previous one hundred years. Carried to its logical conclusion it will make the states as Hamilton would have made them, mere administrative departments of the Federal government. Then power will flow from the center outward, rather than from the members toward the center. Add to this Roosevelt's assumed right of adopting policies not passed upon, or disapproved, at the polls, and the executive becomes supreme.

In the carrying out of this campaign, the states must be discredited. Perplexing problems are to be met. Shackled by the power of the Federal courts, the states have failed to solve these problems. If a state strikes a trust, the courts find such action unconstitutional. "Grab" has been given other shields in the prohibitions against taking property without just compensation and without due process of law. Strange uses are made of constitutional clauses intended to guard individual rights. Railway rates are lowered by state laws. It is found that the legislatures have exceeded their powers.

At every state line, in every state capital, have Federal courts built forts in which predatory interests, state-attacked, may find sanctuary.

Shackle a man's feet and tie his hands, and

nobody will expect from him a wonderful exhibition of prowess in either fighting or running. States just as fully shackled fail to protect their citizens from the powers that prey. Hamiltonian theorists, Roosevelt the loudest, cry failure of state government. The public sees the failure and is impressed. It overlooks the shackles.

Corporation, trust, transportation problems have not been solved by the states. Therefore must Federal authorities take full control. Clamorous campaigns are conducted; impressive Federal statutes signed; respectable bureaus installed; dramatic prosecutions are begun. Wonders have been done by the Federal government where the states have failed. Certainly, the voters will give the President power.

This is the crucial issue now in the Republic. It overshadows all other issues, for it means life or death. Only by giving citizens full and intimate control of local governmental functions can we build up or maintain a strong, healthy, intelligent citizenship. Without a strong, healthy, intelligent citizenship, no republic can endure. Power in the hands of the central government in a country like this is necessarily out of the control of the mass of citizens. It is too remote. Roosevelt's policy in this regard, if successful, means death to the Republic.

Better all the force and violence of the petty South American states than the orderly death of a centralized empire. One means life, hope,

progress; the other, decay, retrogression, dissolution. Division into small communities seems nature's way of keeping civilization sufficiently fluid for progress. But one nation on earth has defied death and time. It is a non-military, decentralized nation. Its people are no more intelligent, its officers no more virtuous than those of other nations.

Friends of the Republic must save the states for local control, for local self-government, if to do so they shall destroy the Federal court system below the Supreme Court and relegate their jurisdiction to the courts of the several states. They must save the states if to do so the Supreme Court itself shall be restrained upon vital issues by an overruling popular vote giving laws constitutional sanction. They must save the state if to do so the executive must be denied all participation in legislation. When local self-government of the most ample sort is made impracticable, our democratic Republic will have become a thing of history. Better to solve trust, railway and corporation problems by confining corporations absolutely to the states creating them, than to run the risk of state destruction by centralization of power over them.

Huge size is Roosevelt's idea of greatness. If to huge size you add great physical prowess you have reached his national ideal. He would have an empire expanding over the earth by the strength of good right arm. A nation of great breeders and great fighting men is to him the nation's truly great. With guns,

ships, and fighting men, it must grimly, resistlessly, relentlessly, pursue its career, chastizing to its own standards of holiness weaker nations which may come in its path, scattering its spawn over the earth. It must be a dull, beneficent, fecund giant who insists that even pigmies shall be cast in the same mold. The serene, self-contained service of such a country as Switzerland fails to arouse Roosevelt enthusiasm.

Roosevelt would not have the overmastering empire of his dreams regard in the least different races, different environment, different conditions. All must accept the same standards and forms of government, or turn the business of government over to the predominant giant nation.

Since Roosevelt's idea is growth in size and a conquering progress over the earth, he would have such internal organization as best to support such an ideal. Government must be so planned as to be most efficient in aggression. Centralization is necessary to aggressive military efficiency. Roosevelt would have centralization. As instrument he would have great armies of regular soldiers, carefully trained as were the Roman legions. Great navies must bear his flag. Patient toilers he must have who murmur not against the weight of this crushing load, for it is all for the nation's glory. Subject nations must cheerfully bend their necks for the yoke for as it is righteous that the great should rule over them, it is also righteous that they should submit.

As Roosevelt sees it government is a thing handed down from a governing class to a governed class. The quality of the government depends entirely upon the wisdom and good intentions of the rulers. They are to say what is best for the governed. Therefore the need of centralization, the unhampered executive will. His power must not be circumscribed. Especially must he be free to override laws so as to meet properly what look like emergencies to him.

Such a plan of government falls naturally into the bureaucratic form. Commissioners responsible only to the executive become the best means of carrying out his will. If the executive could attend to all details himself, there would be no need of the commissions, but even Roosevelt finds this trying.

Once launched, these bureaus naturally expand and absorb. Instead of being instruments of administration, they become seats of power. Growing like a tree, by concentric outside rings, they tend, like the overgrown Linden, to rot at the heart. Then they become most important in protecting from the misguided vagaries of citizens the institutions they started out to control in the interests of citizens. Leagues of red tape wound about every problem, protect like an armor from outer pressure. Finally the executive on the one side becomes as powerless as the people on the other. Special interests, bureau protected, grow in rank luxuriance. Only the man with a sword keen enough to rip away the

husks of red tape can get to the heart of the difficulty. It is a most excellent way of mumifying government. How many thousands of devoted men have sacrificed themselves vainly beating against the immovable Russian bureaucracy?

Roosevelt is doing much to realize this ideal. He has made most wonderful progress in the creation of commissions (bureaus). He has the big navy of his dreams. The army may easily come. Imperialistic expansion is well under way. We have had a colonial empire governed by the President as autocrat—actually if not nominally. The personal government by executive will is now enjoyed. Later will come the bureau power, the principle of which we have accepted. Then will come government by bureaus with the executive when weak a convenient figurehead, when strong an irresponsible autocrat.

In his short lease of power President Roosevelt cannot bring about the flowering of such a system. He can only plant the seeds and see that they take firm root.

President Roosevelt has emphasized the need of strong citizenship. His bureaucratic policies are the best possible instruments for its destruction. Take away power from the states and you necessarily remove political problems from popular control. They lose interest in the state for it cannot help them. It means nothing to them. Soon they find that they cannot control their general government, and they lose interest in that. If cared for at

all it is cared for as "the little father" which will provide.

Removed from the life-giving touch of citizen control, the bureaucratic central government rots from within. Afterward comes general decay and national death. When the citizen's power of resistance was destroyed all was lost. It remained only to ring the death knell.

If denied participation in legislation, as the President must be denied, if we are to set bounds to expanding executive power, Roosevelt would have made a good President. He is an efficient executive. If kept within the bounds of the constitution, permitted mere advisory suggestion and passive disapproval of legislation, Roosevelt would not have been a bad executive. But his effort to control legislation and court decision and make the executive the whole government, has produced in him a most sinister and dangerous President. Much legislation has been forced through by Roosevelt. Hundreds of tons of bureau reports have been turned out. But there has been no great accomplishment and none is promised. Achievement has been most meagre. No striking progress has been made in transportation, trust or taxation problems. He has adopted but one vital policy of beneficent promise—the conserving to the people of their natural resources in mines, forests, and streams. No more important policy could be adopted. While Roosevelt did not originate

this policy his adoption of it should be granted full meed of praise.

As an agitator Roosevelt has done some good work. Appealing to the popular imagination as he does, he has popularized the ideas of bolder men of greater penetration and enterprise. The very hubbub he has raised has kept these problems up for public discussion. Some truth has been found in spite of Roosevelt. Predatory wealth is less respectable than it was ten years ago. But Roosevelt might have done vastly greater service in this regard. His pathological partiality for Delphic ambiguity has served to cloud almost every issue he has touched. Truth has been obscured in a cloud of dust. The public mind is confused. Few can now separate the vital from the ephemeral, the wheat from the chaff. Some of the most uncompromising reactionaries and some of the most pronounced radicals are shoulder to shoulder with Roosevelt claiming him as their champion. But Roosevelt's service as an agitator is slight indeed as compared with the harm he has done in perverting democratic ideals and centralizing governmental power. Through him the people of the United States have not only tolerated but accepted and applauded a government as personal as that of a Czar.

Roosevelt's place in history is difficult to forecast. A scrub oak immediately in front of us may overtop in our vision the lofty but distant mountain peak. Roosevelt's size cannot be determined finally until he moves farther

away. Certainly he will grow smaller with the lapse of time. Whether he will shrink into a mere scrub-oak of statesmanship is still an open question.

As we view it, his future size will depend upon the future course of the Republic. This none but a prophet can foresee. Centuries are but years in the nation's life. A presidential term but the episode of a fortnight. What it may have accomplished no man can say in advance. But the seed for the future harvest may be sown in a day. More than that—a death germ may be planted in a moment. What moment is beyond our ken. Seeds of the white death lie dormant in many a robust bosom, unsuspected for years. It took Rome fourteen hundred years to disintegrate after the beginning of the end.

If this nation should become a great imperialistic military power, inspiring admiration by its splendor and fear by its momentary strength; if after a hectic feverish course of apparent brilliancy, should ensue the palsied inefficiency of bureaucracy, with the inevitable death and disintegration, some future Gibbon, telling some future people, lusty in the strength of young manhood, the story of its rise and fall, would designate the time of the Spanish war as the day upon which the seeds of the white death had been sown. Theodore Roosevelt would be written down as the President who had seen to it that these seeds had taken root. And Roosevelt would be remembered.

"First freedom and then glory; when that fails, wealth, vice, corruption, barbarism at last."

Roosevelt would come in the beginning of the epoch of glory.

On the other hand, should the bright sunlight and pure air of life-giving freedom strengthen our Republic to throw off the menace of this white death—destroy this cankering germ which imperial ambition has planted in its bosom; if defying time, our Republic should live a democratic sanctuary through the ages, then the period of Roosevelt will be but a feverish, unsubstantial dream. He shall then be counted as one of the evanescent, inconsequent incidents of our national life.

But one enigma will stand through time and eternity:—why democrats devoted to the Republic could have come to regard Roosevelt as their champion.

THE END.

BOOKS YOU MUST READ SOONER OR LATER

Lost in the Mammoth Cave

By D. RILEY GUERNSEY.

Decorated cloth, 12mo. Illustrated.

Price, \$1.50.

A tale which a Jules Verne might envy from his own vantage ground. Imagine the possibilities for a story which are conjured up by the thought of a party of brainy men and women lost in the Mammoth Cave!

A prominent reviewer says:

"This ought to be an immensely popular book. There are no idle moments from cover to cover, and it is one which the reader will not think of laying aside until he has read every word."

Under the Darkness of the Night

A Tale of West Indian Insurrection.

By ELLEN CHAZAL CHAPEAU.

Cloth, 12mo. Attractively Produced.

Price, \$1.00.

The scenes of this story are laid in Ste. Domingue from 1792-93. It is a most timely book, written by one whose life has been passed among West Indians, and who can read the African character with surprising skill and accuracy. A wonderful picture of tropical life, brilliantly depicted.

Broadway Publishing Company,
835 Broadway, New York.

BOOKS YOU MUST READ SOONER OR LATER

GREY DAWN REFLECTIONS

BY VIRGINIA BEALE LECKIE



This clever Washington girl has come close to writing the wittiest and brightest book of epigrams that has appeared in this epigram-mad age. A few samples:

A friend lies for—an enemy about—and a wife with—you.

If your grandfather made it in pigs you have a perfect right to look haughty when pork is served.

A married woman's troubled look at 8 A. M. is not so much due to worrying "if" as to "how" he will come home.

The majority of women lay the first misstep to Cupid; some to the man; but it is a fact, if open to criticism, that curiosity and the opportunity are often to blame.

Printed on grey antique paper. Cover in grey, red, green and gold. Marginal decorations in color. Frontis medallion portrait of author in red, sepia and gold. Post-paid, \$1.00.

 What daintier holiday gift for your HIM or HER?

BROADWAY PUBLISHING CO.

835 BROADWAY, NEW YORK

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

Los Angeles

This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.

LD-
URL

REC'D LD-URL
MAY 3 1983
APR 19 1983

REC'D LD-URL

ORION
APR 25 '81
APR 29 1991

QWIL JAN 4 03 1983
REC'D GL



3 1158 00836 3920

K1A

